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Abstract
The creative component of the thesis consists of a novel entitled Mrs Engels.  Mrs 
Engels is a first-person narrative from the perspective of Lizzie Burns, the Irish 
lover of the Communist leader Friedrich Engels.  The action of the novel is 
focused on the years 1870-72 when Lizzie and Friedrich move from Manchester 
to London in order to be close to the Marx’s and the active international 
Communist scene there.
The critical component consists of an essay entitled ‘Illusions of Truth’.  ‘Illusions 
of Truth’ is a meditation on some of the questions raised when we speak of the 
category of ‘historical fiction’.  It  is a response to the fact that, often, discussions 
of historical fiction view ‘the past’ as textual and therefore to some degree 
unknowable, while taking for granted the knowability of ‘the present’.  In other 
words, in order to assert the textuality  of the past, many discussions of historical 
fiction juxtapose it to an immediately  knowable present, sometimes called ‘direct’ 
or ‘present experience’.  But is it true that the present is a more solid, knowable 
form of human experience than the past?  Is direct engagement with reality even 
possible?  Does the present exist at all, except as an historical fiction?  The essay 
uses the theory of Michel Foucault, specifically his ‘archaeological’ and 
‘genealogical’ approaches to history, as lenses through which to examine these 
questions.  Grouping its analyses around the larger themes of time, space and 
truth, it considers whether anything in human experience can, in fact, be present 
and non-historical (and therefore entirely knowable and true).  Can conscious 
human experience be anything other than historical and fictional?  If indeed it 
cannot, is ‘historical fiction’ as a separate literary classification sustainable?
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INOVEL EXTRACT
5
Note
The full text of Mrs Engels has three parts and runs to 105,000 words.  The extract 
presented here is the first  part, around 46,500 words.  The contents page of the 
novel (with the original page numbers) has been included to give an idea of the 
work’s overall length and structure. 
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PHASE THE NOW
 
1870
9
September
I 
Fair Warning
No one understands men better than the women they  don’t marry, and my own 
opinion—beknown only  to God—is that the difference between one man and 
another doesn’t  amount to much.  It’s no matter what  line he’s in or which ideas 
he follows, whether he is sweet-tempered or ready-witted, a dab at one business or 
the next, for there isn’t so much in any of that, and you won’t find a man that 
hasn’t something against him.  What matters over and above the contents of his 
character—what makes the difference between sad and happy straits for she who 
must put her life into his keeping—is the mint that jingles in his pockets.  In the 
final reckoning, the good and bad comes to an even naught, and the only  thing left 
to recommend him is his money.
Young lasses yet afflicted with strong feeling and seeking a likely  subject 
for a tender passion will say  that money  has no place in their thoughts.  They 
make exceptions of themselves and pass on good matches, for they believe that 
you must  feel a thing, and that  this thing can be pure only  if it’s a poor figure it’s 
felt  for.  To such lasses I says: take warning.   This is a changing world, we don’t 
know today  what’ll happen tomorrow, and the man you go with will decide where 
you’re put, whether it’s on the top or on the bottom or where.  The fine feelings 
love will bring won’t match the volume of problems a pauper will create.  Odds 
are, the handsome fella you go spooney on will turn out  to be a bad bargain, 
white-livered and empty of morals; the gospel-grinder is sure to have his own 
blameworthy past and will drag you to the dogs; the flash charmer will come to 
act the tightwad, insisting you live on naught a year; the clever wit will loiter 
away his hours believing others must  provide his income, and the happiness you 
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anticipated will never turn into happiness enjoyed; there’ll always be something 
wanting.  
Better—the only honest way—is to put away your hopes of private feeling 
and search out the company of a man with means, a man who knows the value of 
brass and is easy enough with it.  Make your worth felt to him, woo his protection 
as he woos your affections, in the good way of business, and the reward will be 
comfort and ease, and there’s naught low or small in that.  Is it of any 
consequence that he isn’t a looker, or a rare mind, or a fancy poet, as long as he’s 
his own man and is improving you?  
This must be calculated on.
Love is a bygone idea; centuries worn.  There’s things we can go without, 
and love is among them, bread and a warm hearth are not.  Is it any  wonder 
there’s heaps of ladies, real ladies, biding to marry the first decent man who offers 
them five hundred a year?  Aye, young flowers, don’t be left behind on the used-
up shelf.  If you must  yearn for things, let those things be feelings, and let your 
yearning be done in a First-Class carriage like this one rather than in one of those 
reeking compartments down back, where you’ll be on your feet all day and 
exposed to winds and forever stunned by the difficulty of your life.  Establish 
yourself in a decent situation and put away what you can, that, please God, one 
day you may need no man’s help.  Take it and be content, then you’ll journey 
well.  
II 
On the Threshold
And there’s no doubting this carriage is high class.  The wood and the brass and 
the velvet and the trimmings: I see it in bright perspective, and though we’ve been 
sat here since early morning, my mind has been so far away, up  in the clouds 
gathering wool, it’s like I’m noticing it now for the first time; a sudden letting in 
of daylight.  I reach out to stroke the plush of the drapes.  Tickle the fringe of the 
lace doilies.  Rub the polished rail.  I twist my boot into the thick meat of the 
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carpet.  I crane my  neck to look at the other passengers, so hushed and nice-
minded and well got up.  None of this is imagination.  It is real.  It has passed into 
my hands and I can put a price on it all.
Across the table, on the sofa he shares with his books and papers, Frederick 
cuts his usual figure: face and fingernails scrubbed to a shine, hair parted in a 
manly fashion, an upright pose, feet planted and knees wide, snake pushed down 
one leg of his breeches; a right gorger.  He fidgets round and tries to throw off my 
gander.  
‘All fine with you, Lizzie?’ he says.  
‘Oh grand,’ I says, though I’m slow to take my eyes away.  I can’t see the 
crime in it, a lady taking a moment to admire.  
‘Lizzie, bitter,’ he says, rustling his newspaper, and slapping it out, and 
lifting it up to hide himself, ‘I’m trying to read.’  
I click my tongue off the roof of my mouth and turn to look out the window. 
For him, naught in the world has worth unless it’s written down.
Outside, the country is speeding by, wind and steam, yet not fast enough for 
my liking.  The further we get away, and the further again, the better.  
I forbade anyone from coming to the station to see us off, for I didn’t want 
any scenes, but of course Lydia, the rag-arse, disobeyed me.  
‘Don’t let it change you,’ she said, gripping my hand and casting anxious 
glances up at the train as if it  were a beast about  to swallow me.  ‘Find a friend 
as’ll listen to you and don’t be on your own.  It’s no fine thing to be alone.’  
We embraced and she cried.  I squeezed her arm and fixed the hair under her 
bonnet and told her she was a good friend, the best.  
‘Find your people, Lizzie,’ she said then through her tears.  ‘I’m told St 
Giles is where they be.  St Giles, do you hear?’  
I sat backways in the carriage so I could leave the place looking at it.  To go 
from a familiar thing, however rough-cut, is a matter for nerves, and I suppose 
that’s why so many people don’t move.  Manchester: leastwise they know the run 
of it.
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At Euston, Frederick stands on the platform, waist-deep in smoke and soot, and 
takes it all in: heaves it up his nose and sucks it through his teeth and swallows it 
down as if all these years in Manchester have weakened his bellows and London 
is the only cure.  Around him, around us, a mampus of folk, mixed as to their 
kind.  Men and men and men and men, and here more men hung off by ladies 
dressed to death and ladies in near dishabbilly  and ladies in everything between. 
By the pillar, an officer in boots.  Over there under the hoarding, a line of shoe-
blacks.  A pair of news vendors.  An Italian grinding tunes from a barrel-organ. 
And passing by now—charging through with sticks and big airs—a tribe of 
moneymen in toppers and showy chains, chased at heel by beggar boys so 
begrimed it’s impossible to tell if they’re Christians or niggers or what.
I stop one of the railway porters and ask him to tell me what time it says on 
the station wall.  
‘Ma’am?’ he says, unsure whether I’m playing a rig, for the clock is large 
and plain for all except  the stone-blind to read.  ‘That there says a quarter past two 
o’clock.’  
I nod him my thanks.  He bides for the penny.  I wave him away; a tone 
won’t win any favours from me.  
‘On time,’ I call to Frederick.  And then again to be heard over the music 
and the patter and the tramp of boots on the pavement: ‘I says we’re right on 
time.’  
Frederick takes his watch from his fob and holds it up  to the clock, makes 
sure the one isn’t fibbing to the other.  ‘So it seems,’ he says.  
I push through to stand in front of him, my arms folded against him.  ‘Now 
don’t go being slippery, Frederick, and remember what you said.  You said if there 
were no delays we’d be able to go and see the house today.  If we got here before 
three, you said, we wouldn’t have to put it off till tomorrow.’  
He drops his watch back in and wrestles his hands into his gloves.  ‘We’ll 
see.’
We bide in the waiting room for our bags to be loaded onto the cab, then we 
bide in the weather for them to be removed to a second cab, on account of the 
lame nag that’s preventing the first  from moving off.  These added minutes spent 
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in the strangeness of this strange place—a smell of drains just like Manchester, 
only with a special whack to it—has given me a sick headache and has me 
wanting, more than ever, to get to the new house.  To close the doors and be safe 
behind my own walls.  I become impatient.  I huff and stamp my foot.  And by the 
time we climb up and are on our way, my tongue is aflame with speeches, even 
though I’ve promised not to bring them out again.  
‘Frederick,’ I says.  The bump and jolt of the wheels makes my voice 
tremble.  ‘Frederick?’  
He sighs.  ‘What is it?’  
‘My love, forgive me if I my insistence bores you, but still I don’t 
understand why we must stop with the Marxes.  If our house is ready, why don’t 
we go there direct and move ourselves in?  Then we could see Jenny and Karl at 
our leisure, when we’re right and settled.’  
He lets loose another sigh.  Crosses his leg over and lands a sharp elbow on 
the windowsill.  ‘Really, Lizzie, I cannot discuss this with you again.’  
‘I just don’t see the need, that’s all.  Causing trouble for Jenny, when our 
house is there, biding to be walked into.’  
‘For blazing sake, Lizzie, you know well it was Jenny’s idea to have us for 
these few days.  She desires us there so we can make the final arrangements 
together.  Besides, it’s too late to change the plans.  We’ve been kindly invited, 
we’ve accepted the kind invitation, and that, if you’ll be so kind, is the end of it.’
And though it feels to me like the depths of unkindness, I know this must 
indeed be the end.  When a man’s mind is set, there’s rot-all you can say to change 
its direction. 
I turn to watch out the window.  Soon the giant station hotels give way to 
workshops and warehouses; now to rows of brick and stone; now to terraces and 
park.   Like Manchester, the whole of human history is here, only more of it.   I 
make to point something out to Frederick—the door of a house on a better kind of 
street—but he’s not looking.  He’s quiet in his chair.  Like a statue he sits stock-
still, his gaze on his lap, his mouth pulled down.  
‘A penny for your thoughts,’ I says.  
‘What’s that?’ he says, blinking at me like a dazed child.  
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‘You looked a hundred miles away.  Were you thinking anything?’  
‘Nine, nine,’ he brings a fist  to his mouth and clears his throat, ‘I wasn’t 
thinking anything.  Nothing at all.’  
He says this, and of course I ought to credit it, but his face and manner go 
for so much; I can tell he’s lying.  He’s thinking about her, and it makes me sad 
and envious to know it.  Spoken or unspoken, she hangs there between us; an 
atmosphere.  
I arrange the cuffs on my wrists till I’m able to look at  him again.  When I 
do, I can tell he has noticed a hurt in me, though I’m sure he doesn’t know what’s 
caused it.  He brightens, his mood freshens and he speaks in the tone of a man 
who wants to make up for he doesn’t know what.  
‘I have always thought it interesting,’ he says, bringing his face close to the 
glass and squinting through it, ‘I’ve always thought it interesting that the English 
divide their buildings perpendicularly  into houses, whereas we Germans divide 
them horizontally into apartments.’  
I shrug to tell him I’ve never thought to think about it.  
‘In England,’ he goes on, ‘every man is master of his hall and stairs and 
chambers, whereas back home we are obliged to use the hall and stairs in 
common.  I believe it is just as Karl says: the possession of an entire house is 
desired in this country  because it draws a circle round the family  and hearth.  This 
is mine.  This is where I keep my joys and my sorrows, and you shan’t touch it. 
Which is a natural feeling, I suppose.  I dare say  universal.  But it is stronger here, 
much stronger, than it is in the Fatherland.’  
I make a face—‘Is that so?’—and pull the window down to let the breeze in. 
Don’t I deserve to have some days that aren’t about her?
The cab stops outside a detached house of fair style: three up and one down, a 
good-sized area, a flower garden and a porch.  That they live bigger than their 
means—that they  live at the rate of knots and don’t use their allowance wise—
isn’t a surprise to me.  Even so, I feel called on to speak.
‘It won’t be long now before they have us cleaned out.’  
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I take the cabby’s hand and kick my  skirts out so I can land my foot without 
stepping on my hem.  I’ve bare touched down before the door of the house flies 
open and two dogs come surging out with Tussy close on their tails: ‘There you 
are!’  
The larger of the dogs runs to Frederick and puts his paws up on his good 
waistcoat.  Frederick bends and allows himself to be licked on the cheek and the 
ear.  For a man so neat he has a queer love for what roots and roves.  The other 
dog, the ratty-looking one, comes to make circles around me.  I stand frozen while 
it sniffs at my privy parts.  
‘Don’t be frightened,’ Frederick laughs.  ‘He’s harmless.’  
I give him a look that says I’ll scream and make an episode if it’s the only 
way.  
Snorting, he takes the animal by the collar and shoos it off.  ‘Come on, 
Whiskey, come away from that mean woman.’  
Tussy kisses Frederick on the lips and tells him he’s late getting to London, 
twenty  years late.  He laughs and says something in the German, and she tosses 
her head and speaks back to him in the same, and between them now they release 
a mighty  flow of language, one so foreign that, if you were to judge from their 
faces and features only, you wouldn’t know what they were feeling.  
When their business is done, Tussy comes and wraps herself round me, 
making me feel the child, for she’s taller than me now and has a bust bigger.  ‘At 
last you’re here, Aunt Lizzie, at last.’  
‘Tussy, my sweet darling, let me see you.’  I hold her out and look her up 
and down.  She has her hair in braids and a jewel at the neck and a dress that 
shows a new slightness of waist.  Only a year since her last visit to Manchester—
what a prime and drunken affair that was!—and yet, from the look of her, it’d be 
easy to believe thrice that time has hurtled away.  Fifteen and out of her age, never 
to be a child again; it’d break your heart.  
‘You’ve grown all out of knowledge,’ I says.  
‘Have I?’ she says, and does a twirl, and curtsies.  She sticks out her tongue 
and winks as she rises from the dip.  
16
I swat her on the arm with my glove.  ‘You’re getting more and more like 
your father.’  
‘You mean, more like a Jewess?’
I laugh.  She hasn’t lost her mouth.  ‘Mind your father doesn’t hear you 
saying such things.’  
Frederick instructs the cabby to take our belongings inside, suitcases first, 
boxes and gifts last.  Tussy takes my arm and walks me up the path to the porch.  
‘I have missed you so, Aunt Lizzie.’  
‘And I’ve missed you, child.’  
‘And now, finally, we get to be neighbours.’  
‘Aye, it’s been a long time coming.’  
‘You know, it’s only twenty-two minutes away.  Your new house, from here. 
I’ve been there often and have counted the distance.  Door to door, twenty-two 
minutes on foot.’  
‘Is that all?  A mere a hop and a skip.’  
‘We shall do all sorts together, shan’t we Aunt Lizzie?’  
‘There’ll be time for it all.  We’ll not lack for things to do, nor time to do 
them in.’ 
The rest of them are stood in the hall passage; the family display.  Mother, 
father and eldest daughter, biding to bask in the honour they  know we must feel to 
be connected with them.  Frederick walks in and is greeted by more of the 
German, and more again till the air is full of it.  I leave them to have their minute. 
Lingering on the matting, I marvel at the tree they have in a tub on the porch.  
‘A tree,’ I says, ‘in a tub.’  I tug on Tussy’s sleeve.  ‘I wouldn’t  let that grow 
any further or it’ll burst out.’  
Giving vent to a howl of laughter, Tussy pulls me up the step  and presents 
me as the ringmaster presents his lioness: hip  cocked back, arms stretched out, 
fingers twinkling, a giant grin.  Young Janey comes forward first and she’s a 
winsome sight to see.  It’s a beauty that might need a little bringing about, true, 
but it’s a beauty  all the same, and I wouldn’t  take it  from her.  Next comes Karl, 
his whiskers like bramble on my face, his lips like dried-out sausage.  
‘Well coming, Lizzie,’ he says.  
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And final now, Jenny herself.  The changes in her face speak to how long 
it’s been.  Five or six years, by my count, though she looks to have been drawn 
out by a decade and more.  Well settled, she is now, into the autumn of her time. 
‘Welcome to our home, Lizzie,’ she says with a bit too much energy. 
‘Welcome to London.’ 
I offer a grateful smile and now blush at the falseness of it.  We’re not used 
to playing this visiting game with each other.  For some reason or another, I 
always decided to stay at home when Frederick took his trips to the capital; 
likewise Jenny never joined Karl or Tussy on their visits to Manchester, and no 
one ever seemed to wonder at it, no excuses were given for us, our absences were 
taken to be the normal and wanted way, which I suppose they were. 
‘And Laura?’ I says in case I forget to mention her later and am judged 
thoughtless for it.  ‘Are there tidings from Laura?’  
‘Safe,’ Jenny says, ‘They have moved from Paris to Bordeaux. They will be 
safe there.’  
I open to inquire further but she grips my arm to say there’ll be plenty of 
time for that, I’m not to worry, now is a moment for reunion and celebration.   
Behind us, Karl and Frederick start a scuffle over who ought pay off the 
cabby, as if it made a piddle of difference on earth which pocket it came from: 
isn’t it all water from the same fountain?  Jenny can’t help but to get involved, and 
I’m glad of the free moment to take off my bonnet and have a proper look.  The 
hall, I see, is papered gay.  There’s a table with pottery animals and a bust.  A 
mirror and a line of pictures, and in every wall a door.  The carpet is rich and 
unworn and goes up  to the first landing and into the beyonds.  The bannisters are 
painted three coats of white.
Once the cabby has been dealt  with, Jenny sends the men into the parlour 
and out of the way.  She smiles a moment through the silence and now she says, 
‘Nim?’ only the once and bare over her breath, almost a sigh.  
Miraculous-like the maid comes up from the kitchen.  She’s wearing a 
simple dress and a white cap and apron.  I’ve heard so much about her, how good 
she’s supposed to be to look at, I’m relieved to see she’s plainer in true life.  Fine 
bones, to be sure, but the work tells upon her.  
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‘Nim, the cases, please,’ says Jenny.  She whispers it, as if the giving of 
orders hurts her and must be made soft.  ‘Into the guestrooms.  Thank you.’  
Nim nods at her mistress and, as she passes, gives me another as a greeting. 
I step aside to give her way, but not so far that I can’t measure her up.
Her nose doesn’t reach my shoulder!
The sight of her knocks me out of myself, for when a figure has been made 
famous to you—when she’s been talked about till her name sounds louder in your 
ears than Jehovah’s—you expect her to tower over and be massive, and yet here 
she is now, a tiny  thing.  As I watch her go up  the stairs I’m left in no doubt as to 
the solidness of her frame, and her limberness—she manages to haul two burdens 
at a time and not be tripped by the dogs whirling about her—but there’s no getting 
clear of the fact that, God bless her, she’s but a pip.  If you didn’t  keep an eye on 
her you’d lose her.  
‘Oh and Nim,’ says Jenny when the maid is already gone round the bend of 
the stairs, ‘When you’re done with that we’ll have some refreshments in the 
parlour.’  Jenny now turns to me and makes a gesture to indicate that it’s a relief to 
be rid of ugly tasks.  She takes the bonnet out of my hand and leaves it down on 
the table.  ‘Come,’ she says and puts me on her arm and walks me off for the tour.
I count a parlour, a morning room, a conservatory, a cellar, five bedrooms, 
three cats and two birds.  
Says Jenny: ‘It is indeed a princely  dwelling compared with the holes we 
have lived in before.  In fact, to my mind it  is far too large and expensive a house. 
I am forever telling Karl we ought to move, that we live too grandly for our 
circumstances.  I for my part wouldn’t care a damn about living in Whitechapel. 
But he will not hear of it.  He thinks the house is the one means by which the 
Girls can make connections and relationships that can assure them a future.’  She 
unfurls a finger and makes circles in the air with it.  ‘Surrounded as we are by 
doctors and lawyers.’  The shape of her mouth is supposed to tell me that such 
people are a necessary unpleasantness to her, like the stink of the slop  pail. 
Pondering a moment, she lets the face fall away.  ‘But I dare say  Karl is right.  A 
purely  proletarian set-up would be unsuitable now, however fine it would be if we 
were alone, just the two of us, or if the Girls were boys.’
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We’ve stopped outside Karl’s study.  By  the way she puzzles at the half-
open door, I can tell she’s queasy about whether to venture in or to pass over it. 
Shamming ignorance of her unease, I unhitch myself and go through.  
‘It might look like a mess,’ she says, following after me, ‘But it has its own 
peculiar method.’  
I make my way to a clearing on the rug, a small circle of carpet bordered by 
piles of books and papers.  
‘It may not be immediately evident but this room is actually  the brightest 
and airiest in the house.’  She picks her way through and draws the curtain back. 
‘The Heath right there.  The air the best in London.  One has only  to leave the 
windows open a moment and that cigar smell is killed.’ 
I’m close enough to the chimney piece to have a proper gander at the things 
littered on it: the matches, the tobacco boxes, the paperweights, the portraits of 
Jenny and the Girls.  
‘Look, here’s yours,’ she says, pointing at the picture of Frederick.  
On the way back out, I take the liberty to push in a file that looks ready to 
topple from the bookcase.  
‘He calls them his slaves,’ says Jenny, meaning the books.  
Back downstairs a tray  had been made ready in the parlour.  Nim stands beside it, 
biding our wishes.  Frederick and Karl have already been served liberal shorts of 
gin.  
‘Lizzie, what shall it be, tea or coffee?’ says Jenny.  
‘Whatever you’re having yourself,’ I says.  
‘What do you say to coffee?’  
‘Nay, I won’t have coffee, but thank you.’  
‘Tea, then.’  
‘Not much up for tea either, you’re very kind.’  
Karl slaps his thigh and gives out  a good-humoured roar.  ‘Can’t you see it’s 
a drink the woman wants!’  
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The colour runs up Jenny’s neck.  She lets out a little laugh, glances at the 
clock and now down at her hem.  ‘A drink, Lizzie?’  
‘Aye, I’ll have a nip, if it’s going.’  To put me into the spirits.
Nim comes to me with a half-measure.  She refuses me her eyes when she 
hands me the glass; keeps them low on the floor.  
‘Thanks, Nim,’ I says, loud and clear so I’m heard.  ‘You’re awful good.’  
Her mouth twitches.  Someone coughs.  She scuttles back to the tray  and 
sets about readying the Girls’ tea.  Sat in the chair closest to her is Frederick.  I 
watch for his behaviour, but, in actual fact, he bare notices her.  More than that, he 
ignores her.  I’d even say rude, if I didn’t know Frederick to be so particular about 
his graces.  
From his royal spot on the settee, Karl proposes us.  ‘To Frederick and 
Lizzie,’ he says.  ‘After the darkness of Manchester, may you find happiness and 
rest here in London.’  
Tussy rummages in a drawer and comes out with two wrapped gifts. 
Frederick is served first: a red neckerchief.  He ties it on and marches up and 
down and gives a blast of the Marseillaise, and everyone laughs and claps.  Mine 
is a jewellery box, and inside, lying on a bed of velvet, a silver thimble and a pin 
with a bit of thread already fed into it.  I hold up  the needle between my  fingers, 
and they all brim over.  
Says Karl between his guffaws: ‘The revolutionary finally settles down to 
her fancywork!’  
I make as if to pour my  drink into the thimble.  ‘It’ll come in handy  for 
measuring my poteen.’  And that—easy as falling off a chair—brings the house 
down.
When the laughter drains, the room settles into a tired silence.  The tick of 
the clock.  The sucking at glasses.  
‘Uncle Frederick,’ says Janey after a time, ‘Have you finished your history 
of Ireland?’  
This gets Tussy excited.  ‘Oh yes, Uncle Angel, when do we get to read it?’  
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‘Oh, oh,’ says Frederick, trifling with a corner of his jacket and frowning, 
‘Thank you for your interest, my dear children, but I’m afraid I’ve been distracted 
of late.  It’s all about France now.’  
‘Hmm,’ gurgles Karl, ‘Indeed.  And speaking of that damned place, we need 
to take a clear position on the situation.  Our initial support of Prussia is proving 
quite an embarrassment—’  
‘Karl, please,’ Jenny interrupts.  ‘Can’t you leave this outside talk until you 
are actually outside?’  
Karl puts his hands up in surrender.  
Tussy giggles.  
Jenny catches my eye and gestures at the tray.  ‘Lizzie, there is some tart 
here,’ she says.  ‘But if you are hungry for something more filling I could have 
Nim fix you up some cold cuts.’  
I shake my head, perhaps a little too fierce.  ‘Please don’t go to any trouble. 
We ate on the train.’  
Frederick, always liable for a man-faint if he doesn’t have his in-betweens, 
looks about to contradict me, but he sees the arrangement of my face and checks 
himself.  ‘I fear Lizzie is getting restless.  She is anxious to see the house.  I 
promised to bring her to see it today.’  He looks at Karl, as if begging leave.  
Karl waves a woman’s wave.  ‘Go on, Frederick.  Show Lizzie your new 
home.  We’ll have time to catch up later.’
While I’m putting my  coat and bonnet back on, Jenny tells me what she’s 
done to the house.  She calls my attention to certain arrangements and wonders if 
I’d like them altered.  
‘When I see them, I’ll tell you, Jenny,’ I says.  ‘You’ll be the first to know.’
The air outside runs into me, a respite.  I wouldn’t mind walking the twenty-
two minutes.  ‘Will we foot it?’ I says, thinking Frederick is beside me, but when I 
turn I see he’s clean gone.  ‘Frederick?’  
Of a sudden, I feel him behind me, and then I see only black.  
‘This way it will be an even bigger surprise!’ he says, bringing forth more 
laughter and clapping from the family gathered on the threshold, and though I 
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notice I’m allowing it to happen, I do say to myself, I says, ‘Can’t I just see the 
blessed thing?  Must it be one of their games?’  
He’s gone and put his new neckerchief over my face as a blindfold.  
III
A Resting Place
A donkey’s age, it  takes him, to get the wretched thing off.  Two, four, six taps of 
my boot and still he’s behind me, fighting with the knot.  
‘What’s keeping you?’ I says.  
‘Patience, Lizzie,’ he says, and I know it’d be no use telling him again, at 
this late stage, that his time in Manchester has turned him into a northern 
stumpole.  
I feel him wiggle his finger underneath the neckerchief; now I hear him bite 
into it and grind it between his ivories.  The cotton presses tight against my nose, 
which confirms my suspicion that it’s not new, this rag.  It’s one of the old ones 
from the Club, still smelling of cigars and bear’s grease.  
With a last wet groan, he gets it free.  A curved terrace of houses—dream 
palaces—unrolls itself in front of me.  
‘Primrose Hill,’ he says and turns me round to face the hill of grass that rises 
out of the ground where the terrace ends on the opposite side of the road.  
‘Are those sheep?’ I says.  
‘And this one’—he turns to me again, this time to meet a giant face of 
plaster and brick—‘is ours.’  
I have to creak my  neck back to see to the top  of it.  The brightness of the 
day gleams up its windows.  Three floors.  Iron railings.  An area.  A basement.  
‘Well?’ he says.  
My heart feels faint, which can happen when you make the acquaintance of 
a real future to replace the what-might-be.  
‘Have you nothing to say?  Hot and cold water all the way up!’  
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Dazed by light feeling, I clutch at my throat and dither about stepping over 
the door-sill.  ‘Bless and save us, Frederick, I don’t know.  It’s awful grand.’
As I make my way  around—the green room already  filled with flower and plant, 
the laundry  room fit for an army, the cloak room with hooks for a hundred, the 
cellar bigger than the one I myself was reared in—I can’t help holding onto the 
walls and the tables to keep myself on end.  I keep expecting a steadying hand 
from Frederick but it  doesn’t  come.  Something isn’t right with him.  A flash 
temper has come over him.  When I point something out, he makes sure to bid his 
interest the other way.  When I open a door on the left, he opens one on the right. 
When I go to look at a wardrobe, he goes to look at a lamp.  
‘She’s done a fine job,’ I says, ‘A fine job.’  
But he doesn’t answer.  It must  be that  he doesn’t like what she’s done. 
And, to be honest, I can see why.
In her book, there’s naught worse than a new house that looks new.  She said 
so just now before we left. ‘So long as the thirst for novelty exists independently 
of all aesthetic considerations,’ she went, ‘the aim of Manchester and Sheffield 
and Birmingham will be to produce objects which shall always appear new.  And, 
Lizzie, is there anything more depressing than that lustre of newness?’  
And I went to myself, ‘Aye, the smell of decay,’ and took her attitude for a 
London attitude, set square against sense.  But what  do I know?  She’s the 
Baroness and knows better about the styles.  (How she ended up with a cruster 
like Karl is anyone’s wager.  He must have thought that, because her family  tree 
has as many rebels as it  does nobles, she’d have the right opinions about 
everything, already there in her blood.  And she must have thought, well, she must 
have thought he was intellectual and clever, the kind of man they’ll write books 
about, which only goes to show how little true wisdom there is in young hearts.) 
In decorating the house what she’s tried to do, she said, is dull the pristine 
down and make the place appear longer stood.  I said I hope this doesn’t mean 
there’ll be dirt and dust round the place for I don’t allow it.  She said it isn’t  a 
question of cleanliness but of heritage, for olden things can be clean without  being 
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shiny.  I said what would I be wanting with heritage?  All I need is a couple of 
chairs that stand upright.  She said it  isn’t hard to give the idea of it, even in recent 
and modest houses, by  buying the necessaries at auctions, such as movables of no 
modern date and art that’s been handled and weathered—and chipped, I see now
—and by scattering it all about so that two new things don’t rub against  each other 
and make a glare.  
‘Ending the tyranny of novelty,’ is what she called it.  
‘Spending other people’s brass,’ is what I call it, but  only to myself.  And 
it’s unkind even to think it, for I wouldn’t  have been able to do it—the ridding, the 
arranging, the fixing up—without her.  
She’s thought of everything.  She’s had the right  fringe put on the draping, 
and the right frills put on the fringe.  The few bits we sent down ourselves, she’s 
had cushioned over.  She’s had the stores stocked.  She’s had calling cards made; 
there they are stacked on the hall table.  Everything: first to last, start to end.  
‘We went a finger over budget,’ she said.  ‘But I believe quality  speaks for 
itself.’  
And the rooms do indeed speak.  They speak dark and solemn.  For in 
buying the movables—and by  all accounts she bid like a mad-body after most of 
it—she thought not about what was handsome but about what was suitable to 
Frederick’s position.  And seeing them now, these hulks of bookcases and cabinets 
and desks and tables, I find myself wondering has she mistaken him, all along, for 
a priest.
‘Are you thinking what I’m thinking, Frederick?‘ I says, as a way of 
cheering him.  
But there’s no humour to be had from him.  He’s gone like a brick.  Closed 
like a door.  He shrugs and disappears upstairs.  I follow him up and find him on 
the first landing, glowering down at his feet.  
‘Lizzie, I wish you to favour me by  showing me which room you would like 
to have as your boudoir.  I’d rather have these matters decided for me.’  
‘All right,’ I says, hardening myself now, ‘If that’s how you want it.’
Jenny has put a cabinet and a toilette table in the large room on the first 
floor, so she probable expects me to claim that one, on account of its size and 
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distance from the road.  As it happens, I decide to leave that one to Frederick—it’s 
closer to his study after all—and I choose instead the smaller one on the top  floor. 
Here I’ll have to share a landing with the maids, and it  means an extra flight of 
steps up and down, and I know people will think I picked it out of a fear of taking 
too much.  But the truth is I much prefer it.  They’ve thought to put a fireplace all 
the way up here.   And there’s a nice washstand and a hip bath and the flowers on 
the wall are so brilliant and colourful they look fresh picked.  And the bed: the bed 
has golden posts and an eiderdown quilt, and the way it’s sitting in the light, it’s 
like God shining down over it.  I sit on it and know immediate that it’s mine. 
‘That’s it  with the moving,’ it  makes me think.  ‘We’ll not budge from here.  This 
is the place that’ll see me out.  This is the bed that on my last day  I won’t get up 
from.’
‘This is the one I want,’ I says.  
‘Fine,’ he says and goes to look out the little window that  gives over garden 
and the roofs of the other houses.  
There’s a terrible quiet.  His back is a wall blocking out the lovely  bit of 
sun, and the shiver in his limbs makes me think he’s going to put his fist out 
through the glass.  For what reason, it’s beyond me to say.  
‘Is everything all right with you, Frederick?’  
Slow, he turns round.  He doesn’t look at me and heeds only the wringing of 
his hands.  ‘I am sorry, Lizzie’—he shakes his head in a sorrowful way—‘I am 
sorry  that you judge the house only awful grand.  You were expecting something 
more.  But this will have to do for now.’  
Alarmed, I open to object.  I rise to a stand and reach out an arm, but he 
raises to halt me.  
‘It is already  a risk to take a house this size.  A bigger one would be a push 
too far.  Besides, I have already given my word on it.  It has been signed to us for 
three and half years.’  
‘Frederick, I—’  
‘Jenny and Karl are waiting for our impressions.  They, and especially 
Jenny, have put a great deal of time and effort into finding us this house and 
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making it  fit to occupy.  So what you are going to do, Lizzie, what I’m telling you 
to do, is to pretend that you think it more, much more, than awful grand.’  
A rising laugh makes me push my face into my sleeve.  As foreigners go, 
he’s unusual fast at picking things up.  His problem—the big noke—is letting go 
when a thing is long done and over.  There’s times he’ll get his whole fist round a 
delicate article and won’t drop it till he’s wrung all the sense out of it, and he 
holds it still, even if he knows it’s crushed or broke or anyhows beyond repair.  
‘Lizzie, are you laughing?’  
Laughter that’s sealed only builds and I think I might burst.  I plonk back 
down on the bed and lift my shirts up to hide my face.  
‘Ya, you are laughing!  What is so funny?  Stop it!  I said, stop it!’  
‘Oh Frederick,’ I says, and it all spills out of me, a peel, ‘Come here and let 
me kiss you.’  
He lumbers over, confounded, and sits beside me.  
‘Frederick,’ I says, ‘The house is much more than grand.  It’s an effin 
castle!’  
He frowns and studies my face for any hidden rigs.  
‘I’m serious!  I just adore it!’  
He grins and lets out a sigh and takes tight of me and kisses me.  And for a 
moment, now, it almost doesn’t  matter that  it’s her he really wants to be holding, 
that it’s her he’d prefer as his princess, for she isn’t here and won’t be coming 
back, and I’m the closest thing to her he can ever hope to get.  
‘You know something?’ he says then, tears in his eyes but laughing too. 
‘The Queen was right.’  
‘The Queen?  About what?’  
‘About the Irish.’  
‘And what, pray tell, did the old hooer say about us?’  
‘That you’re an abominable people, none in the world better at causing 
distress.’
IV 
27
Cross to Bear
Imprisoned, they have us, in their hospitality.  Already here two days longer than 
planned.  It’s my own fault  for not  being firmer with Frederick.  I ought kick up 
more of a row.  
At first  I was worried about getting in the way.  I didn’t want to walk in on 
top of anyone or trespass on their time.  But, as it happens, I keep finding myself 
alone and lost and off the beaten course, in rooms that go into rooms, up and 
down and every which direction.  My heart  goes out to Jenny, having to govern 
such a monster, and I’ve come to admire her practice of going away to rest in case 
she might be tired later in the day, for I’ve learnt that a mere glance into the 
parlour is liable to dizzy you, for the depth.  It certain can’t be work  that drains 
her.  Since our arrival I haven’t caught her doing anything but make work with her 
queer times.  She has a joke: ‘Better a dry crust and manners at eight than fowl 
and vulgarity at five,’ but in actual fact she wouldn’t be content  with crusts at  any 
hour, and the maid is left bearing the brunt.  Boiling up and bringing in and 
fettling about, the little creature attends to all of their little wants, and she does it 
on her own, too, with no others to aid her (for it seems that with servants, if not 
with any other portion of life, Jenny knows how to make a saving).   
Ah, the poor wee puppet!  The petty  pocket!  The pigwidgeon!  Nim—I 
can’t deny  it!—has succeeded in fascinating my attention.  Despite my strict 
resolve to be cool in her company—‘Don’t notice her,’ I says to myself whenever 
she comes in—I always find myself flushed and susceptible.  Whether it be the 
quiet show she makes of her modesty, or the delicate manner with which she 
wields her influence, or her sad-sad-secret (now so-so-public) that cuts a perilous 
edge around her china figure; whatever it is, she absorbs me, and I’m fain to get 
her alone.  ‘I must  find a moment,’ I think.  ‘I must separate her and present 
myself proper to her.  I must hold out a hand.  I must get an idea.  What is the 
nature of your powers?  What do you do that makes the women bend to your will 
and the men so heated to mount you?’ 
My chance comes now.  The a.m. of another empty day.  Jenny  off for her 
nap.  The Men locked into the study upstairs.  The Girls gone to play shuttlecock 
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in the garden for want of something else going on.  I’m supposed to be watching 
them and learning what’s what, only I know my break when it  comes and make an 
excuse of my bladder.
I find her sat on a stool in front  of an open cupboard in the storeroom, 
drooped and snoring over a book that  lies on her lap.  Her dress is tucked up  and 
the laces of her boots are loosened.  She’s taking her two minutes, and I’m sorry 
to have come in on her.  
‘Can I help you, Mrs Burns?’ she says before I can steal away.  Her face is 
bleary but her voice is bright, not a hint of sleep in it.  
‘Oh, Nim, I—’ 
Apologise, is what I want to do, for barging in and robbing her leisure.  But 
more than that, I want to apologise for Frederick.  There’s no excuse for the 
shabby treatment he’s been giving her.  It’s as if he believes that by  overlooking 
her, by paying no regard to her, by passing orders for her through the rest  of us, 
he’ll convince us once and for all that she means naught to him, that not  even his 
words are worthy of her (when in fact there’s not a single word he speaks that 
doesn’t fly right at her, that  doesn’t explode about her like fireworks, that, in the 
noise and the bright light, doesn’t call to our minds that day some twenty years 
ago when her charms got such a hard handle on him that he decided the only 
means of release was to lift up her skirts and put his seed inside of her, not a 
single thought given to the harvest such behaving so unfortunate bears).  Aye, 
that’s what I want to do, apologise for all of Frederick’s behaving.  But instead I 
fumble with my tongue and shrink within myself and end up saying, ‘So how do 
you find it here?  Do you go much to the parks?’  
With red-shot eyes she pins me, and I hold her stare, and we stay like this 
for a time: two maids across a storeroom floor.  
At last she closes her book and stands.  ‘It’s nearly time for the picnic, Mrs 
Burns.’  She checks the floor around her and rummages in her pockets, looking to 
see if she’s dropped anything.   ‘We’re to gather in the parlour,’ she says.  And 
when she unbends and sees me still standing here: ‘Perhaps you’d be more 
comfortable waiting up there?’
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Spread out  on the couches, fidgeting and yawning and trying to ignore Karl’s 
pacing, we bide for Jenny.  After forever has passed, she swishes in and kisses the 
air about us, a hand busying itself with a button of her coat.
‘If we want to make the best of the afternoon we should set off immediately. 
It could be raining in an hour, and then we would have missed the fine spell, or?’  
Behind her, Karl widens his eyes and purses his lips as if to say, ‘Don’t look 
at me, I’ve had a lifetime of it.’  
Once outside the gate, Frederick and Karl stride ahead, arm in crook, their 
heads tilted close so as not to drop anything important between them.  The Girls 
hold hands and swing their arms like children; they each lead a dog by a strap. 
Jenny lets them gain a bit of distance before drawing me in and sallying forwards. 
Nim follows with the basket.  
‘Nothing extravagant,’ says Jenny.  ‘Just some roast veal, some bread and 
cheese, some ale.’  
I turn and smile a weak smile at  Nim, the tiny doll straining under the 
poundage.
The Men bide for us at the Heath’s edge.  Karl asks whether it’s a good idea 
to go to the usual spot, given the strong breeze.  ‘Would some place more 
sheltered be better?’  
Jenny suggests under one of the big oaks, and we agree.  Ohing and ahing 
like she’s just solved the National Debt, we agree.  And I, for one, must be careful 
of my mood.
We set off again.  The dogs are released onto the grass.  Tussy skips after 
them.  A sullen-looking Janey searches for flowers to press.  The trees are tossed. 
The wind is loud in the leaves.  The kites in the air fly slanted and set their owners 
straining.  Down in my bad lung there’s a pain.  Naught to fret over but there.  Too 
much fast air after these long days spent between the dust of the mattress and the 
smoke of the fireside.
‘Karl is so happy to have Frederick nearby again,’ says Jenny now.  ‘It  does 
me good to see him happy, he’s been so nervous of late.’  
‘I’m glad, Jenny.  That’s nice to hear.’  
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‘Of course, he hasn’t been alone.  My own hair is gone grey thinking about 
Laura in France.  Her second baby lost, and now pregnant again.  Caught up in 
this damned war.  It has us all hysterical.’  
‘You oughtn’t worry, Jenny.  Laura’ll be fine.  Doesn’t she have Paul to look 
after her?’  
‘Paul?’ she says, whipping a handkerchief from her sleeve and making a 
whisk of it at me, ‘Paul is French.  And a politics man.’
‘Mohme!’  Tussy is calling from about twenty yards.  ‘Mohme!  Mohme!’  
‘What is it?’ Jenny says without slowing her gait.  
Tussy runs to catch up  with us.  She comes round us and, walking 
backwards, her hem dancing around her boots and liable to trip her up, holds out a 
feather.  ‘Look what I found.  Which bird is it from, do you think?’  
Sighing, Jenny takes it and runs it through her fingers.  ‘A common 
magpie,’ she says and hands it back.  
Tussy looks at it a moment, disdainful, and drops it.  Wanders back onto the 
grass.
‘And it’s not only Laura,’ Jenny says when we’re out of ear-shot again, ‘I 
also worry for these two.  Look at Janey there and tell me she isn’t  radiant?  And 
Tussy, perhaps she even more so.  But I’m anxious.  I’m anxious that, for this 
same reason, they are all the more out of place and out of time.  And with the life 
we give them, how will they ever meet a good ordinary man?’  
‘How will any of us?’ I says.  
She squeezes my arm and grants me a smile.  ‘Oh Lizzie, you are funny. 
But perhaps I am not expressing myself well.  I speak of a subject it is hard for 
people who do not  have children themselves to understand.  A mother will look at 
her children and if she sees that one of them has already been denied the chance of 
a happy kind of life, she will naturally  worry  that  the others will go the same way. 
I know I sound like a philistine when I say it, Lizzie, but if they  could but find 
husbands, a German or even an Englishman if he had a solid position, and get 
themselves comfortably  settled; if they could do that, I wouldn’t mind my own 
losses so much.  The last thing I want is that they have the kind of life I have had. 
Often I think I would like to turn away from politics altogether, or at least be able 
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to look upon it  as a hobby to take up  and leave down as I please.  But  for us, 
Lizzie, it is a matter of life and death because for our husbands it is so, and I fear 
it has to be the same for our children.  This is our cross to bear.’ 
I say naught.  Thoughts and memories come vivid, of old desires and 
chances lost, and though there’s regret  in them, and mourning, it’s not unpleasant 
to have their company.  We walk on.  
‘But we must be optimistic, mustn’t we, Lizzie?  Rather than dwell, we 
must look forward to better things.  And I do think we are entering a new phase, a 
happier time for all of us.  Your move to London marks a change.  I believe great 
things will happen now that Frederick is here.  Karl has been so looking forward 
to it.’  
‘Frederick also.  He’s overjoyed to be out of that job.  Only a month 
wanting till he’s fifty, and he’s like a young drake again.’  
‘Ha!’ she hugs my shoulder, ‘And it is about time.  Frederick’s talents were 
wasted in that dusthole.  It  is true there was pleasure to be gained from taking 
money  out of the enemy’s pocket, draining it from the inside, so to speak, but 
enough is enough, the real work has to begin, and Frederick is essential to it.  He 
really is a genius.  Are you following his articles on the war?’
‘Not myself, nay.’  
‘Oh but you must, they  explain—’  She sucks in her breath.  ‘Oh I do 
apologise Lizzie, I wasn’t thinking.  I’ll read them to you one of these days.  Or 
better, I’ll have Nim do it.  She wouldn’t mind.  She likes to keep abreast.’
Up ahead, Frederick has stopped at a coster’s cart to buy ginger beer for the 
Girls.  I wish he wouldn’t.  I’ve seen it done in Manchester, the ginger boiled in 
the same copper that serves for washing, and it’s not healthful.  Jenny halts us in 
order to keep our distance from the others.  She bends down and picks some 
flowers from the verge.  
‘What are these?’ I says when she puts a posy in my buttonhole.  
‘Snow-in-the-summer,’ she says.  ‘It’s rare to see them still blooming this 
late.’  
‘They’re lovely,’ I says.  
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She gives a vague smile and, seeing that the others have moved off, starts us 
up once more.  ‘I realise I have been talking only of myself.’  
‘That’s all right, Jenny.’  
‘Well, I do not want to talk any more.  It is only  boring you and upsetting 
me.  And distracting us from the other matter.’  
The other matter is, of course, the house.  She reminds me that  the maid, 
Camilla Barton, is due to arrive in a fortnight’s time, and gives me advice on how 
to keep  her, which is harder than I might think, for things aren’t like they used to 
be, in sixty-eight and the crisis years, when the good families were letting go of 
their help and the registries were brimming with girls to be had for the asking and 
for a price much closer to their worth.  Nay, things have changed and a girl will 
walk if she finds a better situation, and it’s often not even the mistress’s fault, for 
it’s difficult to define in exact terms what’s owed a girl and what she herself owes, 
and not everyone can learn the art of leaving the servants alone.  
‘I recommend a second girl,’ she says.  ‘Frederick instructed me to find only 
the one, and I followed those instructions, but my true feeling is that you will need 
two.  Everything works better with two.  The girls are happier because they have 
company and get to sit down in the evening, and you are happier because the work 
can be divided out and gets done.  You do not want to be a slave with your apron 
never off.  London is your retirement.  If I could afford it, I would get another.’  
‘Can’t Nim manage?  Has she ever threatened to leave?’  
‘Nim?  Oh she’s different.  We’ve had her for so long she’s like family.’
In the distance, Karl beckons us to a tree where he thinks we ought lay  the 
picnic.  Jenny flutters her handkerchief in answer.  
‘Speaking of family, Lizzie, I would like to say something to you.’  
‘What’s on your mind, Jenny?’  
‘I’d like to clean the air.’  
‘Does it need cleaning?’  
‘About your sister.’  
The other matter.  The real matter.
‘Jenny, you don’t have to.  It’s not important.’  
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‘Nine, nine, it’s on my mind, Lizzie, and I’d like to say it out.’  She turns 
into the wind so the loose strands of her hair fly  back over her bonnet.  ‘Mary was 
your sister, Lizzie, and you loved her as any sister would and should, and I don’t 
think little of you for it.’  
‘And I’m glad for that Jenny.’  
‘You already know relations between her and I weren’t easy, and I’m not 
going to insult you by pretending otherwise now.’  
‘Well, we can’t get on with everyone.’  
‘But there are reasons, Lizzie, good reasons, I did not, as you say, get on 
with your sister, and I want to share some of those with you.  I want to tell my 
side.  Not to vindicate myself, you understand, or absolve myself of any 
wrongdoing, but  to let things out in the open, so we can be friends, you and I, 
honestly and truly.’  
I shake my  head and keep  my gaze on the path ahead.  ‘What’s past is past, 
Jenny.  What’s to be gained from walking back over it?  Mary  is gone, and what 
spite there was between you has gone to the grave with her.  There’s no point 
digging it out and giving it life again.’  
She tugs on my arm in an effort to turn my eyes towards her.  I don’t give 
into it.  ‘You are a good person, Lizzie, and I appreciate most deeply your trying 
to save me the pain.  But I must talk on it.  Otherwise it shall always be there, 
haunting me.  The only way to put a thing behind one is to put a name on it and to 
know it, or?’ 
She goes quiet, leaving just the wind in our ears, and it seems for a moment 
like her mind has countered itself and decided against naming or knowing 
anything, but the moment passes and she turns to me now, intent on my face.  
‘As you well know, Lizzie, anxieties and vexations are the lots of all 
political wives, but I can say with certainty that few are familiar with the misery 
and anger I have experienced over the years.  With Karl I have lived a gipsy life, 
forced from place to place, this country  to that.  I can barely remember a week 
when I did not have to struggle in some mean way to keep the family healthy and 
alive in the hovels our poverty  pressed us to live in.  I often went to pieces and 
saw Karl weep.  Many times I felt I could no longer keep my strength.  I became 
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an expert at composing begging letters.  I lost my looks.’  She wipes a hand across 
her cheek as if to remove the pits that the smallpox has left there.  ‘And through 
all of this, the only means, the only means I had of preventing a total collapse was 
the show of respectability I was able to maintain.  It  may sound silly  to you now, 
Lizzie, but I was young and I had certain ideas, and my  public face was all that 
kept them alive.  And when Frederick took up with Mary, it threatened to take 
away even that.’  She takes my hand from where it was warm in my skirt pockets, 
and she holds it.  ‘Did Mary speak to you of me?’  
‘Speak, nay.  She fumed.  Called you all sorts.  And she had some right, 
Jenny.  It was no business of yours what she and Frederick did.’  
‘Yes, I know, Lizzie.  And if it was only  that they  were not married, then it 
would not have been a problem.  Please, I am not a fanatic.  But the fact was, they 
were using each other.  Mary was using Frederick to get ahead.  And Frederick 
was using Mary to make a splash.  Nothing was real.  They were playing each 
other like a game, and that was all.  She took his money and gifts, and lived like a 
fine lady of society on the back of him.  And he showed her about like a prize.  He 
said it himself, she was his finger-up to his family and the whole blasted 
bourgeoisie, and it was clear they both enjoyed it a bit too much, she and he.  It 
was vulgar and intolerable, and it was doing no good for the Movement.  People, 
our comrades, were asking questions.  I remember hearing them wondering, out 
loud to each other, why such an intelligent man was involving himself with one of 
his workers.  They could accept he was a capitalist and a millocrat.  That was the 
family burden he had to carry.  But did he also have to behave like one?  He was 
taking advantage of his position.  He was no better than the other rich sons of 
Manchester who used the young girls of the proletariat for their pleasure. 
Frederick, they said, was an exploiter.  They thought he was exploiting the—’
She stops here.  She sees my  face and is clever enough to know she ought. 
She gives me back my hand and I put it  away again.  ‘Can you forgive me, 
Lizzie?  Do you think we can be friends?’  
I’m far from charmed.  It’s not in me to offer any softening words.  But nor 
do I push her to the apology she’s paining to reach.  At bottom she’s a good 
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woman.  Her affliction is only that she believes, still, that she has a right to be free 
from all that’s disagreeable.  ‘Of course,’ I says and touch her on the shoulder.  
She moves around to allow an embrace but, before anything can happen—
before I’m seen stood in this park in this woman’s arms—I come away  to help 
Nim with the final bit of carrying.  
‘Do you need a hand with that, Nim?’  
‘I can manage, thank you, Mrs Burns.’
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October
V 
Let Us Hear
I lie under, his whiskers like a broom of twigs and stinking of liquor, till I’ve 
come to terms with the dark and my situation in it.  ‘Angels of grace defend us,’ I 
says, ‘What bloody time is it?’  
Our first p.m. in the new house and Frederick went out to the Club to 
celebrate.  ‘Karl is insisting,’ he said.  ‘There are some people he wants me to 
meet.  I’ll be back before ten.’  At midnight and no sign of him, I went to bed. 
Alone among the unfamiliar walls, I slept in a state close to waking.  Now—some 
unholy hour—the weight of man collapses onto me.  When God wants to punish 
you, he answers your prayers.  
‘My Lizzichen,’ he moans, grappling for a grope through sheet and dress, 
‘Forgive me but I’m in need.’  
‘You rotten scoundrel,’ I says, using my  elbows against him, ‘Get you to 
your own chambers.’  
‘Come now, mine leebling, show some mercy.’  
‘I’ll show you more than mercy, Frederick Engels, now skedaddle.  Away 
with you.  Can’t I put my head down a minute?’
He kneels over me and, mocking-like, clasps his hands together as if to beg. 
‘Have pity on a rogue,’ he says, ‘Am I not good to you?’ he says, ‘Is a moment of 
comfort too much to ask?’ he says, and other such phrases that he thinks will 
wheedle him in.  
‘Mary Mother give me patience.’  I yank up the linen to stole myself. 
Knowing neither my own forces nor the degree of his impairment, this sends him 
rolling—thump!—onto the carpet.  I sit up and hold my breath.  Rain is falling 
outside and there’s a barking of animals off and yonder.  Bellows of laughter rise 
up from under the bed.  I fall back and sigh.
37
Boys kept like monks by their mothers go one of two ways: they turn 
womanly  or they  turn wild.  Frederick’s rearing among the Calvins—kept behind 
curtains drawn tight and doors too thick for the world’s vices to get  in—has done 
naught for him but disease his head with what it’s been deprived of, and now look 
at him: single-minded and seeing no ends that aren’t low.  He keeps pictures.  He 
makes foreign requests.  It’s not always the Council he runs off to.
After some scratching about and some fumbling, there’s a striking at lucifers 
and the lamp flares up.  I cover my eyes from the sudden light.  ‘Still in fit  shape, 
I think you’ll agree,’ he says.  I see, when I’ve come to terms with it, that he has 
his clothes off and is showing himself.  He clasps his hands behind his neck, 
which makes the skin run up over his bones and the hair jump out from under his 
arms.  He holds this pose as long as the lush in his veins allows it.  Now he 
wobbles and, giggling like a little girl, staggers over to lean on the wall.  The lamp 
shines hard against him.  
Growing up, no one sits down and tells you what  the man’s bit is going to 
look like.  Knowledge is got from the snatches you catch.  The hole in your 
father’s combinations.  The neighbour man washing at  the pump.  The surge in the 
gent’s breeches on the bus.  The Jew Beloff pissing in the bucket.  Frederick’s is 
like none of those.  In its vigours, it points up and a bit to the side.  Its cover goes 
all the way over the bell and bunches at  the end like a pastry twist.  Before he 
does anything, he spits on his hand and peels this back.  Then you know he’s right 
and ready.
Personal, I have my limits with it.  There’s things I’ll not be brought to do. 
I’ll maw it: no harm in that if he doesn’t shove too.  And I’ll let him turn me over: 
let go of your vanities and there’s pleasure to be got there.  But the hooer’s trick, 
that’s crossing the pale.  What’s the draw of an act so cruddy?  And what’s the 
purpose, anyhows, when the normal carriage road has been clear of courses these 
past twenty years?  ‘Keep dreaming, General,’ is what I says whenever he starts to 
rub up that way, ‘Not for love nor lush.’
Tonight, though, he wants the usual, and I don’t quarrel with that.  I bring 
my hands down his back and put them on his arse, his little arse that hasn’t 
dropped with the years but has stayed upwise and firm.  Where it meets the leg is 
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like the underneath of swollen mammies, and when he pushes, its sides dip in to 
make dishes smooth enough for your morning milk.  It turns heads, the round of it 
under his breeches.  I’ve seen it with my  own eyes.  When it’s late in the parlour 
and hot with bodies, and when he himself is sticky from all the hosting, he 
sometimes takes off his coat and turns to throw it somewhere; that’s when they 
nab their peek.  
He puts his arms behind my knees and bends my pins over them.  I know 
he’d like them hooked over his shoulders—my ankles clutching his neck, my toes 
taking hold of his hair so sleek, his whiskers tickling skin that usual only  feels the 
itch of a stocking—but I’m no longer the young thing I once was, and neither is 
he, though he likes to think his physical senses are as hale today as when he first 
fetched a lass.  
His eyes are open.  He doesn’t ever close them doing it.  He likes to pin you, 
pierce you through.  I swear with those eyes he’d stare into naught and find 
something.  Even when he’s lushed they  stay clear and bright, and seem to let you 
into his head, though this can only be a fancy, for afterwards there remains the 
mystery  of what he thinks when he gets on top of you, whether it’s dark or light or 
what.  
I begin to feel it, the quiver down in my cunny, but I’ve to conjure it up if I 
don’t want it to fade the last lick of oil in a lamp.  I help  it  with my hand like he 
himself has taught me—a French recipe—and I let out a gasp.  Reading this a 
sign, he comes down bricks on me.  
If he says anything now, dear Jesus, I’ll credit it. 
There’s never been anyone like him. 
It’s rare I sleep the whole night when he stays.  I go off easy  enough but am 
woken early by his kicking.  For some reason, I can’t bear to roll over and see him 
there grunting and happy.  There’s others, I’m sure, who lie and watch for the sun 
to rise up out of him.  He’ll not get that from me.  I stay with my back turned.
In actual fact I ought be up already, doing the round.  The maid doesn’t get 
here till Sunday  and I’ve to look after everything myself.  The pulling back of the 
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blinds and curtains.  The opening of the shutters.  The drawing up of the kitchen 
fire and the polishing of the range.  The checking of the boiler.  The putting on of 
the kettle.  The cleaning of the boots and the knives.  Then the other fires.  And 
the hearth rug.  And the grate.  Then the rubbing of the furniture.  Then the 
washing of the mantelpiece and ledges.  Then the dusting of the ornaments.  Then 
the scattering of the tea leaves and the sweeping of them up.  So many things, and 
for every one a thought.  So many thoughts at a time, for so many  things, it’s hard 
to know the ones you ought be hearkening to.  By  thinking you’re forever running 
behindhand you make things the master of you.  
The worst thing, though, will be the answering of the door.  I can already 
see it in their faces:  ‘Why  her?’  The butcher boy, the shop girl, the milkmaid, the 
grocer, the letter carrier:  ‘Can’t see what makes her stand out.’  Every day of 
every week, somebody, some way:  ‘If she can do it, any old beggar can.’  
I’ll try to turn blind from it.  I’ll pass them my coins and tell them my orders 
and make as if I’ve not remarked a thing.  But  afterwards, I know, I’ll be left  with 
something inside, a prickling feeling like a hair in my collar or a pea in my 
bodice; a reminder of the fact that, when it comes to my hike to the higher caste, 
there’s no getting away from the chance of it.  Would I know what I know, would 
I have done what I’ve done, would I be here today, swelling it  up, if I’d gone 
down different alleys, taken up with other souls? 
_________
Fortune first  spins her wheel in my favour in the summer of forty-two.  It’s the 
summer the wages are cut and the mills are turned out.  The summer the coalpits 
are shut and the boiler plugs are pulled and the workers gather and the riots flare 
and the soldiers march.  And while all this is happening I’m at home, locked into 
the basement with Mary.  Though I don’t know it yet, though it will take me time 
to understand, my being here, inside away from it all—my sitting it out—will be 
the chancest thing I ever do.
I want to join in.  There’s rebellion enough in my heart  to spark a hundred 
rallies.  But Mary has other plans for me.  
‘If you go out that door,’ she says, ‘you’ll not be getting back in.’  
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‘Well, maybe I won’t want to get back in.’  
‘You want to be a corner girl, is that it?  You want to be a loafer and a 
beggar till you die?  Go out there now and that’s what you’ll be, and that’s what 
you’ll stay.  If anyone from the mill sees you with that crowd, or even a girl who 
looks like you, you’ll have no hope of a situation when the mill opens again, no 
hope in hell.  And I’ll not support you.  I’m over with looking after you and being 
your mother.’  
She touches something with that, the proud bone in me.  With Mammy 
passed over, and now Daddy at the workhouse, I’ve come to depend on Mary for 
what I can’t beget on my own, and though I’m grateful for her good offices and 
will live to thank her for them, they come at a dear cost.
‘You want me to be a knobstick, is that it?  You’re telling me to break the 
strike?’  
‘I’m telling you to pull your weight.  When a girl gets to fifteen, she ought 
know how to walk for herself and not tug on other people’s sleeves.’  
‘The neighbours will make it hard for us.  They’ll shut us out.’  
‘Let the neighbours act for themselves.  They can throw stones at us, for all 
I’ll cry, as long as we can feed ourselves.’  
‘Who wants to work in the mill anyhows.  It’s the mill is keeping us down. 
It’s the mills that’s killing us.’  
‘Fine sentiments, sister lady, but I hate to tell you, it’s the clemming that’s 
killing you right now, and unless you find yourself a swell and marry up  quick, 
it’s the mill or a pauper’s grave for you.’
And true enough, it’s the hunger that eventual brings me round.  Weeks, the 
mills stay  closed, the Ermen & Engels the same as the rest, and without Mary’s 
wage, we’re brought to winking distance of the workhouse ourselves.  I feel I’d 
like to cry, only I don’t have the forces, and I know then I’m in the last ditch and 
sinking, for I’d like to and I can’t.  And in that moment I know that when the gates 
of the Ermen & Engels are thrown back, I’ll be there in the horde, elbowing and 
stepping on heads to get to the front.  
An animal, that’s what chance makes of me.
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On my first day, the girls are already  talking about the owner’s son.  ‘Soon he’ll 
be coming,’ they says to each other, for there isn’t much else to amuse them in the 
yard, ‘Soon he’ll be coming from Germany to learn the strings, and one day he’ll 
be the boss man himself.’  And they’re excited about this idea.  They can’t wait  to 
slap an eye on him, for they’ve heard he’s quite the looker.  
They  haven’t a good head between them.  Most of them are yet young like 
myself, some of them well under the age, and every morning that he doesn’t 
appear makes the next morning a thing for them to look forward to.  Me, I dread 
the next morning as a plague, for it only  promises more of the same: a job that 
lays you low and saps you.  And I can’t picture how the owner’s son, however 
dapper, could change it.
I’m unhappy, but more than that, I’m raging.  In the place bare a month and 
I’m already having urges.  To scream and shout.  To climb on top of the yard wall 
and from there to get onto the roof so there’d be no one in Manchester who didn’t 
hear me.  But  actual fact, I do what I’m told.  I stay  quiet, just as Mary has warned 
me, and don’t let tell of my affairs.  I keep my opinions and my illnesses hidden.  I 
put a rag over my mouth to keep  from coughing.  And I work hard, harder than 
I’ve ever worked at anything before, by putting my cholers into it. 
‘The strikes came at a good time,’ we’re told at assembly one morning, ‘The 
strikes came at a good time for you.’  The mill has bought new machines, the 
latest crop of mules that need but a fraction of the hands to work.  They  were 
planning to let go of the people they no longer needed, given the advances.  But—
luck and behold—the job was done for them, the troublemakers weeded out 
natural.  Leaving us, the new, leaner, better Ermen & Engels family to march with 
the banner.
Mary is thankful to be given one of the new mules.  I think better of 
reminding her of the people her mule are replacing, people she knew and declared 
to care for; or of the meanness of her new wage, lower than what they were giving 
her before.  I think better of it  because she knows these things well and is 
choosing not to give them their proper weight, for if she did, they’d crush her.  
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I’m to follow her on the floor, pick up the new ways, and then take over a 
mule of my own.  ‘Be fast,’ she says to me, ‘Be fast and you’ll be seen, and you’ll 
move up,’ for it’s a fine spinner she wants us to be, a spinner of the Diamond 
Thread, which she believes to be a situation that can’t be robbed by  the machines 
or by the children.  ‘If we don’t learn the fine spinning,’ she says, ‘We’ll go the 
same way as the men.  Out on our backs and not a situation in Manchester to be 
had.’  
Though it makes me bitter to do it, I give in and learn, and what I do well I 
try to do better and faster, for that’s the way to beat the weariness and to sleep at 
night.  I come early  and leave late.  I join in the talk in the yard.  I spend my 
Sundays with the girls in the halls and the fairs.  And when the time comes, in 
spite of myself, I have to own that he’s handsome.  
He holds himself slim and erect, and has a good forehead, and—still so 
young—all the colour is yet in his hair.  At assembly he talks quick and short, 
ashamed, it seems, about  the foreign in his patter.  He’s going to make a tour, he 
says, and he promises to get to know each and every one of us, which makes 
everybody  giddy.  Except Mary.  It makes her regular cross.  ‘When he comes,’ 
she says, ‘Keep at it and put on you don’t even see him.  The last thing he wants is 
a mill full of girls losing the run of themselves.’
Of course, it’s herself, then, who goes and loses herself entire.  
His laughter comes into the room before he does, and it’s catching.  ‘Lethal 
as the consumption,’ Mary will say later.  
‘My lucky  day!’ he belts from the doorway, stretching out his arms to get 
the full lung into it.  He looks around.  Even from a distance I can see his eyes 
take in the world and see to the bottom of things, and though he keeps his face, I 
know he’s disappointed by us.  Fine lookers between us, there aren’t  many. 
There’s only  Adele in the carding room, but she’s got  very thin and looks to be 
down with something serious.  And Maggie two rows up, I suppose, if that’s your 
dish of tea.
As he moves around, he waves his hand in front of his face to keep off the 
dust, and I’d like to tell him it’s a useless exercise, all that waving, for it only 
wafts the flyings in, but of course I keep my trap shut.  He’s nowhere near me yet 
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anyhows, and I don’t know if he’ll even get close, for time’s ticking on and work 
hasn’t been taken up proper, and he’s stopping at every  girl and asking them 
questions—about themselves and where they’re from and their work and how 
they’re finding it—and he doesn’t seem to be putting on, he appears sincere 
enough and waits for their answers, though the bulk of them can only stretch to a 
blush and a curtsy.  
Soon Mr Ermen loses patience and hurries him on—something about having 
to finish the tour before Christmas—and then all he can spare is a flash of his 
whites as he passes.  He doesn’t even stretch that far with me, but strolls by 
without so much as a glance.  I see his cheek out of the side of my eye: skin like 
the back of a babby.  He goes past Lydia, too, without a look, I’m glad to see. 
And Mary.  And soon all there’s left of him is his little arse, swaggering away out 
of our lives. 
Only what happens then is, he nigh on catches his side against a wheel. 
Mary rushes over to steady him, for she’s the closest.  She takes tight of his arm 
and pulls him away from the danger, and while he’s still reeling in his boots, 
heedless to what’s happening to him, she says to his face a curse in the Irish, 
something our mother used to say when we were being hazards to ourselves. 
The room catches its breath.  Speaking out of turn costs you sixpence of 
your wage, and that’s on an ordinary day.  Mr Ermen makes for Mary and looks 
ready  to handle her, but Frederick, now recovered, waves him away and tells him 
not to be so jumpy.  Can’t he see this woman has saved him from an injury? 
Then, God bless him, he asks her to repeat what she said, for he loves a joke.  
‘Let us hear it,’ he says.
She wipes her brow and looks about at all the faces, and in that moment I 
wish her looks were doing her better justice, for she’s recent taken on a touch of 
jaundice and isn’t as flush as God wants her.  
‘Come on, do share,’ he says, and folds his arms across like someone biding 
to be impressed.  
Mary coughs.  ‘It’s only something Mammy used to say  when we were 
little.’  
There’s a shuffle of feet as we prepare for the worst.  
44
‘Go on,’ he says, not annoyed but eager-like, fain to be on the inside of 
things.  
‘She used to say it  when she’d see us knocking over things,’ she says, and 
bites her lip and looks down.  
He waits for her to look up  again before addressing her.  ‘Your accent, 
young lady,’ he says, ‘is most  unusual,’ and he asks her where it’s from.  She says 
it’s from Manchester, like herself, but the Irish part.  Then he asks was it the Irish-
Celtic her mother spoke when she scolded her.  
She says, ‘Is that the old language you’d be referring to, Sir?’  
And he says he supposes it is.  
And she says, ‘Well then, aye, it was.’  
Then he asks does she speak the Irish-Celtic herself, and she says she does 
but only the few phrases she has.  And then he asks has she ever been to Ireland, 
and she says, ‘Nay, though I hope to go before it pleases God to call for me.’
There’s a tense air about the room.  He’s spent more time with Mary than 
anybody else, and in a manner more intimate than most would judge her worth. 
But it’s to get worse, for instead of calling it a day  and leaving it at  that; instead of 
being happy with saving her a fine and taking his leave, he puts a hand on her 
back and draws her out of her place, as if to make something special out of her, a 
fine example.  The two of them are standing apart now, Mr Ermen several paces 
back, and he begins to ask her about the firesome spirit of the Irish he’s heard so 
much talk of, and he wonders if it’s true that we’re more related in character to the 
Latins—to the French and the Italians and the like—and if, like them, we’re more 
interested in the body—the body!—than in the mind.  
There isn’t a sound in the room, and the heat makes it  all seem like a 
feversome dream, and Mary, I can see, is struggling to understand whether she’s 
being mocked, whether this foreigner is using her for his fun, and it’s all a trap, 
and these are the last agonies of her situation.  So what she does is, she hardens 
against the doubt and says the only  Italians she knows are the organ boys that 
come into the pub, and they’re only good for making a racket and slipping their 
dirties up your skirts, and she wouldn’t like to be put in a basket with them. 
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At this, he roars.  So shocked are we by its quickness and its power that at 
first we don’t understand it’s laughing he’s doing, and we’re relieved when we see 
that it is, and that it’s the good kind, not the sneering kind, and then we let 
ourselves do it  too.  For we can see he’s no longer behaving like one of them—
listening from across a fast river—but has dropped his distance and waded in, like 
a hunter that’s lost his fear.  His arm reaches further around Mary’s waist. 
‘Where would a man have to go in this town to meet a girl like you?’ 
I know now that a bold manner goes well with women and impresses men. 
I’ve seen it work a hundred times since.  But back then I think he’s gone too far, 
crossed over too quick.  It isn’t the species of thing a mill man ought say—though 
it is, I know, the truth of what they do without saying—and I’m not prepared for 
everybody  laughing, and Mr Ermen clapping his back and calling him a sly 
trickster, and the girls turning to measure their disbelief against each other, and 
Mary giving him a soft elbow and asking him, scut-like, what type of man he is at 
all.  Nay, I’m not prepared for any of it—the fainting and the adoration that no 
mortal body deserves—so when I see it, it sickens me. 
He takes to walking out with her, I believe, because she talks well and he enjoys 
hearkening to her.  And he keeps walking out with her, he doesn’t bore of it, I 
believe, because he doesn’t  understand her and wants desperate to understand her, 
for it promises so much.  
She likes to say  it’s because of her ankles.  They have a peculiar allure, she 
thinks, that he can’t get full of.  She takes to flashing them at  him in the yard. 
He’ll be up in the office looking down, and she’ll be walking with us and putting 
on not to notice anything but the ground in front, but then, easy as you please, not 
a whiff of warning, she’ll lift up  and step  one out from under the hem.  They 
aren’t bad as ankles go—of the two of us she has the better—and I’m sure they 
don’t put a damper on proceedings, I’m sure he likes them regular enough, but 
what really keeps him interested, I’m also sure, is her blather.
He’s like a young scholar trying to pull truth out of a foreign gospel.  If he 
learns to understand her, and to speak like her, he’ll know what it’s like to be her, 
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and by there to be poor.  Of course, what he’s chasing is a shadow down a 
passage, for you can’t learn that species of thing.  To have your wittals today and 
to know it doesn’t  depend on you whether you’ll have them tomorrow, that’s 
something you’ve either lived or you haven’t. 
‘What do you talk to him about?’ I says to her, for I want her to be ashamed, 
going around at night with the owner’s son.  
‘Oh everything,’ she says.  
‘Everything?’
‘My life.  His life.’ 
‘You’re telling him our affairs.’  
‘Arrah, don’t be at me, Lizzie.  He’s not like the others.  He wants to learn 
about how things are for us.  To help us.’  
‘Help?  Well, we know what that means.’  
‘It’s different.’  
‘Why is it different?  Why  would he want to help you?  Hasn’t he enough to 
be getting on with?  A mill to run.’  
‘He doesn’t like what he sees here, Lizzie.  In Manchester and thereabouts. 
He wants to understand it so he can change it.’  
‘He has ideas, all right, and for that he’s no different than any other man. 
You’ll be ruined.’
Listening to me, you’d think I’d become the eldest and she the youngest. 
The truth is I’m scared for her.  She’s gone deaf to her own advice.  Isn’t  it herself 
who says that the higher-ups only marry their own and if they want your time it’s 
only to lie down with you, and then only  for the thrill: it’s you who pays the final 
price?  Hasn’t she gone back on her own words?  It’s a part of Mary  I’m not 
patient with, this habit of not heeding herself, but I don’t punish her with it either, 
for she punishes herself enough on the days he doesn’t call.  
No doubt he goes with other women—he’s been seen wandering alone 
down the District—and the thought of it makes her suffer, deep  and miserable.  He 
stays away for weeks on end.  She sees him in the mill and pours all her hurt into 
her eyes, but he resists her willing and stays upstairs where he is.  Then when it 
suits him, he appears again, raps his ashplant on the door and goes to the end of 
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the passage to wait.  So strong is her wanting, she throws a shawl around her pain, 
and runs out.
‘What do you do when you go out with him?’  
‘I show him around.’  
‘Around where?  What’s there to be shown?’  
‘He wants to see where we live.’  
‘We?  We who?’  
‘We the Irish.  We the workers.’  
‘Jesus.’  
‘The Holy Name, Lizzie.’  
‘Well, he’s not coming in here, he’s not welcome.’  
‘He’ll want to come inside eventual.  And I’ll not stop him.  And you’ll not 
stop him neither.’
She enjoys her new position, any body  can see that.  It’s easy  to picture her 
leading him down the passages and into the courts, choosing the meanest of the 
doors to knock on, pointing out all the things that are filthy  and wrong, speaking 
to the bodies for him and getting them to show him their children, and their hips 
and their sores.  Oh aye, all that would come to her like breathing.  But what it 
takes a sister to see—and what I can’t keep my eyes off once I’ve seen it—is what 
she’s doing her best to hide:  her love illness.
For it’s ill she is.  Ill and pure struck-blind.  The moments when he needs 
her and wants her—‘Precious moments’ she calls them—these moments are when 
she’s fullest and happy, and she wishes them to go on and on into forever, for she 
doesn’t want to go back to being empty of him.  She wants him to be unable to do 
without her.  And he leads her to believe this is so.  Just by  looking at her a certain 
way he leads her down that lane—she herself tells me it’s all in his eyes—and she 
forgets her own person there, gets lost in the maze of his possibilities.
She falls, just as he does, for a promise.
Then comes the night he comes inside and stays for tea.  He brings pies and ale, 
too much for the three of us, so he orders the neighbours out from behind the 
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curtain and divides it all up.  I’m sure I’m not the only one thinking, ‘Who in 
God’s name does he think he is?’
He gets the good chair, and the best cup and plate, and a knife and a fork, 
and everybody watches how he uses them, on a pie.  No one dares talk, so he has 
to do the talking himself, though he leans on Mary for help, there being so much 
in what he says that’s hard to get.  He tells us many things, gossip  most of it, 
about the foremen in the mill and their romances, and the practical jokes he likes 
to play on Mr Ermen.  And a whole other heap, too, about growing up in Germany 
among the Calvins, and hating it because the Calvins credit that all time is God’s 
time and wasting a minute is a sin, and life isn’t meant for enjoying but for 
working only.  
As for working, he hates his situation at  the mill.  He hates the position it 
puts him in, up there on a pillar, for he’s happier down here with us lot.  But he 
judges it  good for himself also.  ‘Because Germans of my particular caste know 
too little of the real world.  It’s an education of sorts, and will do me good.’  
What he’s learnt so far—and he swears to learn more before he leaves for 
Germany again in a year’s time—is that the workers are more human in daily life, 
less grasping, than the philistines who employ  them, and that the philistines are 
interested only in money and how much it can buy them.  The least grasping of 
all, he thinks, are the Irish.  And, as far as he can see, they work just as well as the 
English.  
Says he: ‘It’s true that to become something skilled like a mechanic, the 
Irishman would have to take on English customs, and become more English, 
which would be a formidable task, for he’s grown up without civilisation, and is 
close to the nigger in this regard.  But for simpler work which asks for more 
strength than skill, the Irishman is just as good.’  
All this sort  of science, he talks, and more besides, but what’s stayed with 
me—what my mind lingers on oftenest—is what he says about the way  we talk. 
At this stage, we’ve all imbibed a fair amount, and most of the neighbours are 
already sleeping: Seamus is on the ground away from his straw, the children are in 
their different spots, only the wife Nan is still with us.  It’s late, and I’m trying to 
signal to Mary to put an end to it.  We all have work to get us up in the morning. 
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But she’ll not break in on him, not  in his stride, and what he’s saying is interesting 
to her, or so it seems from the way she has her chin in her hands and is staring at 
him, tranced.  
What he’s talking about is the old language.  He says he has heard it  spoken 
in the thickest of the slums, as if this is something to wonder at.  From there, he 
gets to talking about the English as it sounds in the Irish gob.  
‘I can read and understand twenty-five languages,’ he says.  ‘But I admit to 
being tested by the English spoken by you and your people.’  
Then he gets us to say a few things, and he laughs and repeats what we say, 
and then we laugh.  
‘Grand this and grand that,’ he says.  ‘Everything is always so splendid for 
you!  Through it all, you manage to stay so cheery and optimistic!’  
At this, Nan near on falls off her stool for the laughing.  ‘I’ll tell you 
something for naught, girls,’ she says, ‘These foreigners are shocking queer!’ 
 Then we all roll around, and Frederick does too, though he’s only  allowing 
himself to be taken along, for he doesn’t really know what we’re laughing at.  
Mary takes it on herself to let him in.  ‘For the Irish,’ she says, ‘Grand 
doesn’t mean more than middling.’  
Nan sees Frederick’s muddled arrangement.  ‘We’ll need something strong 
to get us through this,’ she says, and goes to get the bottle she keeps safe for the 
priest.  
Meantime, Mary goes over and sits down on his lap—right there in plain 
sight—and scratches his whiskers and plucks his cheek.  ‘Listen now, Foreign 
Man.  If a thing is grand, it’s holding together.  If a situation is grand, it’s 
tolerable good.  If a body is grand, she’s alive and likely to do.  No more and no 
less than that.’  
Nan can barely get the spirit into the glasses for all her snorting and 
shaking.  I’m just mortified and want the pageant to end so I can face the mill 
tomorrow with some of my honour intact.  Frederick, for his part, takes to 
pondering what he’s been told, and when he’s over with that, he looks about our 
little room.  
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‘And a house?’ he says, being the type who wants to know the in-and-out of 
things precise.  ‘If a house is grand?’  
Mary stops smiling then, and puts down playing with his necktie, and turns 
to us, and takes us in—stunned-like—as if remembering us from a distant past. 
And then she says, ‘If a house is grand, my  love, it comes with a rent that will 
leave you enough to go on.’  
_________
Now, awake, Frederick gets up and dodders about for his clothes.  He’s having 
another cock-stand.  I watch him muffle it into his breeches.  In his room he keeps 
a tin, lozenges meant for sustaining your piss and vinegar, though I can’t  see the 
use of them myself, it being a fine and thirsty animal God’s made of him.  
‘Are you well, Lizzie?’  
‘Well enough.’ 
He puts on his shirt, leaves it tucked out to hang over the stubborn article. 
‘I’ve missed the morning.  Why  didn’t you wake me?  I’ll have to skip my walk 
and work late to make up.  Can you bring my meals up?’  He picks up his shoes 
and puts his coat over his arm.  ‘Lizzie, did you hear me?’  
I nod.  I heard you.  
I put onto my side, haul the covers up.  ‘Frederick?’  
‘Ya?’  
‘Jenny thinks it’s a good idea to get another maid.’  
‘There’s one coming on Sunday.’  
‘Another one, I mean, over and above her.’  
‘Oh?  Jenny thinks so?  And what do you think?’  
‘I think it’d be a good way to get Pumps out of Manchester.’  
‘Pumps?’  
‘My niece.  Half-niece.  Thomas’s eldest.’  
‘Oh him.’  
‘Aye, him.  He has her in a bad way.  When she’s not locked at home 
looking after her nine brothers, she’s on a corner selling bloaters till all hours.  It’s 
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only a matter of time before she gets into trouble.  She could come down and help 
me here.  It’d be a chance for her.’  
‘Let me think about it.’  He goes for the door.  
‘Oh and Frederick?’  
‘What now?’  
‘Can you open the curtain before you go?’  
He looks at me like I’ve just asked to be fanned.
VI 
Capital
Not shy of the curtsies.  Round-boned.  Clean-cuffed.  Plainness of a good human 
sort.  Frederick sits her in the morning room and reads us through her character.  
‘It says here that you can read and write.  That will be helpful.  And you can 
milk a cow.  Interesting.  And make butter.  A country girl?’  
‘Devon, sir.’  
‘Oh and look, how about that!  You can do the scales on the piano.’  
Aye, with her feet.  Blindfolded. 
‘Listen here now Miss Barton,’ I says, ‘Do you know anything?’  
‘I beg your pardon, ma’am?’  
‘About keeping a house?’  
‘Well, as it says there—’  
‘I don’t care a whit for what it says on that bit  of paper, I want to you to use 
your voice and tell me out.  Can you cook?’  
‘I can.’  
‘Good.  Because it’s for the kitchen I want you.  My niece will be joining us 
in a few days, and she’ll look after the hearths and the upstairs.  You’re to tend to 
the cooking.’  
‘Aye, ma’am.’  
‘I don’t  know what you’re used to from your last  place but here there’ll be 
fish on Fridays.’  
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‘Course, ma’am.’  
‘You’re to keep the counters and pots clean, I won’t stand for mice.  And 
most important you’re to look after the kitchen store.  Groceries for the day, the 
week and the month are to be put in the book.  You must keep  a check on what’s 
lacking and you must do the writing yourself, do you hear?  I won’t do it  for you. 
I’ll count what comes in and you’ll cross it  off the list.  Not a penny  is to be spent 
that does not have my  approval.  Breakages must be mentioned within the day or 
they’ll be made good from your wages.’  
She nods a biddable nod.  
‘Now come with me and I’ll introduce you to the kitchen range.’
I lead her downstairs.  ‘Don’t be shy now.  Get familiar.’  
She makes her way around, opening into cupboards and checking for what 
she’ll need.  ‘Naught much to her,’ is what I think.  ‘Improvable,’ is what I think. 
‘She’ll do, she’ll do.’  But she has another think coming if she thinks I’m going to 
spend my days calling hoity up the stairs. 
Nim.  Skim.  Spin.  Spiv. 
‘Spiv,’ I says.  ‘We’re going to call you Spiv.’  
‘What’s Spiv?’  
‘It’s your name from now on.’  
‘What does it mean?’  
‘Naught only I like the ring of it.’ 
Once I’ve taken her on the full round, I go up  with his middle-p.m. cheese and 
beer.  I come in on him pacing.  He freezes and turns from where he’s stood, feet 
outspread in the centre of the carpet.  ‘Lizzie, I must ask you to knock.’  
‘Oh I would, Frederick, I would, only I’m holding this’—I nod down at my 
burden—‘And I would have kicked only I saw the door half-open.’  
‘Excuse me, Lizzie, I’m a brute.  Come in, come in.’  
I put the tray down on the sideboard and take up the old one.  
‘Thank you, my love,’ he says, not moving from where he is.  Then, as if a 
brilliant idea has just occurred to him: ‘Why didn’t you let the maid do it?’  
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‘Sure if I gave it all to her, I’d never see you.’  
He laughs.  ‘And how is she settling in?’  
‘Early yet,’ I says.  ‘We’ll see.’
‘Ya.  Indeed.  Good.’  He claps his hands, rubs them together, now strides 
over to his desk, lifts the moneybox out the drawer.  ‘Actually  I’m glad you came. 
I wanted to talk to you.  Karl and Jenny are giving a party in our honour.’  
‘Oh, aye?’  
‘Tomorrow.  To celebrate our arrival and to introduce us to some the 
London-based comrades.’  He rummages in the box and comes out with four 
sovereigns.  ‘I want you to take this and buy yourself something nice to wear. 
We’re dandying up, making a bit of a fuss.’  
I give him a stern look.  
‘Come, Lizzie,’ he says, ‘It’s all right to spend a little to look good.’  
‘Where would I go?’
‘Well, to the dressmaker’s.  Have something pinned that will leave their 
jaws hanging.’  
‘What dressmaker’s would have anything ready for tomorrow?’  
‘Go to Barrow’s’—he speaks like a man who knows—‘They will be able to 
help you, I guarantee it.’  
I crinkle my brow on purpose: ‘Barrow’s?’  
‘It’s not far, in Camden.  You won’t find anything here in Primrose Hill. 
Get a cab.  Give them my name and pay them off a few extra shillings, you’ll see. 
A new place recently  opened opposite them and they’re begging for the business. 
They’d have it sewn while you waited, if that was what you wanted.’ 
He comes and puts the coins on the tray by his dirty plates.  Seeing them 
there, twinkling among the pork rind, I feel a fresh lightness in my heart.  ‘You 
might be right, Frederick.  I wanted to get abroad of the house anyways, and a run 
round the shops might be just the ticket.’  
‘That’s the spirit, Lizzie.’  
‘I’ll go right away.’  
‘Ha!’ he laughs.  ‘No time to lose.’  
‘And I might have something out.’  
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‘Of course,’ he says and searches his pocket for an extra guinea.  ‘Good 
idea.’
I leave as I am, only  a light shawl and a reticule as excitements, and I leave the 
house as it is too, shambled with unfinished tasks, the new girl with the dinner yet 
to prepare, and I can’t say I’m bothered about it.  
I cross the road to the lamppost at the bottom of the Hill and flag a cab from 
there.  On the journey, I watch out the window and put the roads to memory  so I 
can walk back and save the fare.
The bell in Barrow’s brings two girls beetling out from the back room. 
They’re got up in identical silk dresses with short sleeves and lace caps, but to 
look at, they couldn’t be further apart: one tidy and pinched, the other large and 
dusky-skinned and curled about the face.  
‘I need a dress,’ I says.  
‘Um, certainly,’ says Pinch, leading me over to a counter so polished you 
can see yourself in the black.  ‘Is it for a special occasion, or do you require 
something useful?’  
‘I suppose you could call it special.’  
‘Oh.  Well, in that case might I recommend our antique mwaray, which we 
have on special offer at the moment, nearly half price?’  She throws a length of 
rippled silk over the counter; gold so gold it  glows.  ‘We have this in a range of 
shades.  Unfortunately one cannot see its full effect here.  It’s most becoming at 
candlelight.’  
‘Half price you say?’  
‘Half price, Madam.’  
‘So how much would a dress of this cost, at half price?’  
‘Four pounds, eighteen shillings and sixpence.’ 
 I splutter.  ‘You must be barking.  I won’t be spending more than a pound.’  
She purses.  Beside her, Curly  laughs an appeasing laugh and whips the gold 
silk away, replaces it with another, this one a high-shining blue.  ‘Am I right to 
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say the Madam is of the more sensible sort?  Less interested in the novelties of 
fashion than in value for her spend?’  
‘Well, you wouldn’t be wrong anyhows.’  
‘In that case, we have this plain glassay silk in over thirty shades of colour, 
commencing at  only  two pounds fifteen shillings and sixpence for the extra full 
dress.’  
I give an impatient cluck.  ‘Maybe I didn’t make myself clear—’  
She shakes her curls.  ‘Madam, you made yourself perfectly  clear.’  She 
rolls away the blue silk and puts out a green muslin.  I touch it.  Stiff as a board. 
‘This is French organdie, one of last year’s designs, which we are giving away at 
the very reduced price of one pound six shillings and sixpence for the extra full 
dress.’  
I put my hand under my chin and tap  my lip with a finger, as if considering. 
‘Do me one without the frills and I’ll give you a pound for it.’  
‘Without the frills, Madam?’  
‘None of those ridiculous trimmings you have in the window there.  All that 
unnecessary bib and tucker.’  
‘We have other models we can—’  
‘I want it plain, plain as can be.’  
‘You don’t want to see—?’  
‘Do you understand the word plain, young lass?’  
‘Of course.’  
‘Well, that’s what I want.  And I want it for a pound.’  
‘I shall have to speak to—’  
‘Speak to whomsoever you like.  Mrs Engels is the name.  One-two-two 
Regent’s Park Road.  I’ll bide here.’
Curly curtsies and goes into the back room.  Pinch forces a smile into her 
cramped little face and goes to busy herself with the show dummies.  I turn my 
gander to the carpet to keep from catching myself in the looking glasses that  leer 
from every side.  
‘All right, Mrs Engels,’ says Curly  when she comes back, ‘That should be 
fine.  If you would like to come this way, we shall get you measured up.’  
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‘That won’t be needed, I can tell you straight off what I am.’  
‘I do not doubt it, Mrs Engels, but at Barrow’s we like to measure all our 
customers to ensure the best style and fit.’  
‘Listen, chicken, do you have a book to write in?’  
‘Of course.’  
‘Well, put this down.’  
Flushing, she picks up her feather.   Dips it.  
‘Bust thirty-four, hips thirty-six, length-to-foot  just as you see me.’  I step 
back to give her a full view.  She frowns at me and scribbles down.  ‘I’ll be back 
at five tomorrow to pick it up.’  
‘Tomorrow?’  
‘That’s right.’  
‘Madam, I’m sorry  but we usually need at  least three working days.  We 
could have it ready by close of business Monday.’ 
I pick a sovereign out of my reticule and put down on the page of the book.  
She waves her hands over it as if to magic it away.  ‘No, Madam, please, 
you can pay when you come to collect it.’  
‘Take it now and be done with it.  And I’ll be seeing you tomorrow.’
I find a cookshop a little up the road and order a chop and a pint  of Bass’s 
ale, and now a slice of plum pudding and a cup of ready-made coffee with cream 
and sugar.  I take the table in the window, for I like to look out.  
Passing by, streams of people with bags and boxes: gone out for a ribbon 
and coming home with the stock of an entire silk mercers.  These places, they do 
it on the cheap and make their capital out of pressure and high prices.  It takes 
cleverness and steel for a woman to get her fair portion.
Exhausted, I look into my cup and try not to feel like the only one fighting.
VII 
The Party
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When it comes to the dangers of a bit  of food, the Germans can be as afraid as the 
English, so I eat before we leave.  Spiv heats me up a kidney pudding, and I have 
a glass of milk with it to line the gut, and after that some cold saveloy and penny 
loaf.  
As it happens, I needn’t have ruined my stomach, for there’s wittals enough 
to feed a battalion: tables of meat and fowl and fish and cheese, salvers of 
delicates and dumplings carried by livery-servants in silk hose, all sorts of strong-
tasting aliments smelling up in our noses.  ‘Who’s died?’ I think as I marvel the 
fare.
Tussy appears beside me.  ‘I’ve been looking all over, Aunt Lizzie.’  
Embarrassed to be the only one grazing, I drop my pastry roll onto the 
damask.  ‘Tussy, my sweet darling.’  
‘Come on, I want to present you.’  
She takes a glass of red from a tray, puts it  in my hand and pulls me with her 
into the crush.  ‘I don’t think I have ever been in a room with so many  interesting 
people at once,’ she says. 
The men have changed the usual shab-and-drab for frilled shirts.  The 
women are in clothes above the ordinary but not showy.  I feel in tune, glad to 
have put my foot down at the dressmaker’s.  Tussy  introduces me to everybody, 
even to those I’ve met and know.  
‘This is Mr Engels’s wife, Mrs Burns.  An Irishwoman and a true 
proletarian.’  
The strangers bow.  The familiars wink and smile along.  There’s more 
women than I expected to see.  One sitting beside Karl on the couch.  A pair by 
the window, looking foreign and bored.  And by the chimneypiece, in a circle 
around Jenny and Janey, several gathered.  Frederick—no surprise—has dug out 
the one with the lowest neckline.  
‘I’m not going to remember all these new names,’ I whisper to Tussy, 
mortifying of the fuss.  
‘Don’t worry,’ she says, ‘What’s important is that they remember yours.’
 From where he’s sat, Karl makes a big act of twisting his monocle in to 
show he has it tied on a new ribbon.  Janey’s wearing the Celtic cross I sent her. 
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Jenny has made more of an effort than anyone else to draw attention onto herself: 
a feather in the hair, yards of a colour not found in the wild.  
‘Oh ladies, please,’ she’s saying to her audience, the lush sending her voice 
up a pitch, ‘Before the illness, I had no grey  hair and my teeth and figure were 
good.  People used to class me among well-preserved women!  But that’s all a 
thing of the past.’  
Loud protests.  
‘Come now, ladies, I am not looking for your reassurance.  I speak from a 
place of solemn awareness.  I can see the reality.  When I look in the glass now I 
seem to myself a kind of cross between a rhinoceros and hippopotamus whose 
place is in Regent’s Park Zoo rather than among members of the Caucasian race!’  
Reddening for her, I busy myself with the only bow on my bodice.  
‘Now, Lizzie,’ she says when the required objections die down, ‘I’d like you 
to meet  some extraordinary women.  Mrs Marie Goegg, chairman of the 
International Women’s Association.  Mrs Anna Jaclard, writer and communist. 
Mrs Yelisaveta Tomanowski, thorn in the side of every Bakuninist, real or 
suspected.  And Mrs Elizabeth Dimitrieff, Karl’s own private reporter in Paris. 
Elizabeth is just here for a few days before going back into the melay.  And what 
exactly are you going back to do, Elizabeth?’  
‘Well, I certainly won’t be sewing sandbag sacks, that is for sure!’
They  cackle and clap and swat the air with their gloves and fans.  I drink 
and look around.  Nim is by the door ordering one of the hired men down to the 
kitchen.  Her hair is looped and she’s put  earrings in, but apart  from that, she’s the 
selfsame: sensible petticoat, two pleats in her dress.  It’s said she’s had many 
suitors and could have made a good match more than once, even with the shame 
of Frederick’s bastard hanging over her, but here she has stayed, devoted and 
constant, both when the wages have come and when they haven’t.  She sees me 
looking and comes over.  
‘Your glass is empty, Mrs Burns,’ she says, taking it from me and replacing 
it with a full one from a passing salver.  
‘Thanks Helen,’ I says, for that’s her real name; I know it to be so.
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‘Lizzie!’—Jenny is calling—‘I was just about to give the ladies a tour of the 
upstairs.  Do join us.’  
‘Well, thanks Jenny, that sounds nice, only—’  
Laughing, Tussy takes my arm.  ‘Don’t be such a bore, Mohme.  Lizzie is 
going to stay here with me.  The band is going to start soon, and the men aren’t 
nearly drunk enough to dance, so I’m relying on Lizzie to be my partner.’ 
Tussy leads me to the bay window where the band has set up.  ‘Music, 
please!’ she cries, and they start up.  She spins me from one side of the empty 
floor to the other till, three songs later, I start hacking and I’ve to sit down.  
 After a time—no sooner do I finish one drink than another is pressured on 
me—the women come back from upstairs.  ‘Finally!’ says a voice, and the men 
approach with outstretched hands.  I refuse the two who ask me up.
‘Maybe the next one,’ I says.  ‘I need the rest.’  
But the truer truth is I’ve become interested in what’s happening by the 
second fireplace; to get up  now would be to miss it.  It appears the woman 
Dimitrieff is telling something of her life.  Sat  on an easy  chair like it’s a throne, 
enough space between her legs to fit a violin-cello, she has the place rapt. 
Frederick, Karl and some others have made a ring round her and are fighting with 
each other to laugh loudest at her utterings.  I strain my ear to catch a scrap.
‘So I said, I only married you to get a passport, and he said, Well, I only 
married you for your—’
She widens her eyes in mock horror and peers down at her bust, as if 
noticing for the first time how smooth and well-looking it is.
Now there’s a body to contend with. 
Refusing another round of dancing, I rise and make for the empty chair 
beside her.  But Jenny, who must have been watching too, is faster.  She slips 
through the band of men and takes Dimitrieff’s hand.
‘If none of these men are brave enough to ask you up, then you shall have to 
make do with me.’  
Dimitrieff laughs.  ‘Oh Mrs Marx, I thought you would never ask!’
The two skip to the floor, and the men look after them, murmuring and 
scratching and wondering why all women aren’t like them.  
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Stranded now on a bit of empty  carpet, I hasten to the nearest free seat.  I 
watch the array over the lip of my glass: Jenny and Dimitrieff, Karl and Goegg, 
Frederick and Janey, Tussy and Dalby, Tomanowski and Lessner, Jaclard and 
Eccarius, Dr Allen and his wife, the Lormiers, and maybe ten others, swaying and 
reeling.  The number dawns on me: thirty  or more altogether.  A good way to clear 
off those who are due a visit, but the expense must be—well, it  must be effin 
mighty.
Of course, it’s easy to spend when you haven’t done a tap to have it.  Three 
hundred and fifty  pounds a year, in three instalments, straight from Frederick’s 
accounts, that’s what they get.  I’m sure they think it’s a secret; I’m sure they 
think I’m oblivious because I’m unable to make out what Frederick writes in the 
books.  But, in our house, having keen ears is just  as good as having snooping 
eyes of your own, for half of the time he’s forgetting to speak in the German; half 
of the time he’s shouting through the walls instead of keeping his talk to a 
whisper; and the other half of the time he’s at the street door barking orders to 
messengers and letter carriers; it was never going to be long before I caught wind. 
Three hundred and fifty  pounds is the digit, and that’s before the gifts and the 
sneaky envelopes; that’s before he sweeps in to level the bills and promises-to-pay 
that they leave to pile up on their desks and dressers and drawers (and not, where 
they ought be, on their memory and their morals).  
Careless charity, is what the world would call it, if it knew.  Helping those 
who beg and not those who really need the help.  And who needs the help  more—
can someone please tell me?—than Nim’s son?  Lord knows what condition of 
roof that boy is living under, and yet I don’t see a single tormented penny leaving 
the house in his direction.  Would Frederick even know where to send it?  One day 
justice will have to be done the poor lad; one day he’ll have to be cut his sliver.
‘You know, there’s a story told about them,’ I says, turning to the man sat 
beside me.  
‘About whom, Madam?’ he says, his breath wafting through his moustache.
‘The Marxes.’  
‘Ah, yes.  Such a remarkable family.  Stories are bound to be told about 
them.’ 
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By the fireplace, Karl has taken up the fire blower and is making smutty 
jokes with it.  Watching him brings a smile—like a secret understanding—to the 
man’s face.
‘You one of the Party?’ I says. 
His smile drops.  ‘The Party?’  
‘You know, the International.’  
‘Madam, the International is not a party.  It is an association.  A free 
association of working men.’  
I make a face to say I stand humble and corrected.  He accepts it with a nod. 
Brings his glass under the hair of his lip to suck from it.
‘Well, Sir, the story I’m thinking about—’  
‘Is almost certainly just that, a story.  Tittle-tattle from the bread queue.’
‘You haven’t heard it yet.’
‘I don’t need to hear it to know that it’s false.’  
‘If it’s false I tell it, it’s false I got it.’
‘Precisely.’
I take a sup and ponder this a moment.  ‘Only I don’t believe this one is 
false.  And if you only listened a minute, I’m sure you’d find you agree.’
He shakes his head and groans.
‘The way it goes is, her mother, I mean Jenny’s mother, gave them some 
money for their honeymoon, and they took it with them in a chest.’  
‘Please, Madam, must we do this?’
‘And what they did was, they left the chest open on the table in the different 
hotel rooms they  stayed in, so that any old body who visited them could take as 
much as he pleased from it.  As you can imagine, empty the chest soon was!’ 
The man stares at me.  He joins his brows together and frowns.  ‘That’s it?’ 
he says.  ‘That’s your story?’
I push a finger into the soft  bit of his arm and whisper into the black of his 
ear: ‘But don’t you see, this is the root of it!  One generous thing done a lifetime 
ago, and they think the world is in debt to them since.  There’s no fairness in it.  In 
the first place, I don’t think you can call giving your parents’ good money away 
generous.  If you can call it anything, it’s—’
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The blood, now, comes beating to his face.  An angry flush overspreads his 
features.  He shifts his chair so he can face away from me.  I take my hand back 
and sigh.  These foreigners have no notion of the banter.  The Irish, there’s not 
much I can say in their favour, but at  least they  allow for a woman’s words when 
she’s lushed; they know it’s only the drop talking.  
 The music stops and the remaining dancers bow and clap, and now make 
their way back to the chairs and sofas.  A woman rushes in from the hall, as if 
summoned by the new quiet.  
(‘Where’ve you been?’ rasps her red-headed friend, just two paces from me. 
‘All this time, I’ve not seen you.’  
‘I was in the kitchen playing cards with the hired men.  What a lark!  I won 
this.’  She opens her palm to show a threepenny bit.)   
Jenny walks into the centre of the room and calls for a final applause for the 
musicians, then orders us up the stairs to the parlour for the performance.  
‘The moment we’ve been waiting for!’ someone shouts.  
Frederick comes to take me up.  ‘Are you safe?’ he says when my foot 
squeaks on the carpet of the stairs and I have a little wobble.  
‘Go to blazes, Frederick,’ I says.
In the parlour we get seats but the men have to stay on their feet.  Jenny 
comes to stand in front of a counterpane held up as a curtain by two menservants. 
She gives a little speech about the effort she and Karl have made towards the 
Girls’ education, and how unfortunate it is they couldn’t do so much for them in 
music as they’d have hoped.  ‘In any case,’ she says, ‘Their real strength is drama 
and elocution.  And tonight my youngest daughter Eleanor, whom many of you 
know as Tussy, shall be playing Hamlet.  This is apt, for her father used to always 
say she was more like a boy than a girl.’  
A chuckle goes round.  
‘Good old Tussy!’ someone calls out.  
‘My eldest daughter Janey shall be playing Gertrude, and although she 
knows not yet  the joys and pain of motherhood for herself, I think you shall find 
she does the role full justice.’  
Cheers and claps.  
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‘The Girls would like to dedicate their performance to their sister Laura and 
her husband Paul, who are now safe in Bordeaux, thank heavens, and expecting a 
child.’  
Applause.
Jenny bows and the servants let drop the curtain.  One of the men has given 
Tussy a military jacket.  Jenny has put Janey in one of her ball gowns.  
‘Now mother,’ says Tussy, ‘what’s the matter?’  
‘Hamlet,’ says Janey, ‘Thou hast thy father much offended.’  
‘Mother, you have my father much offended.’  
This stirs up such laughter in the crowd that Janey is forced to bide before 
speaking her next line.  ‘Come, come,’ she says once there’s quiet, and the two set 
off into their theatricals, speeching off and casting their limbs about.  I don’t  know 
if it’s the lush or the heat of the room, but I’m finding it hard to stay with the 
meaning of it.  My head pounds.  I feel all face.  I look around to see if anyone has 
noticed the wrong with me.  Nim, I see, is stood by the door.  That’s where I must 
go.  
‘Excuse me, excuse me,’ I says as I make my way down the line.  
‘Are you all right, Mrs Burns,’ Nim says when I reach her.  She gestures 
into the room to remind me of what I’ll miss if I leave.  I turn back to see Tussy 
striking a blow at a figure wrapped in the drapes, and now Karl spinning out from 
behind them and falling onto the floor. 
Dizzying, I rush down the stairs and out the street  door.  I take the air and 
am thankful for it; it keeps what’s down from coming up.  A moment and Nim is 
outside with me.  
‘Here,’ she says, wrapping a shawl around me.
‘You don’t have to worry, Helen.  I’m grand.’  
‘Shall I fetch you a glass of water?’  
‘Nay, nay.  Just stay a minute.’  
‘Well, all right.  But not too long.  I must get back.’  She puts the door on 
the latch.  Rubs her arms.  ‘It’s getting cold now,’ she says.  ‘It  will be fully  winter 
before we know it.’  
‘Aye, that it will.’  
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Some minutes pass.  The noise from upstairs comes through the windows 
and out into the night.  All down the road, the houses are dark. 
‘I shall have to leave you now,’ Nim says.  
‘Nay, wait—’
Knowing no way to proper introduce it, I go ahead and bring out the money: 
the savings from the dressmaker’s and a few other morsels I’ve managed to gather 
up.  
‘Here,’ I says, ‘I want you to have this.’  
She takes a step away.  
‘Take it.  It’s from Mr Engels.  He wants you to have it.’  
‘Mr Engels?  For what?’  
For what.  For what.  She must believe my head emptier than the Saviour’s 
tomb.   
‘Helen, please.  I’m not just another of these silly  women.  I know how 
many beans makes five.’
‘I’m sure I don’t know what you mean.’
‘Mr Engels and me, we have so much.  More than we can cope with.’  
‘I’m not going short.  I’m looked after.’ 
‘I don’t doubt it.  This is just an extra bit.  You have full claim to it.’  
She shakes her head and pushes open the door.  ‘I have no claims to 
anything.’
‘Your son does.  Think of your—’  
But she’s already gone.  Leaving me to hold the whole weight of my purse.
Back upstairs, I find the performance over.  Port and sweets are being tendered 
round.  Tussy pushes through to reach me.
‘You missed the whole thing, Aunt Lizzie!’  
‘Not at all, I saw you up there.  You were a star.  I’ve never seen such—’  
But she’ll not be cozened, nor condoled, and she doesn’t spare me any of 
her pouting, and I don’t have the force to bring her round, so it comes a relief 
when, from across the room, the woman Dimitrieff calls her away with the lure of 
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her smoke.  I watch her go, the man’s jacket spilling over her shoulders, and it 
occurs to me now which one Hamlet is: it’s the one where she marries her 
husband’s brother and, by there, sends it all down-falling to shite.
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November
VIII 
Inverted World
Pale as royals, the pair of them.  Wouldn’t know a day’s work if it shone on them 
blazing.  Put their backs into nought, far as I can see, except giving me gob.
Only this morning Spiv says to me, she says, ‘Don’t mind me, Ma’am,’ 
when I find her dangling her feet  while she ought  be cleaning the slops, ‘Don’t 
mind me, I’m only resting up on account of my courses.’  Then when I catch her 
putting the woollens through the mangle:  ‘But, Mrs Burns, this is how I did them 
in the last place, this is how the missuses are doing them.’ 
You come to London, get a nice home about you and—blight your 
innocence!—you think you’re over with the toils and the trouble.
The other one can hear me chiding from two flights up, and comes down in 
her night-rail.  ‘Don’t stand there, Pumps,’ I says to her.    And then, ‘For the love 
of Christ, Pumps, don’t stand there gawping,’ for she’ll not hearken to something 
spoken only the once.  ‘Make yourself useful and go do the grate, it’s a blind 
disgrace and needs blackening.’  
She bobs a curtsy and goes, and I’m left relieved by how easy she’s toed, for 
on your regular day she’s the worse of the two, all her energies spent trying to get 
one over me and prove I’m not up to the dodge.  With the passing of the moments, 
though, my  relief turns to suspicion—the lass so yielding is a forecast for bad 
goings-on—so when I’ve done with Spiv and sent her into the kitchen to think 
about lunch, I go to the parlour to give it the once over. 
 Just as I pictured: the grate still undone, the drapes covered with paw 
marks, and Pumps herself in front of the mirror rubbing black onto her face. 
Which is to say, it’s worse than I pictured, and we’re back to the usual.  
‘Pumps, what’s this?’ I says.  
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‘What’s what?’ she says.  
‘This here, on the drapes.’  
‘That?  Was there when I got here.’  
‘Why didn’t you get the benzene to it, then?’  
‘Thought you wanted it that way.’  
‘And on your face?  Did you think I wanted you with whiskers as well?’  
‘Oh this?  I just thought you could use another man about the place.’  
This, for the London missus, is life.  Not the fancy ball you might have 
imagined, but this.  Which only goes to show you can’t foreknow the shape of 
things to come.  For if you’d told me this day twelvemonth how it was going to be
—that my hours would be spent poking in nooks and sniffing in corners, running 
the finger and dancing at heels; that every day would be a scrub, and every week a 
starch, and every  year a white; that tomorrow’s coals would turn to yesterday’s 
ashes, and time would burn my wick both ends—if this day  twelvemonth you’d 
told me the God-glaring truth of it, I’d not have credited you.  I’d have thought 
you unkept in your mind.  
‘Get away with you,’ I’d have thought, ‘It can’t be shabbier than 
Manchester, can it?’ 
Yet nowadays I oftentimes think we oughtn’t have flown the old kettle at all. 
I oftentimes think the mill wasn’t so killing as this.  Topsy thinking is what this is, 
but topsy is how it goes up here; topsy and wrongways.  
Advice:  if you come, leave your senses back where they were common.
IX 
Island Dwellers
I like to do the step myself.  Which is a lucky thing.  For Spiv refuses to be seen 
out front.  And Pumps is too afraid of a bit of exertion to take her shoes and 
stockings off and get down into the scrub.  It’s a task I ought stay away from, on 
account of the knees, but I’ve learnt it gives me more pain to watch them do it 
than to do it myself.  They’re likely to be content  with less than the right white. 
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And there’s no precise measure for the clay, the blue, the size and the whitening; 
you have to judge the mixture by its look.  
I go hard at it—my sleeves rolled, my face lathered—and I don’t let off till, 
out the side of my eye, I light on a crowd of four women coming up the road from 
the Hill side.  They, in return, catch sight of me when they’re a few doors away. 
By my own deeper wisdom, I know they’re headed in my direction.  I put my 
attending back on my cleaning, but I’m aware of myself now and don’t feel inside 
the task.
They come to stand in a line over me.  I twist my neck to look up at them.  
‘Might we see the lady of the house?’ says the one in the high-boned collar.  
I stand.  Brush the hair off my brow.  Flatten my  pinny.  ‘Come on, Lizzie,’ I 
says to myself, ‘Don’t be put so easy to the blush.’ 
When it dawns on one, it  passes through the others like electricity.  ‘Oh!’—
they  clutch their chests in the spot where the air has been knocked out—‘How 
novel!‘  
Sat on my sofa, gummed together in a talcumed clump, the committee members 
of the Primrose Hill Residents’ Association tell me what they saw: a woman and a 
girl viewing the house, and then the same two overseeing the arrival of the 
furniture and making all the arrangements.  They describe both figures in a detail 
that’d chill the devil: the size and shape of their noses and mouths, the height of 
their brows, the colour and curl of their hair, the cut of their clothes; it’s as if 
they’ve painted picture portraits of Jenny  and Tussy and hung them in their heads. 
They expected to be received by them.  They look disappointed to have got me. 
‘Relations of yours?’ the woman named Stone asks, pulling out  the end of 
her dress and floating it out over her boots.  
‘Nay,’ I says, ‘Just intimates.’  
‘I’ve seen her before,’ Leech says.  ‘The woman, I mean.  Does she live 
nearby?’  
‘Aye, not far.  Near the Heath, up that way.’  
‘Foreign?’  
69
‘A Baroness.’  
‘Oh, I see.’  
‘And her name?’ says Westpot, jigging her leg in a manner that says she’s 
unprepared to sit here, in these uncomfortable visiting clothes, and bide for the 
required particulars to come out of their own accord.  
‘Von Westphalen,’ I says, giving Jenny’s maiden name to avoid mention of 
Karl.  
‘Von Westphalen.  Let’s see.  German?’  
‘Aye.’  
Westpot ponders a moment.  ‘Doesn’t  ring any bells.  Does she go much 
into society?’  
‘I’m not sure, you’d have to ask her.’  
‘And yourself?’  
‘Me?  Oh, well, I’m not the outsy-aboutsy sort.’ 
I ring for tea and sandwiches and cake.  Pumps bites the side of her finger 
and glares at the women through squinted eyes.  
‘Go on, girl,’ I says.  ‘Don’t be dallying.’  
While we’re biding I bring the talk round to the house—that’s what they’re 
here for, isn’t it?—and mention the hidden costs of living in a new area: the 
uncivil distances, the bad roads, construction everywhere, hoarding blocking the 
paths.  It’s a speech I’ve heard Jenny give on several occasions and it’s always 
been well received.  Here, now, I’m met with a row of faces longer than a day 
with no bread.  
Pumps brings in the tray and I give out the tea.  
‘And you are Mrs Burns,’ says Mrs Westpot.  ‘Isn’t that what you said?’
‘That or thereabouts,’ I says.  
Leech look about for signs of children.  Halls sighs into the emptiness.  
Sensing an edge to our nerves, Stone says I’m not to be embarrassed, 
there’ll always be duties the householder will reserve for herself.  She, for 
instance, makes the beds of her own choice, for the servants aren’t to be depended 
upon to put down the same number of blankets every  night.  Leech looks shocked 
that Stone would let go of her home secrets to a stranger; she tries to turn our 
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minds away from the blunder by lashing herself into an enthusiasm about my 
draping.  I ought keep  the windows open as much as possible, she says, so the 
smoke doesn’t linger on them.  This prods Halls to air her loath for women who 
insist on smoking, especial out in the public.  
‘It can only be taken as a kind of challenge.’  
Leech tut-tuts and says she heard there were women smoking at the funeral 
of Mr Miller, a man who used to live down by the Canal.  Fifty  people for 
breakfast, there were, a table covered in cakes and biscuits and oranges and nuts, 
and all species of wine and exotics, and though Leech herself didn’t attend—she 
wouldn’t dream of it, for it wasn’t her place—she was told there were women 
there, attending; women with flowers in their bonnets and fags in their mouths, 
and it had the atmosphere of a wedding more than anything else.  
‘It’s hard to imagine a grieving widow having to serve delights to such a 
rabble, but that’s exactly what Mrs Miller had to do, as it was ordered in the will. 
Then, after all of that, he didn’t leave her enough to get by on her own.’
There’s a pause to allow the shaking of heads.  I pass the plate of 
sandwiches around.  ‘Thank you, but no,’ they each say in turn, for they don’t 
want to ruin their appetites; they’re on route to other engagements.  
Saucers under their chins, as if to catch every  precious thing that might fall 
out, they  take it upon themselves to explain the area to me.  It’s best, they say, to 
think of Primrose Hill as an island, with the railway forming the northern 
boundary and the Canal the southern one.  The better sort  of residents live this 
side of St George’s Road.  This is because, here, one escapes the murky  results of 
the railway activities, thanks to a benevolent wind that blows the smoke and dust 
eastways over the Chalk Farm Road and Camden.  On the opposite side of St 
George’s Road, running towards Gloucester Avenue, the residents are working 
types, three families or more to each of the houses.  It is, they say, like a little 
northern town, dominated by the railway and with a strong bond between the 
bodies living here.  The houses are impossible to keep clean, of course, due to the 
flakes of soot that float  about  and settle everywhere.  But the people are happy 
and tend to their own.  Nevertheless, it’s best not  to walk there at night, for the 
roads can be rough, with families of boys patrolling about.  And the railway 
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bridge is to be avoided at all costs, and at all times, for it  provides dry  arches for 
the congregation and accommodation of street Arabs and gutter children.
Their speech causes me a twinge, to be sure, but, if I’m honest, I don’t 
despise them in my heart.  Perhaps this is because I don’t feel beneath them.  I’m 
no great lady and I don’t know the fashion of the months, but I’m aware of my 
new position, in the middle class of life, and I don’t think I’m fairing so shabby.
Once satisfied that  I’m a woman with the right information, they allow their 
talk to move to other subjects.  It comes to rest on the banks.  They’re thankful the 
crisis years have passed.  
‘Dreadful, was it not, ladies?’ says Stone.  
‘Dreadful, dreadful,’ the heads nod.  
‘When I heard that Overend and Gurney had gone under, well, I got such a 
shock I called my husband in and I said to him, Gregory, take all our money out of 
the banks immediately, our savings would be safer under a board here at home.’  
Halls laughs.  ‘Did he do as you commanded?’  
‘Are you mad?  He just snickered and told me to not to worry my head over 
affairs which aren’t mine.  They can be such rotters, can’t they?’  
A chuckle passes round.  
‘Speaking of rotters,’ says Leech, ‘Have you heard about Mr Wagner?’  
At this, they all sigh together and say it’s a shocking and terrible thing. 
Such a disappointment, they say, when a genius fails his public with immoral 
private doings. 
It’s clear they’ve talked about this Wagner character before.  He might even 
be someone they regular use to take the corners off a meeting, to make it feel 
rounder and sister-like.  I take him to be another neighbour and am glad I don’t 
ask further about him—that instead I sigh along in my ignorant stead—for it soon 
becomes clear to me that it’s a musician he is, not a neighbour, and, by the sounds 
of it, a bit of a hound too.  Once I know the facts, I’m resolved to tell them some 
true and shocking stories about musicians, stories that will go all the way to their 
cores: about the Manchester halls and what the singers and fiddlers got up to 
there, the fiddling they did in the dressing rooms, and not only  with the loose 
women from the boxes but with the higher-ups too, who would bribe their way 
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down the corridors and hide themselves between the costumes.  But my chance 
doesn’t come, their fast  manner of talking to themselves makes it hard to break in, 
and when the subject passes on, it irks me that there’s things I could have said on 
my own side, about musicians.
‘You’re not from London, are you Mrs Burns?’ Westpot says, impatient to 
be getting on.  
‘Nay, from down Manchester way.  But my kin, they’re from across the 
water.’  
‘France?’ says Leech, making Stone and Halls giggle.  
‘The other way.’  
‘Ah, of course.’  She looks at the other three.  They twitch their faces back 
at her.  
‘So you and your family,’ Westpot says, ‘You are, um, shoppy people then?’ 
She talks to her nails, as if abashed by having to bleed this personal vein.  
‘We were in the cotton, if that’s what you mean.  But we’ve stopped with 
that.  Now we’re in something else entire.’  
‘Well, that’s a relief,’ says Stone.  
‘A relief indeed,’ says Halls.  
‘Shoppy people are bad enough,’ says Leech, ‘But the Manchester ones are 
supposed to be a whole grade down, if that’s possible.’  
‘Always behind the counter, even when they’re not,’ says Stone.  
I can’t  gainsay  what they’re saying about Manchester and the rest, but I 
don’t like how they’re saying it, so I says, ‘If the Manchester men have a bad 
name, it’s their own doing and they  deserve it, but  they’re not all the same, there’s 
good eggs between them.’  
‘Good eggs?’ says Westpot, ‘Like Mr Burns, you mean?’  
‘Mr who?’  
‘Why Mr Burns, woman!  Your husband!’  
When you’re called a missus, oftentimes you forget yourself, and it’s a good 
idea to have a story to tell, to cover over.  But I have no such story  ready.  ‘There’s 
no Mr Burns,’ I says.  
‘Oh my dear woman.’  
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‘Oh Lord.’  
‘No Mr Burns?’  
‘Where is he?’  
I clear my throat.  Scratch an itch that takes hold of the scalp  under my bun. 
‘He’s in his grave,’ I says, undressing the lie by thinking of my father.  
Stone allows herself a gasp.  Leech takes a napkin from the tray and offers it 
to me.  Halls gives me a Protestant ‘Bless you’ and looks down, virtuous-like, at 
her clasped hands.  
I nod my thanks and reach once more for the sandwiches, happy to be off 
the hook as light as that.  But Westpot has drawn back her lips and is thirsty  for 
the truth.  For that’s how they bite you: smiling.  
‘But I’ve seen a man,’ she says, ‘I’ve seen a man coming in and out.’  
‘You have?’  
‘Yes, Mrs Burns, a man.’  
‘Oh, aye.  Now that I think of it, there’s a man who lives here.’  
‘But he’s not Mr Burns?’  
‘Nay, he’s not Mr Burns.’  
‘Oh?’  
‘Oh!’  
‘Oh.’  
‘Who is he then?’  
‘He’s Mr Engels.’  
‘Mr Angles?’  
‘Engels.  Mr Engels.’  
‘Is he here now, this Mr Engels?’  
‘Nay, he’s away from the house on business.’  
‘And who is he?  A lodger?’  
‘Nay, not a bit of a lodger.’  
Westpot simpers, understanding.  ‘You’re not married, are you Mrs Burns?’  
‘He’s my husband, I just haven’t taken his name.’  
‘You can’t take a man’s name unless you’re wedded to him.’  She turns to 
the others.  ‘She’s not married.’  
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‘I’m his helpmeet is what, Mrs Westpot.’  
‘You’re his—?’  
‘She said helpmeet.’  
‘Shh, ladies, let’s try not to be rude.’  
They  suck themselves in.  Leech’s stays creak.  Halls, so fascinated by the 
proceedings, forgets herself and takes up a slice of cake.  Her eyes darting around 
for the next move, she feeds the whole thing in.  
‘Mrs Burns,’ says Westpot, ‘If you don’t mind me asking—’  She hesitates.  
I meet her gander full force.  I’ve naught to hide from no one.  ‘Aye, Mrs 
Westpot?’  
‘What I was going ask was, what business is Mr—?’
‘Ah!’ Halls lets out  a splutter, and now a gullet-bursting cough, and now the 
contents of her gob drops out—pat!—onto her lap.  ‘Pepper!’ she yelps, ‘There’s 
pepper on the cake!’  
Pumps—I could hear her ear scratch against the door the whole time and 
now I know why—shimmies in, calm as a cucumber.  ‘You all right, ma’am?’ she 
says, ‘Can I help you there.’  She walks around, positions herself behind Halls and 
serves out four slugs to her back.  
Stunned, I watch the scene, the perfect horror of it.  And I’m still sat here, 
unable to move, while the women file out, crinolines crumpled, bunches bounced; 
and still now while Pumps fettles up the tea things.  
‘Those were some bitches,’ she murmurs to herself as she makes a pile of 
the plates.  ‘They got what was coming.’  
Her behaviour is a credit to those who brought her up.  For she was raised in 
thoughtlessness.  Reared to be someone who’d have none of the advantages.  Just 
one more of the poor tattery  children of Little Ireland.  Like all of us, she 
would’ve seen much brutality  within the circle.  A crooked look would’ve caught 
her a larruping at  the hands of her slack-spined father and rag-and-scram brothers. 
Her face and the bent of her back bear the marks of this ill-usage.  I can’t blame 
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her for feeling angry and wanting to defy  the laws of the wide world.  I’ve been 
her.  I am her.
My punishment, so, is not the belt  or the starvation.  Nor is it the water 
pump or the locked door.  Rather, it’s the needle.  
‘Come and help me with the stitching,’ I says to her.  ‘Come, please, and 
salvage my efforts.’   
And she comes.  And she looks at my  work: a bundle of botched and broken 
thread like a wild shrub.  And she bursts out.  And I can’t help but join her.  We 
hang off each other, now, and laugh till we’re sick. 
X
A Free Education
I’m not clever with the needle.  I can’t keep  my mind full on it.  When it comes 
time for it—this hour after lunch is the usual, though I’m told some ladies can’t 
stop and have to have it torn from them at bedtime as a babby  from the breast—
but, aye, when the lunch is cleared and way is made for the buttons and patches, 
I’m hindered from settling into it by a draught that, no matter what the weather 
outside, comes under the door and cuts into me like a knife.  
Over my shoulder, it does blow, and into my ear.  Then, whirling in my 
head, it swings my weathercock round and points it  backwards and northwards, 
and sets me to believing that because I’ve done my time spinning cotton, I ought 
be handy at this fancywork too.  ‘Lord bless us and save us, Lizzie Burns,’ the 
wind roars, ‘All those years at the mill and you can’t do a simple cross-stitch?’
I know it’s only the devil trying to make me pucker a seam or prick my 
finger; it’s only himself trying for my soul before the Lord calls for it.   So I try to 
pay no heed.  Though it gives me an ache to have to listen to him, speeching off 
like one of the mill men—‘What we do today, London does tomorrow!’—or 
whistling the sound of the mule, dandier to him than a lark, I make as if I’m taken 
up with the feeding of thread and the making of loops, for I don’t need to answer 
for myself.  
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That’s just how it went in Manchester.  The way  it was, we were the ones 
who went out to earn the fire and candle, and it was the men who sat home and 
did the darning.  That was the custom of the place, on account of our wages being 
the lower.  I can’t be faulted for that.  
_________
Mr McDermot down Parliament Passage, he even does it for the mint, like he’s a 
seamstress.  You pass your clothes into him in the morning—he has a basket set 
out under the window, so all you have to do is drop them through and shout  in 
your name—and he sews them up grand while you’re at work, and has them ready 
for collecting the same p.m.  Mrs McDermott is a spinner like the rest of us, but at 
one of the shabbier mills that doesn’t let you out till nine or ten, so when you pass 
by and gander in, you see her man there, pinny-tied and stool-sat, sewing panels 
and fixing hems and putting strings in caps, looking all alone only  for the bits of 
clothes and children spread about him.  You only ever see him getting up to stir 
the supper.
They wouldn’t believe you in London, if you told them.  
Nor would they understand—though it’s a simple thing to grasp—that when 
you’re out  working all day, you don’t learn how to knit  or to mend, or to have any 
of the home virtues other missuses might have.  Indeed, if today I’ve any skills to 
boast of at all, it’s only thanks to the Jew, Mr Beloff, from up Ancoats Street way.  
I run in with Beloff during my second year at the Ermen & Engels.  Having 
served out his year at the mill, Frederick has gone back to Germany, leaving Mary 
with a head full of dangerous notions.  She thinks he’s coming back.  She believes 
that, one day  soon, when he’s done with his business on the continent, he’ll ride 
back into Manchester and carry her off to the good life, the foreign life.  It’s a bad 
moment.  When she’s not demented with high feeling, she’s sitting in the dark and 
letting the blue demons waste her.  And on those frightening occasions when she’s 
neither up nor down but normal, she’s entertaining men, one after the other, in an 
effort to forget.  I often fear she is near to downbreak.  But I don’t know how to 
reach her.  My words she screams over.  My attempts at embrace she throws off 
and resents.  ‘You don’t understand,’ she says, ‘and you never will.’
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It’s not long before I feel worn away by it  all, and I begin to spend my 
evenings from home, and my Sundays too, in the dramshops and the pubs.  Soon 
enough I’m getting thick with a boy called Sully from Spinning Field, who takes 
to walking me over to where the Medlock meets the Irwell, and to kissing me, and 
to putting his hands inside my  dress, and to telling me that  Manchester is in 
England, and England is in London, and as soon as he’s saved a bit of money, 
he’ll quit the whole damn place and boat it back to Ireland, make a big family 
there.  Sully  has no regular situation.  He spends his days collecting bits of 
smoked cigars from the gutter, which he then dries out and sells back to the 
tobacconists for a price.  And when there’s no cigar butts to be had, he looks over 
the streets for sticks and handkerchiefs and shawls that have been dropped in the 
night.  Or he digs out the cracks between the paving stones with rusty nails to find 
a penny.  Or he collects dried out dog-dirt for the tanning yards, and bones for the 
glue makers.  And he never sticks to anything.  Spends most of his time 
wandering about, looking for a bit of amusement.  And when I’m finished my day 
at the mill and have no desire to go home to Mary and her wailing, I join him, for 
I like his way of living outside. 
Push to shove, we fall in with the mud larks, and we fare grand with them. 
We sit by the Medlock, Sully and his gang and me, waiting for the tide’s retiring, 
throwing stones and shouting oaths at the old women who make a head start by 
wading straight into the water and fishing down to their elbows, not minding what 
they  stand on for their feet have long gone to leather.  We wrap scraps around our 
own to keep them safe, but we’re young and still have imaginations about what 
we can’t see, so we decide it better to bide for the mud.  What we find in it, we 
sell.  Bits of coal, we knock off to the neighbours at a penny a pot.  A pound of 
bones gets you a farthing at  the rag-shop.  Dry  rope is worth more than wet.  But 
copper nails are the real treasure: fourpence, you get, for a pound.  You get naught 
for the blood worms, their having no use or value, but we collect them anyhows, 
fill our pockets with them and then take them out in fistfuls to show the fine ladies 
on Deansgate.  
The worms are all the wildlife there is in Manchester, apart from the pigs in 
the courts.  But oddtimes—it’s true—a wind comes down the Medlock and brings 
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a seagull with it.  You don’t remark on it hanging there till one of the others points 
it out to you.  Then you’re not able to stop remarking on it, the way it stays up 
without moving a limb, and you go all envious, like a fool.
Mary’s livid about my larking.  ‘When you sink so low,’ she says, ‘It isn’t 
easy to pick yourself up  again.  What if the mill people find out what you’re 
doing?  What if one of the foremen sees you running about like Miss Jim Crow, 
all torn and covered in muck?  What would Frederick think?  You’re going to ruin 
everything!’  
And eventual things do go Mary’s way.  I get a nail in the foot, and in the 
same unlucky week, a bit of glass in the other, which leaves me lame.  I can’t get 
up from crawling and have to go about the place like a dog.  I’m still suffering for 
it in the knees.  
‘Serves you right,’ Mary says, ‘That’ll learn you.’  
All the same, she makes sure to put a word in for me at  the mill, and she 
gets a promise—it’s no secret how—that I’ll get my job back once I’m healed.
I spend most of the days pent up in our room.  But if the weather’s nice, I sit 
on the step outside and watch the course of the passing day.  Sully from Spinning 
Field doesn’t find his way to me—he must be a dullard or just a laggard, for I told 
him precise how to get here—but as chance has it, the Jew Beloff passes by 
regular to visit the boghole, his own court having none.  And one day, when he 
gives me a farthing for no more than a salute, I get to speaking with him.  
‘See you about the place, Sir,’ I says, for he’s hard to miss, as tall as he is, 
all long and black, and with very little whisker on him; not a bit like Karl.  ‘I see 
you about but I’m not familiar with your people.  Is it Irish you are?’  
He enjoys that, he does.  He stops and gives me his gums and leans on the 
wall beside me and tells me his kin isn’t a bit of Irish but comes from the other 
direction, far out East.  
‘Out Ardwich way?’ I says.  
‘Further,’ he says.  
The way he explains it, the Jews live in England like a people apart: private 
rites and holidays, and a separate parish to give out  relief.  Most  of them work as 
clothesman, like himself and his own father before him, buying and selling.  Hats, 
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he says, are valuable and always will be, as long as there’s heads to put them on. 
He opens out his bag and shows me his wares, and I’m surprised how quality  they 
are, fit for a different caste altogether.
From now on, every time he comes by, he stops to talk, and when I’m not on 
my step but inside, he takes it on himself to knock on the door and ask for me, 
much to the fright of Mary, who sees no good reason for a Jew to be calling, and 
wants him sent away.  I do no such thing, of course, for I’m fain to go out to him, 
and we get to knowing each other well.
When we’re together I even forget he’s a Jew, for it isn’t like when you see 
a nigger musician in the halls or a stray Chinaman off the Liverpool boats and 
your heart falls to thumping and you don’t want to get close.  With Beloff you can 
pass the day  beside him and not think about it, for he’s skin-coloured and doesn’t 
appear that queer when you check him over proper, and you can laugh with him 
just the same as with one of us.  Like the time he tells me he gave me that first 
farthing because he thought I was a cripple, and a cripple is as good as a corpse in 
his book, no good to the living except as a weight to carry around, and there’s 
something about that—the picture of the living carrying around the dead—that 
makes us buckle.  
From my blather, he gets intimate with our affairs.  Mary warns me about 
talking to strangers and letting on how hard things are for us, and dragging us 
through the muck that way.  
‘The less people who know our worries the better,’ she says.  ‘No name is a 
good name.’  
But the way I see it, Beloff knows anyhows that we’re down a wage on 
account of my wounds, and he can hear the bang and clatter of Mary inside, and 
can see for himself how hard it  is to be cooped up  with it all day, obeying rules 
made by an ill woman.  He isn’t blind to the thin stick of my arm either.  ‘It won’t 
do me harm to play it up a portion,’ is what I think.  
And sure enough one day he says to me, he says, ‘As soon as your feet  are 
better and you can get around again you should come and work for me.’  
And in that moment I come to the knowledge that a man can indeed help 
you rise in the world.  All you have to do is pick him out right and play him well.
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A matter of weeks and I’m going to Beloff’s house every Friday p.m. after 
the mill, and again on Saturday till nightfall, for that’s when the Jews keep  their 
Sabbath and won’t touch anything, so he gives me my wittals and a couple of bob 
to do it for him.  Snuffing the candles, is what I do, and poking the fire and 
scrubbing his collars and doing the dishing-up, and he says if I ever get good at it, 
I’ll one day be able to do the sewing too: the sewing of all the clothes that come to 
him broken.  What he gives me in return isn’t enough to get a room of my own, 
but at least it gives me time away from Mary, with the added thrill of a regular lot 
to eat: supper on Friday and fried fish on Saturday, and dinner then, and tea, and 
supper after that, and that suits me.  
A one-room back-to-back in a court same as our own, is all he has, but  he 
has the luck to live alone, his wife being passed over and his children gone to try 
their chances in London and such fields.  This means it’s only ever the two of us: 
me going about  my business and him at the table or on his mattress, rolling 
cigarettes and calling out his orders.  ‘Do it with two hands is better.’  ‘It’s not 
going to come out, Lizzie, if you don’t bend down into it.’  ‘You’ll take your eye 
out like that.  The needle needs to come at you and over your shoulder, not away 
from you like you’re doing.’  
I don’t see it yet but what I’ll eventual realise is that he’s training me for 
home service, for that’s the only way out of the mills.  
‘You’re ignorant on the fundaments,’ he says.  ‘It’s best  not to show you 
know anything, they’ll not stand for a know-all, but  for the sake of your mind and 
the mind of your people, you should know the fundaments, every  one should 
know the fundaments,’ and then he starts pumping me on subjects I feel young yet 
for grasping. 
I don’t trust  him at first, for there’s one thing I do know for myself: there’s 
always someone trying to improve you, especial if you’re Irish.  But over time I 
come to understand that Beloff is different from the higher-ups who pity  you to 
the amount of a lecture.  Over and above being a Jew, he’s a separate species of 
man and fond of learning, and wants to pass it on, for he thinks that important in 
itself.  He thinks learning alone can smarten you.  He even thinks it’s better than 
mint or land.
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One day he notices my suspicions and he says to me, ‘What motivates me 
isn’t charity, Lizzie.  Ask anyone who knows me, I don’t have a compassionate 
bone in my body.  Nor am I looking to have power over you by making you a fool 
to myself.  Believe what I say  only  when it  agrees with the dictates of your own 
common sense.  When it doesn’t, I want you to speak up, for perhaps there is 
intelligence you can give me in return,’ and that gives me pause to consider, and 
the fears I have of him turning me into a queer body like himself fade, and I begin 
to hearken proper.
He gives me many  lessons.  About the earth and the sun, and which goes 
around which.  And about how to speak, like you don’t says ‘worser’ but ‘worse’, 
and unless you say it a hundred times a day till it comes out natural you’ll be put 
down as an unread and no notice will ever be taken of you.  And about England 
and how it’s a place where the people spend too much time inside, thinking, and 
this gives them notions about themselves and sets them to believing they’re 
masters and can rule over other people who live in other places.  And about the 
difference between the English and the Irish, how one are Protestants and have to 
choose between High and Broad and Low, and the other are Catholics, plain and 
simple, and slaves to the English, and will keep on being slaves until the Catholics 
from other places, Spain and that neighbourhood, come to free them. 
A lot of what he says is thick-spread like this and hard to swallow, and I 
oftentimes feel like telling him that a Jew has no right to be talking about things 
that don’t concern him, and he’d better shut his trap in case any  body hears and 
slaps it shut for him.  The only  thing that stops me is a feeling I have, strong and 
deep down, that liars don’t talk like him. 
My last ever lesson with Beloff I remember like I had it yesterday.  
‘Stick clear of the religions, Lizzie.  There’ll come a time in your world 
employment when they’ll want to save your soul by  making you read passages 
and live by  rules written down.  There’ll be little you can do to avoid it, you being 
the pauper and them being of the conviction that you’re such because you lack 
faith.  You won’t have a say except to listen, but you shouldn’t let it in.  Mouth the 
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words they ask you to speak, but don’t put your believing in them, do you 
understand me?  Learn the words but don’t credit their meanings.’  
It’s the sad hour of a Saturday evening.  When I finish putting this last bit of 
polish on the candlesticks, I’ll have to cook his tea, then it’ll be time to go back.  I 
rub as slow as I can to stretch out the minutes.   
‘But I already have a religion,’ I says.  ‘I even go to Mass for it.’  
He’s over by  the fire, wrapped in the bed things.  ‘What matters your 
religion if it’s the wrong one?  They’ll want to change it, and you should be ready 
for them.’  
‘Sounds like you’ve quarrels with the Protestants, Mr Beloff.’  
‘Yes and with your kind too.  And my own kind most of all, make no 
mistake about it.  Each as bad as the next, thinking they  know the secret to living 
and dying, and fighting each other over it all the while.’  
‘But you obey the rules.  You don’t work on a Saturday.’
‘Ignoramus girl.  You mistake something born of blind conviction and 
something done out of mere habit.’
‘You don’t believe at all?’  
‘It’s not a question of believing.  It’s about suspecting the ideas they’re 
putting into your head.  Always look at who is telling you something as much as 
what he’s telling you.’  
‘What are you saying, Mr Beloff?  I oughtn’t hearken to someone if I don’t 
like the look of him?’  
‘No, you should listen more.  That’s how you’ll learn to be the good judge.’  
I put the sticks I’ve shone back where he likes them—one on the 
windowsill, two on the table, the rest on the dresser by  the pictures of his family
—and put the water on for the potatoes, but  low.  If he keeps on like this it’ll go 
past the hour for my leavetaking and that’ll be grand by me, every minute away 
from Mary being a minute from the scourges saved.  I peel with the blunt knife. 
Instead of bringing the fork and plate to the table together on the salver, I make 
trips back and forth.  
‘You can stay, young Lizzie, if it’ll take the stones out of your shoes.’  
‘Mr Beloff?’  
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He takes the bite off his pipe, spits into the fire.  ‘If it’s such a vexation for 
you to go back, you can remain.’  
‘Where’d I sleep?’ 
 He whirls round, looking horrored.  ‘I said nothing about sleeping!’  
‘Oh.’  
He makes a gesture to say his heart is pierced by my look.  ‘All right, all 
right, I suppose we could find something for you to lie on.’ 
I smile and put  the bacon in to fry and, over the sizzle, try to comprehend 
my feelings.  
I’m put on a mat in front of the fire with a rolled-up rug under my head and a coat 
thrown over.  
‘How’s that?’ he says.  
‘Warm enough,’ I says.  
All night I keep  my eyes closed but am kept alert by  the expectation of a 
snore or a fart or any  sign to show Beloff’s gone off into his slumbers so that I can 
go off myself without fretting about keeping him up with my own noises.  But 
naught comes, bare even a breath.  When I open my eye a slit and look through 
the dark, I can make him out on his back on the mattress, stiff and ironed out like 
a corpse.  
It’s the first time in my life I don’t say my prayers.
As soon as there’s light I get up and make a new fire.  I take out the ash and 
the night soils.  Seeing the volume that comes out of the bucket, I realise I must 
have slept after all, for I didn’t hear Beloff getting up.  I spend in the lane myself 
so as to leave the bucket empty.  While I’m haunched over I watch the flapping of 
the oilskin in the window of the house opposite, which satisfies me and gives me 
no short measure of peace, it being early  and there being no bodies yet risen to 
distract me. 
Back inside, I’m surprised to find Beloff up and waiting for his breakfast.  
‘Am I getting something for the extra day?’ I says.
He grumbles something about asking no questions till he’s had his coffee.  
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‘Where do you go to the Mass?’ he says once served.  ‘I want you to take 
me.’  
‘To Mass?’  
‘That’s right.’  
‘Do the Jews not have their own churches?’  
‘They do but I want to go to yours.  That’s the humour I’ve woken up to.’  
On the road there, he must realise I’m not bringing him to my regular place, 
for I lead us out of the way, far from the passages and over past the lots.  But he 
doesn’t let on or allow his good mood to change.  He whistles through his lips and 
skips through the puddles, jumps over the lushed-out bodies sleeping on the road. 
When a scrawn of a cat  comes out of a sprung door, he lifts it up and presents it to 
me for petting.  
I’m having trouble finding the church I’m thinking about, for I’ve never 
stepped inside it but only wandered by.  The third or fourth time we circle past the 
same court, Beloff stops and leans on the pig-pen that takes up  most of it.  From a 
window a bit of something is thrown and the animals snort and climb over each 
other to get it.  
‘You know, Lizzie, most of the Jews who don’t eat pork don’t know why it 
shouldn’t be eaten, only it’s wrong to eat it.  Do you see the lunacy of that?’  
‘The only lunacy I see, Mr Beloff, is yours for the bacon.’  
He laughs.  ‘I’m no bigot, Lizzie.  I don’t care where I get my meat, so long 
as I can get it.  I often go and buy it without looking at what it is or how they’ve 
killed it, whether it has a seal or not.  And why?’  
I shrug.  
‘Idiot girl.  Because I don’t think it’s wrong.  The Chinaman eats cats and 
doesn’t think that wrong.  He’d be shocked and appalled if you told him it  was. 
Does that make him bad and evil?’
When eventual I find the church, I’m appalled to see that, despite it being 
first Mass, it’s squeezed to bursting.  Have we come on a feast day without my 
knowing?  I go to stand at the back with the men who, hungover and coughing, 
have been pulled out of the beds by their women.  Beloff is having none of that. 
He bends his arm out, puts my hand on the inside of his elbow and marches me up 
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to the top  as if giving me away.  I don’t think my heart has ever beat so fast  or my 
face taken in so much blood.   
He genuflects.  He kneels.  He stands.  He bows.  The old beggar even 
clasps his hands and speaks out the prayers, word for effin word, and all I can 
think is ‘Will this ever be over?’  Then, just as I begin to see a light shine at the 
end, he joins the file of bodies going up, and my worst fears come to be.  
‘You oughtn’t of taken the host,’ I find the boldness to say on the walk back 
home.  
‘Why on earth not?’ he says, putting on to be surprised by my displeasure.  
‘You’re not a bit of a Catholic and you oughn’t have.’  
‘Oh but Lizzie’—he’s enjoying this, the hooer’s donkey—‘I was hungry.’  
‘You were making a mockery.’  
‘And do you see me burning up for it?  Has the lightning come to strike 
me?’  
‘You’re going to hell.’  
‘Which hell is that?’  
‘Whichever one’ll have you.’  
He shakes his head and chortles.  ‘Oh child of the Irish benighted—’  
‘Lizzie’s my name.  Lizzie Burns.’  
‘Well, Lizzie, it’s time you grew up and climbed out of your swamp.’ 
Mary is waiting outside his door.  She has a shawl dragged over her head 
and pulled across her nose against the cold.  I’m almost glad to see her.  
‘How long have you been out here?’ I says.  
‘Long enough,’ she says, muffling through the cloth.  ‘Where were you?  I 
was worried sick.’  
‘It’s Sunday, young Mary,’ Beloff breaks in.  ‘Where else would we be but 
at the Mass?’  
Mary’s hand comes out from under her coverings to bestow on me an 
almighty  whack.  The pain of it rings as far as my toes.  Before this violence, I 
was resolved to leave Beloff, to skivvy no more for him, for he’s a man with no 
respect to show for anything, but now I find myself conflicted.  
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‘And you, Sir,’ Mary  says, pointing a finger at him, ‘You ought be ashamed 
of yourself.’  
Beloff doesn’t look the slightest bit fussed.  ‘Sister child, why don’t you 
come in and we’ll boil up some tea, get the cold out of those limbs?’  
‘Tea?  Here’s your tea, you dirty Jewish.’  
She frees her mouth of its veil and spits on the ground by his feet.  Turns on 
her heel and storms away.
When I leave I know I’ll never be coming back, so I stay a while drinking 
tea and looking into the fire, and another while frying up the midday dinner.  
Says he:  ‘Don’t look so hard at it or it’ll turn.’  
When it begins to darken he tells me he has a card party to go to and it’s 
time I faced what  I had coming.  I hate him then and wish him dead.  How dare he 
send me away  when it’s his own hide that ought be tanned?  All the same, I know 
that when Mary comes at me, it will be pleading his honour I’ll be doing.  
 
XI
With Radical Chains
‘Here!  Spiv!  Pumps!’
Five in the p.m. of another day and I’m feeling compunctions about being over-
hard.  Five in the p.m. and, again, I decide it’s time for a fresh start.  Five in the 
p.m. and I call them to the morning room.  
Pumps arrives, her hand in her mouth as usual, finger rubbing tooth.  ‘Are 
we expecting?’ she says, making sheep’s eyes at the tea things I’ve put  out, the 
cake I’ve cut.  
‘Nay,’ I says, ‘I thought  we’d have a sneaky tuck-in, the three of us.’  I smile
—muster all I can—and spread butter onto the slices and put them onto the plates. 
‘With all the running round we do, it’s rare we take the time to sit down and have 
a chat like us girls ought do together.’  
Spiv appears in the doorway.  Folds her arms across.  ‘I made that cake for 
Sunday.’  
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‘You did?’  I take the prize-slice with the cherry  for myself.  ‘Well, no harm, 
can’t you make another?’  She opens to give out, but I’m faster:  ‘And aren’t there 
always the shops?  The world wouldn’t stop without you.’
I pour.  Spiv perches, ready to jump up and gainsay any involvement if it  all 
turns out to be a rig.  The more effort she spends keeping the saucer from falling 
off her knee, the more figetted she gets and the more tea that spills over.   Pumps, 
on the other side, slouches like it  was onto cushions she was born.  A parish pip 
warming her hands, she makes, the way she’s holding her cup underneath.  
‘Now, girls,’ I says, ‘I’ve been thinking.  It’s nigh time we looked at your 
half day.’  
Pumps takes her bit of cake up and bites into it.  ‘The half day’s fine as it 
is,’ she says, wet crumbs flying.  ‘Why fix something that isn’t broke?’  
‘For goodness sake, child,’ I says, ‘If from time to time you hearkened 
before you spoke, you might actual learn something.  You’ve neither of you to 
worry.  I don’t want to take any of your time away.  It’s more time I want to give 
you.  An extra hour seems fair to me for all the work you’ve been doing, helping 
us settle in and the rest.  Believe it or not, it’s already two months since we came 
to live under this roof, and that makes a whole quarter of a year, and it’s not 
always been roses, I know.  There have been high emotions and some bad scenes. 
I own I’ve not been the easiest, this being a new arrangement for me.  But now I 
want to wash the plate clean.  I want us to be friends.’ 
Glad of myself, I push my  cake in and wash it  down, press my thumb onto 
my plate to collect what’s fallen.  We all of us ought remember that, though it’s no 
small task to be large and humble, the pleasures got from it make it worth the 
trouble.
Spiv clatters her cup down and narrows across at me.  ‘Pumps is right, the 
half day ought stay put as it is.’  
‘But—’  My tea goes down the wrong way.  ‘But Spiv, cough cough, don’t 
you understand, cough, I’m trying to give you something?  A reward for your 
services?’  
She curls at me.  ‘The name’s Camilla, Ma’am.’ 
Lord have mercy, not this old bone.  
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‘Your name’s what I call it, Spiv’—how swift a rising ire can gulf the finer 
feelings—’And it’d do you no harm to remember there’s girls who get only  an 
afternoon a month, if they’re given pause at all.’  
As if to remind me of the times, she throws her eyes up.  ‘Adding an hour’d 
be no help, Ma’am.  With the lunch, I can’t  get out before two, and if I come back 
after seven there’d be every thing still to do for the morning.  It’d make Thursdays 
unpossible.’ 
Camilla Barton, Camilla Barton, it’s higher than your hole you’re fartin’.
‘All I want,’ I says, putting the rage into the stirring of a fresh cup, ‘All I 
want is for us to be a bit closer.  I’m not asking us to be bosom familiars or any 
such thing.  I understand you must live according to your age and have your own 
secrets.  I don’t expect you to have older heads than you do, nor give out all their 
contents.  But wouldn’t it be right to share ourselves out a touch, to take our spare 
time together now and then, to do things more like a family?  I’m sure Frederick 
would like to see it that way.  You know how he hates ill-feeling in the house.’  
‘Listen, Aunt Liz—’  Pumps puts on that voice she’s learnt from listening to 
the Men in the parlour, that reasonable voice they like to use.  If I wasn’t busy 
with my handkerchief getting a splash of milk off my sleeve, I’d flatten my  hand 
and silence it that way.  ‘Aunt Liz, it’s very nice of you to offer, and we love 
Frederick right well and want him happy in every feature, but I’m telling you, you 
wouldn’t like what we do.  We run about  and get  up to young tricks, it wouldn’t  fit 
you right.  You’re a bit past it, if you don’t mind me saying.’  
This brings a new rush of gall to my embittered mood.  Lucky, she’d be, at 
my age, to have hair half as black, not a grey strand on show, and no lady do-
naught in London has it so shiny and thick.  ‘Mind yourself, Mary Ellen Burns,’ I 
says.  ‘If you’re let out at all it’s because I licence it.  And if you’re here instead of 
freezing your derry-air on a Manchester street corner, it’s also because I licence 
it,’ and she knows it  good and she knows it  well, which is why the colours come 
up her face and she withers back into her cap.  
By now our little Burns dramas must be as familiar to Spiv as any she can 
recall from her own childhood, but I don’t think it’s in her natural nature to be 
generous in her comparisons, or to own that her bad feelings towards us might 
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actual be the flutterings of envy, on account of being so far from her own kind and 
having so little opportunity  to quarrel with them.  So she sits through it silent and 
judgeful, and when it’s over and Pumps has begged her pardons, she stands up 
with a sigh and starts to clear.  
‘Mrs Burns, if I may,’ she says, licking a blot of icing that gets on her finger 
while scraping.  
‘What is it, Spiv?’  
‘Mrs Burns—’  She doesn’t look at me but between her fingers, in those 
warm spaces where the mites sometimes gather, for any icing she might have 
missed.  ‘Mrs Burns, can’t you go out with Mrs Marx and her intimates?  Isn’t she 
forever inviting you?  And wouldn’t you enjoy that much the better?’ 
‘Put those plates down, Spiv.’  
She gives me a wary look.  
‘I said put them down.  I’ll do them.’  
Once free of her burden, she bobs a curtsy.  
‘Now get out of my sight.  You too, Pumps.’  
Heads bowed, they hare for the door.  
‘You both ought be married by now,’ I call after them.  ‘You ought be 
married and not here bothering me.’  
I’m left feeling too much to move.  A cruddy humour has come and teased away 
my goodwill, the hopes I had of refreshing the heavy airs in this wretched house. 
Of course, the proper thing now would be to turn my affliction to good, to rise and 
come over it with busyness and tasks.  Trial and emotion strengthen the 
constitution and ought be cheerful borne, is how the saying goes.  But to look at 
the half-eaten cake and the pool of tea in Spiv’s saucer—just to look at them—
tires me right out, weighs me to the carpet.  
Jenny says that the Revolution will better our fare.  That it will pay  us for 
our home tasks and make us self-supporters.  And I’m ready to put  my doubts in a 
drawer and believe it isn’t a swindle; I’m ready to follow the wind.  But what 
she’s not saying—what I’ve to keep  to my own sorry  self—is that the pace the 
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Revolution’s going, with the comrades divided on themselves and squabbling over 
trifles, we’ll not live to enjoy it.
I stay in my chair like this till I hear Frederick’s step coming down the 
stairs.  Of a sudden I’m charged with a desire to squeal on them.  I must let it  out, 
I think.  I must reveal to him how they really are before it burns me away.  A fire 
lights in my chest and roars in my ears.  ‘We could do without them,’ I’ll say.  ‘We 
could live alone, just you and me, and get by regular well.’
I hear his feet hitting the tiles in the hall.  I stand and take up a stack of 
plates and hold them in front so that, if he comes in on me, I’ll be seen to be doing 
something.  He shuffles about outside the door.  Picking things up and knocking 
things over.  Giving out German curses.  
‘Shy-sir,’ he’s saying, ‘Shy-sir, shy—’
A moment and he bursts in, the skirts of his coat flying.  ‘Ah, here you are,’ 
he says.  ‘Have you seen a letter lying around?’  He spies over the tables and 
sideboards, turns over the clock on the chimneypiece, peers under the mats and 
the doilies.  I can’t work out if it’s me who’s looking slow or him who’s moving 
train-speed.  ‘I put it on the hall table to take to Karl, but someone seems to have 
moved it.’  
By his tone I know he’s holding down a temper.  I decide now to be the 
wrong minute to come at him with the house doings.  ‘I’ve not seen any  letter, my 
love,’ I says, putting down the plates to help in the search.  ‘What did it look 
like?’  
He turns to look hard at me, the conch shell in one hand and the ballerina 
figurine in the other.  ‘It looked like a letter, Lizzie.’  
Folding open the doors to the parlour, he has to fix his elbow to his side to 
keep  the papers under his arm from falling.  I go to help him.  ‘Here, give me 
those.’  
‘Nine—’  He puts them down on the writing desk.  ‘Leave them there, do 
not touch them.’  He pulls the doors open the rest of the way and goes through, 
begins tearing at every blessed thing: the plants, the vases, the albums, the 
pressing books, the sewing box. 
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I sigh and follow him in.  Lift the newspaper off the seat  of the armchair.  ‘Is 
this it?’  
‘Which?  Ya, thank the devil.’  He whips it up.  ‘I wish people would keep 
their hands off things.’  He puts it under his arm where he had the other papers 
before.  ‘Right, Lizzichen, I’m off’—hand brushing light on my arm, whiskers 
tickling my cheek—‘I’m with Karl for dinner tonight.’  
‘But I’ve ordered fowl.  Spiv is going to roast it.’  
‘Have it yourselves.  Or I can send Jenny down to help you.’  
‘Nay, nay.  I’m sure the girls will be happy with an extra helping.’  
‘Super, then.’  
‘Don’t forget these.’  I give him the papers from the writing desk.  
‘Ah ya, thank you.  Bis bald.’
I bide till he’s halfways out the door.  ‘Oh but Frederick—?’  
He twists and looks at me over his collar.   
I point to his shoes, all scuffed and muddied.  ‘You’re not going out with 
those looking like that, are you?’  
He looks down and curls his toes up.  ‘I don’t have a clean pair left.  These 
will have to do.’  
Being so peculiar about his appearance—his lines he likes straight and his 
colours in tune—I thought he’d be pleased to have his eye drawn to the lapse, but 
I see now I’ve only  nettled him further.  A flush comes to his cheeks, and his 
response is mottled by it, and it makes me feel down-low and contrite, for I 
remember now that I promised to polish them yesterday, and it’s only on account 
of his high manners he’s not mentioning it.  There’s people, I know, that write 
down their tasks in a ledger, and the hours for doing them, but I count on my own 
brains, and I’m not a machine, time and times there’s things that slip through.  
‘Come on then,’ I says, ‘Take them off and I’ll do them this minute.  I won’t 
have Jenny saying I send you out on your business looking like a rural.’  
‘I have a cab waiting.  They are fine as they are.’  
‘Sit down there now.  Flick of a lamb’s tail and they’ll be done.’  
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I draw him over to the chair by  the occasional table and put him into it.  He 
moans.  Throws his papers down.  Takes out his watch and studies it.  But he stays 
sat all the same. 
I’m about to ring the bell for Pumps to bring the polishing box when the 
earwigger herself comes running in with it.  ‘Here we go, Uncle Angel,’ she says, 
and kneels in front of him.  ‘Give me your foot here and we’ll get those spick and 
span for you.’  
The bell-cord still tight in my grip, I glower down at her.  ‘I’ll do that, 
Pumps, thank you.  I’m sure you’re busy at other things.’  
‘Not at all,’ she says.  ‘I can’t think of any task that would better merit my 
attending.’  She smiles up at Frederick and takes his foot onto her pinny.  He 
meets her mooning face and—begad the weakness of men!—his arrangement 
softens.  
‘Pumps,’ I says, coming to stand over her, ‘This is something I’ve promised 
Mr Engels to do and I’d like to do it.’  
‘For God sake, Lizzie,’ he says, chucking an arm at me, ‘Let the girl do it.’  
I’m still holding the newspaper I took from the armchair.  I slap it now 
against my skirts and take the chair on the other side of the table.  All right, let her 
do it, but she’ll need watching over.  
While Pumps works, he fans himself with a magazine, sending the smell of 
spices across.  ‘What would I do without you, Pumps?’ he says.  ‘You’re a good 
girl, you’re learning well.’  
She looks up  at him, and they beam at each other, and it’s enough to make 
the juices rise from your stomach.  
He lets her work for as long as he has the patience.  ‘I’m going to be late,’ 
he says when it’s final exhausted.  ‘Are we nearly there?’  
‘Nigh on, Uncle Angel,’ says Pumps.  A few more lashes of the brush, and 
she lifts his foot down to the carpet.  ‘There we are.  Good as new.’  
‘Thank you, mine leebling,’ he says.  ‘They look great.’  He leans over and 
kisses her on the cheek.  
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She reddens and bows down, hides her face under the fringe of her bonnet. 
‘You’re some fine charmer, Uncle Angel,’ she says, putting the tubs and the 
brushes back in the box.  
He tips his head and grins.  Gets up and stretches.  Puts his papers under his 
arm.  ‘Don’t wait up!’ 
He’s gone—slam!—and I’m left with the task of bursting the little grubber’s 
head, though I find now I don’t have the energy for it.  She mutters something 
about clemming for a smoke, and I let her go. 
I gather up my ends and make the window in time to see Frederick climb 
into his cab.  But there’s only a flash of him to catch, and it strikes a chill in me, 
the fact that I see less of him now I’m living with him than in Manchester when 
he had us separate; the fact that we were better off the old way, better friends to 
each other.  And there’s other facts, too, that come dashing towards me like the 
rain against  the glass, but I turn from them and come away, for I’d hate for him to 
look back and see me here, watching at his coat-tails.
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December
XII
The Holy Family
Like flies on gristle, the mad bodies of London swarm the Zoo.  A thicker brew of 
hatters in this corner of the Park than in the whole rest of the city.  In the parrot 
house, weird old women trill and chirp and throw buttons to the birds.  In the 
aquarium, gents softened by idlement leer into the murk and, by the looks of it, 
dream of sprouting fins of their own.  The reptile house, the giraffe house, the 
camel house, the pelican house: little asylums, all, for those nuts with the shillings 
to spare for the turnstiles; wealth enough to be separate and peculiar, the busy 
world not daring to put on them or hinder their temper.  It makes me queasy to be 
here, in and among them, and I worry that Tussy’s love of the place is a sign she’s 
headed the same way.
‘I beg you, Auntie Lizzie,’ she said.  ‘Come with me to see the moving crib.’ 
‘The what now?’  
‘The moving crib.  Every year before Christmas they build a stable and fill 
it with exotic animals.  And instead of statues, they have real people playing the 
holy family.’
Am I the only me who sees it?
I agreed to come, against my own wishes, for I was afraid that alone she’d 
be approached, or in her innocence would do the approaching herself and, by 
there, get herself into situations.  I’m so fond of the poor child, I’d hate to hear of 
her tricked or fouled.  ‘All right, all right, the Zoo it is,’ I said, and no sooner was 
it out of my mouth than I began to look forward to the hours spent away from the 
house, and to the hand-holding and the secret whispers.  ‘We’ll bring a picnic, 
make a day of it,’ I said.  
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But, of course, by the time today  arrives around, bright and free of rain, 
she’s assembled herself an entire army of keepers, in the middle of which I vanish, 
bare noticed.  
Frederick leads us down the paths with the confidence of a man who has 
come to see this Christmas spectacle before.  With his women, it’s probable; the 
ones he fears will go to the bad if they’re not given proper distraction.  He’s 
dressed light for the freezing weather, in a frock coat built for September.  Beside 
it, Karl’s broadcloth suit, buttoned up to the whiskers, appears a solemn demand 
for respect: from the season, from the people, from the animals the same.  
Scattered around are the comrades Tussy has convinced to come.  One of 
them, a young strap I don’t have a name for, looks to have tied invisible twine 
from his sleeve to Janey’s, so firm does he stay by her, so little does he let  her 
drift from his air.  To watch it makes my heart sink, for I’ve seen it before, the 
clever and quiet  middle girl dashing into the arms of a rake, not for love or money 
but to avoid remaining at home as help to failing parents.  My wager is she’ll be 
engaged before we even realise.  
Two others, old enough to know better, are making circles around Tussy like 
stalking dogs.  She puts a sweat on them by  darting from cage to cage, pointing at 
the fur and feathers, lecturing on the ins and outs of the mating business, and now, 
for breaks, insisting they repeat the English names of the beasts till they can say 
them proper and with no foreign slurring.
Pumps is climbing a railing to get a better view of something.  I watch her 
and worry that I’ve made a mistake by  allowing her to come while keeping Spiv 
at home.  She’s getting used to the little privileges that come with having Burns in 
her blood and it’s hard to know whether that’s right or wrong.    
Jenny is far off with the women Jaclard and Goegg.  I’m being tanned by 
her, I can tell.   Every time I come near her, she turns her head towards the bars 
and puts on to be interested in the life going on behind them.  And her face: a 
window once wide open, now closed fast.  Her behaviour is no mystery to me, of 
course.  She’s acting like she is because I refuse her invitations.  Because I don’t 
call to see her.  Because I’ve not turned out the way she’d planned.
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Walking alone, I follow the company  into the tunnel.  Our noses closed 
against the reek, our eyes lowered against the loiterers in the shadows, we soon 
come out by the deer paddock.  
‘This way,’ Frederick calls out, and marches us towards a stable where a 
small crowd has gathered.  A collection of forlorn-looking boys in sandals and 
robes and false beards are stood, shivering, around a cot lined with straw.  The 
Virgin Mary has blue paint around her eyes and red on her cheeks and a shadow 
where her fluff has been sheered.  The baby Jesus is a doll in winding sheets.  The 
wise men have gold slippers and blackened faces.  Scratching around the sad 
scene is a collection of impossible animals.  Trunks, tusks, horns, hooves: it’s all 
there, a ridiculous array.  Saddest and loneliest of all is an animal half-zebra and 
half-donkey standing on three legs in the corner of the stall.  Tussy lures it over 
with some grass she’s pulled up from someplace.  
‘I consider that nothing living is alien to me,’ she says when, final, it takes 
her offering.  
It chews.  Flaps its lips.  Trundles back to its place.  Lifts its tail and pisses a 
gush.  
‘What is that thing?’ I says.  
‘It’s called a quagga,’ she says, reading from the plaque.
Fact: the hippopotamus is the only thing worth the fare.
Frederick suggests taking tea in the rooms by  the bowling green, and we 
agree.  
‘Everyone, follow me!’  
Jenny takes Tussy by the hand, steers her onto Frederick’s arm, leaving her 
admirers to tussle over Karl’s attentions.  Karl humours them the length of the 
llama pen (it’s Tussy, again, who tells us what they are), before breaking away and 
coming across to me.  
‘Do you mind, Lizzie?  Can I beg the favour of a word?’  
‘Of course, Karl.  What can I do for you?’ 
He applies just enough tug on my arm to draw me to the back of the pack.  I 
watch Tussy move further and further away and, trapped like a bird, curse myself 
for having left the nest at all.  
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‘As you can probably see,’ he says, ‘My wife is not in the best of shape.’  
I look at Jenny giggling onto Frederick’s shoulder.  ‘I’ve seen her worse.’  
Karl can’t hide his surprise.  ‘I must object, Lizzie.  Please do take into 
consideration that she likes to put on a good face.  I can assure you the woman is
—’
Suffering.  I get it.  The lot of the thoroughbred. 
‘My wife loves company,’ he says, ‘Even when the season is over and the 
days are shorter, she likes to receive guests and to get out as much as possible. 
True, she is beginning to understand that she must cosset herself a little more and 
not try  to make every single event.  But, on the other side, when she spends too 
much time at home she becomes, well, she becomes weary and crabbed, and her 
temper fires quick at the trigger.  Like one of these animals here.’  He looks 
around and rubs the back of his hand in a fretful way.  ‘Please do call on her, 
Lizzie.  She would benefit greatly from your company.  We all would.’  
‘I’ll do the best I can, Karl.  I’ve a house to run.’  
He turns and, with desperate eyes, searches me through.  
‘I’m sorry, Karl.  What I mean to say is, it would be a pleasure.  You don’t 
have to worry.  I’ll make sure Jenny is well looked after for the winter.’  
He sighs and smiles and lands one on my cheek.  ‘Thank you, Lizzie.  I just 
wanted to mention it.’  
‘Of course, Karl.  Any time.’  
The bogwork done, he brightens.  ‘And now we have Christmas to look 
forward to, don’t we?  We’re delighted you will be joining us.  We are inviting all 
the comrades who have no families to go to.  Making it special for them.  I 
guarantee a ruckus.  I know Jenny will love to have you there.  And Nim will 
appreciate the extra help from Pumps and Camilla.’  
He grins and pecks me again, his beard dipping down into my collar and 
tickling my neck, and like a ninny  I let out a titter, but inside there’s a fury 
bubbling, fired by the feeling that, once again, I’ve been tricked.  
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‘What’s this about Christmas in the Marxes?’ I says to Frederick when I get him 
alone later.  
‘Didn’t I tell you?’  
‘Nay, you’ve didn’t.  As usual I’ve to find out from the wrong people.’  
‘Are you angry?’  
‘What do you think?’  
‘I thought you’d like the idea.  Less work for you.’  
‘Oh, by the wilful ass of Mary and Joseph.’  
‘You don’t want to do it?’  
‘Of course I don’t want to do it!  Our first Christmas in London?  Spent  with 
Jenny and the whole wide world?  Why can’t we have it alone, as a family, quiet-
like?’  
‘All right, if that’s what you want, that’s what we’ll do.’  
‘Nay, it’s too late now.  You’ve already committed us.’  
‘We can change our plans.  I’m sure Jenny would understand.’  
‘Nay, we can’t do that.’  
‘Why not?’  
‘Blessed be, Frederick, for a man who claims to know the destiny of 
mankind, you understand diddly-dick about the laws of womenfolk.’
Where the greatest crime is to have your own mind.
XIIII
An Irish Lie
I know I ought to go up to her.  There’s things she’ll want me to do.  A list.  To 
buy and to do.  But I can’t rouse myself to it.  Tomorrow the spirit  might be in me, 
but not today.  Today my duty is to my own.  My own place.  My own house.  And 
Lord knows it’s long overdue a laundry wash.
‘Frederick, I’m going to need your help.’  
He’s bent over his desk, scribbling.  ‘Uh-huh,’ he says without looking up.  
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Sighing, I get down and check under his chair for slut’s wool.  ‘It’s going to 
be a busy day, Frederick.’  
‘I understand.  If you need a hand’—he waves the free one in the air over 
his head—‘All you have to do is ask.’  
‘Well, that’s what I’m here doing, Frederick.  I’m asking.’  
‘Ah.’  He turns his eyes up and looks at me through his fallen fringe.  
‘It’s laundry  day,’ I says, ‘The last before Christmas.  And I’ve no intention 
of putting it off or getting the woman in.  If we’re to get it done before 
suppertime, we’ll all have to pitch in our bit.’  
‘What do you want me to do?’  
‘Follow me.’  
‘Now?’  
‘Take that plate and those dirty glasses with you.’ 
Down in the scullery Spiv is bent over the washing book.  
‘Sir,’ she says, ‘What are you doing here?’  
‘He’s going to help,’ I says.  
He winks.  
She looks him up and down, a lick of scorn, before getting back to her list.  
‘Right, Frederick,’ I says, ‘You can start  by  sorting the pile out into aprons, 
collars, shirts, body linen—and what’s else?—nightclothes, pinnies and 
petticoats.’  
‘I am not certain I—’  
‘Any muslins, coloured cottons or woollens, leave to me.  Unusual looking 
stains, put them at one side and I’ll have a look.’  
‘But, Lizzie, I have not yet eaten lunch.’  
‘You’ll be having a big dinner.’  
‘I do not think I will make it that far alive.’  
I take the old cheese from his plate (he’s still holding it, of course, for he has 
no idea where to put it down) and push it into a bit of yesterday’s bread.  ‘There, 
that’ll keep you going.’  
The aggrieved look he pulls doesn’t prevent him from stuffing it in.  
‘Spiv, where’s Pumps?’  
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She nods towards the storeroom.  
I shake my head, not grasping.  
‘Hiding,’ she says.  
‘Oh by  the burning hole of Moses.’  I pull on the storeroom door but it 
doesn’t come.  ‘Pumps, let go of the handle.’  I try  again but it  stands with. 
‘Pumps!’  I bang on it with a fist.  ‘Get you the blazes out of there!’  
The silence of a cringing animal.  
‘Mr Engels is here, do you want him to see you acting the brat?’  
A yelp, the sound of things falling from the shelves.  The door gives, swings 
open.  
‘Git!’ I says.  
She stays cowering in the gloom.  
‘I said, git!’  
Keeping herself as far from me as the area allows, she creeps into the light. 
A scarf is tied round her face to cover her nose and mouth.  
‘What in the name of—’  I tear it down: a line of blisters across the top of 
her lip.  
‘She’s been at the arsenic again,’ says Spiv.  
‘Shut up!’ Pumps screams.  
Spiv mimics her—Shut up!—before turning to Frederick.  ‘She uses it to 
take her runner off.’ 
Middle-chew, Frederick lets his mouth fall open, crumbs and wet bits 
falling.  He puts a hand to his own whiskers, hides them away, as if they too were 
in danger.  You forget they can be a shock, the home doings, when you’re not used 
to them. 
Pumps runs crying from the room.  I follow her out.  ‘Spiv, I’ll deal with 
you later.’  
She shrugs, dips her pen in the pot, scribbles something down.  
‘Frederick, when you’re done separating, take the sheets out from soaking 
and rinse them.  Spiv’ll show you how.  We’ll be right down.’  
He swallows and gawps like a man out of his depth, a man sunk too deep.
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I find Pumps upstairs, slumped and sobbing.  ‘The consequences of vanity,’ 
I says.  
She buries her weeping puss deeper into the crook of her elbow.  
‘Shall I call Dr Allen?’  
She shakes her head.  
‘We’ll dress it, then, and you’ll be right.  I hope you’ve learnt your lesson 
this time.’  
She lifts her head and wipes her face.  
‘Come now, Pumps.  It’s not the end of the world.’  
Laying on liberal with the sniff and blubber, she lets herself be led to my 
room.  There I put a tincture on the wound that leaves a purple stain all about her 
mouth and cheeks.  It looks a fright, from three paces like a regular mutton chop, 
so I allow her to put the scarf back on, but only  as far as the nose and not over it; 
I’ll not have her going around looking like a sneak-thief.  I tell her where I’ve hid 
the cake and send her down to it.  
‘Get it into you quick and don’t dawdle, there’s work to be done.’  
Left alone, I stop a minute at my dressing table.  Take my favourite brush 
from the tin.  Run it through once.  Pull a handful round.  Start at the ends. 
There’s relief in this stolen moment, and I’m certain there’d be pleasure too, if the 
tart I baked yesterday hadn’t just now crowded in on my  mind.  I wince 
remembering how Spiv and Pumps looked at it coming out of the oven, hard as 
stone from too much rolling.  
I put the brush down.  It’s not the big but the petty things that keep us from 
sitting.  It’s against the little mistakes that we bear on, on, on.  Through the 
mornings of upped nerves and wasted breaths, the breakfasts warmed with a sup 
to stead us.  On into the lonely lunches and the afternoons of blaspheming in the 
mind and reflecting on what can’t be helped.  On across the halls and landings, the 
seeing-afters and well-doings, the fires and folds.  The book room.  The cook 
room.  The privy.  The parlour.  On and on and into the bedroom again, where 
again we pale at  the filth of the windows and the chimneypiece caked and the 
mirror smeared, and we catch the cut of ourselves, nuddy but for our workaday 
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dress, head bare of a cap and in want of attention, exhausted and deserving of a 
sit-down, if only we could learn proper how to air the dough. 
Back downstairs, Spiv has the possing stick and is beating the linen.  I send her 
out to make a start  on the supper—I suppose we can’t have Frederick starving—
and I give the job over to the man himself.  He takes the stick without complaint. 
But then he starts to enjoy  himself too much, whacking at things and creating a 
mess, and making lewd gestures to put Pumps into convulsions, so I put the two 
of them to shave the soap and do it myself.  
We take turns rubbing in the jelly and throwing the water.  I bide till the 
soda is done before coming away to the kitchen to check on Spiv, leaving them 
alone to do the blue.  When I come back some minutes later, I see they’ve come 
round to be on the same side of the copper, and are stood close enough to hold the 
holy host between their hips, three hands in a line down the stirring pole—hers, 
his, hers—and for an awful minute I’m reminded of himself and Mary, standing in 
that boat in the river, the hold of the oar shared between them, him showing her 
how to push off.
I elbow between them and look down into the pot.  ‘Have you mixed it well 
through?  If there’s streaks it’ll be your head, Pumps.’ 
After a minute, I take her off to the kitchen to dab the woollens and silks. 
‘Start with this light conduct and you’ll always be taken light.  Easy to put on, 
easy to cast off.’  I leave her there to sulk.  
Back in the scullery, I tell Frederick to follow me to the garden with the 
load, for there’s a strong breeze and still an hour or two of good winter sun left  in 
the day.  
‘I’m sorry  about  my niece, Frederick,’ I says when the largest sheets are up 
and hiding us from the house.  
‘She is certainly a personality,’ he says.  
‘Do you find her handsome?’  
‘Lizzie!’  
I snatch at his sleeve.  ‘She’s a young thing yet.  I’ll not have her meddled.’  
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Startled, he steps back, tugs at his arm to free it.  ‘Lizzie, I am appalled.’  He 
looks about as if waking up  in a place he doesn’t recognise.  ‘Do you need me for 
anything else?’  
‘Nay, go on.’  
He shakes his head and marches back inside.  
‘Don’t disappear, Frederick,’ I call after him.  ‘We’ll need you for the 
flatirons.’
Is there a loneliness more lonely than mistrust?
_________
Boating on the river was his idea.  He comes back to Manchester from the 
Continent full of them.  His first, straight off the boat, is to take up with Mary 
again, to take up with her as if no time has passed to make him wiser, though in 
fact it’s been a full eight years.  Eight years he’s stayed away, writing his books 
and chasing the great revolutions around Europe.  And for the same length she has 
lived here, as she has always done, a tiny cog in the Manchester machine, only 
now with her heart locked in a secret box that she believes only he can open.  And 
here he returns, the prodigal son, to run his father’s mill—the job that family duty 
more than poverty  has forced him to resume—and he comes to Mary with his 
idea, his big idea, which is to have her again as his woman.  And what does she 
do, only spring open with gratitude.  And from there are born further ideas.  To 
travel to Ireland on holidays.  To move in together.  To one day marry…  
But first  there’s the river: what will be Frederick and Mary’s first daytime 
outing as a reunited pair.  They’ve been seeing each other as they  always did, at 
night and behind curtains, but now they’ve decided go broad with themselves, and 
they  insist I come along (not for my good company, mind, but to take some of the 
philistine gape off them).  I’ve vowed never to play the goose for them again, not 
since last week, when they dragged me around every music hall in Ancoats and 
then ditched me in a hush-shop to go up the stairs together, so I tell them I’ll come 
only if I can bring a friend.  
‘Which friend?’ says Mary.  
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‘Lydia,’ I says.  ‘Lydia from the carding room.’  
Says Lydia: ‘Not a chance in highest hell.’  
But she shows mercy when I grease her with the promise of beer and a free 
lunch.  ‘He’ll pay for everything,’ I says.  
‘Is it right, though?’ she says.  ‘Going about with yer man?’  
‘It’s himself who wants it, Lydia.  And Mr Ermen knows about it and can’t 
do anything.  Isn’t  it  a free country?  Don’t worry, you won’t lose your place, you 
have my oath.’  
She thinks on it a long time.  ‘All right,’ she says ‘I’ll do it.’  But only if she 
can bring her sweetheart Jamie.  Which puts me right back in the muck.  There’s 
no road left for me but  to tell Lydia to bring someone else, a man, to even the 
numbers.
She brings Moss.  His real name is Donal Óg but they call him Moss 
because of the fair hair that grows in small clumps on his cheeks, never quite 
joining to become the full beard.  It’s a name born out of envy, of course; a name 
devised by men who won’t  ever look half as handsome as him.  He’s a dyer at the 
same place our own father used to work.  We once met at a wedding in the 
Grapes, and I’ve noticed him on other occasions since, but in truth I could whistle 
down the wind for all I feel for him.  His fifteen shillings would never get you 
anyplace.
We meet at the park gates.  Moss is late but he comes with flowers.  
‘Picked not bought,’ Mary whispers.  
Frederick puts himself between Jamie and Moss, takes their elbows. 
‘They’re called Pomona Gardens after the Roman goddess of fruit trees and 
orchards,’ he says and leads them ahead towards the water.  
The men made themselves neat, but put beside Frederick they  seem but 
cadgers, their efforts to spruce and shine themselves only  making them look 
wretched, as if they’ve come straight from the early house.  Understanding this, 
and prickled by  Frederick’s high talk, Jamie flashes back and gives a face.  Lydia 
and Mary  trade tittles.  Moss understands the rareness of the occasion—it’s not 
every  day you’re put level with the powers—and acts the brown-noser, looking to 
where Frederick points and nodding along to whatever he’s told, the effin eejit.  
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I look down at  my flowers.  Not bought and looking beaten.  But fair’s fair, 
Mary, he’d have had to walk out to the fields to find them.
We spread the rug while Frederick goes to talk to the boatmen about renting 
a boat.  
‘Don’t come with us,’ says Mary  when we’re sitting.  ‘Let me go out alone 
with him.  Say you’re scared of drowning or something and you’d prefer to watch 
from here.’  
The men shrug.  Lydia winks.  I look daggers.
‘I got us a good deal,’ says Frederick when he comes back.  ‘Two hours for 
only a little more than the price of one.’  He looks thrilled with himself.  ‘It’s 
always worth your while to bargain.’  
They nod.  I pick at the grass.  
Mary gets up  and takes his hand, makes a show of dragging him away to the 
banks.  
‘Aren’t you coming?’ he calls back to us.  
‘You two go on and have a turn,’ says Lydia.  ‘We’ll join you in a bit.’  
Jamie moves to take Mary’s place on the rug to be closer to Lydia.  In the 
fuss of arses and limbs, I stretch my  legs and spread out my dress, leaving only 
the corner for Moss.  He doesn’t seem to care.  He takes two bottles from the 
basket and walks on his knees into the sun.  There he rolls up his sleeves to the 
shoulder and his breeches to the knee, and puts himself out to bask.  He’s watched 
by the people drinking tea at the little tables under the creepers.  Further down 
river, there’s a spot where the men swim in the next-to-nuddy  and the women take 
off their boots and show their shins, but we’re not there now; we’re here.  
‘Piss-artist,’ goes Jamie, as if to say he himself is the kind that stays covered 
if there’s ladies about and drinks only what he’s offered or can afford.  
Lydia is glad to gob the bait.  ‘One beer goes further in a poor family  than 
two in an oiler like him.’  Her smile is crooked.  His is cruel.  Mine is faint-livered 
and craven, for though I want naught from Moss and wouldn’t be happy if folk 
put me together with him, I do hate to hear a bested man drubbed further.  He’s 
had it  harder than most, I’ve heard, a father that  ill-used him and kept him from 
his meals, and he’s turned out a lovely looker and kind enough, considering.  
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‘Moss,’ I says, putting the sandwiches on a plate, ‘Come and have 
something to eat.’  
‘In a minute,’ he says without turning his face from the heat.
For a time then there’s silence, just the flies and the moving water, and for 
another time we play a game where we guess what dodge Mary is going to try 
next to make Frederick handle her.  Rock the boat?  Splash the water?  Grab the 
oar?  When we tire of this, we turn our attention back to Moss.  
‘You’ll get burnt,’ I says.  ‘Come back into the shade.’  
‘I’m grand,’ he says.  
‘Arrah come on, Moss,’ says Jamie.  ‘We’re missing you here.  Come and 
tell us one of your stories from Ireland.’  
‘I’ll do no such thing, I’m fine where I am.’  
‘Arrah Moss, don’t be like that,’ says Lydia.  
‘I’ll be how I like.’  
‘Leave him be,’ I says.  ‘Isn’t he grand where he is?’  
I bring him a beer and a sandwich.  
‘Guh rev meela, lovely  Lizzie,’ he says and gives me his teeth.  White and 
strong, they are, the ones they  haven’t been knocked out.  He bites the sandwich, 
takes a gulp, then puts the bottle and what’s left of the bread onto the grass and 
rolls onto his side as if to sleep.  I pick up the old bottles and bring them back to 
the basket.  
‘I’ll tell you what then,’ says Jamie once I’m settled, ‘I’ll tell one of Moss’s 
stories.’  
‘Go on,’ says Lydia, nudging him, ‘Go on, tell us.’  
‘Oh Christ, Jamie, spare us,’ I says.  
‘Lizzie!’ says Lydia, ‘Remember yourself!  We’re only  here for you.  Doing 
you a good turn.’  
He tells a story of Moss when he was a boy back in Tipperary.  How one 
day at the river—a river like this one only called the Ara—he had his clothes 
robbed and had to walk home stitchless except for the bit of sack he picked up  to 
cover his vitals.  It  takes Jamie an age to tell it, going into all the particulars about 
Tipperary town and who did the robbing and how, and making sure to mention 
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that Moss already had clumps of hair growing up and over himself even though he 
wasn’t yet ten. 
I watch Moss through the telling.  He doesn’t show himself to be 
hearkening.  He doesn’t kick up  or cut in.  Doesn’t move at all, except to swat a 
wasp  or scratch his tummy.  It  must be he knows Jamie’s jealous.  It must be he 
knows Jamie would take on all of his troubles if it meant being a stunner the 
same.  So he turns the deaf ear.
But when Jamie is over and Lydia has balled out her laughs, and when 
there’s been pause enough for a bit of guilt to be felt for telling another man’s tale, 
Moss does get up and come over.  
‘You didn’t tell the end of it,’ he says, dropping his empty onto the rug and 
rummaging in the basket for another.  ‘What you’ve told is only the beginning.’  
He keeps us biding while he drinks from the new one, and then while he 
swallows and wipes and staggers over the lean on the tree.  When final he gets 
round to it, I can’t help but think he’s putting on to be tipsier than he is, for the 
scene it makes. 
How he tells it, when he got home from the river, starkers as he was, his 
mother wouldn’t open to him, the news of his shame having reached her before.  
‘Off with you and find your father,’ she called at him through the door.  ‘If 
the sight of you doesn’t bring him home, Christ only knows what will.’  
Knowing she’d not be talked round, he set off on a tour of the drinking 
houses and, by  the time he’d found the one holding his father, the whole of Tipp 
was laughing at him.  His father himself was laughing till he understood it was his 
own son that had come through the doors.  And when he understood this, he was 
quick to turn the laughing to his favour, the cute hooer, by keeping on laughing 
and making a song and dance of ordering his son a spirit from the bar.  
‘Give the boy something to warm him,’ he said.  ‘Can’t you see he’s half-
froze?’  
To the delight of his intimates, he gave Moss his shirt for the walk home.  
‘A double act!  There’s a pair of you in it now!’  
Some sight they were on the roads, father bare of chest and son bare of leg, 
the two of them three sheets to the wind.  Moss—watching his father wave at the 
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people who turned to mock, listening to how his father caught their sly sniggers 
and threw them back as heartful bellows—began to feel light, near happy, and 
well nigh forgot what he was going home to receive.  
His father’s high mood vanished when the door of the homestead was 
thrown closed.  But when Moss looked at his father, he saw that  it wasn’t only his 
humour that was changed but something else too.  What it was, his hair had gone 
white.  White complete.  Some time between the pub and the house, he’d lost  all 
the colour out of his locks.  His father’s hand was raised to start the thrashing but, 
seeing how Moss was looking at him, not with fear but with gaping disbelief, he 
broke off and went to check himself in his shaving mirror.  Being as vain as he 
was handsome, he thought the thing was lying, and he put his fist into it.  Then he 
pulled it out of the wall and used it on Moss.  
‘That’s how I got these scars here,’ Moss says, opening his shirt and taking 
it down to show his neck and shoulders and back.  
I turn away.  On the other side of the green, at the little tables, people are 
peering out from under their hats.  ‘Cover yourself up,’ I says.  
He obeys.  Puts his hands in his pockets.  Spits in the grass.  ‘I’m going for 
a jimmy-riddle.’
We watch him go off towards the bushes.  A fine figure, no question, but it’s 
his own fault everybody knows his trials.  
‘Do you even think he’s from Tipperary?’ I says.  
Jamie and Lydia shrug together.
While he’s gone, Frederick and Mary bring the boat to the banks and beckon 
us to join them.  
‘You two go on,’ I says.  ‘I’ll bide here for Moss.’  
I’m still here biding when the four get back.  
‘Where is he?’ says Jamie.  
‘Must still be looking for a private spot,’ I says.  
Lydia hisses and folds her arms across.  ‘Well, we’re going to the 
roundabout.  Are you staying here?‘   
I look at the hole in the brier where he disappeared.  ‘Nay, I’m coming with 
you.’
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Frederick buys tickets for everybody.  Jamie and Lydia take theirs without a 
thanks and climb up onto the same horse.  
‘Woo-hoo,’ cries Jamie.  
‘Yipee,’ cries Lydia.  
Frederick laughs and calls out to Mary.  ‘Come, Mary, let us ride together 
like Lydia and James!’  
‘Nay, nay,’ she says, waving her hands and shaking her head, ‘Nay, please 
Frederick, nay.’  
I look at her.  Nay, please Frederick, nay?  Aren’t these public displays what 
she lives for?  
‘Come on, Mary,’ says Frederick.  ‘It is going to start in a minute.  It would 
be fun!’  
‘I’m sorry, Frederick, but I can’t, I can’t.’  
I give her a stern look.  ‘What’s wrong with you.  Can’t  you get  up there 
with him now he’s paid for you?’  
‘I can’t, Lizzie,’ she says, touching her belly, ‘Not in my condition.’
I want to fetch my  picnic up.  And in fact, that’s what  I do, only  I put a hand 
up to stop it coming past my lips.  
‘Are you all right, Lizzie?‘   
The roundabout creaks to a start, and the three of them, the wanton couple 
and the lonely  German, go round.  The music rings a pain in my temples.    I 
swallow down and look around for somewhere to sit.  
‘You’re no more pregnant than I am,’ I says as I move away.  ‘Wasn’t I 
washing the run out of your sheets just two weeks ago?’
I sit on a bench by the bandstand.  Mary stays by  the roundabout, gives a 
weak-looking wave every time Frederick passes.  When it stops, Jamie and Lydia 
come off arm-in-arm, swerving and wobbling and all-round acting like topers. 
Frederick rushes to Mary and pours his foreign concern over her.  From where I’m 
sitting, I can’t  be sure if he knows what game she’s playing.  He brings her over to 
sit at the tables.  I wait till the tea is brought before joining them.  
‘We ought get the rug and basket,’ I says.  ‘They’ll be robbed.’  
But no one moves.
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Moss doesn’t come back.  
‘Typical,’ says Jamie.
That night Frederick doesn’t stay the night, for he can’t be seen walking to the 
mill from this direction in the morning.  I hear him leave around midnight.  Mary 
comes straight into me.  
‘I’m tired,’ I says.  ‘And we’re up early.’  
She pays me no heed.  Gets into the bed beside me.  ‘I’ve told him,’ she 
says.  
‘Told him what?’ I says, though I know well what.  
‘About my circumstances.’  
‘Oh for Christ sake.  Good night, Mary.’  
‘If I’m not pregnant now, Lizzie, I will be before long.  It’s not a real lie.’  
I shake my head in the dark.  ‘And is he happy about your circumstances?’  
‘That’s the thing.  He’s over the moon.’  
‘Suffering Jesus.’  
‘He’s going to stick by us.’  
‘Is he now.’  
‘He’s going to put us in a bigger place, maybe even further into the country, 
for the fresh air, and as soon as I start to show, he’s going to tell everybody and 
move in with us himself.’  
‘Us?  Who’s this us?’  
‘You, me and the baby.  And him.’
I laugh.  ‘Have you lost your senses?’  
‘What do you mean?’  
‘You think I’m going to stick round here and take on the burden of your 
mistakes?  Sit up for your dirty issue?  Clean the crap out of his nappies?’  
‘You’re twisting my meaning.’  
‘You’re the one that’s twisting, Mary.  Twisting the good out of everything.’  
‘You’re my family, Lizzie, and you’ll soon be Frederick’s too.  He vowed to 
look after you.’  
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‘Look after me?’  
Out of naught a vision of Moss comes: nuddy as Our Saviour on the cross. 
‘Better to marry me,’ he says, ‘than to burn in this hell.’
The next day, after the bells ring, I go looking for him.  He’s not  hard to find.  I 
take the seat beside him.  
‘Two more of those,’ I says to the tapstress.  
‘What do you want?’ he says.  
‘I’m sorry for yesterday, Moss.’  
He shakes his head.  ‘Arrah, you don’t have to be sorry, Lizzie Burns. 
You’re a good woman.  I’m not worth you.’ 
 I touch his hand.  ‘Enough of that, Moss.  You’re worth more than most I 
know.’  
He looks at me then, and through his blinking eyes, I can see his urges.  
‘I’m getting you out of here,’ I says.  
And he follows.  You don’t understand the power you have till you test it.
We can’t go to his house for he shares with other men, and I’ll not bring him 
to ours, not with Mary there to fling the dirt, so I lead him up the passages.  We 
start a couple of times but we’re not left alone for long.  
‘I know a place,’ Moss says.  ‘But it costs.’  
‘Don’t worry about that,’ I says.
He brings me down Great Ancoats and into a neighbourhood I can’t name. 
The room is bright enough and tidy.  The lass who shows us up  is younger and has 
a plainer, cleaner face than you’d suppose.  
‘Thanks,’ I says when I hand her the coins.  
‘You have till the morning,’ she says.  ‘Nine on the clock.  If you leave 
before, you don’t get it back.’
His bit is a thick log that sobers me and gives me second thoughts.  
‘You ought know something, Moss,’ I says.  
‘What?’ he says, lifting his head out of my mammies.  
‘I know my way around a man but I’ve never let one inside.’  
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His eyes go wide and his brow creases, and I can’t tell if he’s more surprised 
by my frankness or my maidenhead.  
Once it’s in, there’s little in the act that surprises me.  I lie under and he goes 
over, and I search in it for the pleasure, though it’s over before I catch more than a 
spark.  
Afterwards he stretches out beside me, puts an arm across my belly.  
‘If I’m up the pole,’ I says, ‘Will you run off like you did in the park?’  
‘I’m sorry  about that, only I didn’t feel right.  I was riled up, and when I’m 
like that my manners are not of the best.  I hope you can forgive me.’  
‘I suppose.’  I put my arm to rest over his.
We’re like this till I’m almost asleep.  But then he chooses to say, ‘I was 
engaged to be married, you know.  In Ireland.’ 
‘I don’t need to know about that, Moss.’  
‘She was a fine girl and I loved her, but I had to leave.  It was the only way.’  
‘Please, Moss, that’s all none of my business.’  
He sits up on his elbow.  Looks down at me.  ‘I hope you’ll make me your 
business now.’  
‘Let’s see what happens.’
What happens is not a babby but ulcers on my fingers and about my cunny.  
‘You filthy bastard,’ I says to him when he comes to see me at the lock-
hospital, ‘You big dirty filthy bastard, you’ve given me the Old Joe,’ and if I’d 
strength enough to mete him out a lashing I’d do it, in front of the nurses and all.  
‘I didn’t  know, Lizzie,’ he says, holding out another posy of his picked 
flowers, ‘Please believe me, I didn’t know.’  
I wave the weeds away.  ‘Well, you don’t  have to worry  anyhows. 
Frederick is paying for the mercury.’  
‘Lizzie, please forgive me.’  
‘You’ll have to take the same yourself before you get another lass into this 
mess.’  
‘Oh Lizzie—’  
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‘I can talk to Frederick for you, if you want.  About covering the costs.’
He falls into the chair by the bed, white as death.  Around us, the women 
cough and moan.
‘Lizzie, let me marry you,’ he says after looking at me for a long while.  
‘Proposals, Moss?  This is not the time.’  
‘I’ve naught only  what I stand upright in, but I love you and want to look 
after you.’  
‘Are you talking out of shame, or do you mean it?’  
He doesn’t have to reply.  I can tell by the way  he takes grip  of the 
bedsheets that he means it, violent. 
It’s men are at the bottom of every plague in this world.  We come to the lock with 
this frontmost in our minds, and as we lie here stewing in our cures and 
wondering if we’ll be next to go cripple, or walk off into fits, or turn so childish 
we’ve to be washed in bath chairs and given to drink with a spoon in a teacup, our 
knowledge turns to action: sometimes screams or fists but most often sombre 
vows of chastity breathed out into the late-night miasmas.  ‘Dear Lord,’ we says, 
‘Dear Lord God Our Father, if you find the grace to spare me, I’ll never go near 
another one again.’  And we’re dead earnest.  We believe ourselves new-made 
saints.  And we make the same vow the next night and every  night after, till we’re 
told by some twist-whiskered pup that we’re saved and can likely  leave in the 
morning.  And now we’re so grateful—so effin overglad—our holy promises are 
dropped and we forgive the dirty  drakes everything.  More than that, when we see 
them biding by the door to take us home, it’s ‘Lucky me!’ we think, ‘Lucky me to 
have such a morsel worrying after me!’
Moss goes for my elbow and I let  him have it, but when he uses it to slow 
my walk, I take it  back from him and says, ‘I don’t need a crutch, I can get round 
grand.’  And further on, when he lays hold of my  hip to help me cross a road: 
‘Don’t handle me like I’ve lost the use of myself.  I’m well and not changed.’
We stop for a pause at Ducie Bridge.  Shoulder-to-shoulder, we lean over 
the parapet where the bricks have fallen away.  The weather being dry, the river is 
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shrunk to a string of pools.  Caught in the weirs, the slime sits out to dry and rot. 
The stink is enough to make you dizzy, but we close our noses to it and stay.  
‘Look,’ I says, pointing to the sky above the tanneries.  
‘What?’ he says, searching in vain.  ‘What is it?’  
‘Arrah, you’re too slow.  It’s gone behind.  It was a seagull.’  
We come away.  My knees are sore after the weeks of lying slack, and by 
the time we reach Salford I’m in a mighty sweat.  We buy ass’s milk and brandy-
balls from a coster outside Weaste station, and eat and drink sitting on an 
overturned cart.  
‘Moss, you need to know something.’  
He stops chewing and looks at me in a tone of ‘Ah Lizzie, what’s this?  Do I 
really need to know anything?’  
‘If you don’t like what I say,’ I says, ‘you can walk.  I’m giving you licence 
to turn on your heel and go.  I won’t hold it against you.’  
He looks at me, afraid.  
I throw what’s left of my sweet to the mice and rub my fingers on my skirt. 
‘I can no longer have children.  That part of me has been taken.’  
He drops his face down to his boots.  ‘So we’ll do without and we’ll live 
better for it.’  
His answer comes too fast and I don’t trust it.  ‘Look at me, Moss.’  
He lifts up, his eyes ashiver from too much talk.  
‘Don’t you want a family?  A homestead of your own?  Without the hope of 
little ones, would there be any sense to us?’  
‘I’d go on happy with just the two of us.’  
‘You says that now.’  
‘I says that now and I mean it.  The most I can give in this life is my word.’  
And what more, for brutal truth, could I ask?
Sat on the cart, we stay, and watch the bodies come out of the station.  The swells 
and sailors coming from Liverpool.  The Manchester men climbing into their gigs. 
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‘Did you make friends at least?’ he says.  
‘In the lock?’ I says. 
 He nods.  
I smile and poke him in the side.  ‘All I’ll miss from that place is the 
laudanum.’ 
 We get up and walk the rest of the way.  At the end of my road we kiss.  
‘Leave me here, Moss.’  
‘I want to go in with you.’  
‘Nay, I’ll do this alone.’  
‘I’ll bide here.’  
‘Go home and I’ll call on you tomorrow.’  
‘Don’t change your mind, Lizzie.  Don’t let them talk you against me.’  
‘Don’t be fretting and git.’  
He doesn’t move till I peel him off and push.  
‘Go on, skedaddle. ’    
I don’t have the key so I have to knock.  
‘Here she is, back,’ says Mary, opening.  She kisses me on the side of the 
head above the ear.  
Frederick is here.  ‘Look at you,’ he says, taking me from her and planting 
on my cheeks.  ‘More ravishing than ever.’
She’s cooked a fish, I can smell it.  
‘I hope you’ve not gone to any trouble.  I’m not  terrible hungry.  It’s more 
tired is what I am.’  
‘You’re out of breath,’ Mary says.  ‘Have you been walking?’  
‘Just a little.’  
‘Why didn’t you get a cab back?  The money I gave you yesterday, didn’t 
you use it to get a cab?’  
‘It’s not the walking.  I’m just tired out after all the time on my back.’  
‘Well, come on, you’ll sit and have something.’  
‘Just a drink, Mary, please.  That’s all I want.’
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From the armchair I listen to them eat.  The whiskey softens the noise of 
them, their scrape and swallow.  It softens Mary’s ire, too, when final she decides 
to release it.  
‘Oh but she’s some wilful one,’ she says, the same as if I’m not sitting here 
two paces away, ‘Insisting on going into the lock like a pauper when she’d have 
been cared for best here at home.’  
‘Leave it be, Mary,’ says Frederick.  
I don’t look over.  I keep fixed on the window and the day that’s darkening 
on the other side.  
‘Well, she’s cured,’ she says.  ‘I suppose that’s the main thing.’
When they’re finished, they bring their glasses over to the sofa.  
‘Aren’t you going to give her the gift?’ says Mary to Frederick after he’s sat. 
‘Ah, ya,’ he says, getting up again and going off to the bedroom.  
When he’s good and gone, she leans in.  ‘Aren’t you the lucky one.’  
‘Aren’t I the what?’  
‘Getting away with only your womb lost?’  
‘Only?’  
‘Well,’ she says, ‘It could’ve been your hair.  Or your teeth.’ 
He comes back and hands me a basket of soaps.  
‘That’s awful kind of you, Frederick.’  
‘With these you can take lots of hot baths and rebuild your forces.’ 
 I smell them.  Lavender.  And rose.  ‘They’re lovely.’  
‘Lots of baths and fresh air and rest, that is what I prescribe.  And I forbid 
you to go back to the mill.’  
‘I’m not intending to go back, Frederick, not till next week at least.’  
‘Not next week, not ever.  Mary has left for good and so should you.’  
I look over at her.  She sips from her glass, then holds it out to the side, 
dangles it between two fingers as if threatening to drop it  on the carpet, as if such 
a spill wouldn’t be her mess to fettle.  ‘What’re you looking at me like that for, 
Lizzie?  It was only a question of time.  It’s not right for me to be there any more.’  
‘Not right?’  
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‘The rumours were putting Frederick into too many awkward corners.  The 
Ermens were asking questions, only  dying for the excuse to smoke him out of the 
business.  And the Club, he couldn’t even pass it without jokes and whisperings 
coming out at him.  And the Communists up in London, well they are—’  
‘They’re not rumours if they’re true.’  
Frederick coughs.  He has to sew his mouth to keep the lush from 
showering.  Mary doesn’t flicker a lid.  Slugs the end out of her glass and puts it 
down.  ‘Lizzie, you wouldn’t believe how jealous those bitches got, what a misery 
they were making of it for me.’  
It’s bitches they are now.  Once upon a time, they were careful and kind. 
Once on a time, they were the salt of her earth.  
‘At first  I laughed along, put on like I thought it was funny, but then the 
slighting speak began, and the games in the yard crafted only to make me suffer, 
and I realised I’d crack before they’d ever stop, that’s how cruel they’d turned. 
It’s best I got out before’—she rubs her belly like a trencher woman brewing a 
belch—‘before, you know.’  
I know, I know.  It’s enough to see her changed out of her bodice and into 
her loose shimmy.  Fraught.  In foal.  Brought to bed.  On the straw.
Sighing, I hold my glass out.  ‘Where did you put that bottle?’  
Fredrick jumps up and goes for it.  Tilts me more in.  Puts it on the floor 
beside my chair.  
‘So what’s all this got to do with me?’ I says when I have it downed, ‘Why 
ought I leave my situation on account of your troubles?’
Mary darts Frederick a fearful look.  He clears his throat.  Crosses his legs. 
Looks about  to speech off, but I hold up  to halt him.  I don’t need to hear it.  I can 
suspect for myself.  The rumours have my name in them.  They say it’s the two of 
us he keeps for his pleasure.  One Burns one night, the other Burns the next, the 
two Burns together on feast days and strikes.  They  say it’s him who put me in the 
lock.
‘Are you discharging me, Frederick?’  
‘Nine, nine, of course not.’  
‘Am I to lose my earnings to keep you safe in your circumstances?’  
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‘Christ, Lizzie,’ says Mary, ‘We thought you’d be happy to leave the place.’  
‘Happy?  What’d I do instead?  Can you tell me that?  What’d I do?’  
‘That’s what we want to talk to you about.’  
‘I couldn’t go out to service.  No respectable house would have me after so 
long in the mills.’  And I’ll not sit here all day stitching and learning the melodies, 
going soft on a foreign man’s mint.  
‘Lizzie, would you listen a minute?  It’s been arranged.  We’ve it all drawn 
out.’  
And now she lays it out visible, the picture of us.  In the middle is herself, of 
course, glowing under her own halo.   And around her, sitting and standing and 
draped over, are her stout, German-faced children.  And around them, circling 
with velvet arms and a grinful of perfect teeth, is Frederick.  And behind him, the 
faint colour of wallpapering, is myself, the starve-acred relative without a sprig of 
her own to tend except her breakdowns abloom.  And around us all, built  solid and 
flush and clean, is a house on Burlington Street: two floors, two gardens, three 
bedrooms, an inside bathroom and an attic for lodgers to cover the extra expense 
of me.  
‘Nay.’  I nigh on snap an ankle in my  rush to get upstanding in my boots. 
‘Nay, nay, nay.’  I’m wag-wag-wagging my finger in their faces.  ‘Nay, nay, nay, 
nay, you can rub me right out.  I’m not going any  place with you two, not to 
Burlington nor any other street.  I’m staying in my job and earning my wages as 
usual.  And I’m going to live with Moss O’Malley.’  
Now Mary bats.  ‘You’re going to what?’ 
‘You heard me.  It’s all been settled.’  
‘Settled?  When?’  
‘Today.  Over the past weeks.  He’s been coming to see me.  I paid off the 
nurses to let him in.’  
‘Mary Mother of Jesus.  With our money, too.’  She gets up, takes the 
glasses out of our hands and brings them to the kitchen.  
‘I wasn’t over with that,’ I says on her way out.  We hear her putting the 
kettle on for the dishing up.  A pause while she gathers herself.
‘What’re you playing at, Lizzie?’ she says when she comes back.  
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‘I could ask the same of you, Mary.’  
‘Ladies, please!’ says Frederick from way  below on the couch.  ‘Sit down 
and let us talk this out like civilised human beings.’  
‘He’s no good for you,’ she says.  
‘He wants me no harm.’  
‘Harmless, aye, that’s the right  word for him.  Wet and harmless.  A big man 
gone damp.’  
‘You’re one to talk, a prime tippler yourself.’  
‘And his intimates?  All the same.  Jamie, Kit, Dan, Mick, Joseph, the whole 
crowd of them.  Naught doing but passing their time in swilling ale and smoking 
like the beasts that perish.‘   
‘He’s a good man.’  
‘Arrah, he’s a toss-pot.  They all are.  Talking for the good of Ireland when 
they’re the worst of its examples.’  
Furious, I point down at her shame.  ‘Well, he’d never do something like 
this by me.’   
‘And how could he, even if he wanted to, with your insides taken?’  
I clasp my mouth and teeter back.  That’s the end of it.  No gain to be got in 
keeping on.  She has her mind and she can keep it.  
Turning from her, I pitch a pleading eye to Frederick.  ‘All we need is a few 
pounds to set  ourselves up.  Then I’d be out of your hair for good.’  I already owe 
him—God knows I owe him and not a little—but if I’ve gained any sense of the 
man, he’s above keeping personal accounts.  ‘It would be a loan, Frederick.  We’d 
pay you back bit at a time.’  
Behind me, Mary foams over.  Frederick silences her with a finger.  Comes 
to the edge of his seat.  Signals towards the armchair.  ‘Bitter, Lizzie, sit down. 
You too, Mary.’  
We obey.  The furniture creaks.  He studies me a minute.  Then he says, ‘Is 
this truly what you desire, Lizzie, or do you feel pressured, by  him or by us?  If it 
is the former, I would be glad to help.  But if it is the latter, then we should talk 
and try to come up with a different solution.’  
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His question puts a knot in my innards.  Am I starting out of my own mind, 
or am I being forced against the grain?  If I’m honest, I know the answer.  My 
accidental life was bound to put me swimming upstream eventual.  But I can’t say 
it aloud.   
Mary sees me shally.  ‘What Frederick’s asking you is, are you going with 
him to get away from us, you ungrateful axe, or do you love him plain and true?’
Love?  
Love?  
The way I’ve heard Mary speak of it over the years makes me doubt I’ve 
feelings in my body at all.  But I’ve seen enough of this world to know that most 
of us have to accept men we don’t feel for, and I’m not sure it’s for the worst in 
the end.  A marriage of emotions can’t be lasting.  It wouldn’t  be healthful if it 
was.  You only  have to look at Mary, gone thin and nervous, to know it doesn’t do 
a woman good, and she’ll waste away entire if she doesn’t soon understand it.  
‘I have to be practical,’ I says.  
‘How is shacking up with Moss O’Malley  practical?  God, it’s like you’ve 
not heard a word I’ve ever said to you, about anything.’  
‘I’m prepared to give him the benefit of a doubt.’  It’s a stranger he is, but a 
man too, and most men lean to the good.  
‘You’re a fool, Lizzie, to cast your life on such a die.’  
‘I’m not with him for what he’ll win me.  I’m with him for his character. 
His morals.’  
And just like that, it’s said.  The whole ‘morals’ bit.  Said and heard, and 
certain to come back and scorch me.
We find a room in Hulme, Moss and me, a fair walk from our situations but where 
the Irish are few and nobody bothers with our private affairs.  The place costs 
more than we can afford but we’ll manage, for Frederick has put me in charge of 
the Diamond Thread and added three and sixpence to my wage, and with his loan 
I’ve paid an advance on the first three months.  For that’s what I’m giving it: three 
months.  
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‘Three months?’ says Moss.  
‘Aye.  After that, I’ll decide.’  
‘You mean you haven’t yet decided?’  
‘Nay.’  
‘Oughtn’t we do it straight off?  Isn’t that the normal way?’  
‘Three months.  A trial run.  A chance to prove yourself.’  
‘Prove myself?’ 
‘You can start with your drinking.  I’ll not  be ballyragged by a soaker for the 
rest of my days.’  
‘Is that what you think of me?’  
‘It’s what I’ve heard of you.  It’s what they’re saying.  You’re lucky I’m not 
one to put faith in the voices.  I’m giving you three months to make liars out of 
them.’  
‘And what about our living together?  What’ll we tell them about that?’  
‘Why must we tell them anything?’  
‘Passing as man and wife, isn’t that a sin?  Doesn’t God look down on it?’  
‘He might, but He also knows my reasons and will forgive me for them.’  
‘They’ll be expecting a wedding.  Everybody’ll be.’  
‘Well, they’ll have to bide.’  
‘Bide?  Begorrah, woman, don’t you have any Church in you at all?’
When not at the mill I keep close to home and watch him, and what I see is 
a man raised on naught to be naught, thankful for any  crumb he has and not 
particular as long as he gets the needful.  I tend to the meals, but I give out the 
stitching and steer wide of the baking, and I make sure not to take him anything to 
the bed, for then he’d expect it every day.  He does what he’s required about the 
place, fixing it up and making it a bit of a home, and he makes an effort to be 
cheerful, striving against the sorrows of the past that sometimes sore beset him. 
Though we’re not yet joined in God’s eyes, in my own he’s within his rights, and I 
give myself over to the fetch whenever he wants it, to keep him manly and also to 
relieve him.  And though he’s inclined to be quiet, I press him to speak and to tell 
his stories, and the odd time we bring the chairs out to sit, and the neighbours 
stand in their doorways and hearken, for I understand that in his soul he holds a 
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deep  well of feelings, and that, without a means to draw down, it could boil into a 
storm and burst out of its own willing.  On Saturday  nights he goes out  with the 
lads, which keeps him in bed most of Sunday morning, and he often comes home 
from work with the whiff, but he never gets in too late or without his legs full 
under him, and what he spends doesn’t make us poorer, so I make it my business 
not to complain.  And for some weeks we live like doves together, never having 
disputes.  
Some time in the second month, Frederick summons me to the office.  
‘How are you getting on?’ he says, closing the blinds against the clerks at 
their desks outside, then changing his mind and opening them again.  
‘At the Diamond Thread?  Pretty tidy, Mr Engels,’ I says, ‘The girls are 
good workers.’  
‘Good, good.’  He comes away from the windows to fiddle with some 
papers on his desk.  Takes a file out, puts it back.  When he looks at me again it’s 
with a sly twinkle.  When he speaks it’s in a whisper.  ‘What I mean is, how are 
you plural getting on?  We have not seen you since you left.’  
‘Oh, we’re getting on grand.’  
‘You have not come to visit.’  
‘We’ll come when we’re proper settled.’  
‘Mary misses you.  We both do.’  
‘Nice of you to say.’  
I brush some flyings off my sleeve.  I don’t  intend to give it easy, whatever 
it is he wants.  
‘We would like to see where you live.’  
‘I’ll do you a dinner when the place looks halfway decent.’  
He comes round the desk and takes a box from the cabinet.  ‘Do you need 
any—?’  
‘Nay, not a bit of it.  And we’ll start  paying you back as soon as the wedding 
is over and paid for.’  
‘Ah!’—he shakes the coins in the box—‘There is to be a wedding!’  
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On the other side of the glass, the men look up  from their business.  I pinch 
myself through my pocket.  ‘No date yet, but I suppose it  will have to happen 
sooner or later.’  
‘Well, this calls for a celebration.’  
‘Nay, Frederick, please.’  
He puts the box down and goes to pour two drinks from a bottle on the 
sideboard.  I try to hide behind a hand.  ‘I oughtn’t, Frederick.  They’re watching.’  
‘Do not pay attention to them.  I shall tell them you have had a faint.’  
‘I want my head clear going back to work.’  
‘Oh pish-posh,’ he says, handing one to me and touching his own against it.  
‘Cheers.’  
‘Cheers.’  
My throat is dry from the mill air.  The lush burns it  further and I cough. 
One of clerks lowers his papers to peer at me.  I take another sup and catch his eye 
over the rim.  He turns away.   
‘It is good to hear you are so happy, Lizzie,’ Frederick says now, sitting 
down and leaning back in his big chair.  ‘You deserve it, more than anyone I can 
think of.’  
‘Well now, Mr Engels, happy is a stretch.’  My time under Frederick’s 
protection made the hobble of life foreign to me, and I’ve been alarmed by the 
difficulty of returning to it.  But it’s also true that I’ve been enjoying the simple-
and-straightness of it.  It’s what it  is, and it’s a struggle, and it doesn’t put on to be 
anything else.  
‘Well, you certainly look happy, Lizzie.’ 
‘I do?’  
‘I only wish Mary were the same.’  
So we’re there already.  
He sits there looking at me, biding for a word—advice and such—but I 
don’t give it.  I put the glass on the desk and my hands on my lap.  I cross my feet 
in front of me and look straight back at him.  He doesn’t need me to say  what he 
already knows.  She’ll never be happy.  She’ll always be like a child, ever wanting 
what she doesn’t have.  
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‘Please come and visit,’ he says when the silence gets too heavy for him to 
carry.  
‘I will.  Maybe when the babby’s here.’ 
 He flinches at the mention.  Grimaces like he’s been jabbed.  And that’s 
how I get to know the babby’s gone.  Come out before its time.  I put on not to 
understand.  
‘Mr Engels, I’ll get behindhand if I sit here any longer.’  
‘Ya, of course.  Be on your way.’  
‘Thanks anyhows for the drink.’ 
 I leave him pale and scrambling to look busy.
‘What was that about?’ says Lydia when I get back to the workroom.  
‘What do you think?’  
‘Is she all right?’  
‘She’s made her bed, now she may lie in it.’
When I get home that evening I find Moss sitting outside, making speeches to 
some of the local children.  
‘Don’t be giving them nightmares,’ I says, going in.  
When the supper is on, I decide to go out and join them, but something 
stops me on this side of the door.  I put my  ear against it, but it’s only  the usual 
racket I hear: the Liberator O’Connell and the landlords and the Great Hunger, 
things any Irishman with a head would know, though to hear him you’d think he 
was a prophet of the news.
‘You’ll get those children into trouble,’ I says to him later when we’re 
eating.  
‘Not a bit,’ he says.  
‘They’ll get some hiding if they go home spouting about the suffering sister 
island.’  
‘Well, it’ll be good for them if they do.  They’ll learn what their folks are 
really like.  The history they carry.’  
‘Just be careful,’ I says and leave it there. 
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But it’ll not be left.  There’s something I heard him say to the children that 
stays with me like a tick, burrowing down and making a wound.  And a few days 
after, while I’m scrubbing his back in the bath, I find myself saying, ‘Moss, I need 
to ask you something.  Do you mind if I ask you?’  
‘Jesus, not so hard, Lizzie!’  
‘The other day when you were talking to the neighbours’ children.’  
‘When?’  
‘A few days back.’  
‘I don’t recall, but what about it anyhows?’  
‘I heard you say something and I didn’t like it.’  
He looks over his shoulder at me.  Big worried drops fall from his lashes. 
‘What didn’t you like?’  
‘It’s probable naught.’  
‘What was it?’  
‘You said that if you weren’t born in the Catholic provinces of Connaught, 
Leinster or Munster, you weren’t Irish at all.’  
He laughs.  ‘Is that what has you so nerved up these past days?  Stomping 
around and clattering the pots?’  
‘If it’s anything particular, aye, it’s that.’  
‘Christ, it’s well for some, having so little to worry them.’  
I slap him on the arm with the brush.  ‘What did you mean by it?’ 
‘Ah for feck sake, Lizzie, it’s only  a way of talking.’  He rubs his arm.  Lifts 
some water out and pours it over the spot.  ‘A way of talking is all it was.’  
‘Well, I don’t want any more talk like it.’  
‘Well, you know what, Lizzie Burns—’  
Of a sudden he’s up standing and the water’s rushing off him onto the flags 
and he’s grabbing the towel from my shoulder.  ‘I’m getting sick of your rules. 
Sick to the teeth.’  
‘If you don’t like my rules, what’s keeping you here?’  
‘I’m beginning to ask myself the same.’  
He leaps out of the tub and strides across the room, leaving his wet on the 
only bit of carpet we have and has to last us.  
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‘You’re dreeping every place,’ I says.  ‘Can’t you wait till you’re dry?’  
He tears at the fresh clothes I’ve put out on the bed.  His breeches stick to 
the damp  and he has to hop  round to get into them.  ‘A better man would have 
raised his hand to you long ago.’  He slaps his cap on and makes for the door.  
‘Where’re you going?’  
‘Out.’  
‘Off with you then.’  I follow him onto the road.  ‘Off with you back to 
Tipperary, if that’s where you’re from at all.’ 
He reels back, comes to giant over me, though what I see is only a boy in 
his tantrums.  ‘What did you just say to me, woman?’  
‘You heard me.  How can we know for sure where you’re from?  We only 
know what you tell us, and any amount of that could be tarradiddle.  There’s 
voices saying you were born in Cheetham and your accent is only what you kept 
from your kin.’
He slams his fist into the brick behind me.  Draws his hand back slow.  Puts 
it under his arm.  Bares his teeth.  Growls through them.  ‘And what are you, 
Lizzie Burns, only an effin Britisher?’  
Four whole days he’s gone.  Sunday night, Monday night, Tuesday night, 
Wednesday night, till the Thursday when his money  is spent  and he shambles in 
looking like he’s been pulled through the bush.  
‘Did you go to work at least?’ I says.  
He doesn’t answer.  Instead he heaves himself by the limbs to the bed, falls 
down on it full-clothed.  I leave him there and finish my tasks.  At supper, I put 
out a plate for him, but he doesn’t get up  for it.  What’ll not keep till tomorrow I 
eat myself.
‘I’ll not having you running off every  time you don’t like the sound of 
something,’ I says when it’s time to get in beside him.  
He says naught but I can tell by his breathing he’s not asleep.  
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‘Do you hear me, Moss?  Do you hear me?’ and I keep at him till he groans 
and pulls the sheets over his head, for he needs to understand the health of a thing 
is told by how fast it recovers, and four days it too long by any measure. 
I blow out the candle and in the dark allow a hand to rest on him.  It’s late, 
after all, and he’s learnt.  
After so many days with only broken rest, sleep comes quick, but I’m 
hauled from it young by  the sound of the springs grating.  ‘I’ll not be made a 
mocking stock any more.’  
I blink up at his shadow.  ‘What’s the matter with you?’  
‘We’re to marry.  This week, we’re to do it.’  
‘I told you three months.’  
‘And I’m telling you, Lizzie Burns, I’m finished with your tricks and your 
tests.  We’re getting married or we’re calling it off.’  
‘All right,’ I says, ‘All right,’ for his whimpers are those of a man who’ll not 
be any further pushed, and they’d frighten the insides out of you.
He caves onto me, more out of relief than longing, but  he’s soon going at it 
full peck, and what touches me is not the sopped words he leaves on my neck but 
the effort it costs me to show him proper feeling in return.  My heart’s hard 
against him, and the more he gives way, the harder it grows.  
‘It’s the proper thing,’ he says afterwards.  ‘I couldn’t live on like this, it 
goes contrary to my morals.’  
I tell him he’s right, all along he’s been right, I was only being silly and 
afraid, and that sends him off into his snores.  Leaving me to stare into the thought 
that there’ll never be light for me locked into this Irish lie.
XIV
The Franco-Prussian War
Jenny has grapes, real grapes, in her hair.  She’s drawn me over to the sideboard 
and is poking furious at a display of green boughs.  
‘I don’t know what to expect,’ she says.  
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‘I’m sure they’ll be charming,‘ I says.  
‘They  are French, most of them.  Escapees from the siege in Paris.  It 
worries me.’  
‘What does?’  
‘Them.  I do not know how they will be.  We are Prussians, after all.’   
At a loss—why are we whispering?—I look back into the room.  Karl is 
treading the length and breadth, glancing at the clock and grumbling.  He’s had 
his beard brushed out and locks curled up  special, and is making great efforts not 
to touch them and put them out of place.  Frederick is fidgeting by the 
chimneypiece.  Bare through the door and he’s already on his second vodka. 
Christmas day in Jenny’s parlour, and I don’t think Joseph himself was as fretful 
as this, waiting for the virgin birth. 
She tugs on my elbow and I turn back.  
‘You must think I am being silly, Lizzie.’  
‘Nay, not a bit of it.’  I give her my best face.
‘If they are coming here to dine with us, it  must mean they have embraced 
Communism and are free from that blasting curse of national prejudice, which at 
the end of the day is nothing but wholesale selfishness.’
What has them so nerved up?  As far as I’m concerned, you’ve dealt with 
one frog, you’ve dealt with the whole pond.
  Outside, the sound of wheels.  Karl moves to the window and checks up 
and down the road.  
‘This must be them.’  
He sends Nim down to pay off the cab.  I go to the mirror to make some last 
revisions.  In the glass now, I see Nim coming in, looking wan.  No one appears 
behind her.  She speaks something in German.  Exclamations fly.  There’s a rush 
for the door.  
‘What’s wrong?’  
‘Oh forgive us, Lizzie,’ Jenny  says.  ‘We have to go straight down to the 
dining room.  One of the men has an injury and cannot get up the stairs.  How 
could we be so thoughtless?’ 
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‘Not thoughtless,’ I says, shaking my head, ‘Not a bit of thoughtless,’ and a 
part of me feels sorry she’ll not have her pageant processing down, two-by-two, 
the biggest animals first.  She looks forward to such affairs and it will damper her 
mood to have it passed over.
Nine men stand in the hall.  In any other house they’d be crushed but here 
they’ve room to stand in a line crossways and to bow.  I’m not the only one 
shocked as to their number.  Nim’s pallor has gone to green, and Jenny  has a 
croak in her voice when she says, ‘Gentlemen, the season’s greetings to you all.’  
The injured man is balancing between two ashplants.  In his aspect the good 
lords over the bad, though he isn’t a man you’d ask for a direction with any faith 
you wouldn’t be cursed at.  What I suppose to be presentations are made.  When 
my turn comes, Jenny switches to the English.  
‘And this is Frederick’s dear spouse, Lizzie.  An Irishwoman.’  
They dip a final bow in my direction before being led into the dining room.  
Nim has to run around and reset the table before we’re put sitting down. 
Jenny fills the time by  making a theatre of deciding who to put where.  I make 
myself busy  lighting the candles that have been blown out by  the draught we 
bring in.  The table is laden—dishes of tomatoes and strawberries and grapes and 
greengages, bowls of nuts and savouries, a Russian salad—but I know that Jenny 
likes to keep her courses spare, and I’m curious to see if there’ll be enough to sate 
the extra stomachs.  (Spiv in the kitchen won’t  be happy, but at least Pumps might 
do as she’s told and not put a foot higher than the scullery step, for she won’t want 
so many men to see her dressed as she is, in the dreariest bonnet I could find in 
her wardrobe.)
I’m glad to be sat at  the corner, away  from the horror of making myself 
understood.  Frederick is put on my right, Karl at the head to my left.  The wine 
has been taken from their dandy green bottles and put into dull-looking jugs.  Nim 
pours from these now.  Once all our glasses are full—it takes an uncomfortable 
time for her to get all the way  round—Karl bellows out a toast.  At the other end, 
Jenny makes to stand but remembers the wounded man’s condition and sits back 
down.  We touch glasses from where we are.  
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After some murmuring and shifting, Karl drops his eyeglass and clears his 
throat.  All heads turn to this end.  He speaks loud and in the French.  During his 
pauses, his mouth makes that sarcastic curl that Frederick says makes his enemies 
quake.  Hair like wire pokes out from his ears, long and strong enough for a bird 
to land on.  He’s wearing his usual broadcloth.  Poor Frederick, meantime, has 
gone all out with the silks.  It  can’t be chance alone that his necktie matches the 
runner on the table.  
While Karl speeches, I can’t help  handling the silver, which has been shined 
to blinding.  The china has been rubbed to white by time.  Invisible on the linen, it 
is, and brittle as the host, though it probable cost a sum nonetheless.  I see my 
fiddling has been noticed, so I take my hand away.  Folding and unfolding my 
napkin under the table, I bide for the soup.
With Frederick’s help, by the time the second broth is cleared and the fish 
arrives, I’ve put names on some of the Frenchmen.  The thin, raw-boned one is 
Lenoble.  The one with the ragged pair of worsted gloves tucked under his plate 
and the busy gob tucked under his nose is Boyer.  The stern one, strong-made, is 
Pernaudet.  Ottlick isn’t French at all but a Magyar.  He’s my first  glimpse of his 
race, and it’s a let down, though the patch on his eye is fair and impressing.  The 
wounded man is Bouton.  He has been silent since we sat down, keeping watch. 
He catches my eye now and smiles like he knows what I look like out of my 
shimmy.  I look away.  Give my flush to the wall.  
Frederick does most of the speeching during the meat course, which isn’t 
long for it contains a turkey that looks much less massive now it’s cooked and put 
in the centre of this crowd.  While Nim carves, Jenny fiddles with the cuff of her 
blouse and, by her staring, tries to will more meat off the bone.  I do my bit by 
refusing more than a smitch.  ‘I can fill myself up with water,’ I think and reach 
for the third glass on the right (you only make a mistake with finger bowls once).
With pudding—fruitcake, custard, jelly, ices, nuts and cream cheese—Nim 
also brings bread and butter and seed cake and macaroons and wafers in case 
anyone is still hungry.  No one dares touch any of it, except the Frenchmen, who 
larrup in, but they have the excuse of being strangers.  
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Talk about the war starts up.  Anxious that I not be ignorant of what’s 
passing, Frederick speaks in the English about the manifestations in London in 
favour of British assistance to France.  Jenny—in a voice far more foreign than I 
know it to be—tells the men that her daughter, too, is across the Channel, working 
with her husband, Mr Lafargue, to end Prussian occupation, and then, of course, 
to bring about the final Revolution.  Karl says that a German victory, and a 
carving up of France, would end by forcing France into the arms of Russia, 
followed by a new war of revenge, which would act  as a midwife to revolution in 
the East.  The men listen and have opinions of their own, which they give out in 
the French.
Where there is now a lull, Lenoble gives Nim a nod and she brings him two 
parcels he has given her to put away.  The crumpled brown bag, he holds out to 
Jenny.  She clutches her chest and cries out.  Only when he insists does she take it 
and look inside.  More yelling.  
‘What is it, Frederick?’ I whisper.  
‘Dried apricots,’ he says.  ‘They would have preferred to bring a bottle of 
something French and good, but times are bad.’  
To Karl they give the gift covered in newspaper.  
Frederick nudges me.  ‘They have wrapped it  with one of my articles about 
the war, do you see?’  
At first Karl is careful not to tear the paper but the French jeer him till he 
rips it open.  A book.  He reads the title and everyone laughs.  
‘What is it, Frederick?’  
He starts to explain but soon stops and calls across the table.  
‘Mr Lenoble, if it  doesn’t displease you, can you explain in English what the 
book is, for my wife’s sake?’  
Lenoble bows an elegant bow.  ‘Madame Lizzie, the book is called 
Confessions of a Breton Seminarist and it tells of all the ways the religious men 
and women in France misbehave themselves.’  
‘We used to read about the Empress,’ snickers Boyer, ‘Now we read about 
the nuns!’  
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Roars of laughter.  Jenny  yelps and claps her hands.  I sip and bide for the 
noise to die down before I says, ‘Is it true?  What it says in the book?’  
Lenoble wipes his mouth.  ‘When it comes to the religious orders, Madame 
Lizzie, truth is worse than fiction.’  
I can’t be sure what he means, only that it’s of a familiar persuasion.  I let it 
go. 
A discussion follows about the refusal of religion by  the working classes, 
and now about the need to abolish marriage, as a next  step.  I open my fan and 
beat some air into my lung.  What puzzles me is why  it’s oftenest married people 
who want marriage abolished, while the unmarried ones, like myself, want it kept 
safe, in case one day we might need it. 
Jenny rises and opens a hand in the direction of the sofas: time to remove 
ourselves there.  Pumps stokes the fires and lights the candles on the tree.  Nim 
pours tea and coffee into cups on the occasional table.  Frederick looks after the 
gin and whiskey.  Karl passes round the cigars.  I find myself beside Ottlick.  
‘In France,’ he says, ‘Men and women separate after dinner.’  
‘Oh, I think it’s the same here,’ I says.  ‘Only we’re not the kind to go by.’  
More talk about the war.  More speeches in the English.  As far as I can tell, 
the only one who fails to offer something is Bouton.  The longer he stays mute, 
the more blistering my curiosity for him grows.  Perhaps he doesn’t have the 
language to grasp what’s being said, or has gone so separate in his head that he 
can’t even hear it.  Perhaps he’s one of these soldiers who can no longer see the 
beauty in anything, on account of all the death he’s witnessed, and cares least  for 
speeches and words.  Perhaps he’s just biding the good moment to put in.  Perhaps 
all he needs is a push.  
‘Your leg looks very sick,’ I says.  
The room goes quiet.  Jenny bulges at me over her fan.  
‘I hope you’re having it  seen to proper.  We know a good doctor if you’re in 
need.’  
He covers his heart and leans down into a bow.  
I raise my glass to him.  ‘To life and surviving it.’  
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A silence now takes command, a silence made of swallowings and sighs. 
Out of it, Bouton’s voice rises a rumble.  
‘Madame Lizzie, you are a tradeswoman, ness-pa?  A worker?’  
‘I am.  Spent most of my young years in a cotton mill in Manchester, and 
not a bit ashamed of it.’  
‘A cotton mill, wee, this is what I’ve been told.  Is it  also true that your, ah, 
your husband here owned the factory you worked in?’  
‘Monsieur!’  Frederick is up quicker than a lady-do-naught sitting down.  He 
disguises his haste by taking an ashtray  and holding it  out for Bouton to tap his 
cigar on.  ‘Mr Bouton, you speak on a complicated matter and, moreover, one that 
is now past.  Myself and my wife now live away from Manchester.’  He puts the 
ashtray  down, stabs his own cigar into it.  ‘It is no secret that I come from a 
family of capitalists.  Bourgeois and philistine, those were the unfortunate 
circumstances I was born into.’  
I can’t help being impressed by Bouton’s sharpness, his knowing precise 
where the weak point is, but I pity my  Frederick more.  It’s not uncommon that he 
has to answer to this charge, not uncommon even though the world knows he 
worked in that mill to keep  Karl and the Movement afloat.  And knock me acock 
if I ever see Karl having to defend himself in this way.
‘Believe me, Lieutenant,’ Frederick says, moving back to his chair but not 
sitting on it, ‘I never lost sight of the contradictions of my situation.  I managed 
the mill because I had to.  Destitute, I would not have been much help  to our 
Cause.  Be in no doubt, it was a hard time for me.  I occupied a position I did not 
enjoy, and I occupied it for twenty years.  What sustained me was the knowledge 
that my profits were also the Revolution’s.’  
Bouton hearkens without cutting in, but  he makes sure to show himself 
unpersuaded.  Karl stares at his feet.  Jenny offers the wafers round.  
‘I would also like to say  so that  the record is clear,’ Frederick says now, 
flicking out  the skirts of his coat and sitting down, ‘I would also like to say that in 
Manchester I made a point of not socialising with the bourgeoisie and of devoting 
my leisure hours to intercourse with plain working—’  
134
‘I heard you were quite the fox hunter,‘ says Bouton, his tone as easy as a 
sea breeze.  
I wince at the clout of it.  The colours rush to Frederick’s face.  He throws a 
leg over one way and now the other.  Cups his hands over his knee.  Jigs up  and 
down.  The quiet is complete enough to hear the rustle of my  dress as I run by 
palm down my thigh to dry it.  I look at Bouton.  I can tell by the stones of his 
eyes that, in spite of his flippant manner, it  doesn’t pleasure him to be contrary 
like this.  He’s not doing it for fun or high spirits but rather is doing what he 
thinks a soldier must when he finds himself among parlour men.  He’s saying the 
truth of real things.
‘In Manchester,’ says Frederick, ‘I discovered poverty and degradation 
among the working people worse than in any civilised place on earth.  But I also 
discovered a proletarian culture of significant intellectual elevation.  The 
labourers devoured Rousseau, Voltaire and Paine.  Byron and Shelley were read 
almost exclusively by them.  On Sunday  evenings thousands filled the Hall of 
Science to hear lectures by their working brothers on political, religious and social 
affairs.   And I was there with them.  I was there to hear those men whose fustian 
jackets scarcely held together speak on geology and astronomy with more 
knowledge than most bourgeois paper-shufflers possess.’  He tucks his hair back. 
Runs a finger over his lip and smiles.  His esteem is recovering.  ‘I can assure 
you, all of you, that even when in the service of cotton capitalism, I was never 
anything but devoted to the International.’  
‘I’m certain Mr Bouton is not suggesting otherwise,’ says Lenoble.  
‘See voo play, Mr Engels,’ says Pernaudet, ‘Mr Bouton was simply being 
curious.  He did not mean to cause offence.’  
Frederick bends forward into a bow and takes his drink back up.  
‘Mr Bouton,’ he says and salutes the soldier.  
‘Mr Engels,’ Bouton returns the gesture.  ‘Do forgive me if my questions are 
bold.  I have been so long among fighting men whose manners were poor, I am 
prone to forget myself.  I hope you can excuse me.’  
‘Please Mr Bouton,’ says Frederick, ‘There is no need to apologise.’  
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And, with that, it looks like it’s over, the storm blown wide.  Frederick sits 
back and slugs down.  Bouton turns his attention to lifting his bandaged leg and 
carrying it to a new spot on the carpet.  Jenny  rushes over and puts a cushion 
under.  Ottlick turns to me with a small conversation about the weather in London 
and how it compares to the outside world.  
‘It’s the only thing,’ he says, shaking his head, ‘The only thing for which 
this city cannot claim greatness.’  
I nod and smile for politeness sake, but in truth my interest  is what I can see 
over his shoulder: Bouton and the winds still howling through the ruts on his face.  
‘There is still one thing I do not understand, Mr Engels,’ he says.  
Fredrick pulls away from Karl’s ear.  ‘What is that, Mr Bouton?’  
‘Since my arrival here in London, your role has been explained to me on a 
number of occasions and by a number of different people, and yet I cannot seem 
to comprehend it quite.’  
‘My role?’  
‘Your role, Mr Engels, your position in the International, as you call it.  If 
you have left the situation by which you were financing it, what do you do for it 
now?’
This churns Karl right up.  He rises—creak!—to stand by Frederick’s chair. 
Slaps a hand onto his shoulder.  ‘Mr Bouton, please, if I may  speak for my 
colleague.  The man you are addressing, and with such ill-manner if I may say, is 
our corresponding secretary for Belgium, Italy, Spain—’
Fredrick murmurs something.
‘And Portugal and Denmark, that’s right.  This, Mr Bouton, is none other 
than the man in charge of co-ordinating the proletarian struggle across the 
Continent.’  
Frederick accepts Karl’s tribute with a quick nod.  
‘It sounds like your secretary does important work, Dr Marx,’ says Bouton.  
‘I can assure you he does,’ says Karl.  ‘Important work and apparently 
thankless.’ 
With a proud flick of his head, Karl seizes Frederick’s glass and brings it to 
the drinks tray with his own.  
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‘Have you ever fought, Mr Engels?’ says Bouton.  
His back still to the room, Karl slams down his glass.  ‘Indeed he has!’  He 
swings round.  ‘Back in forty-eight he was involved in no less than four important 
battles against the Prussians.  He himself raised the red flag over his hometown. 
In theory and in practice, Mr Engels is an expert on war.  It is not for nothing we 
call him our General.’  
Bouton smiles a conceding smile.  ‘I did not know this history  of yours, Mr 
Engels, and am most glad to learn it.’  
Frederick receives this weak praise with an extravagant whirl of his hand. 
‘Now that  you are in London, Mr Bouton, I hope we shall have many more 
opportunities to learn about each other.’  
Karl gives Frederick his drink and, mumbling quiet oaths to himself, returns 
to his own seat.  He plumps down.  Pulls the thighs of his breeches towards 
himself so that their ends come up  over his boots to show a sliver of pale and 
spotted skin.  
‘And you Dr Marx?  Have you ever fought?’
The grin comes so quick to my face I’ve to rush to cover it with my fan.  I 
see it now.  Karl has been Bouton’s target all along.  He’s been going through 
Frederick to find his way to him.  A coil in me loosens, and I feel I can start to 
enjoy myself.  
Karl gulps down and wipes his mouth with his sleeve.  For a grain of what 
has already been said, I’ve seen him drench bodies in bitter slang.  This time, 
though, he manages to keep his temper.  ‘If forty-eight has left us with a lesson, 
Mr Bouton, it  is the danger of inadequately prepared rebellions.  It is my duty as a 
revolutionary  leader to educate the Proletariat towards its eventual destiny. 
Without  instruction and guidance there can be no useful action.  We all cannot, 
nor should we all be, soldiers.  To the Revolution, as to the new society, we must 
give according to our abilities.’  
‘And the International?  What does it do?  Does it have an army?’  
‘Our Association constitutes nothing more than the bond between the most 
advanced working men in the various countries of the civilised world.’  
‘A bond?’ says Bouton.  ‘Does the bond do anything?’  
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‘Its task is to infuse workers’ groups with socialist theory and a 
revolutionary temper.’  
‘You mean its task is to sell your books.’  
Lenoble and Ottlick both fling their arms out in objection.  ‘Monsieur 
Bouton, see voo play.  We are guests in Dr Marx’s home!’  
Bouton ignores them.  ‘Don’t  you think, Dr Marx, that the workers would 
be moved more easily  by  appeals to direct action than by learned treatises about 
labour and capital?’  
Uproar.  Everyone on their feet, shouting and flailing about.  Everyone 
except Bouton, of course.  And me.  You won’t  find me up there bawling over 
politics. 
Karl raises up to calm the waters.  ‘Bitter, bitter, bitter,’ he says, and now 
when he has quiet and everyone is sitting again, ‘You know, Mr Bouton, you are 
right.  Ideas can accomplish absolutely nothing.  Ideas never lead beyond the 
established situation.  They only lead beyond the ideas of the established 
situation.  To become real, ideas require men to apply practical force.  However—
and this is the vital point—force must be organised by the new idea.  Force 
without the new idea is wasted.’  
Bouton folds his arms across and frowns.  ‘You speak of action, Dr Marx, 
but what action is your organisation taking?  I am sorry  but I cannot believe it to 
be merely a coincidence that  your headquarters are in the only country in Europe 
determined not to revolt.’  
Again, chaos.  Again, everyone up  and shouting.  This time, though, Karl 
follows Bouton’s lead and stays in his seat.  Screened by the dancing bodies and 
the curtain of blue smoke, he digs his elbows into his lap and lets his head fall into 
his hands, reaches his fingers into his brush and scratches his scalp.  
‘Will the cursed peace in this country ever end?’ 
When things have settled, Karl leaves for the cellar to choose something to fill the 
empty jugs with.  He plods out, followed by Frederick, and now by Lenoble, 
Boyer, Ottlick and Pumps.  Jenny  rings for Nim and helps her bring some things 
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downstairs.  On the way, she tries to collect my eye, but I look down and sit tight. 
I spend enough time in my own kitchen.
I’m left  with Bouton and Pernaudet.  Huddled like plotters on the couch, 
they talk in low voices in the French.  I clear my throat.  
‘Don’t you think it gives a queer air to a place, having so many people who 
don’t want to be in it?’  
They look confused.  
‘London, I mean.’  
‘Oh, London.’  
‘Why did you choose London, gents, if it displeases you so much?’  
‘This was the only place.  It was either here or Switzerland.’  
‘I see.  And Switzerland?’  
They shake their heads as if to say, ‘You think here is peaceful?’
I use a stray napkin to rub the paint off the lip of my glass.  ‘I’ve come to 
believe emigration can’t be healthful for a person,’ I says.  
The two men nod, wistful.  
‘You know, Madame Lizzie,‘ Bouton says after a time, ‘You have the aspect 
of someone who has seen trouble and had to fight it.’  
‘That I’ve done my share of fighting can’t be gainsaid.  By nobody it can’t.’  
‘You’re not the same as these people’—he nods towards the door—‘My 
advice to you is, go softly and do not lose yourself among them.’  
I begin to protest but I have to admit the justice of his words.  
‘We all have our reasons for being somewhere, do we not, Madame Lizzie? 
In France there is war.  An order out on our heads.  We cannot return, not if we 
want to live.  This is our excuse.  But you, Madame Lizzie, what is yours?’  
‘My excuse?’  
‘Go easy, Bouton,’ says Pernaudet, and mutters something in the French.  
Bouton dismisses him.  ‘Yes, Madame Lizzie, what is your reason for being 
here, away from where you belong?  You must have one.  We all do.  If we did 
not, we would be back there, ness-pa?’  
‘I’ve no place to be going back to, Mr Bouton.  This is my home.  Is that 
what you call a reason?’  
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‘No.’  
‘Bouton!’  
‘Please leave him, Mr Pernaudet.  Though he tries, Mr Bouton doesn’t 
offend.’  
Pernaudet bows.  
Bouton smiles.  ‘Do you like it  here, Mrs Burns?  In London.  In these 
houses?’  
‘Like it or nay, it’s where I find myself, and it’s where I’ll live myself out.’  
‘Such a pity.’  
‘Bouton!’  
‘Please, Mr Pernaudet, I don’t wish to be handled with kid skin.  Mr 
Bouton, I’ve been to Ireland only once, on a holiday  with Frederick, but I still call 
myself Irish, and I will till the last of my breaths.  Can you understand that?’  
He curls his lip down.  ‘No.’  
I laugh.  ‘All right then, can you understand this: was I to take myself off 
tomorrow, back to Ireland or wheresoever, Mr Engels’s house would fall right 
down.’  
‘No house for the Internationals?’ he says.  ‘My God, Madame Lizzie, 
where would we all be then?’
Where?  Nowhere is where.  
A body must be where her money is made.
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Introduction
The quagga was a South African wild ass.  Its front part resembled a zebra, but  in 
the mid-section its stripes faded, and the spaces between them widened, leaving a 
brown hind quarter much like a donkey’s.  In 1870, the same year Friedrich 
Engels and Lizzie Burns moved to their new home on Regent’s Park Road in 
London, the quagga mare held at the nearby zoo was photographed.  
Fig. 1. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.  Encyclopædia 
Britannica Inc., 2012. Web. <http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/486005/Quagga>.
It was to become the only existing photograph of the animal.  The last wild 
quagga was shot some time before the decade ended, and the last captive 
specimen died at the zoo in Amsterdam in 1883.  
Despite appearances, the quagga was not a hybrid: the offspring of a male 
horse and a female zebra are zebrine, those of a male zebra and a female horse 
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zebrule, and those of a male zebra and female ass zebrass.  But nor was the 
quagga an individual species.  In 1984—the same year Michel Foucault died—
genetic tests carried out on preserved skins found that the quagga was in fact a 
subspecies of the plains zebra.  This discovery gave a group of people in South 
Africa an idea: by selectively breeding the zebra, they would resurrect the quagga.
Animals selected for breeding are chosen purely  on visual 
analysis.  Those with the least stripes are used for breeding 
the next generation. Animals are methodically scored on 
their stripes to follow the progress over generations.  With 
continuous selective breeding over generations the 
individual stripe and colour variations should fade, 
resulting in animals with coat patterns that closely 
resemble those of the original quagga…It is necessary, of 
course, to have a criterion for deciding when the project 
has achieved its goal.  It has been decided that when an 
animal is achieved which has no scorable stripes on the 
hind part of the body, and no stripes on the legs, then it 
qualifies.  Accepting that  we are only selecting for this set 
of attributes of the original quagga, and not for any other 
genetic features which may have been possessed by  the 
original quagga population, we will then term this a ‘Rau 
quagga’, the qualification giving acknowledgement to 
Reinhold Rau, whose vision and drive inspired and guided 
the project in its initial stages.  <www.quaggaproject.org>
Despite appearances, appearances matter.  The physical traits of prospective zebra 
are examined for how closely they resemble the quagga.  The closer the 
resemblance, the greater the chance that the animal possesses the quagga genes 
which the Quagga Project believes to be present in living plains zebra 
populations.  Likewise, offspring are judged according to how similar their hides 
are to the extinct animal (that is, to the twenty-four mounted specimens that exist 
in museums around the world).  Those foals stubborn enough to cling to their 
stripes are ‘translocated’ or ‘removed’.  Those that  show a tendency to quagga-
ness are kept on and bred in their turn.  
But—the obvious question—are looks alone enough?  Was the quagga 
unique in ways other than its external aspect?  Did it have its own unique genetic 
and behavioural attributes?  
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It has been argued that there might have been other non-
morphological, genetically-coded features (such as habitat 
adaptations) unique to the quagga and that therefore any 
animal produced by a selective breeding programme 
would not be a genuine quagga.  Since there is no direct 
evidence for such characters and since it would be 
impossible now to demonstrate such characters were they 
to exist, this argument has limited value.  The definition of 
the quagga can only rest on its well-described 
morphological characteristics and, if an animal is obtained 
that possesses these characters, then it is fair to claim that 
it is a representation of, at least, the visible quagga 
phenotype. <www.quaggaproject.org>
There are many objections we can make regarding all of this, the most urgent 
being: what has happened to the quagga?  When we ‘discovered’ the quagga in 
1778 and gave it a proper name of its own (equus quagga quagga), were we not 
saving it from these kinds of future confusions?  Have we now to concede that we 
did not  know what we saw, that the uniqueness we discerned was an illusion?  For 
a hundred years, the quagga was allowed to live in peace as a quagga; indeed, 
even after we had wiped it out, it continued to thrive in our science and in our 
history (as an extinct species, it is true, but at least according to the rules we used 
to name it).  
Thrive, that is, until today.  Today we are being told that this history is based 
on a mistake, that it is a lie; today they want us to believe that there was never that 
much ‘quagga’ to wipe out in the first place.  Having put its time-travelling 
techniques to work, gene science has decided it was hasty of us to have ever 
classed the quagga as anything other than a type, a race, a category  of the plains 
zebra.  The quagga, it turns out, had never been more or less unique than the 
Burchell’s Zebra (equus quagga burchellii), the Grant’s Zebra (equus quagga 
boehmi), the Selous’s Zebra (equus quagga borensis), the Chapman’s Zebra 
(equus quagga chapmani) and the Crawshay’s Zebra (equus quagga crawshayi); 
therefore, there is no reason why, with a bit of aesthetic engineering, the quagga 
(equus quagga quagga) could not be resurrected.
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But—our heads spin—if the quagga was merely a kind of zebra that 
happened to take after donkeys (natural deception), and if Rau quaggas are merely 
zebra that try to take after quagga (simulation), has the quagga—as a natural 
object, as a thing-in-itself—ever really existed?  Was the quagga merely  a myth (a 
fabrication of our taxonomic categories) that in the name of conservation (revival) 
and with the aim of atonement for past sins (all the directors of the Quagga 
Project are white like the original exterminators) we are now trying to make real?  
We—writers of ‘historical fiction’—sense that there are lessons to be 
learned here.  Something about the contingent nature of knowledge.  And 
something else about the problems involved in locating origins and essences.  And 
perhaps even a glimpse of the conceptual forces that condition the very possibility 
of our speaking and understanding.  But positioned as we are at  the beginning of 
our inquiry, we are unable to adequately  articulate what those lessons might be, 
and how we might go about learning them.  In truth, we hardly know what we are 
looking at yet; we certainly do not know what we are looking for.  
There are a number of directions in which we can set out for help in making 
sense of the quagga conundrum.  We can head towards science (genetics, biology, 
natural history).  Or towards philosophy  (ontology, epistemology, linguistic 
theory).  Or towards history  (of nature, of science, of conservation, of 
extermination).  Inquiry  carried out in any one of these disciplines would, we are 
sure, yield results both rich and variously true.  It is really only by chance—the 
memory of a passage from a book by Foucault—that we decide to stay at  the 
crossroads between them.
The Order of Things.  Preface.  First paragraph.  A quote from an uncited 
passage by Borges.  The quote is itself a quote from ‘a certain Chinese 
encyclopaedia’ in which animals are divided into:
(a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) 
sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray  dogs, (h) 
included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) 
innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel-hair brush, 
(l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) 
that from a long way off look like flies.  (xv)
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This, Foucault tells us, was the inspiration for his book.  The book ‘arose out of’ 
this passage.  Whether or not this is the case—whether inspiration of any kind was 
involved—matters little.  What does matters is that we are amused by Borges’s 
classification, that we wonder at its impossibility.  What matters is that we ask 
ourselves how could someone think that?  Or more precisely, how could we have 
once thought that; how could they over there think in this way?  Because, as far as 
Foucault is concerned, once we have asked this question, we are primed to 
consider the further and more significant question of what makes something—a 
piece of knowledge, a particular classification, indeed the activity of classification 
itself—thinkable in one time and place, and unthinkable in another.  What forces 
give rise to the possibility of the knowledge that, for example, an animal drawn 
with a camel-hair is a species, or that a quagga is just  a plains zebra from a long 
way off?
As writers of ‘historical fiction’, we are drawn to this question of what is 
possible in the knowledge of a given era; and as inquirers into this question, we 
are drawn to Foucault  because he operates in three modes that, consciously and 
unconsciously, with intention and by chance, we adopt in our own practice: 
history, philosophy and fiction.  That is to say, at different times, and often at the 
same time, he is, like us, an historian, a theorist and a storyteller.  Would an 
analysis of how he works in these three modes help to shed light on what is 
happening—in our culture, in our language, in our minds—when we write what 
we call ‘historical fiction’?  If, with the help  of Foucault’s work itself, we were 
able to glimpse the network of conceptual forces that make possible Foucault’s 
propositions, would we also catch sight of the network that makes possible our 
own?  Indeed, can we truly  speak of two networks: one for Foucault and one for 
us?  Are they, in reality, one and the same?
In Chapter One we will approach Foucault as Historian.  More precisely, we 
will examine what Foucault calls ‘archaeology’: a distinctly  historical mode of 
theoretical analysis which seeks to isolate discourse from any material influence 
in order to reveal the purely discursive conditions that make certain kinds of 
knowledge possible at particular moments in history.  We will undertake this 
examination in the context of a broader inquiry  into how history  as a discipline is 
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understood today, that is, the specific character of those questions about history 
that are thinkable in the present.  We will demonstrate that underlying our current 
ideas about history are the conceptual and linguistic possibilities and constraints 
that shape our ideas of time itself, and that these more fundamental conditions are, 
in fact, what make possible Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ analyses.
In Chapter Two we will consider Foucault  as Theorist.  Here, we will 
examine Foucault’s method of ‘genealogy’: a singularly  theoretical mode of 
historical analysis that seeks to move away from archaeology’s concern with 
‘pure’ discourse towards an exploration of the material conditions under which 
discourse is produced (and, conversely, the discursive regime within which 
material conditions are themselves (re)constituted).  We will show that 
genealogy’s interest in these material conditions reflects a deeper concern with the 
problems of space.  Genealogy’s preoccupation with space leads it, we will 
demonstrate, to a further set of questions regarding the relationship (established 
by archaeology) between ‘discursive’ and ‘non-discursive’ domains of knowledge. 
We will argue that genealogy’s attempt to dissolve this relationship—to annul 
what it perceives as an artificial division between the conditions that produce (and 
are produced by) matter and the conditions that produce (and are produced by) 
discourse—is made possible by  a more generalised configuration of knowledge 
that sees space and time as unified and indistinguishable.
Finally, in Chapter Three we will look at Foucault as Storyteller.  More 
precisely, we will examine the peculiar status that truth holds in Foucault’s work, 
given that it  is highly sceptical of the possibility  of certainty in all kinds of 
discourse.  Here we will encounter what might be the central paradox of 
Foucault’s thought: on one hand, a total lack of faith in the existence of a ‘space 
of truth’ located outside the historically contingent conditions of language, and on 
the other hand, an apparent delight in those instances in history  where 
marginalised voices succeed in speaking their ‘truths’.  We will argue that this 
contradiction in Foucauldian thought is, at  core, a product of our current 
conditions of knowledge that permit a highly  ambivalent conception of truth to 
flourish: in our scientific and philosophical discourses we wonder whether truth 
can ever be possible and yet in our everyday  lives we behave as if truth is a given. 
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This ambivalence, we will show, is closely bound to the problem of self.  What 
role can truth play in our experience of time and space?  How true can the 
products of our consciousness be?  Through an analysis of current scientific and 
philosophical perspectives on consciousness, we will demonstrate that not only 
our perception of the world, but also our perception of self (and therefore the 
claims to truth we make in our discourses) are, at base, historical fictions.  This, 
we will conclude, has interesting consequences for those categories of discourse, 
such as ‘historical fiction’, which apparently rely on what is ‘true’.
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IDonkey’s Years
Once upon a time—let us call the moment ‘the fourth century AD’ or ‘the later 
Roman Empire’—it occurred to us to ask, ‘So what is time?’  The question arose 
from an uncomfortable awareness: although in our everyday lives we behaved as 
if we knew what time was, when we actively sought to define it, we could not 
(Augustine, 231).  Our common sense understanding of time as the measure of the 
movement of physical objects did not, we realised, explain the nature of time 
itself.  We had no measure with which to measure our measure.
Of course, this was not the first time we thought to puzzle over this 
problem.  Inquiry  into the essential qualities of time had been taking place for at 
least nine centuries (Sorabji, 99); it  was not an activity unique to us, the late 
Romans.  What was new were the possibilities of thought about time in our time; 
what was new were the conditions under which our theories about time were 
produced, that is, the social, historical and linguistic factors which determined 
what was true about time for us.  
Time had, by our time, become a problem that Christianity was obliged to 
address.  If Christianity  was, as it claimed to be, the sole holder of truths; if it was 
the system of laws that was to replace all previous systems, there was an onus on 
it to come up  with answers to some fundamental questions about the world and its 
workings.  And if we were to be true spokespersons for this modern religion—if 
we were to justify  our conversion to ourselves and to others—we had to formulate 
explanations for certain phenomena, such as time, in a way that both conformed to 
the messages of the Bible and refuted those of the older pagan cults.  
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This task of distancing new truths from old falsehoods was to prove 
difficult, however.  The challenge was not finding phrases about time that 
contradicted what had gone before.  (Assuming an antagonistic position in 
relation to the existent myths and images came relatively easy  to us; overturning 
and inverting ungodly convictions was indeed an essential feature of our Christian 
identity.)  Rather, our troubles lay at a deeper level: we could not, we found, step 
outside of our time to produce entirely new—that is, entirely Christian—
propositions about time.  In the process of giving proper sense to our assertions, 
we came always to depend on what we were opposing.  Which is to say: the 
historical circumstances that gave validity to our Christian lessons about time—
those circumstances that made our lessons thinkable in the first place—were the 
same that supported the ostensibly  conflicting teachings offered by  other 
contemporary  belief structures, from Manichee theosophy and Neoplatonic 
mysticism, to Scepticism and indeed Atheism (Chadwick, xiv-xxv).  The 
fundamental conditions of knowledge that determined the truth of our Christian 
descriptions of time were identical to those that determined the truth of these other 
descriptions; the two discourses (old and new, pagan and Christian) were simply 
contrasting elements within the same system of knowledge; they were hostile 
products of a single discursive matrix, bound by the same limits and governed by 
the same rules concerning what was coherent, consistent, sound or acceptable. 
There was nothing stopping us from judging as false all non-Christian approaches 
to the question of time, but this did not mean that these rival approaches did not 
count as a kind of knowledge.  Quite the opposite, they counted enough for us to 
include them as counterpoints in our formulations.
Looking back on our Roman selves, what brings this shared epistemological 
ground most vividly into view are the paradoxes that ran through and underlay  our 
explanations of time.  What these paradoxes reveal is that the relationship 
between our Christian discourse and the pagan discourse it was attempting to 
replace was, more often than not, marked by interdependence; the conclusions we 
came to were, in many instances, as irreligious as they were Godly.  In our 
discussion here, we will focus on two of the most important of these paradoxes.
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The first relates to the problem of time’s existence, and specifically  to the 
question, ‘Where did time come from?’  Our answer to this began with an 
unsurprising assertion: God made time.  Time was—it existed—and therefore, 
like everything else in existence, it had to be God’s creation.  
How could innumerable ages pass, which you [God] had 
not made?  You are the originator and creator of all ages. 
What time existed which were not brought into being by 
you?  Or how could they pass if they never had existence?
…You have made time itself.  Time could not elapse 
before you made time…There was no ‘then’ when there 
was no time. (Augustine, 229-30)
About this, then, we were clear: before God made the earth, there had been no 
time.  Time had begun with the dawn of the physical world.  Time was bound to 
matter.  Although it had come out of heaven, it did not belong in heaven; time was 
itself thoroughly mundane.  
Thus conceived, time was at once the product of eternity and the opposite of 
eternity.  This raised the question of what sort of time eternity was.  Was eternity a 
different kind of time?  Was it  time at all?  We had to be careful when formulating 
our answer to this: it was unavoidable that we conceptualised eternity using our 
terrestrial conceptions of time (what other conceptions could we have?), but, 
equally, it was a crime—blasphemy—to attribute worldly  time to God, for to do 
so was to presume that there was a human idea that could capture His vastness, 
and thereby mimic or reproduce it. 
Your ‘years’ are ‘one day’ (Ps. 89: 4; 2 Pet. 3: 8), and your 
‘day’ is not any and every day but Today, because your 
Today does not yield to a tomorrow, nor did it follow on a 
yesterday.  Your Today is eternity. (230) 
In our attempt to construct a single account of the creation of time that, on 
one hand, related to our understanding of everyday  time (our discourse had to be 
thinkable), and on the other hand, refrained from tarnishing God with 
connotations of transience (God had to remain eternal at all times), what  we 
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actually ended up creating were two realms containing distinct forms of time: 
firstly, the time into which we had been born, and secondly, the no-time from 
which God had brought about time.  In the former, things arose and then passed 
away in succession, while in the latter, nothing had ever arisen or died.  There was 
time here on earth because God, who Himself had no time, said that time ought to 
exist elsewhere, outside of heaven.  But—and here lies the paradox—how could 
God have created time if He had no time in which to create it?  What kind of 
words could God have used to bring about time (‘And God said, Let there be…’) 
if the action of speaking itself required time?
But how did you speak?…[If] it was with words which 
sound and pass away that you said that heaven and earth 
should be made, and if this was how you made heaven and 
earth, then a created entity  belonging to the physical realm 
existed prior to heaven and earth; and that utterance took 
time to deliver, and involved temporal changes…
Whatever it might have been which became the basis for 
such an utterance, unless it was created by you, it could 
not exist.  Therefore for the creation of a physical entity  to 
become the basis for these words, what kind of word 
would you have used? (225)
The only  possible solution was that the words God used to make time were of an 
eternal sort.  
You call us, therefore, to understand the Word, God who is 
with you God (John 1: 1).  That word is spoken eternally, 
and by it all things are uttered eternally.  It  is not the case 
that what was being said comes to an end, and something 
else is then said, so that everything is uttered in a 
succession with a conclusion, but everything is said in the 
simultaneity of eternity.  Otherwise time and change 
would already  exist, and there would not be a true eternity 
and true immortality…And so by  the Word coeternal with 
yourself, you say all that you say in simultaneity  and 
eternity, and whatever you say will come about does come 
about.  You do not cause it  to exist other than by speaking. 
Yet not all that you cause to exist by speaking is made in 
simultaneity and eternity. (226) 
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So, although it was true that God had taken a week to create the earth, that his 
verbal commands had come in succession, one leading onto the next, it was also 
true that each of these commands had happened in a space where all words were 
simultaneous and eternal; the action of bringing about time on earth had itself 
been timeless.  Hence our conviction that reality was double and divided: here 
there was the reality  of our fleeting words and over there, separate from us, there 
was the reality of God’s eternal Word.  God’s Word had no time; it functioned as a 
kind of endless Wisdom from which our meagre knowledge sprang.  Our having 
to use fleeting words to communicate our commands (to ourselves, to others, to 
nature) was a consequence of our fallen state.  Thanks to our original sin, our 
words were, and would always be, inadequate for the expression of divine actions. 
The exception was the Bible.  Although made up of our words, the Bible 
consisted of His Word; it was a gift from Him, a flowing of words from his Word. 
This fact opened up the possibilities of time for us: if we studied the Bible and 
spoke only with the words we found there; if we lived in our time with the Bible’s 
timeless truth within us, guiding our actions, we could, on some rare occasions, 
experience a beatific vision and thereby live, if only for an instant, God’s eternal 
time here on earth.  What this meant was that, in some special circumstances, the 
two separate realms of time entered into a relation; channels opened between 
them.  The challenge for us was to lead a life that would bring about this opening 
of channels; the challenge was to dedicate our lives to devotion, to speak only of 
God using his Word; the challenge was to transcend our words and glimpse the 
other eternal reality.
Who can lay hold on the heart and give it fixity, so that for 
some little moment it  may  be stable, and for a fraction of 
time may grasp the splendour of a constant eternity?  Then 
it may compare eternity  with temporal successiveness 
which never has any constancy, and will see there is no 
comparison possible…Who will lay hold on the human 
heart to make it  still, so that it can see how eternity, in 
which there is neither future nor past, stands still and 
dictates future and past times?  Can my hand have the 
strength for this?  Can the hand of my mouth by mere 
speech achieve so great a thing? (228-29).
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Our insistence on the realness of time in both its earthly and Godly 
manifestations, and on the possibility  of real, if momentary, communication 
between the two domains, was, at base, a rejection of Sceptical ideas that were 
current in our era.  Sceptics doubted the possibility  of any  certainty—any 
fundamental reality—except in questions of pure mathematics (Sonabji, 150). 
They  looked with suspicion on any attempt to attribute truth to any  phenomenon 
that could not be tested in a theorem.  By arguing that our day and God’s Today 
were to the same extent real (even if not to the same degree holy), we were, in 
effect, disassociating ourselves from these radical doubters.  This attempt at 
disassociation was not wholly  successful, however.  When it came to disproving 
the Sceptics, we could not avoid articulating peculiarly Sceptical concerns.
These concerns stem from the fact that, although we swore by the reality  of 
earthly time, we could not properly  attribute existence to at least two of its tenses: 
the past and the future.  We understood that if nothing passed away there would be 
no past and if nothing were still coming there would be no future, but, try  as we 
might, we could ground neither the past nor the future in reality; no matter how 
hard we tried to grasp  them, the past continued to be no longer and the future 
continued to be not yet (Augustine, 231).  Despite the traces of the past and the 
images of the future that shaped our landscapes and weighed upon our 
consciousness, it seemed the present was all there actually was.  
If future and past events exist, I want to know where they 
are.  If I have not the strength to discover the answer, at 
least I know that  wherever they are, they are not there as 
future or past, but as present. (233)
This inability  to locate the past and the future threatened to undermine our 
conviction that time was a reality.  That is to say, it threatened to make Sceptics of 
us by destroying our certainty about the existence of time.  This could not, of 
course, be allowed to happen.  As one of God’s creations, time had to be saved.  
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Our solution was to subsume the past and the future into the present.  In 
order to account for the slipperiness of the past and the future, we began to treat 
them as conscious states residing within the larger and more real present state.  
Perhaps it  would be exact to say: there are three times, a 
present of things past, a present of things present, a 
present of things to come…The present considering the 
past is the memory, the present considering the present is 
immediate awareness, the present considering the future is 
expectation. (235)
This represented a significant shift in our vision.  Time went from being an 
objective to a subjective reality.  It ceased being a phenomenon that could be 
measured against eternity, and became instead a form of consciousness: an 
awareness of what  had happened and what was happening and what might 
happen.  It had, in short, entered the mind.
So it is in you, my mind, that I measure periods of time…
The impression which passing events make upon you 
abides when they are gone.  That  present consciousness is 
what I am measuring, not the stream of past events which 
have caused it.  (242)
Here, we see a curiously  Sceptical account of time: time as internal measure; time 
as consciousness measuring consciousness; time as ‘I’ timing the current 
impressions of ‘I’.  And our Scepticism was not to stop at this.  Once we had 
understood that the three tenses of time were in fact different modulations of the 
present; once we had identified time as the present, we were obliged to account 
for this present, and this task was to lead us into even more uncertain waters.
  
If we can think of some bit of time which cannot be 
divided into even the smallest instantaneous moments, that 
alone is what we can call ‘present’.  And this time flies so 
quickly from future into past that it is an interval with no 
duration.  If it has duration, it is divisible into past and 
future.  But the present occupies no space. (232)
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This, then, is the second important paradox of our Christian discourse on time. 
The present—that which we believed to contain all time—could not itself be 
measured; it  had no perceivable duration.  The present appeared to be both 
instantaneous (instantaneously short, gone as soon as we blinked) and infinite 
(infinitely long, there as long as we looked).  Every  moment that we tried to fix 
was, by  the time we fixed it, already gone, and every moment we thought we 
fixed could itself be infinitely  divided.  The measure of the present’s passing was 
not stable.  We found it impossible to mark the moment in which it slipped into 
the past or rolled on to the future.  When, we were left  wondering, did now 
become then?       
But how do we measure present time when it has no 
extension?  It is measured when it  passes, but not when it 
has passed, because then there will be nothing there to 
measure…In what extension then do we measure time as it 
is passing?  Is it in the future out of which it comes to pass 
by?  No, for we do not  measure what does not yet exist.  Is 
it in the present through which it passes?  No, for we 
cannot measure that which has no extension.  Is it in the 
past into which it is moving?  No, for we cannot measure 
what now does not exist. (236)
Here, we were treading on dangerous ground.  If, as we contended, the present 
was the only real form of time, and if the present was by all accounts 
immeasurable, it  meant that the present was not time at all but eternity.  And if this 
was true, then we who resided in the present were God.  
Blasphemy!
To suggest that, like God, we lived in eternity was to compare ourselves to 
God; it  was to impersonate Him; it was to give ourselves equal importance; it was 
to pretend to be coeternal with Him; and, although by thinking such a thing we 
had proved it was thinkable, it was nevertheless unacceptable.  Somehow we must 
ascribe mortality to the present.
Yet if the present were always present, it would not pass 
into the past: it would not be time but eternity.  If then, in 
order to be time at all, the present is so made that it passes 
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into the past, how can we say that this present also ‘is’? 
The cause of its being is that it  will cease to be.  So indeed 
we cannot truly  say that  time exists except in the sense 
that it tends towards non-existence.  (231)
Our thinking was pulling us in two different directions.  As Christians our task 
was to devote ourselves to God, and through this devotion, to rise above time, an 
experience which would demonstrate to us the difference between our transient 
lives and the eternity of heaven.  Equally, however, any suggestion that eternity 
could exist outside of the specific circumstances of a beatific vision had to be 
invalidated.  Eternity could not exist all the time on earth; the present had to be 
allowed to die, otherwise it would be heaven.
This ambivalent attitude towards the apparently  timeless quality of the 
present reveals an underlying struggle to expunge our discourse of pagan 
vocabularies, and in particular the vocabulary of Neoplatonism.  Neoplatonist 
mysticism was grounded in the belief that the purified soul, purged of all physical 
contact and all images of material things, was capable of achieving a union with 
the One (God).  For Neoplatonism, this experience was one in which the soul was 
lifted up  beyond the successiveness of time to the simultaneity  of eternity, and the 
only method to gain such an experience was introspection; Neoplatonism 
exhorted us to go into ourselves.  In so doing, we escaped the successiveness of 
the temporal process, which distracted our soul from its ascent into eternity. 
During our ascent, we moved from discursive to non-discursive thinking and then 
finally to a union with the One.  In this sense, to have a mystical experience was, 
for Neoplatonism, to achieve a sense of timelessness (O’Meara, 91-111).
It was Neoplatonism, then, that provided us with a model for our quest for 
transcendence or the union with God (O’Connell, 139-42).  The only  means we 
found to distance ourselves from this model was to speak of a less complete union 
with God.  In Christian transcendence, we did not become a timeless being—we 
do not become God—but only  momentarily lost our attachment to time as we 
caught sight of Him in the beatific vision.  Ultimately, only after death, and only 
for a number of souls (those who were chosen by God to be saints and angels), 
was it possible to become truly eternal (Sorabji, 168).
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  
Today, we—let us call ourselves citizens of the late American Empire, or ‘late 
Americans’—are still wondering about the nature of time.  Is time the fourth 
dimension of the universe (a plane with an actual existence) or is it a reified 
abstraction (a concept, an idea)?  Did it  begin with the Big Bang or with human 
awareness of the passing day?  Does it—can it—have an existence independent of 
motion to be measured?  Does it  proceed in a straight line and in a single 
direction?  Is it  uninterrupted (a continuum) or does it have discrete durations 
(atomistic)?  Can we even ask such questions if we have not addressed the 
underlying problem of whether, outside of our minds, it proceeds at all? 
(Holford-Stevens, i).  
Although we no longer direct  our questions to a God or a One; although we 
devise our inquiry in such a way that empirically quantifiable solutions are 
favoured over those that are merely metaphysically justifiable, nevertheless we 
struggle to wholly  erase mystical discourse from our investigations.  Like for the 
late Romans, this mysticism—this letting-in of doubt and speculation—is most in 
evidence when we try to measure bodies and events as they occur in the present.  
For instance, we find it impossible both to assign a precise instant to when a 
note is sounded and to know precisely what the pitch is.  This is because 
determining the pitch of the note requires us to analyse the frequency of the sound 
(the length of its wave), and this requires us to listen to the note for a period 
lasting several oscillations before an accurate estimate can be made 
(Polkinghorne, 33).  If we want to know what the note is, we cannot know the 
exact moment of its emergence into ‘the now’, and vice versa.  Delving deeper, 
quantum theory  tells us that we cannot have perfect knowledge of the position and 
speed of a particle (Coles, 109).  If we can pinpoint the particle exactly, then its 
speed (the time it  takes to cover a given distance) remains completely unknown. 
Conversely, if we know its speed precisely, then the particle could be located 
anywhere.  In other words, we can know where a particle is, but not  know what it 
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is doing (present continuous); or we can know what it  is doing, but not know 
where it is (present simple). 
In other words, our conception of time requires duration.  For the purposes 
of our philosophical and historical discourses, we require time-as-duration in 
order to formulate questions or assign signification to practices or events: an 
immeasurable instant in ‘the now’ cannot hold meaning in the way a series of 
instants that we conceive to have passed can.  In our scientific work, meanwhile, 
we assign time to phenomena of increasingly short duration.  As of 2010, our 
measuring record stands at  12 attoseconds (and attosecond being a quintillionth of 
a second), which is itself 1024 times larger than our theoretically conceived Planck 
time, a value that we describe, with characteristic hubris, as the smallest time 
measurement that will ever be possible.  What this actually means is that within 
the context of the laws of physics as we understand them today, we can neither 
measure nor detect any change for times less than one Planck time apart (Coles, 
9).  Beyond this—down there, somewhere—time is instantaneous (infinite, 
eternal, God-like).  
Is that where ‘the now’ is?
To think about duration even for a second is to understand the artificiality of 
our systems of time measurement.  For our scientists, it is to wonder about the 
role of mathematics in physical theory, and to ask, is nature really mathematical? 
(Coles, 123).  For our philosophers and historians, it  is to wake from the delusion, 
firstly, that our markers of time (attosecond, second, minute, hour, year) possess a 
reality  beyond the conventions that created them, and secondly, that the discourses 
we attach to these markers (the ‘disciplines of knowledge’ or the ‘human 
sciences’ that we construct around them) correspond in any  direct way to the 
human life that existed in ‘the now’ now past.  Lastly, for late American 
community  as a whole, it  is to understand a) that time has to have duration if it is 
to make sense to us, b) that time with duration is a concept, and c) that  this 
concept is what makes it possible for us to think about time at all.  
This is more than mere tautology.  Consideration of the temporal aspect of 
thought—the measure in time of its eruption, elucidation, utterance, dissemination
—has profound consequences for our understanding of the present, and therefore 
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how we think of the past.  As we consider it further here, it  may even lead to a 
reformulation of our old Christian definition of ‘immediate awareness’ as ‘present 
considering the present,’ and thereby to a position where we can detect the 
assumptions we continue to rely  on in order to speak with ‘straightforwardness’ 
and ‘common sense’ about the past and the present in our discourses, especially 
those we define as ‘historical’. 
  
The minuteness of an attosecond, the experience of it, is far beyond our 
consciousness and our imaginations.  This is because we—the atoms that have 
gathered into collections that now think they  are us—are huge compared to those 
constituent parts (Close, Nothing, 2).  Our senses have developed in a way that 
allows us to make sense of the macroscopic world, but leaves us blind to the 
molecular world that exists in restless agitation around us.  Self-awareness 
involves vast numbers of atoms, and when large numbers of atoms become 
organised, simple regularities can emerge and be perceived; we can assign 
properties to the organised collection that we cannot assign to individual atoms or 
small numbers of them.  Laws that we see operating at  the level of individual 
atoms become organised into new laws as we move our sights to more complex 
systems.  It  is this hierarchy of structures and laws that enables us to understand 
and describe the world as we see it (without scientific instruments), even if our 
understanding and our descriptions are inadequate to the worlds—just as real and 
infinitely vaster—that we cannot see (91).  Were it to suddenly develop an 
individual human-like consciousness, an atom would not experience time as we 
do; neither, at the other end of the scale, would a planet or a galaxy.  The tick of 
the clock might make sense to our minds, but it certainly  does not to an atom or a 
star.  Our perception of the present and its deep reality—its microscopic and 
macroscopic infinity—cannot be the same.  The exact location and momentum of 
every  particle in the universe at a precise point in time is an inconceivable reality 
for our science, our philosophy and our history—our mind—and yet this is what 
‘the now’ must ultimately be.
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Simultaneity is ‘the now’ (what we are doing here and what they  are doing 
there are actions in the same ‘now’) and yet to relay information (to tell them 
what we are doing, or to see us do it) implies a duration, however small, and a 
passing away of the moment that we are telling or that they are seeing. 
Experiments have been done to measure the lag between things happening and us 
experiencing them.  The results show that our conscious experience takes time to 
assemble (Carroll, 64).  Neuropsychology has revealed that we re-sort our 
memories within fractions of a second so as to change the order in which we shall 
remember events happening, and that decisions we are going to make are 
detectable by brain scans before we are conscious of having decided anything 
(Deutsch, 5).  We will put aside the questions that  these findings raise about free 
will (we will return to them in Chapter Three), and focus for now the 
consequences they have for our understanding of ‘immediate awareness’ or ‘direct 
conscious experience’: henceforth, we must allow for the possibility that 
experiencing something directly in the mind may in fact  be an illusion of the 
perceiving mind itself, and that what direct experience represents is not ‘the 
present considering present’, as we once believed, but ‘the present pastness of 
things present already considered’.
What this means is that the conscious present—our mental here and now—
is not equivalent to ‘the now’, and must by  definition contain something of the 
past.  To measure what we perceive, and thereby to understand it, we need to wait 
until the act of perceiving has lasted a certain amount of time.  If we are 
perceiving an explosion, this may be only a second; if we are perceiving a current 
battle or a revolution, it may be a day or a week; if like Foucault we are 
perceiving ‘the Modern Age’ it may be decades or even hundreds of years.  The 
result is always the same, however: our ‘direct’ mental experiences are not 
actually present to what phenomena, images or texts they are describing.  ‘The 
now’ cannot form part of our discourse, for ‘the now’ is not time (Gefter, 42). 
What this actually means for us is that the brain itself, as a collection of 
atoms, exists in ‘the now’ like everything else, but its products—the reactions, 
thoughts, interpretations that it issues in order for us to have conscious, rational 
experience—need time to mature into movements or mental objects, and must 
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therefore necessarily  contain an element of the past: the present that  we are 
reacting to, thinking about, interpreting, has always already moved away.  It may 
well be true that the fundamental non-conscious mechanics of understanding 
occur somewhere deep in the instantaneous ‘now’, but all we can ever hope to 
have conscious knowledge of is the mental present, with all its inherent pastness. 
This is because it takes time to understand that we have understood.  To observe 
with our minds—to think—is an inherently historical act.  
When did now become then?  When we took the time to think about it.  
  
When something moves, we believe that it changes.  Clocks tell us that time is 
linked somehow to change.  From here, there are two paths that lead to opposing 
views of time, the first of which (the idea that time is a real, fundamental property 
of the universe, that it provides the framework in which events take place) we are 
in the process of rejecting.  The path we are following instead leads us to believe 
that change itself is the fundamental property of the universe and that time 
emerges from our mental efforts to organise the changing world we see around us 
(Clark, 38).  When we observe or measure change, we are making time, and in the 
process, our state of knowledge changes.  Which is to say: measurement 
represents what is known by us rather than what has actually  changed out there in 
‘the now.’  What we know (time) and what is happening (‘the now’) are different, 
and can never be the same.  What we know is discursive (it is expressed in 
thought); what is is extra-discursive (it is whether we think about it or not).  Or to 
put it  all another way: the discourses which our thought expresses as knowledge 
are historical; what we are knowing is a history of a mentally fixed present and 
not the truth of ‘the ever-changing now’. 
When considering the form of knowledge that we call history, it is important 
to notice that the present that we choose to speak to is as much a construction as 
the past we choose to speak of.   ‘The then’ has occurred and cannot be 
resurrected as actual events but only represented in a discourse that we call the 
past (Jenkins, 8).  Likewise, ‘the now’ is now occurring, but what we measure and 
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turn into knowledge in the mind are only representations of it: what we call the 
present.  The past  (our limited memories, our fragmented record of events) is not 
‘the then’ (the totality of what is gone), while the present (the phenomena we can 
perceive around us) is not ‘the now’ (the totality of what is).  
History is discourse; discourse is historical. 
This principle—the basis for what  we might call ‘language-model 
epistemology’—severs the tie between discourse (in our case history) and any 
external reality to it on the grounds that discourse is the structure of mental life, 
and no discourse can ever stand outside itself to observe a reality  external to itself 
(Partner, 95).  In other words, our discourses (our histories) speak not to real 
events but to other discourses that purport to be about real events.  Our minds 
cannot get  out of discourse to check if our discourses correspond to the real world 
or its past, because these discourses constitute our mental reality (Jenkins, 11).
 The world—and only most obviously  its past—comes to us with a duration 
in time.  This duration (this pastness that is always already) is essential to 
discourse, for it  is within it that our concepts of beginning and end, including 
forgotten beginnings and unreached ends, and our simultaneous awareness of 
impenetrable reality  and intelligible story, are given existence (Partner, 92).  An 
acute sense of history, the feeling of being in the middle of a story fraught with 
meaning, which must have had a beginning somewhere and will somewhere have 
an ending, in which the pattern will be completed and revealed, is characteristic of 
our minds (90).  In this sense, our knowledge comes not directly from the world 
but emerges as we organise, configure and plot out what our minds perceive 
(Munslow, 8).  Our knowledge does not directly correspond to the world but 
instead to the discourses themselves that order the world in our minds.
Despite the wide currency of such ideas, most of the history we write today 
persists in claiming reality as its authority (White, ‘The Value of Narrativity,’ 23). 
This kind of history we shall call ‘traditional’, not to suggest that its methods are 
driven by  nostalgia for a history as we once did it, but  rather to acknowledge its 
own long and ongoing history, its endurance through at  least  two centuries into the 
present.  Traditional history depends, for its special tone, on a concept of language 
which unhesitatingly asserts the external reality  of ‘the now’ and ‘the then’, its 
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intelligibility  in the form of ideas, concepts, phenomena or other mental things, 
and a direct connection between mental things and verbal signs (Partner, 94-5).  In 
this sense, it is the kind of history which continues to make the real into an object 
of desire (what really happened?).  It remains resolute in imposing a formal 
coherency on events, which it then presents as real.  This reality wears the mask 
of a meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can only  imagine, never 
experience (White, ‘The Value of Narrativity,’ 24).
In its petitions to reality, traditional history is supported by a number of 
underlying images, one of the most potent of which is the ‘dialogue’ or 
‘argument’ that it  imagines itself initiating between ‘the real now’ and ‘the real 
then’.  It is this image that it most regularly summons when it is called upon to 
define itself.    
The reciprocal process of interaction between the historian 
and his facts, what I have called the dialogue between 
present and past, is a dialogue not between abstract  and 
isolated individuals, but  between the society of today and 
the society  of yesterday…The past is intelligible to us only 
in light of the present; and we can fully  understand the 
present only in light of the past.   To enable man to 
understand the society of the past and to increase his 
mastery over the society  of the present is the dual function 
of history.  (Carr, 49)
Indeed, in some cases, it seems, the dialogue can go forwards as well as 
backwards.
[O]bjectivity in history does not and cannot rest on some 
fixed and immovable standard of judgement existing here 
and now, but only on a standard which is laid up  in the 
future and is evolved as the course of history progresses. 
History  acquires meaning and objectivity when it 
establishes a coherent relation between past  and future. 
(124)
Even when such self-conceptualisations make concessions to ‘the unavoidability 
of interpretation’, ‘the multiplicity of historical voices’ or ‘the gaps in the 
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record’—gestures made to demonstrate, perhaps, that traditional history is 
‘postmodernising’ at a rate at least as fast as the other disciplines—still they 
ultimately  rely for their validity on a deeply  embedded optimism in the capacity 
of discourse to offer accounts of the ‘the real now’ and ‘the real then’, accounts 
which can then be used as lenses through which each can view the other. 
Which is to say: whether its indulgences to postmodernism have been paid 
or not, traditional history remains, at turns, a ‘reconstructionist’ and a 
‘constructionist’ mode of doing history.  The reconstructionist approach maintains 
a foundational belief in empiricism and historical meanings deriving from sense 
experience as mediated by discourse.  It claims that history is about objective and 
forensic research into the sources, the reconstructing of the past as it actually 
happened, and the freedom of the whole process from ideological contamination 
and artistic ambiguity  (Munslow, 20).  It believes it possible to detect  bias and 
expunge it by attending scrupulously  to what the sources say (Jenkins, 46). 
Constructionism, meanwhile, appeals to general laws in historical explanation in 
an effort to build all-encompassing theories to account for past phenomena.  It 
examines much broader sweeps of history and searches for deeply  rooted currents 
in past economies, societies and cultures.  Drawing on anthropology, among other 
disciplines, it sketches out the unstated or unrecognized reasons why people did 
the things they did.  What it  hopes to grasp is the mentality of people living in 
previous ages (Arnold, 98).
Given that traditional history still exists—that it keeps on securing 
widespread authorisation for its continuance—we can only suppose it must 
change the state of our knowledge in ways that continue to be compelling for us. 
Yet, to judge from the amount that we have written against it  in recent years, and 
from the persistence of our urge to extend and enrich these criticisms, it must also 
be that we are ill at ease with at least  some of its principles and methods.  It must 
be that we want it to acknowledge—we do not yet know how—the 
undiscoverable, possibly meaningless, and open-ended nature of its objects (the 
past and the present).  Of course, we are unsure if traditional history could make 
such an acknowledgement and carry  on being traditional history, but this does not 
stop our wanting; it does not satisfy our hunger for a kind of history that would 
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educate us about the pastness of the things present and the unknowability of ‘the 
now’.  
 
  
Traditional history  and the criticisms made of it occupy  the same constructed 
present (the present pastness of things present).  If we are to find an alternative to 
traditional history, it is in the same present that we must search.  With a regard 
that is by necessity backward-looking, retrospective, we must seek out the kinds 
of history  that are at  once ‘non-traditional’ and thinkable, according to the criteria 
established by our analysis of the concept of time, and within the conditions of 
knowledge as they exist today.
Chance, accident, occasion lead us to that  body  of texts, located in the 
present of postmodern theory—present because, though far from novel, it has not 
yet decayed into a state of unthinkableness—that we shall call ‘Foucauldian’.  We 
shall call it  this not because the man Foucault  was the absolute origin of, or the 
sole genius behind, the ideas and methods it puts into practice, but rather because 
his name is a recognised sign, a sort of metonymic substitution, for a network of 
related discourses of which Foucault’s texts make up an important but by no 
means total number of cells.
An analysis of this Foucauldian network implies a triple folding back of our 
discursive present: we will be looking back into our present to see the ways in 
which the Foucauldian critique looks back into its present to criticise what it calls 
‘traditional history’.  The traditional history that we will see through the lens of 
Foucauldian criticism, and, in turn, the Foucauldian criticisms that we will see 
through our own critical lens (one that has been given its own particular strength 
and curve by our questions concerning the idea of time) will necessarily be 
distinct from each of these elements considered in isolation; distinct, yes, and 
perhaps more capable, too, of identifying which problems of history are solved, 
which are ignored and which are overlooked by, on one hand, each element 
individually, and on the other hand, by the three elements folded together.  
168
As we take this look back, the first thing we notice about Foucauldian 
history is its ‘magnanimity’.  Foucauldian history recognises that traditional 
history remains determinedly thinkable in our present, and, what is more, it 
understands that its own validity hinges upon its compatibility  with traditional 
history’s accounts (Goldstein, 12).  For these reasons, Foucauldian history openly 
supports traditional history’s right to continue to explain the past as it  has always 
done; all it asks of traditional history is that it be careful not to look at itself more 
closely than it does, not to peel away the banalities it depends upon for its 
operations, for if were to do so, it would notice that there is more to explain than it 
thinks (Veyne, ‘Foucault  Revolutionises History’, 156).  In this sense, 
Foucauldian history  ironically claims not to be critical.  Its approach is not, it 
says, a way of proving that everyone else is wrong.  Quite the opposite: it 
understands that discourse is so complex a reality  that we not only can, but 
should, approach it  at different  levels and with different methods.  Rather than 
trying to reduce others to silence by claiming that what they say is worthless, it 
undertakes the more ‘positive’ task of defining the present from which it speaks 
(Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 17).
It is not  by pretending to transcend its own historical standpoint, or by 
speaking from a fictitious future, that Foucauldian history  is able to submit the 
present to analysis; on the contrary, it achieves this by attributing duration to the 
present, and by  sitting within it, an embedded perceiver of what in the present has 
always already past.  As such, it is not interested in uncovering what cannot be 
seen.  It is not interested in the reconstitution, on the basis of what the documents 
in the archive say or hint at, of the past from which those documents emanate and 
which has now disappeared far behind them; it  is not interested, that  is, in treating 
discourse as the language of a voice since reduced to silence (6).  It is interested, 
instead, in the documents themselves as they appear.  It is interested in working 
from within the same present in which the documents exist, in order to develop 
them, organise them, divide them up, distribute them, order them, arrange them in 
levels, establish series, distinguish between what is relevant and what is not, 
discover elements, define unities and describe relations (7).
For Foucauldian history, then, the archive does not enable us to reconstitute 
the past—to recover a lost  ‘voice’—but represents a field that must itself be 
searched for unifying structures, series and relations (Delaporte, 141).  Implicit in 
this approach is a dismissal of the image, essential to traditional history, of an age-
old collective consciousness that makes use of material documents to refresh its 
memory; a dismissal of the kind of history  that is primarily and fundamentally 
about ‘remembering’ or ‘memorising’ a reality that  floats, in an indistinct but 
retrievable form, beneath the surviving documents.  In contrast to this, 
Foucauldian history sees its work simply  as that which is expended on the 
material documentation that exists today; it sees its work as one way  in which we 
can recognise and develop the mass of documentation with which our structures 
of knowledge are inextricably linked (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
7).  
 In this sense, it does not set out to discover what is obscured or concealed, 
but to make visible precisely what is visible.  Or if we prefer: it  makes evident 
what is so close, so immediate, so intimately  linked to us, that we do not perceive 
it (Davidson, ‘Structures and Strategies of Discourse’, 2).  It regards what is 
thought to be hidden beneath the archive as that which is, in fact, most familiar to 
us because most consistently ‘uncovered’ in our discourses; and argues that, 
actually, what we are unable to see because it is always before our eyes holds 
more interest (3). 
Since everything that Foucauldian history needs lies open to view, there is 
nothing to explain.  That is to say, it  is not, by its own claims, hermeneutic: it does 
not seek another, better-hidden discourse to the one it sees.  To this end, in place 
of explanation, it puts description.  Or rather, it offers its mode of description as a 
precondition of the explanatory  task (Davidson, ‘Archaeology, Genealogy, 
Ethics’, 223).  Ultimately, all it wants to do, it says, is describe statements in the 
field of discourse and the relations of which they  are capable (Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, 31).  
Thus, the Foucauldian method asks on what could be based the relations 
and unity of the large groups of statements that constitute a particular history.  As 
opposed to traditional history, which might explain this unity in terms of a full and 
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continuous field of objects, or a normative type of statement, or a well-defined set 
of notions, or the permanence of a thematic, or a progressively  deductive 
structure, or the oeuvre of a collective subject; as opposed to this approach, it sets 
out to discover whether, between the constitutive statements of history, it can 
discern a regularity: an order in their successive appearance, correlations in their 
simultaneity, assignable positions in space, a reciprocal functioning, linked and 
hierarchised transformations (37).
  
Perhaps foreseeing the threat posed by homogenisation to an approach based on 
relations and regularity, Foucauldian history  insists that the discursive visibilities 
to be described must not be gathered in groupings based on uniformity or 
sameness, or brought together within globalising or totalising frameworks.  These 
kinds of ‘regularities’ are, it argues, incompatible with another of its defining 
tasks: the specification of difference.  In this respect, Foucauldian history overlaps 
with other areas of postmodern theory  (Derridean, Baudrillardean) that seek not to 
overcome the differences they might discern in a set of discourses; which seek not 
to hide them, smooth them out or explain them away; but which try to locate 
them, to analyse them, to say what exactly they consist of, to differentiate them 
(171).
But Foucauldian history can be itself differentiated from other postmodern 
approaches in at least one significant way: it  does not dissolve all forms of 
structure, coherence and intelligibility  into an endless flux of signification (Best, 
44).  Having cleared the ground of those traditional assumptions which make 
discourses that are actually  dispersed appear close-knit or homologous, or which 
make those that are actually adjoining appear distant or analogous; having shone a 
light on their actual difference, it then attempts to grasp what forms of regularities 
and relations really do exist among them.  In other words, its task is not just to 
attain a plurality of histories juxtaposed and independent of one another, but also 
to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described between 
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different series and configurations of things (Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, 10).  
To put all this into a Foucauldian vocabulary, then: Foucauldian history 
aspires to the condition of ‘archaeology’, to the intrinsic description and 
differentiation of visible documents (7).  Such a form of archaeology—what is, at 
base, a metaphor that Foucauldian history uses to describe its own methods to 
itself—does not lay bare an edifice; it does not  propose to reconstruct that which 
once stood, as it once stood; instead it calls attention to the diversity of the visible 
fragments by spreading them out into distinct parcels in such a manner as to 
reveal relationships that would otherwise have remained unheeded, or that  were 
perhaps too obvious to bother with before (Delaporte, 142).  Unlike a ‘geology’, 
which might be seen reaching into and seeing for itself the underlying sediments 
of discourse, archaeology claims access only to the surface effects (specific uses 
of language) from which it must somehow infer more general structures of a 
system of discourse.  Thus the particular documents to be studied are important 
only for what they tell us about the overall configuration of the site from which 
they were excavated (Gutting, Foucault, 34).
But wait: more general structures? system of discourse? overall 
configuration?  Are these not the kinds of totalising explanations that archaeology 
sets out  to avoid?  If the point of archaeology is to remain on the surface of a 
particular discursive field; if its aim is not to define a second discourse concealed 
or revealed by the visible one, but instead to define that visible discourse itself, in 
all its specificity, then what is this extra field of knowledge it  discerns, this added 
layer of epistemological interest  that, apparently, lies exterior to, or ulterior to, 
discourse itself? 
To answer this, let us first of all address, in good Foucauldian fashion, what 
this ‘overall configuration’ is not.  
[A]rchaeology does not try  to restore what  has been 
thought, wished, aimed at, experienced, desired by men in 
the very moment at which they expressed it in discourse; it 
does not set  out to recapture that elusive nucleus in which 
the author and the oeuvre exchange identities…[I]t does 
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not try to repeat what has been said by  reaching it in its 
identity.  It does not claim to efface itself in the ambiguous 
modesty  of a reading that would bring back, in all its 
purity, the distant, precarious, almost effaced light of the 
origin.  (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
139-40)
When archaeology demarcates a discursive configuration, it is involved in an 
enterprise very distinct from that which would purport to unearth an ontological 
foundation that would somehow ground discourse.  Indeed, the idea that the 
precise essence of an object of thought can somehow be brought to light, or that 
‘origin’ is the locus of truth, is precisely  what the demarcations of archaeology are 
trying to render unthinkable.  The relations archaeology describes, the limits it 
fixes, the comparisons and correlations it makes are indeed intended to question 
any explanation that has recourse to final causes and zero points.  In the 
archaeological view, quite against teleological thinking, there is nothing prior to 
knowledge, or subsequent to it (although there are certainly  things that rest 
outside it) because knowledge is defined by the combination of what is visible and 
what is articulable in a field of discourse (Deleuze, 51).  For this reason, rather 
than project itself forwards to an imagined last word, or recede ever backwards to 
an illusory first  whisper, archaeology stays radically in the present (that is, the 
present pastness of things present) in order to restore to that present its own 
historical originality.  In doing so, it  exposes any attempt made by traditional 
history to recapture ‘ultimate’ human experience as merely an exercise in 
anthropologism; an outgrowing of the empirical belief in a conceptual abstraction 
called Man (Hoy, ‘Introduction’, 2).
For this is the second point: if the ‘overall configuration’ that archaeology 
discerns in a field of knowledge is not origin, then by the same token, it is not 
Man either.  Man, in the archaeological view, is not a ‘natural object’ that  we can 
grasp and understand in its totality, but an idea, a problem, and not even the oldest 
nor the most constant problem we have ever posed for ourselves.  On the contrary, 
it is one of our more recent inventions (Foucault, The Order of Things, 387).  
According to archaeology, Man eventually  emerged as an object of thought 
(the ‘target’ for psychology, sociology and literature) when, only a couple of 
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centuries ago, the human being for the first  time became not only an aloof 
representing subject, but also the object of modern scientific investigation, a finite 
and historically  determined being to be studied in its living, labouring, and 
speaking capacities (303).  Embedded in a new (modern) field of temporality  and 
finitude, Man as master of knowledge became threatened: how could he continue 
to be master of knowledge when he was now also its object? (Best, 41).  From this 
question there were generated, in turn, a series of unstable but enduring 
contradictions: Man is determined by  external forces yet aware of this 
determination and able to free himself from it; history precedes Man but he is the 
phenomenological source from which history unfolds; Man both constitutes and is 
constituted by an external world (42).
Traditional history attempts to resolve these contradictions by recuperating 
the primacy and autonomy of the thinking subject.  It gives us back our 
sovereignty over knowledge by reconstituting us in transcendental form: ‘Man’, 
‘Humanism’, ‘History’, ‘Progress’.  For Man, this gift to himself, represents: 
the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be 
restored to him; the certainly that time will disperse 
nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted entity; the 
promise that  one day the subject—in the form of historical 
consciousness—will once again be able to appropriate, to 
bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at 
a distance by difference, and find in them what might be 
called his abode.  (Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, 12)
Traditional history rehearses this play of Man awarding transcendence to himself 
every  time it gives absolute priority to the observing subject; every  time it 
attributes a constituent role to an individual act; every  time it places its own point 
of view at the origin of all historicity; every time it tells of noumenal subjects 
moving through time; every time it focuses on works and themes; every time it 
expounds generalities and reports anecdotes; every time it draws on Humanism 
and Progress as the guiding lights of History  (Foucault, The Order of Things, xiv; 
Delaporte, 140). 
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Archaeology, on the other hand, aims at history  without Man.  It does so not 
to assert that human beings are nothing, but rather to expose the concept of Man 
as a fraud (Hacking, ‘The Archaeology  of Foucault’, 39).  There is no subject, it 
argues; there is no ‘I’ prior to the forms of description and action appropriate to a 
person.  Every  way in which we can think of ourselves as people and agents is 
something that has been constituted within a web of historical events; in terms of 
our thoughts and our knowledge, a thing-in-itself is impossible (36).  This way of 
conceiving Man represents a change of emphasis: the stage on which we enact our 
history, as well as much of the script, now seems to be established independently 
of our thoughts and actions (Gutting, Foucault, 34).  Whereas traditional history 
takes the transcendental signified, Man, as definitive of human reality, 
archaeology  maintains that Man is just one contingent interpretation of that 
reality, and that, as such, it might one day pass from our knowledge (our set of 
truth-claims) and become unthinkable (Gutting, ‘Michel Foucault: A User’s 
Manual’, 11-12).  
  
So, these ‘overall configurations’ which archaeology  discerns when it describes, 
differentiates and disperses the discursive fragments of a field of knowledge: if 
they  are evidence of the existence of neither an origin we can retreat to, nor a real 
Man we can depend upon, then what, in fact, are they?
The key  is language.  Or more precisely: language conceived as a structure 
independent of those who use it.  Archaeology works on the principle that at any 
given period in a given domain (late Roman, late American), there are substantial 
constraints on how people are able to think.  There are, of course, the formal 
constraints of grammar and logic, which exclude certain formulations as 
meaningless or self-contradictory, but what archaeology is interested in is a 
further set of constraints, perhaps unperceived by  or incomprehensible to those 
following them, which substantially restrict the range of possible thought, and 
hence make certain ideas unthinkable.  If it can decipher what these rules are—
what kinds of discursive relations they  bring about—archaeology believes it  will 
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be able to see how apparently arbitrary  constraints actually  makes sense within the 
framework defined by them (Gutting, Foucault, 32).
For archaeology, then, what is consciously going on in the minds of 
scientists, philosophers or historians during a given period is less important  than 
the underlying structures that form the conditions in which their thinking operates. 
It is not so much interested in, say, Darwin or Descartes or Foucault, as in what 
made the ideas of these people possible.  
We must be careful to distinguish here between two forms 
and two levels of investigation.  The first would be a study 
of opinions in order to discover [for example] who in the 
eighteenth century  was a Physiocrat  and who an 
Antiphysiocrat; what interests were at stake; what were 
the points and arguments of the polemic; how the struggle 
for power developed.  The other, which takes no account 
of the persons involved, or their history, consists in 
defining the conditions on the basis of which it was 
possible to conceive of both the ‘physiocratic’ and 
‘utilitarian’ knowledge in interlocking and simultaneous 
forms.  The first analysis would be in the province of 
doxology.  Archaeology can recognise and practice only 
the second.  (Foucault, The Order of Things, 200)
Archaeology does not, therefore, exclude subject-centred accounts, but points out 
that they are prone to distortions deriving from the false assumption that  history is 
primarily  driven by  the experience and projects of the consciousnesses that  ‘live’ 
it.  To overcome such distortions, archaeology introduces into its historical 
account forces outside conscious thought; micro-forces which are at odds with the 
continuity  and direction that we read into our macro-visions of the present and the 
past.  
In this world of micro-order, what unifies a field of discourse is not so much 
the permanence and uniqueness of the objects of discourse (statements) as the 
space itself in which they emerge.  What defines the relations between the 
statements are their rules of formation, or, more positively, their conditions of 
possibility: those structures, made visible by the statements themselves, which 
determine the syntactic and semantic form—the material content—of what is said 
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and thought.  When archaeology sets out to describe a field of statements in their 
specificity, what it must show, in fact, is that the set of rules or family of 
conditions that it  puts into operation is irreducible to any other (The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, 139).  
This concern with the unconscious (or, if we prefer, non-conscious or extra-
conscious) conditions for thought is not new; at least since Kant we have been 
wondering for some time about where to find them and how to define them.  The 
conditions that previous approaches claimed to have discovered, however, were 
usually  universally applicable, necessary  constraints on all possible experiences, 
whereas for archaeology the conditions for thought are contingent on the 
particular historical situation and vary  over time and domains of knowledge 
(Gutting, Foucault, 36).  That is to say, archaeological constraints are not global 
and immutable in character, nor grounded in the structure of the mind, but are 
historically changing and specific to given discursive domains; they  operate 
according to a sort of uniform anonymity, but only  on those who undertake to 
speak in a particular time and place, and in a particular discipline or discursive 
field (Best, 40; Deleuze, 56; Flynn, 31-32).  
To the total set of conditions and constraints which unite the discursive field 
at a given period, and which thereby give rise to the effects of knowledge, 
archaeology  gives the name epistemological field or episteme.  The episteme is 
not a form of knowledge in itself, nor is it a hermeneutic framework into which 
knowledge can be placed; it  is the (conceptual) entirety of regularities that can be 
discovered among the discourses of a given period (Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, 191).  
In any  given culture and at any given moment, archaeology admits only  one 
episteme that defines the conditions of possibility  of all knowledge (The Order of 
Things, 168).  It looks back into the archive in order to map out the configurations 
of the individual epistemes that it discerns there.  In doing so, however, it remains 
all of the time aware that this mapping enterprise is regulated by  its own episteme, 
that it  is characterised by  those tools of analysis that the present pastness of things 
present allows. 
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Within its own episteme-determined analyses, then, archaeology  discerns 
four distinctive epistemes that have existed between the sixteenth and twentieth 
centuries: the first begins in the late Middle Ages and comes to an end in the late 
sixteenth century; the second spans the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the 
third begins around the end of the eighteenth century  and extends to the early 
twentieth century; the fourth is the just-emerging-present of the late twentieth 
century (that is, the present that we are looking back on here).  
According to archaeology, the first episteme (roughly, the Renaissance) 
characterises knowledge according to the dominant protocol of resemblance or 
similitude, where closely related objects are viewed as part of a Great Chain of 
Being.  In the second episteme (the Classical Age or the Age of Reason), 
knowledge is generated according to rules that required a clear sense of 
differentness.  In this age, objects are understood and explained by distinguishing 
them from each other so as to create meaningful comparison, an approach which 
generated the kind of knowledge dominated by contiguity and continuity, 
classification and measurement, and the idea that order can be imposed on the 
world through the vehicle of a transparent language.  The third episteme (the 
Modern or Anthropological Age) is preoccupied with Man as both the central 
subject and the central object of reality  (Munslow, 141-42).  The fourth episteme 
(the present, the Postmodern) suggests—suggests because the rules that govern 
the present pastness of things can often only be intimated—that the tension 
created by the Modern invention of Man cannot last for too long, that Man as both 
an empirical and deductive animal is disappearing, and knowledge (and 
consequently Man as a subject of knowledge) is coming to be recognised as 
nothing more than an epistemological product (Foucault, The Order of Things, 
386-87).
Archaeology claims that its use of such long periods does not  represent a 
return to the philosophers of history, to the great ages of the world, or to the 
periodisation dictated by the rise and fall of civilisations (The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, 7).   It would be inaccurate, it says, to see in them an attempt at 
totalitarian periodisation, whereby from a certain moment and for a certain time, 
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everyone thinks in the same way, in spite of surface differences, and says the same 
thing, in spite of a variety of vocabularies.  
On the contrary, archaeology describes the level of 
enunciative homogeneity that has its own temporal 
articulations, and which does not carry with it  all the other 
forms of identity and difference that are to be found in 
language; and at  this level, it establishes an order, 
hierarchies, a whole burgeoning that excludes a massive, 
amorphous synchrony, given totally once and for all.  In 
those confused unities we call periods, it  reveals, with all 
their specificity, ‘enunciative periods’ that are articulated, 
but without being confused with them, upon the time of 
concepts, on theoretical phases, on stages of formalisation 
and of linguistic development.  (139-40)
So the period is not even archaeology’s basic descriptive unit.  If it  speaks of 
periods it is always in terms of particular discursive practices, and as a result of its 
analyses.  The Classical Age, for example, is not a temporal figure that imposes its 
unity  on all discourses; it is the name that  archaeology gives to a tangle of 
discursive formations that it sees appearing and disappearing in specific fields of 
knowledge (176).
In line with this, the four epistemes are not presented as acts of a drama of 
development, or as chapters of a narrative.  The transitions which mark their 
beginnings and ends are not transformations of an enduring subject—an 
homogenised mentality, a transcendental being—but rather ruptures in 
consciousness itself, disjunctions or discontinuities so extreme that they 
effectively isolate the epistemes from one another (White, Tropics of Discourse, 
235).  This idea of isolation is important, for epistemes do not grow organically 
out of each other, nor do they occur as revolutions in thought through some 
version of a dialectical process; instead they  spontaneously appear in parallel to 
each other, filling in the spaces suddenly vacated by other conditions of 
knowledge (Munslow, 141).  A new episteme do not rise up against its 
predecessors, but simply crystallises alongside of them (White, Tropics of 
Discourse, 234). 
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According to archaeology, an awareness of episteme is what is required for 
us even to imagine certain theories and philosophies in a particular age rather than 
in another (Canguilhem, 80).  It  is episteme that allows us to understand how and 
why a statement might count  as serious and important at one time, whereas it 
cannot even be entertained as a candidate for truth perhaps only a couple of 
decades later (Rouse, 96).  It  does so by demonstrating that new ‘ways of 
thinking’ result  not so much from discoveries or advances as from the coming into 
being of new objects of thought for which new truth and falsehoods can be 
uttered.  So, when traditional history sets out to write the history  of biology in the 
eighteenth century, for example, what it  does not realise is that biology does not 
exist at that period; the pattern of knowledge called ‘biology’, which has been so 
familiar to us for a hundred and fifty  years, is not valid for a previous epoche.  In 
fact what exists in the eighteenth century is an episteme that gives rise to a grid of 
knowledge constituted, not by biology, but  by ‘natural history’ (Foucault, The 
Order of Things, 127-28).  
Which is to say: the different  grids of knowledge produced by  the four 
epistemes not  only employ  different techniques for comprehending the objects 
occupying the field, they are not even directed to the study of the same objects. 
Even though the terminology of the natural historians of the eighteenth century 
and that of the biologists of the nineteenth may contain the same lexical elements, 
the differences between the ‘syntaxes’ of eighteenth-century  natural history  and 
nineteenth-century biology are so great as to make any lexical similarities 
between them trivial as evidence.  The language of the two epistemes inhabited 
different realms of discourse, cultivated different modes of representation, and 
remained captives of different conceptions of the nature of the relationships 
obtaining between things, on one hand, and words, on the other (White, Tropics of 
Discourse, 237).  The difference between the language of natural history and that 
of biology is, in fact, the effect of an immense reorganisation of culture, a new 
arrangement of epistemological possibilities (Foucault, The Order of Things, 43).
  
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New arrangement.  Immense reorganisation.  It is safe to say, then, that 
archaeology’s main concern is with change in time.  It is careful to define, 
however, what form this concern takes. 
[H]ow do you see change or, let  us say, revolution, at  least 
in the scientific order and in the field of discourses, if you 
link it with themes of meaning, project, origin and return, 
constituent subject, in short with the entire thematic that 
ensures for history the universal presence of the Logos? 
What possibility do you accord it if you analyse it in 
accordance with dynamic, biological, evolutionist 
metaphors in which the difficult, specific problem of 
historical mutation is usually dissolved?  (Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, 209)
Thus, in its analysis of change, archaeology discounts two traditional explanatory 
notions.  The first of these is ‘cause’.  The search for cause is seen by archaeology 
as a characteristic feature of traditional history, and, as such, it must be 
questioned.  Typically, the search for cause is carried out by moving from the 
level of analysis of statements in a discursive field to another level that is external 
to them: the social conditions, the mentality, the vision of the world.  As a result, 
such a search always risks losing itself in notions such as ‘the spirit of the times’, 
‘tradition’, ‘influence’, and ‘social change’ (Davidson, ‘Structures and Strategies 
of Discourse’, 10).  In archaeology, on the other hand, change is seen, not as the 
result or the effect of something else, but  as a system of transformations, a 
structure that is itself susceptible to scrutiny  and investigation.  In other words, 
archaeology  substitutes for an undifferentiated reference to cause the analysis of 
the configurations of transformation themselves (Foucault, The Order of Things, 
xiii).  In the place of ‘extra-discursive’ ideas like ‘influence’ and social change’, it 
offers a description of statements in a way  that  makes the relations of implication, 
of opposition, of exclusion appear that could link them (Davidson, ‘Structures and 
Strategies of Discourse’, 12).  Underlying this approach is a conviction that 
change from one state of affairs to another cannot take place without there being 
correlative changes, all of which are governed by  the episteme.  So, whereas 
traditional history  asks the question: given a change, what could have caused it? 
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archaeology  asks: in order for a change to be able to be obtained, what are the 
other changes that must also be present in the field of contemporaneity? (10).  
The second traditional image of change that archaeology  rejects is 
‘continuity’.  Rather than refer to change as if it were a living force calmly 
evolving through time, archaeology  speaks of it in terms of the suddenness and 
thoroughness with which certain states of knowledge are sometimes reorganised; 
it speaks of it as rupture and event; as discontinuity.  As we have seen, the people 
of the nineteenth century do not think of ‘biology’ in terms that have been 
bequeathed to them by preceding ages, nor in forms that presage what will soon to 
be discovered; they think of it in terms of a general disposition that not only 
prescribes their concepts and methods, but also, more fundamentally, defines their 
present mode of being (Foucault, The Order of Things, 208).  A mode of being is 
not, in fact, a phenomenon of heredity  and tradition; it does not develop in a 
temporal sequence; it does proceed in a single direction towards greater 
objectivity of knowledge; it cannot be explained by describing the state of 
knowledge that  preceded it and what it has provided by  way of ‘original 
contributions’; on the contrary, the breaches that separate epistemes, and thereby 
bring about new modes of being, are radical events, distributed across the entire 
visible surface of knowledge at a particular moment, and whose signs, shocks, and 
effects it is possible to map (217-18).
Instead of considering that discourse is made up of a series 
of homogenous events (individual formations), 
archaeology  distinguishes several possible levels of events 
within the very density of discourse: the level of the 
statements themselves in their unique emergence; the level 
of the appearance of objects, types of enunciation, 
concepts, strategic choices (or transformations that affect 
those that already exist); the level of the derivation of new 
rules of formation on the basis of rules that are already in 
operation—but always in the element of a single 
positivity; lastly, a fourth level, at which the substitution 
of one discursive formation for another takes place (or the 
mere appearance and disappearance of a positivity) (The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, 171).
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Once it has happened, this fourth level of event—the force that, in a single blow, 
subjects different disciplines of knowledge in an epistemological field to one and 
the same break—can be located within the unity that forms a foundation for the 
diverse forms of the new episteme.  As a surface movement, the event brings 
about a mutation of cultural interests, a redistribution of opinions and judgements, 
the appearance of new forms in discourse, which can themselves be used to define 
the nature of the break that brought them about (The Order of Things, 238).  
This break, however, is never so radical as to spring forth ex nihilo and 
negate everything that has preceded it; rather it  is possible only on the basis of 
rules that are already  in operation (The Archaeology of Knowledge, 17).  Radical 
as it  is, it  is not absolute change, but a ‘reconfiguration’ of epistemological 
elements.  Although it brings about new rules of a discursive formation, which 
redefine the boundaries and nature of knowledge and truth, it includes some 
‘overlapping’, ‘interaction’, and ‘echoes’ between the old and the new (The 
History of Sexuality.  Volume I: An Introduction, 149).  To say that one discursive 
formation is substituted for another is not to say that a whole world of absolutely 
new objects, concepts and theoretical choices emerges fully organised in a text; it 
is to say  that a general transformation has occurred, one that does not necessarily 
alter all the elements (The Archaeology of Knowledge, 173). 
By archaeology’s own admission, establishing discontinuities is not an easy 
task: any limit it sets may perhaps be no more than an arbitrary  division made in a 
constantly mobile whole (The Order of Things, 50).  For this reason it  introduces 
the idea of duration into its conception of discontinuity; it unfreezes change, 
attributes to it a temporality.  This temporality becomes evident in the conflicts 
and resistances that discontinuity  itself engenders.  Taken by  itself, a statement 
cannot count as knowledge.  Only  in the ways it is used, and thereby  increasingly 
connected to other elements over time, does it become and remain 
epistemologically significant.  But these uses and alignments encounter 
resistances and generate conflicts with other emerging uses and alignments, and, 
in turn, these conflicts spur further investigations, articulations, and technical 
refinements.  Conflict thus becomes the locus for the continuing reorganisation of 
knowledge: where knowledge encounters resistance, there is the potential for 
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discontinuity; where it does not encounter resistance, it  is likely  to receive little or 
no further articulation and to risk becoming isolated and inconsequential (Rouse, 
113-14).  
Thus envisaged, change-as-discontinuity  is not substance; it is not 
corporeal; it affects concepts and not people.  And yet, its capacity for conflict 
means it is certainly not immaterial; it  takes effect, becomes effect, on the level of 
materiality.  It has its place; it  exists in relation to, in coexistence with material 
elements (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 230).  It  is here, at this point 
of immateriality  meeting materiality, that we discern a core tension within 
archaeology.  As a historical method, it relies on a conception of language as 
independent of those who use it, and, in line with this, sets out  to address the 
discursive domain alone (the relations between discursive domains and the rules 
that formed them).  But as its analyses spread out and become more involved, it 
develops an interest in the relations between discursive and non-discursive 
domains: institutions, political events, economic practices and processes (162). 
Thus the privileged status archaeology gives to language and knowledge over 
practices and institutions becomes problematic.  While a focus on language alone 
might have a legitimate philosophical justification (recasting traditional views of 
history and seeking the clarification of discourse in terms of linguistic rules 
unperceived by human actors), a more adequate analysis would ultimately have to 
situate discourse within its full social and political context (Best, 45).  That is to 
say, the moment eventually arrives when archaeology must show how the 
autonomy and specificity of discourse nevertheless do not give it the status of 
pure ideality and total historical independence (Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, 164).  Suddenly  it  finds that thinking about ideas in time is not 
enough; it cannot avoid having to think, too, about practices in space.
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II
Zebra Criss-crossing
Perhaps predictably, given what we have seen regarding epistemes and the 
conditions of knowledge at a given time and place, the criticisms that Foucauldian 
‘archaeology’ makes of traditional history—that its representations of the ‘real’ 
rest on transcendent and therefore profoundly unreal ideas of origin and Man, that 
its account of change relies on an impossible search for cause and the imposition 
of mystical explanatory frameworks like ‘progress’ or ‘evolution’—these 
criticisms are countered by traditional history  in terms that are exactly, that is, 
identically opposite: traditional history’s objections to archaeology  appear as 
mirror images of the objections that it itself was subjected to by  archaeology; they 
constitute marks on the reverse side of the same epistemological fold.  If 
traditional history  is, according to archaeology, infatuated with the real, then 
archaeology  is, according to traditional history, infatuated with discourse.  If 
traditional history approaches the world as if it were made to be read by human 
consciousness, archaeology approaches human consciousness as if it were a world 
with its own readable history.  If traditional history is, unbeknownst to itself, a 
prisoner to the language in which it articulates the real, archaeology is a prisoner 
to language, a knowing and willing prisoner at that, one with the audacity to make 
a merit out of its inability  to account  for actual practices, experiences and 
environments.  If traditional history  is embarrassed by or reluctant to openly 
confront the interpretative systems it draws on in order to formulate its factual 
data, archaeology wilfully ignores the fact that a system of interpretation can have 
historical significance only  if it is supported by some significant body of 
corresponding facts.  If traditional history is, by its own claims, anti-theoretical, 
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anti-imagination and pro-science (Jenkins, xvii), archaeology is the reversal of 
these things; it is the Other of historical empiricism; it is a form of metaphysical 
idealism.
Disconcerted by  its unorthodox methods, traditional history thus writes 
archaeology  off as theory, as philosophy (Goldstein, 1; Walzer, 58).  It argues that 
history, if it is to remain recognisable as such, must be composed without an 
explicit  theoretical position; theories, it says, must not be imposed on the texts of 
the archive.  It does not regard as theory  its own rules about how to read and what 
to read for, but instead looks on them as fundamental, necessary, ‘natural’ pre-
conditions to the act of doing history  itself (Young, viii).  History—the ‘proper’, 
‘recognisable’ kind—may well be hindered by  the inevitable constrictions of 
language, and as a result may well fall short of achieving accurate linguistic 
representations of extra-linguistic phenomenon; but these obstructions, these 
shortcomings, do they not represent history’s defining internal struggle, are they 
not what makes history what it is in the first place?  
Archaeology, for its part, leaves unanswered, even unasked, questions 
(about cause and effect, about environment, about physical action, about practice) 
that traditional history  finds essential to its project.  Archaeology is simply  too 
abstract.  Its generalizations are supported by insufficient warrants (Megill, 132). 
Its arguments fly in the face of empirical evidence, and its statements are often 
mere over-simplifications (Midelfort, 259).  It refuses to marshal concrete and 
specific evidence for its claims.  The epistemes, for example, are based on a 
limited and unrepresentative selection of texts (Huppert, 191-207).  Those texts it 
does select, it regularly  misinterprets or mistreats.  It  mixes up dates, includes 
errors so gross that they  appear deliberate, and appears to relish historical 
absurdities (Vilar, 188).  
In inverse proportion to its ability to tolerate its own internal contradictions, 
traditional history refuses to accept the contradictions evident within archaeology. 
Primary  among these unacceptable paradoxes is archaeology’s claim to be 
interested in discourse as it appears to be (White, Tropics of Discourse, 233), 
while at the same time using history  for the sake of something (theoretical) 
beyond it (Bell, 159).  This paradox stems from archaeology’s principled rejection 
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of a deeper structure of reality and of any  significance that might be seen as 
inherent either in the world or in consciousness (Foucault, Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice, 18), even as it unapologetically sustains an interest in the 
deeper structures of human consciousness at particular periods in history (White, 
Tropics of Discourse, 230).  On the one hand, archaeology asserts that individual 
beliefs and actions are not its primary concern; it is not making empirical 
generalisations about what people in various countries and at  various times 
thought or did.  On the other hand, in trying to construct  the epistemes that lie 
behind a diverse range of beliefs and practices, it  must somehow allow the 
appearance within these same epistemes of the factual beliefs and actions of those 
whose thought is constrained by them; that is to say, it must admit some kind of 
correspondence, however complex, incomplete, arbitrary or difficult to discern, 
between a generalised conditioning structure or environment and specific beliefs 
and actions (Gutting, Foucault, 40).
Archaeology’s introduction of an added layer of discursive knowledge in 
which it locates the rules of formation for concepts and theoretical relationships—
the episteme—does not do away with traditional history’s search for specific 
social and environmental causes for human thought (and thereby the conscious or 
unconscious reasons for human action).  Likewise, archaeology’s account of 
change in terms of other changes in the episteme does not eliminate traditional 
history’s questions concerning material agents; external drivers of change. 
Archaeology’s appeal to sudden rupture and random events to explain change 
without resorting to notions such as environment or social change; its appeal to 
episteme as a means of explaining historical cause without recourse to teleological 
thinking (influences, catalysts, agents, origins); these appeals are, according to 
traditional history, tantamount to answering a question with a problem, or 
resolving a problem by displacing the question (Flynn, 43).  At  some point—goes 
traditional history’s objection—archaeology will have to take its head out of the 
linguistic cloud and look at the actual conditions under which words are uttered, 
and within which action is undertaken; at some point it will have to get real.  
 In a sense, then, traditional history  locates a problem within archaeology 
that archaeology has always already identified within itself (always already 
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because it is a requisite for its functioning that this problem be set aside). 
Archaeology justifies its conceptual constructions in terms of their own 
interpretative coherence rather than their correspondence with independently 
given external data.  Its aim, it  says, is a comprehensive, unifying interpretation 
that will give intelligible order to an otherwise meaningless sea of individual 
historical truths; the facts are not irrelevant, but the primary support for its 
position is not its demonstrable correspondence with them but its logical and 
imaginative power to organise them into intelligible configurations (Gutting, 
‘Foucault and the History of Madness’, 67).  At the same time, however, 
archaeology  is cognisant that a method of historical analysis that has any claim to 
historicity  must eventually  address discursive challenges originating outside of its 
own self-contained interpretative schema.  That is to say, it is aware that its 
emphasis on abstract linguistic structures, its obsession with words, is too fragile 
to withstand external demands for an account of when, how and where discourse 
meets the realities of environment, body and action (Hacking, ‘The Archaeology 
of Foucault’, 34). 
As a consequence, Foucauldian history finds it has a new duty: to address 
this problem of the gap between discourse, on one hand, and body and 
environment, on the other—that is, the problem of how this gap might be bridged 
or indeed dissolved—without falling back on or making concessions to the myths 
(influence, origin, essence, Truth, Man) on which traditional history  is built.  In 
this sense, traditional history is important to Foucauldian history  because it 
provides a clear picture of how not to proceed, what conceptual pitfalls to avoid, 
in pursuing this question; traditional history confirms what needs to be done and 
offers for consideration an unsatisfactory  solution.  But, as we will see, 
Foucauldian history  also understands that the archaeological method is equally 
unsuitable to the task; like traditional history, archaeology  cannot cope with 
questions of action and environment without stepping outside its own limits and 
becoming something else.  A new method must be conceived: not one that will 
work against archaeology, or render it obsolete, but rather one that will exist 
alongside it, function in parallel with it.  
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As we shall see, in its efforts to devise such a method, Foucauldian history 
will find that it must shift its emphasis away from the concept of time towards that 
of space: the dimension in which matter (bodies, environment) is thought  to be 
held and in which action is thought to take place.  This movement from time to 
space as the framework guiding its approach, this veering into spatialised 
thinking, will extend beyond the use of spatial metaphors or the embedding of 
lists, tables, photographs and illustrations within texts; it will not be merely 
ancillary to its approach, but will pertain to the core of its historical method, to the 
very possibility of its emergence (Flynn, 42).  This special appeal to space will not 
do away with the concept of time, however.  On the contrary, it will come to see 
time more clearly; it  will come to see it as it is thinkable in the present, that is, not 
as a separate dimension with its own separate laws but as the contents of the 
universe itself.  In this new method, time, the one-time isolated and rarified entity, 
will be enfolded into space; it will become unified space-time.  
  
Let us begin, then, by  taking a look at how we think about space in our present 
(that is, the present pastness of things present), and let us begin that in a 
Foucauldian manner: by considering how we do not think about space, or rather, 
how it is no longer possible for us to think about it.  In the first  century  BC, for 
instance: what made our thinking about space possible then?  How on earth could 
we have thought about space like that?  
At that time, the fundamental question that we asked about space appears, at 
least at first  glance, to be the same as that which we ask today: does space exist 
independent of things?  Then as now, we wondered what would be left if we 
mentally removed all the assorted pieces of matter that exist in a given place. 
Would space remain, or would the removal of matter do away with space as well? 
(Close, Nothing, 4).  Can there be space that is immutable, like a stage that 
remains the same regardless of what is being played on it? (Genz, vii).  
One of the approaches we adopted to this question—the more radical 
approach for its time—was what we might now call ‘Epicurean’: Epicurean 
189
because it  rested on the principle that natural science was the route to 
philosophical understanding; radical because it began not with the more popular 
method of abstract cogitation (could empty  space exist logically?) but with 
observation of the physical phenomena around us.  In adopting this empirical 
approach, we were not being naive; we were aware that our observations of the 
external world would be limited by the frailty of our senses, that what we 
perceived would be only a sampling of a deeper reality that we could not fully 
apprehend:
Since even with the visible, great distance can disguise
Its motions, so that what we see is hard to recognise:
Often, a woolly flock of sheep upon a hillside crops
A verdant pasture all a-spangle with dew’s fresh drops,
And where the grass entices them, they  wander one by 
one,
And the plump lambs gambol, and kick up their heels in 
fun;
But when we view them from afar, the distance blurs the 
scene
Until it’s just a patch of white against a field of green. 
(Lucretius, 45)
Nevertheless, we remained confident that these samplings, these blurred scenes, 
were enough to infer a true picture of the nature of matter and space:
Another reason you should turn
Your attention to the motes that drift and tumble in the 
light:
Such turmoil means that there are secret motions, out  of 
sight,
That lie concealed in matter.  For you’ll see the motes 
careen
Off course, and then bounce back again, by means of 
blows unseen,
Drifting now in this direction, now that, on every side.
You may be sure this starts with atoms; they are what 
provide
The base of this unrest.  (39-40)
190
What we deduced from our observations was that all matter was made up of small 
particles, or atoms, each of which was indestructible, immortal.  The different 
degree of atomic clustering from place to place was responsible for changes in 
density  and the distinctive properties of different forms of matter (Barrow, 65). 
Larger bodies could be broken down to their constituent atoms, but no further. 
Allowing matter to be infinitely divisible would, we believed, result in the 
irreversible destruction of matter’s identity: ultimately matter would slip into non-
existence or give rise to aggregates that were too fragile to persist (66).
Besides, unless there is a smallest part, however small
A thing may be, it must have infinite parts, since after all
Half of a half of anything can still be cut
In two, and on and on ad infinitum.  And then what
Will the difference between the tiniest speck of matter
And all the universe?  There won’t be any whatsoever!
For even if the Sum of Things is infinite, the amount
Of smaller parts in the tiniest speck is likewise past all 
count.  (Lucretius, 21)
According to this vision, our universe was infinite; it consisted of an infinite 
number of atoms.  Yet these infinities were not truly infinite: at the level of the 
universe there existed a final ‘sum’, while at the atomic level there existed a 
smallest, indivisible part: the atom itself.  What we called infinities actually 
referred to finite but uncountable numbers: numbers of a magnitude that the 
human senses were incapable of seeing and the human mind incapable of 
imagining.  
Here, in effect, we were drawing a distinction between mathematical 
(idealist) reality and physical (materialist) reality: in the former, we were saying, 
infinite division of any quantity was thinkable, but in the latter, it was not.  At the 
same time, however, we were also constructing a singularly mathematical vision 
of the universe.  If the universe—our Sum of Things—was made up of immortal 
atoms, then it made no sense that atoms could ever be added or subtracted from it; 
something could not be immortal and newly  born; the universe could not add to 
itself or take away from itself; it had always had everything already within it. 
But, by the same token, a stable universe, a static world, was not what we saw 
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when we looked around us.  What we saw was change; what we saw was variation 
and flux; what we saw was life and death.  Our response to this problem was to 
imagine a regime of mutual cooperation among the atoms: everything existed in a 
perpetual relationship of give and take.  Locally, there were an ‘infinite’ number 
of additions and subtractions, pluses and minuses, but the final outcome was 
always the same ‘finite’ wholeness.  The ageing and dying of things implied the 
creation of other things, something perished here so something could blossom 
there, while all the time the final number of things remained unchanged (Jenkyns, 
xv).  
[T]he particles that go
From one shrinking object cause another thing to grow,
Making the former shrivel up, while making the latter 
flower, 
Never lingering.  Thus the Sum of Things is every hour
Renewed, and thus, in order to thrive, all mortal creatures 
need 
Each other.  (Lucretius, 38)
There was no death but only eternal newness.  The drama of life lay in this 
combination of dependence and independence, change and changelessness at  the 
atomic level.  In between the great One of the universe and the miniscule One of 
the atom everything was activity  and mutability.  The atoms were in ceaseless 
energetic motion, and all events and processes were merely the effects of this. 
Everything that happened, every action, was the product of the push and pull of 
atoms, of their colliding, cohering or flying apart (Jenkyns, xii).  
Our vision of things needed another element, however.  For the atoms to 
partake in all of this heaving activity; for the atoms to be able to move at all, they 
needed something to move through.  Based on our observations, we reasoned that 
the only  thing that could possibly  allow such movement was empty space. 
Motion inside filled space was, we presumed, impossible.  Solid, indestructible 
atoms would not be able to move through each other; they would only be able to 
obstruct or resist  (Lucretius, 13).  Without emptiness, a realm beyond what atoms 
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can touch, there would not be any room to locate bodies, or to have them move 
the way we see them moving (Epicurus, qtd. in Genz, 83). 
If it can affect the touch,
However faintly, then it adds its mass—however much
Or little—to the Sum of Things, if it exists at all.
And yet if, on the other hand, it is intangible,
And offers no resistance, so that anything that moves
Can pass through any part of it, without a doubt it proves
That it is void.  (Lucretius, 15)
The basic nature of our universe, then, was the motion of immutable atoms in the 
empty space—the void—that lay between them (Barrow, 95).  This motion in the 
void proceeded by a series of instantaneous leaps (Bostock, liii).  The moving 
object stayed at  one position for a while, and then at once appeared in a different 
position, without there having been any  times at which it occupied intermediate 
positions (liv).  This meant that, in a given instant, the space the atoms occupied 
was filled, and the rest remained empty; there was no transitional phase between 
one atomic configuration and another; at base, change was not constant but 
sudden.  
In imagining the universe in this way, as instantaneously  jumping from one 
fixed state to another, what we were effectively doing was replacing the concepts 
of ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’, ‘being’ and ‘non-being’, with those of ‘matter’ and 
‘void’ (Genz, 61).  In the universe there was always the same amount of being and 
non-being, matter and void; they just  appeared in different places at  different 
instants.  Solid things were riddled with emptiness (how else could light pass 
through leaves or sound through walls?) and empty places were filled with objects 
(everywhere you turned, there was something) (Lucretius, 13).  Without nothing, 
there could not be anything, and this nothing was everywhere.  
But—we also insisted—out of this ever-present nothing, things could not 
appear (Lucretius, 9).  If it was true that atoms could not be destroyed (that is, 
could not be made vanish into the void), then the converse must also be valid: 
atoms could not originate from the void; something could not come from nothing. 
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This idea was what made our philosophy  thoroughly materialist: if gods or spirits 
existed, they were made of immortal atoms like everything else (Jenkyns, ix).  
This dread, these shadows of the mind, must thus be swept 
away
Not by rays of the sun not by the brilliant beams of day,
But by observing Nature and her laws.  And this will lay
The warp out for us—her first principle: that nothing 
brought
Forth by any supernatural power out of naught. 
(Lucretius, 7)
Thus, ours was a philosophy that appeared, at least to our own Epicurean 
minds, without contradiction: there was being and there was non-being; there was 
matter and there was void; there was object and there was beyond-object; there 
was mass and there was medium; there was here and there was there; there were 
two parts and there was whole, and what in the observable world could gainsay 
us?  The fact was, however, that such a philosophy, with such a generous 
accommodation made for nothingness, was abhorrent to the dominant thinking of 
our time (Barrow, 69).  This dominant thinking—which boasted a pedigree 
stretching back to the Greeks, and which had been successfully refuting similar 
challenges to its orthodoxy since its inception—vehemently  denied the possibility 
of the existence of the void, basing its denial on a sharply  contrasting method of 
inquiry: what was needed to work out the nature of space was abstract reasoning 
rather than empirical observation (Jenkyns, ix).  
When we looked at things through this more favoured ‘Aristotelian’ lens—
that is, when we looked ‘inwardly’—we saw immediately  that the Epicurean 
conception of matter and void would not withstand proper questioning, and would 
quickly crumble.  For what the Epicurean vision did, and what so plainly 
contravened the principles of inner logic, was to turn nothing into something.  It 
located empty  space; it gave it a place, albeit a negative one: a place where things 
were not placed.  And for us,  the majority  Aristotelians of Rome, a place without 
a body  could not be a place; every  place necessarily  had a body in it (Aristotle, 
81).  Place was what contained that of which it was the place; place was no more 
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and no less than the limit of what it contained (85-86).  Without body, place was 
nothing, and nothing, if it  was truly nothing, could not be thought of (Genz, 33). 
It was possible to think and speak only  about what was: what was not could not be 
thought of, and what could not be thought of could not be (Barrow, 44).  Because 
imagining the absence of things was not possible without violating the laws of 
logic (Genz, 5), any knowledge of nothing was intimately connected with some 
knowledge of something (Aristotle, 82).  
We Aristotelians believed that as a consequence of this double negation, this 
logical rejection of the void, nature must, by its very  nature, abhor the creation or 
persistence of any  vacuum or void state (76).  If our minds abhorred the idea of 
nothing, it followed that nature abhorred its reality.  By thus imposing our 
rationally contrived laws onto the non-rational world, we were, of course, 
overturning the empiricism of the Epicurean approach.  Accordingly, the 
arguments we employed to bear out our vision of the horror vacui also operated 
as reversals.  An example of such a reversal was our conception of the universe. 
Like the Epicurean universe, ours was finite in volume, it contained everything 
that existed, and the basic elements of nature—not atoms in our case, but earth, 
fire, air and water—lived eternally.  But what this meant for us was the opposite 
of what it meant for the Epicureans: since the basic elements were immortal, and 
since space itself was defined by these elements, there could be no place that was 
completely empty  of them (Close, Nothing, 9).  By definition, a void could not 
tolerate a body; it could not accept a body into itself and remain a void (Aristotle, 
95).  This suggested that the universe, rather than being a tangle of matter and 
space, being and non-being, was in fact a continuum filled with matter and 
elements, with no place left over for the void (Barrow, 69).  
Our conception of motion within this continuum represented another 
important reversal.  Like the Epicureans, we saw that things in the universe 
changed place, but our thinking about  this yielded solutions that  were precisely 
contrary.  In our conception of things, there was no necessity  for there to be a void 
to facilitate movement.  Quite the contrary: admitting the void would, in a literal 
sense, paralyse the universe.  Motion required an external cause, an outside agent, 
and this was something a void could never supply.  Motion in a void would come 
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to a standstill because bodies would have nothing driving them (Aristotle, 96).  If 
motion did spontaneously occur, there would be no reason for the moving bodies 
to go one way or the other because a void was necessarily the same everywhere 
and in every direction.  And even if a body  did manage set off in a given direction, 
it would continue on this same course forever because there would be no medium 
offering any resistance to it (Barrow, 76).  
The void was needed, therefore, only if it was believed that all matter 
existed in the form of solid, indivisible and incompressible particles; it was 
entirely  unnecessary if it was understood that matter could also consist of a 
continuous fluid that was itself capable of contracting and expanding.  In this 
latter view, when bodies moved, they  simultaneously  made room for one another, 
and they  did this even though there was no interval between them (Aristotle, 94). 
When a body changed from being in state A to being in state B, there was a stretch 
of time which separated these two states, and during this stretch the body was 
neither in state A nor in state B but changing from one to the other; it was in a 
transitory state C (154).  No change could be instantaneous.  Rather than bodies 
leaping through empty  space, there was a continuous flow of bodies in filled 
space.  
Thus, the prospect of an unclassifiable emptiness—a breach between 
bodies, an attributeless hole in the natural fabric of the world, isolated from cause 
and effect and detached from what was palpable to the senses—was unthinkable 
to our Aristotelian minds (Barrow, 59-60).  In place of this unthinkable nothing, 
we placed a thinkable something: the concept of an intangible layer of original, 
primitive matter—a dimension of ur-matter or an ether—which we, translating 
from the Greek, called materia prima (Genz, 21).  When contemplating nature, 
our thinking minds progressed from a given, observable object towards the 
materia prima, and as we did so, specific shapes receded into possible shapes 
(78).  The materia prima became an object by becoming one of the forms or 
properties out of the totality that it  contained; hidden properties transformed into 
seen properties and vice versa; one shape replaced another; there was no such 
thing as a completely new property or shape.  In this completely occupied 
universe, motion was represented by change from a potential new position into a 
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real one.  A flying arrow was not flying at all but was constantly  re-emerging from 
the materia prima, a continuous material flow (79).
After this, there was one final problem to resolve: if, as we believed, every 
movement of a body in this fluid universe was brought about by a movement 
external to that body; if every  change was changed by something other than itself 
(Aristotle, 195), then the search for the cause of change produced a potentially 
eternal succession of causes, which ultimately required a first cause to account for 
it.  Likewise, if, as we also believed, change discontinued when the cause of 
change ceased to operate, then there must have been an eternal cause of change, 
for change in the world never  stopped (199).   What we needed to complete our 
thinking, therefore, was a final and eternal cause: a cause that itself did not have a 
cause and did not itself undergo change.  This external, causeless, changeless 
force was our God (200-12). 
It can thus be said that, as Aristotelians, we used the concept of a 
perpetually present something (materia prima and a first cause) in order to 
confirm precisely the same principle that we, as Epicureans, used the perpetually 
present nothing (the void) to confirm: something could not be caused by nothing. 
The Aristotelian something and the Epicurean nothing were actually two 
configurations of the same conditions of knowledge; they  occupied neighbouring 
positions in a single episteme; the same principle made possible the metaphysical 
nature of one and the materialism of the other.  The void existed/did not exist: 
what made the question even possible was a universe that obeyed the rule that the 
creation of something out of nothing was unthinkable.   
  
Today, our thinking on the subject of space happens in a universe that  obeys a 
different rule: something can emerge from ‘nothing’.  How did we come to this 
present ‘truth’?  How do we understand this ‘nothing’, how do we conceptualise 
it?  This is an important question, for it is this ‘nothing’—a field which we cannot 
directly  see but from which we can see things emerging—that makes our current 
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thinking about space possible.  It is this ‘nothing’, therefore, that  will now be the 
focus of our analysis.   
These days, as in the first century BC, when we talk about space, we are 
talking about something that we cannot directly measure.  What we can measure 
(with our rulers and our light beams and our imaginations) are distances between 
visible pieces of matter (Coles, 22).  Distances between things, however large or 
small, are how we locate and define the distances themselves.  In other words, it is 
only by means of objects that we can think about areas that are apparently devoid 
of objects.  
It makes sense, then, to start  our exploration of space with an object, and 
what better than that which marked the limits of our Epicurean imaginations: the 
atom.  What we call the atom today—the smallest piece of an element that can 
exist and still be recognised as that element—is not what we once imagined the 
atom to be; the two objects are as different as the methods we use to observe 
them.  In contrast  to our immutable Epicurean atom, our present atom can be 
broken down to reveal a rich inner structure.  Its nucleus is built from protons and 
neutrons, and these in turn contain clusters of smaller particles called quarks. 
These quarks, along with the electrons that gyrate around the nucleus, are the 
fundamental particles of matter as we currently know them (Close, Particle 
Physics, 2-5).  We do not know whether quarks and electrons are divisible or 
whether they have any internal structure because we are unable to see any matter 
that operates at a scale of less than about 10-18m.  If there are layers of matter 
deeper than this (working on smaller scales, covering shorter distances, having 
finer boundaries), they are beyond our present ability to resolve in experiment 
(27).
Our fundamental particles also differ from Epicurean atoms by  an absence 
of sharply defined limits separating them from the space around them (Genz, 
305).  There is no distinction possible between the behaviour of quarks and that of 
what ‘contains’ them.  When we model the interactions of quarks with others 
quarks, matter and space are of equal importance and cannot be reasonably 
detached.  When we try to isolate quarks with our instruments, at some point what 
is a quark and what is not a quark begins to blend (307).  Thus, although 
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mathematically matter and space are infinitely  divisible, physically we do not 
know whether there is a limit beyond which divisibility ceases to make sense.  It 
is conceivable that some elementary distance—say, 10-33m—is the smallest 
possible separation between two points; it  is conceivable that, at that level, matter 
fuses with space, and conversely, space becomes discrete (58).  
So much for fixing definite boundaries between matter and space.  But what 
can we say about space that is at some distance from the boundary of the nearest 
quark?  In the universe, between galaxies, each atom is at a distance of about one 
metre from its next neighbour (1): to what extent is this intermediate space 
separate from the atoms that mark its limit?  Is there anything happening in this 
‘physical vacuum’?  Is it  really  empty?  Our current answer is no, but, as we shall 
see, what we imagine to exist  instead of emptiness—our intangible but existent 
‘nothing’—is different to Aristotelian materia prima in a number of important 
ways. 
What we call a physical vacuum today is simply what is left  when 
everything that can be removed has been removed.  And what is left is energy. 
When all matter is excluded, energy continues to exist.  No possible process 
governed by the known laws of physics can extract all the energy from a vacuum 
(Barrow, 216).  A more precise definition of a vacuum, therefore, is a state where 
the amount of energy is the minimum possible; a state from which no more energy 
can be taken away; ‘a ground state’; ‘a zero state’ (Close, Nothing, 102).  Directly 
measuring the amount of energy in a zero state—putting a figure on vacuum 
energy—is impossible because it is infinitely low, but a change in its energy  is a 
real measurable quantity.  Analysis of changes to vacuum energy have shown the 
vacuum energy itself to have a presence and to permeate every fibre of our 
universe (Barrow, 11). 
Small regions of vacuum energy see larger energies appear in the form of 
fluctuations.  There is no pre-existing carrier for this fluctuating energy (217); the 
appearance of an energy-carrier (a particle) to transmit  fluctuations is a 
consequence of the energy fluctuations themselves (233); the fluctuation interacts 
with the particles, which are themselves the fluctuation.  Understanding this 
requires us to imagine vacuum energy as a kind of sea composed of virtual 
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particles, continually appearing and disappearing (237).  These virtual particles 
consist of particles and corresponding antiparticles which spontaneously emerge 
and instantaneously collide to become radiative energy.  In this process, energy is 
conserved, but the structure of the particles dissolves.  That is, all particle identity 
is absorbed into energy (Genz, 203).  The virtual particles that disappear into 
energy and the energy  that permits their emergence and disappearance are two 
manifestations of the same fluctuation.
In a sense, vacuum energy behaves like a medium, but  it is not a smooth one 
like the materia prima.  Any object that emerges from it or enters into it  will 
oscillate and spin in a random, disordered fashion.  We can obtain quantities from 
this random motion which we can then use to define possible directions in a field. 
In other words, when we measure a fluctuation—that is, when we measure the 
tension in vacuum energy  that manifests itself by producing forces—we can then 
map the sphere of possible influence of that fluctuation; a field is this sphere of 
possible influence (Close, Nothing, 38).
So far we have been visualising what happens in the space between distant 
atoms, but in fact vacuum energy exists in space that includes material objects as 
well as space that does not.  All of space—not just that between galaxies but that 
which is everywhere—contains fluctuating particles and fields; all finite volumes 
are subject to fluctuations in energy  (Genz, 201).  We need to examine miniscule 
regions in order to confront such fluctuations directly, but they influence the way 
in which we perceive the physical world on all levels (viii). 
To grasp the extent of this influence, let us return to our elementary 
particles: the quarks and these electrons.  These days we believe that these quarks 
and electrons are best described not in terms of particles but in terms of fields. 
While it is true that they behave as particles as they are being emitted by  a 
material source, and again as they  are observed by a material target; it is also true 
that in the intervening span between emission and observation, they behave as 
spheres of possibility, or fields (209).  In this sense, fields are what exist between 
our measurements.  Once we know a field, we also know with what probabilities 
to expect certain measurement results (211).  The field does not prescribe where 
exactly  a particle will be observed, but when we do many measurements on 
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particles in the same field, we build up a curve, and this curve shows the 
likelihood for finding the particle in a given state at a given location (212).  
The field is what we know about these particles.  It is our view of them. 
The electron, for example, which we think of as a particle, is really a bundle 
within an ‘electron-field’ which acts with wave-like properties (Close, Nothing, 
97).  As a view, this contradicts our old Aristotelian conception of materia prima 
and its principle of external cause and effect.  Not only is it impossible to predict 
where we will find a particle in a field, it cannot even be presumed that every 
action of the particle propagates locally, from one point to a neighbouring point 
(213).   We see leaps; we see non-local relationships between locations in space. 
What is more, unlike the ever-present materia prima, the fields that fill a given 
vacuum must, on the average, vanish.  There is no material aspect to fields.  They 
are, quite literally, nothing.  The only  quantity of a field that  remains immutable is 
its vacuum energy, its zero state (221).  
The vacuum, with its seething mass of activity, turns out to be the 
foundation of our understanding of our elementary  particles of matter, and vice 
versa: we cannot but view fields as particles, and particles as fields.  The field is 
also how we explain the occurrence of force between two apparently  disconnected 
bodies.  We know of only four such forces: gravity, the electromagnetic force, and 
two that act in and around the atomic nucleus, known as strong and weak (Close, 
Particle Physics, 81).  These forces are known to be transmitted among the 
particles of matter (quarks, electrons and so on) by the exchange of force carriers 
(photons, W and Z bosons, and gluons).  There is also a field associated with each 
of these force-exchange particles (Barrow, 218).  The intimate relationship 
between the fundamental forces and particles in space sheds light on how a force 
can occur between two apparently disconnected bodies: the intervening field is 
involved.  Remove all bodies but one from a region of space and its mass will 
release a (gravitational) field that spreads throughout  that space.  We can 
contemplate a region of space devoid of all material bodies, but it would not be 
truly  empty  if there were even just one body elsewhere in the universe: the 
gravitational field from that remote body would fill all of our otherwise empty 
region (Close, Nothing, 38).
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  
Our minds have developed a view of the world based on our macroscopic sense of 
dimensions: one of time and three of space.  Our experience is that  space and time 
are different, at least  in our ability to pass through them and to receive or process 
information.  While this difference is true as perceived by our macroscopic senses, 
and to our descriptions of phenomena down to the scale of atoms and beyond, the 
deeper we travel, the less sense it makes to define them as separate (Close, 
Nothing, 105).  As we approach the level of fields, we begin to have grave doubts 
about the reality  of absolute time (a time that, of its own accord and of its own 
nature, takes course uniformly, unrelated to any external object), and separate 
space (a space that exists in complete independence of bodies and motion) (Close, 
Nothing, 47; Genz, 37).  This is because, at this deep level, we understand space 
and time to be fluctuating together; or to put it another way, we understand field 
fluctuations to occur in the fabric of space and time.  Down there, time and space, 
which appear so different in our macro-level imaginations, merge and become the 
same thing; they lose the characteristics that separate them from each other.  Time 
becomes just another direction in space; space becomes a field of possible 
instants.  Space and time come to be space-time: the contents of the universe 
(Genz, 37).  
What this unified space-time does, in effect, is render meaningless the 
concept of ‘a beginning in time’ or ‘a starting point’: if in the field there is no 
timeline, no time’s arrow; if there is no this way and no that, then there can be no 
beginning, no point of departure (Coles, 121).  In this vision, the Big Bang can no 
longer mean the creation of something; it can merely  signal the instant when our 
universe emerged from an area/era (field) of pure force (gravity); it constitutes the 
point at which space that is virtual and time that is imaginary become real.  Before 
the Big Bang—and, of course, we can only actually speak of ‘before’ in our 
familiar mental matrix of separate space and time—there is no yesterday or 
tomorrow; there is no here or there; just an infinite field of possibilities (Close, 
Nothing, 143).  
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In this picture, the universe has no beginning or no end; it just is.  The 
vacuum—infinitely deep, filled with particles that can take on different forms, and 
charged with the possibility of fluctuation—is where everything that we now 
know came from (106).  The universe itself is a fluctuation, one with a total 
‘virtual’ energy so near to zero that  its lifetime can be huge (128).  Moreover, it is 
just one of an infinite number of other universe-fluctuations; it just so happens 
that ours has produced the right laws, dimensions and forces that allow us to 
evolve.  But even if this is so, even if our universe has erupted as a fluctuation in a 
field, a fundamental question remains unanswered: who, what, where and how 
were encoded the rules of the field that enabled us (144).  Fields and fluctuations 
do not solve the problem of creation but only rehearse a new kind of paradox of 
cause: we disallow the idea of the creation of something from nothing (the Big 
Bang as creatio ex nihilo), but  at the same time, we deny that there was always 
something.  What we actually think is that there was always a ‘nothing’ from 
which something can emerge; we just define ‘nothing’ in a very specific way: as a 
virtual something, a ‘nothing’ whose properties do not add up to something, and 
are therefore nothing.   So, when we say the universe is a fluctuation ‘out of 
nothing’, we are certainly being paradoxical but we are not contravening our 
current laws.  We are not merely replacing the word ‘nothing’ for what is in reality 
something.  ‘Nothing’ as we know it is not the same as something.  If it is the 
same as anything, it is the same as nothing; and if it is anything it is nothing, or 
rather, no-thing.
 Thus, although the fundamental question we ask about space today—can it 
exist independent of things?—appears to be the same as that which we asked as 
Romans, the ultimate object of our questions—‘nothing’—is, in fact, radically 
different, that is to say, radically present, radically our own.  It is not merely that 
we, in the current episteme, are looking at and conceptualising ‘nothing’ in newer, 
more modern ways; it is, rather, that the object we call ‘nothing’ is fundamentally 
different from that  which we once called nothing; the two objects do not belong to 
the same orders of knowledge.  Our ‘nothing’ is nothing in a way that  the 
Aristotelian something is not (our ‘nothing’ is an immaterial nothing, whereas the 
materia prima was a material something).  Conversely, our ‘nothing’ is not 
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nothing in a way that the Epicurean nothing was (our ‘nothing’ is not an absolute 
nothing; it is not a void).  
Our ‘nothing’, therefore, is not a variation, a more complex manifestation, 
of past nothings; making sense of it does not simply require the widening of older 
domains of knowledge; much more than that, it requires the creation and 
elaboration of new disciplines, entire sciences.  Our methods of looking and 
thinking have changed; our empirical knowledge of space renders unthinkable 
previous observations, while our theoretical knowledge of it destroys prior logic. 
However, there remains at the base of our inquiry, an ancient tension between 
experimental (empirical) knowledge, on one hand, and abstract (mathematical) 
knowledge, on the other.  Still today our observations and experiments can only 
take us so far; at some point our inquiries must tip  over into theory.  Conversely, 
our theory is determined by  the limits to our experimental knowledge; our 
thinking can really only operate on the ‘knowable’ side of these limits.  
In the context of space (that is, space-time), we still do not understand the 
boundary where matter arises out of fields (Genz, 203), nor can we precisely 
define the point where matter breaks down within these fields: we rely on our 
theories to tell us what is thinkable in these regards.  It is up to theory to decide 
whether there are any compelling (abstract) reasons to draw a boundary  between 
consciousness and matter (and, by extension, between then and now, here and 
there, I and you, man and nature, mind and body, thoughts and world); it is up  to 
theory to decide where such boundaries ought to be drawn, and to explain why.  
In order to make such decisions, theory finds it must fall back on the 
supposition that everything does not depend on everything else.  If it wants to 
build a theory that is anything less than a theory of everything, it must presume 
that there are domains which can be studied individually, in closed systems, 
without recourse to the universe fields—the forces—that bind them.  Theory is 
theory  because it deals with what we cannot know through observation alone; it is 
what it is because it functions in those ‘soft’ or ‘blurred’ space-times that the 
‘hard’ or ‘factual’ sciences cannot define or validate; and yet, at the same time, it 
is determined by very specific conditions of knowledge; it takes the forms it does 
by virtue of observed laws that describe deep and far-reaching micro-forces 
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(forces which are truly multidisciplinary  in that they do not respect the boundaries 
that theory marks between disciplines but instead condition all knowledge in a 
given space-time).   
Next, we shall examine the extent to which Foucauldian history functions as 
theory.  More specifically, we shall examine the theoretical method
—‘genealogy’—with which Foucauldian history supplements archaeology.  What 
we shall see is that, whereas archaeology  attempts to maintain a separation 
between language (discourse) and matter (body and environment) by building a 
closed or ‘walled’ system that is conceptually  devoid of external or intervening 
forces, genealogy recognises that walled systems are not themselves free of 
forces, that the walls that  encompass systems are not impenetrable, that even the 
walls emit energy, that even they  are a force.  As a result of this recognition, 
genealogy sets out to locate, among the contents of its own (necessarily walled) 
system, those space-times where/when the separateness of discourse, on one hand, 
and body  and environment, on the other, breaks down, thereby revealing the force
—emanating from the walls but also beyond them—that ultimately unifies them.  
  
At the base of Foucauldian archaeology is the awareness that it is as hard to 
understand how consciousness emerges out of matter to become discourse as it  is 
to comprehend how the universe erupts out of ‘nothing’ to become matter.  Added 
to this is the further awareness that it is impossible to precisely mark the point at 
which discourse meets body, or indeed the point at which discourse is ‘felt’ by, or 
helps to shape, environment.  Archaeology’s response to these fundamental 
difficulties is to keep  them outside the bounds of its analysis.  That is to say, 
archaeology  circumvents both the question of how discourse erupts and the 
question of how discourse impacts environment, and instead chooses to focus on 
what a certain discourse looks like once it has erupted; it does not make reference 
to any influence that that discourse might have on anything other than itself.  
As the medium and the outcome of discursive eruptions, archaeology posits 
the episteme, or, to return to its full title, the epistemological ‘field’.  This field is 
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both enabled by and the enabler of discourse; it is made up of and made possible 
by configurations of statements.  This field does not emanate from a region deeper 
than or exterior to discourse; it  is not the expression or the effect of an 
environment or practices outside discourse; rather, it is itself the means and the 
result of discourse.  It is the conditions of discourse made into discourse; it is 
those structures and spaces made visible by discourse, which determine the sense 
(or nonsense) of discourse itself.
In other words, the archaeological field is the combination of what is visible 
in the archive (discourse) and what is potentially articulable given the 
configuration of the archive (conditions of discourse).  It is a description at the 
same time of the discourse that exists at the beginning of archaeological analysis 
(statements), of the discourse that exists at the end of such analysis (the revealed 
conditions of the production of statements), and of any discourses that  might be 
possible in between (given the arrangement of statements and the conditions of 
eruption that such an arrangement implies).  It does not try to describe any 
transitions between these three different states of discourse (that is, between 
visible statements, conditions of statements and potential statements).  It does not 
allow for flux between these states, or evolution from one state to another.  Rather, 
the eruption of a discursive field is sudden and thorough: it  implicates all three 
states.  Eruption is simultaneously  a statement, the condition of that  statement, 
and any statements that are possible given the conditions.  It is a radical event 
that, at  the same moment, creates a field and distributes discourse across the field. 
It is the appearance of new forms in discourse, which can themselves be used to 
define the conditions that brought them about.  
In archaeology we discern not the dynamics of eruption itself, but the 
visible effects of it: its outcome.  Any physical actions or environmental forces 
that might have caused discourse to erupt; any material impact that discourse itself 
might have subsequently caused, lies outside archaeology’s sphere of vision.  For 
the purposes of archaeology, it is sufficient to think of the eruption of discourse as 
spontaneous and always already discursive.  The archaeological field is a space 
free of action, intention, influence, agency; it is a realm independent of the lives 
of those who appear to be speaking, and of the lives, bodies, events or 
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environments that appear to be spoken about.  It  is a closed system, the ‘walls’ of 
which are represented by the edges of documents: where discourse ends.
Archaeology thus establishes two independent spheres: its own enclosed 
field, involving discourse, and beyond that, out of the reach of its analyses, a 
‘non-discursive’ realm, involving bodies, action and environment.  Here: what is 
thought, what has been thought, and what  can be thought.  There: what is not 
thought, what has never been thought, and what cannot be thought.  In between 
these two spaces it builds an idealised partition: idealised because its 
impermeability is total; any relationship  that might exist between thought and 
non-thought, any leakage that might happen between them, is ignored.  
In the archaeological system, the ‘non-discursive’ sphere of action and 
environment is more than simply  the Other of discourse; it  is not extracted from 
analysis and put to rest in a metaphysical place where it has no weight or 
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presence.  On the contrary, it  is a definite reality.  It exists even though it is not or 
cannot be thought or spoken about.  More than exist, it  makes up most of the 
universe.  But this reality is left outside archaeology by archaeology itself; the 
question of how action and environment might be ‘turned into’ discourse, and 
conversely how discourse might ‘turn into’ action or environment, is sidestepped. 
The search for material cause is abandoned in favour of analyses of discourse as it 
has already happened.  Discourse is seen, not as the result or the effect of 
something else exterior to it, but as a system of visible possibilities in the field 
that is the beginning and end of itself.  In other words, reference to outside cause 
is replaced by comparisons of the visible configurations of possible discourse at 
different moments in the history of discourse:  
Fig. 2.   Michel Foucault.  The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 
1973) 201. 
There is thus a distinctly static character to the archaeological field: it is a 
fixed picture of the visible discursive configurations in an instant in time (a 
century, two centuries).  There is no transition between one episteme and the next: 
the later episteme erupts to generate a new field; the relationship between it and 
the earlier episteme is one of rupture and overlap rather than gradual modification 
or evolution.  But there appears to be an active component too.  The field is what 
we, as ‘archaeologists’, observe of it.  The act of observing the field is, in an 
actual sense, the field.  In the process of demarcating the shape and boundaries of 
the field, we search the visible statements for disparate elements in order to 
organise them, order them, define unities and describe relations among them; and 
in doing so, we reorder the field into a new picture, one that is recognisable as a 
new kind of knowledge about the past: apparent paradoxes and arbitrary 
constraints to thought begin to make sense within the framework defined by them. 
However, as far as archaeology is concerned, all of this ‘action’ happens within 
the order of discourse; what is taking place is actually  thought, and all thought 
happens within the discursive field; nothing more material is happening than the 
(re)arranging of discourse.  There is no difference between the field and our (re)
description of it.
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Thus envisaged, the archaeological field is purely  abstract; it is a three-
dimensional spatial grid—a geometry—onto which a fourth dimension of time is 
superimposed.  It  is a picture of concepts at a particular point on a discrete 
temporal line.  As such, it gives no indication of the points at which, or the 
moments in which, these concepts begin to impinge on actual people or 
environments.  And yet, without bodies performing non-conscious or non-
discursive actions in time (breathing, walking, living), and without non-conscious 
or non-discursive environments in which these actions are performed—without a 
space-time to account for the contents of the universe—the archaeological field 
would be nothing: the mind would have nothing to observe and would therefore 
have nothing to create discourses about; neither the mind in which the universe is 
envisaged nor the page on which such an envisaging is drawn would exist.  Which 
must mean that, at some level, archaeology is not  immaterial.  At some level, it 
must be affected by and have an effect on materiality.  But it is here/now, where/
when the question of materiality arises, that archaeology falls silent, offers 
nothing.
  
From this nothing, ‘genealogy’ emerges.  Not as a reversal of archaeology; not as 
a deflation or a contradiction of it.  But as a break; an outgrowth; an overlapping; 
an enrichment.  Put simply, genealogy is that form of Foucauldian history which 
pays attention to material causes; it is a theoretical method of causal explanation 
to complement archaeology’s strictly descriptive approach.
We must be careful, however, to clearly identify what genealogy is seeking 
the material causes of.  Whereas archaeology sought to describe the conditions 
that determined the production of discourse at specific moments in history, 
genealogy is interested in finding the material causes for practices that exist in the 
present.  And, in this context, genealogy defines discourse itself as a practice:
Thought is no longer theoretical.  As soon as it functions it 
offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, 
209
dissociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help  but liberate 
and enslave.  Even before prescribing, suggesting a future, 
saying what must be done, even before exhorting or 
merely sounding the alarm, thought, at the level of its 
existence, in its very dawning, is in itself an action—a 
perilous act.  (Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice, i)
Genealogy accepts the archaeological principle that it  is impossible for the human 
mind to perceive reality  through any other means than itself, that is, through any 
other means than its own discourse, but instead of seeing discourse as a series of 
non-material elements that erupts in an abstract space, it views discourse as a 
lived and living phenomenon, an act that forms part of and helps shape material 
reality.  For genealogy, both perceiving material reality and intervening in it are 
practices; the degree to which we can view our discourses as themselves 
interventions, and, conversely, the extent to which we can understand our 
interventions as forms of discourse, is the core question that occupies it.
Genealogy is, at base, a recognition of the fact that to imagine, as 
archaeology  does, that the validity of ideas can somehow exist prior to their 
genuine material instantiation within existing society is to push the question of 
cause further from view rather than to resolve it (Boyne, 126).  Approaching 
discourse as a practice allows genealogy to speak without contradiction of the 
material conditions of discourse; it  enables genealogy to speak of bodies and 
environments as carriers of discourse and as constitutive elements of practices, 
which together impinge on bodies and environments to produce certain kinds of 
bodies, spaces, traits, behaviours and knowledges (Best, 46).  In other words, 
genealogy aims to show how the rules of formation of discourse are linked to the 
operations of physical practices and processes.  In genealogy, discourse not only 
exhibits immanent principles of regularity, it  is also bound by regulations enforced 
through material practices.  Equally, genealogy is concerned with the ways in 
which discourse produces practices for the formation of a material reality. 
According to genealogy, the world is traversed by the effects of discourses which 
work to constitute the actual state of things (Gordon, 245).  In this view, discourse 
has a discernible impact on other discourses, but also on bodies and the 
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environment; things are objectifications of determinate practices; there are no 
historical objects that pre-exist the practices that constitute them (Chartier, 185).
For genealogy, then, discourse is a practice like any other.  Moreover, other 
practices cannot be detached from or viewed in isolation of discourse.  The 
practice of criminal punishment, for example, is the materiality  of the prison, but 
it is also the social and scientific theories that produced the prison, and the social 
and scientific techniques that reinforce specific practices within, around and 
beyond the prison; criminal punishment is, in a concrete sense, a discursive 
practice.  The relations of such discursive practices are what make up the 
genealogical field (the map of knowledge that genealogy offers).  Unlike the 
archaeological field, which is made up of abstract configurations of statements, 
the genealogical field is built up through analysis of discontinuous but actual 
spaces, such as the prison (Said, 150).  
The shift from archaeology to genealogy is thus also a shift away from time 
as the paradigm guiding analysis.  As an historical method, archaeology privileges 
time.  It displays a rigorous concern with periodisation that contrasts with the 
relative indeterminacy of its spatial demarcations.  That is to say, the uncertainty 
of archaeology’s spatial demarcations is in contrast with the care it takes in 
marking off sections of time, periods and ages.  Genealogy, on the other hand, 
recognises that to envisage the analysis of discourses solely in terms of time or 
temporal continuity can lead to the conceptualisation of change as the internal 
transformation of an individual consciousness; metaphorising discursive changes 
in a vocabulary  of time risks falling back on the model of individual 
consciousness with its intrinsic temporality; always present is the temptation of 
totalising, teleological methods with their appeal to individual and collective 
consciousness and to a tangled network of influences.  By  contrast, genealogy 
endeavours to decipher discourse through the use of spatial metaphors: position, 
displacement, site, field, territory, domain, soil, horizon, archipelago, geopolitics, 
region, landscape.  This approach enables it to grasp precisely the points at  which 
discursive practices emerge and develop  in relation to one another (Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge, 69-70).  In genealogy, an institution such as a prison 
constitutes an interplay of architecture and social science that offers insights into 
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broader workings of modern society.  The demonstrative force of this analysis 
depends on the spatial organisation of prison itself.  Genealogy constantly refers 
back to the visual evidence, to the plans, the prospects and the models that make 
up particular discursive practices.  Thus, genealogy’s line of sight is relational, not 
just descriptive; its contours inscribe not just the points and configurations of 
intelligibility  but  also the (normally invisible) relations between bodies and 
practices, and between practices themselves (Flynn, 42).  
Genealogy’s special appeal to space, however, is not made at the expense of 
time.  On the contrary, it implicates time; it  restores to time its dispersive 
character (44).  Space, which in traditional analyses might be treated as fixed or 
immobile, is ‘given’ time, rendered dynamic and volatile.  Space is seen to change 
with time; space is seen to emerge, transform, decay.  Time, meanwhile, is made 
malleable; it is given length and breadth, and stretched over space, a process 
which divests it of any  dialectical spirit  that may previously have been imposed 
upon it (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 70).  Time no longer advances according to 
contradictions or revolutions; time no longer advances at all.  Instead, it  is seen to 
be spread out in all directions to form a field.  Thus, when genealogy speaks of 
space, it  is not being hostile to time; it is not denying history.  Rather, it  is 
advancing a history  of certain practices explained in spatial and temporal terms; a 
history that  is at the same time a structural and synchronic mode of analysis 
(concerned with configurations of practices at particular points in space and time) 
and a causal and diachronic mode of analysis (concerned with the emergence and 
development of practices through space and time) (Gutting, Foucault, 45).
Within this framework of unified time-space, genealogy conceives the 
search for cause in a particular way: not as the isolation and sealing off of ‘origin’ 
but as a necessarily partial and unpredictable search for descent (Foucault, 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 144).  Genealogy has learned from 
archaeology  that a search for a single ‘origin’ can only become an endless quest 
for beginnings; that such a search annuls the originality of historical events; that it 
makes of every  historical moment a homogenous totality  endowed with an ideal 
and unique significance present in each of its manifestations; that it organises 
historical development like a necessary continuity, one in which events are linked 
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together, event engendering event in an uninterrupted flow (Chartier, 170). 
Genealogy’s search for descent does not look to recapture the essence of things in 
this way; it is not a search for the source of a river of events that courses through 
history.  It is neither single-pointed nor unidirectional; it does not move 
backwards on a timeline of established events in order to locate a single point of 
‘origin’.  Instead, it spreads out in multiple directions, combs space-time for the 
scattered and often forgotten antecedents to present discursive practices.
These antecedents look nothing like the ‘origin’ of traditional history; they 
are in fact challenges to this myth.  Whereas traditional explanations of origin 
centre on vague and general ideas of technological and social influence (‘the 
invention of printing’, perhaps, or ‘the rise of the bourgeoisie’), and have 
explanatory  force only to the extent that history is understood to be moving 
towards correspondingly vague and general goals, such as ‘democracy’ and 
‘secularism’, genealogy proposes alternative accounts based on many small and 
specific antecedents (the move from public to private forms of criminal 
punishment, for example, or more efficient ways of organising the space of 
prisons) which operate independently of one another with no overall outcome in 
view (Gutting, Foucault, 46).  Genealogical antecedents are local and contingent; 
they  are accidents, minute deviations, ruptures, divergences, errors, false 
appraisals, and faulty calculations (Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice, 146); they are surprises, agitations and unsteady victories (Davidson, 
‘Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics’, 224); they are chance, passion and petty 
malice; they are the markers of the singularity  of a particular discursive practice, 
its radical contingency; they are the warnings that a particular discursive practice 
could have been otherwise, that its self-evidence, its givenness or naturalness as a 
feature of the world, is an illusion (Baker, 192).  As no person or population is 
responsible for them; as they are not owned by anyone (Foucault, Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, 150), antecedents cannot be decisions, treaties, reigns, 
or battles.  What they can be is something just as material but much harder to 
identify and measure: the reversal of a relationship between bodies, or the 
usurpation of authority, or the appropriation of a vocabulary, or the turning of a 
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vocabulary against  those who once used it, or a feeble domination that poisons 
itself as it grows lax (155).  
It is from such a jumble of accidental or ‘petty’ antecedents—thanks to 
them, against them—that genealogy sees discursive practices forming (146).  By 
measuring the effects of these antecedents as they  are felt by discourse, physical 
bodies and environmental spaces, genealogy can gain a picture of the emergence 
and growth of certain discursive practices.  The task of genealogy is to tell 
antecedents apart, to differentiate the networks to which they belong, and to 
reconstitute the lines along which they are connected.  In this way, genealogy 
distinguishes between antecedents according to amplitude and chronological 
breadth, that is, according to their capacity to produce the effects that make up our 
knowledge of a particular discursive practice (Power/Knowledge, 114).  
There is, however, something lacking in the genealogical field thus far 
described.  Accident alone does not explain how practices that operate among 
disconnected bodies are established; randomness does not show how discourse 
can impact environment; instability  does not demonstrate the ways in which 
theory  can make its mark on what is not theoretical (the non-conscious body, for 
example, the body that grows and breathes without any  conscious help).  What the 
system requires if it ultimately wants to annul the archaeological division between 
‘discursive’ and ‘non-discursive’ domains is some sort of medium through which 
practices can travel and meet; what the system requires is an energy that animates 
discourse, body and environment from the inside and works on them from the 
outside; what the system requires is a practice that  is also a carrier of practice; 
what the system requires is force.
  
 
Genealogy arises from the recognition that a system (a society, for instance) 
without relations can only  ever be an abstraction; to exist (to live socially) is to be 
involved in relations; to relate (with body, with environment, with discourse) is to 
be implicated in an exchange—a play—of energy.  As a result, the genealogical 
field cannot be static like the archaeological one; it must be mobile and shifting; it 
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must be volatile; within it, effects must be produced (The History of Sexuality. 
Volume I: An Introduction, 102).  In other words, the genealogical field must be 
infused with force: force emanating from the bodies, environments and discourses 
within the system; force emanating from boundaries (the walls) surrounding the 
system; a single all-pervading force whose fluctuations produce, carry, bring into 
communication and reproduce practices over space and time.  
Genealogical force does not in itself exist; it has no life or essence of its 
own.  Rather, it is operational; it is the effect  of individual exchanges within the 
system.  That is to say, it is not  an attribute but a relation (Deleuze, 27-8). 
Genealogical force has no other object or subject than force itself; it is an action 
on other actions (Flynn, 35; Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, Progress’, 135).  As such, it 
cannot be reduced to one practice forcibly constraining or modifying another.  It 
greatly exceeds any single violence that might occur between bodies (or between 
bodies and environments, or bodies and discourse).  Violence acts on specified 
bodies, discourses or environments whose form it destroys or changes, whereas 
genealogical force has no object other than that of force, and no being other than 
that of relation.  In genealogy, the force relation means to incite, to induce, to 
seduce, to make easy or difficult, to enlarge or limit, to make more or less 
probable, to make more or less thinkable.  These, rather than to overthrow or to 
repress, are the categories of genealogical force (Deleuze, 70).
Antecedents emerge into the genealogical field as the entry of force. 
Antecedents come from ‘nothing’; they arise as force from (zero) force; they are 
tensions in the field of force that manifest themselves by carrying and sustaining 
force.  The emergence of force is not specifically the push of a strong body or the 
reaction of a weak body  in the field, but precisely the field where the relations of 
forces between such bodies are displayed, superimposed or put face-to-face.  The 
emergence of force is the emergence of the field that force fills as well as force 
itself; it is force and the medium through which this force passes; it the possibility 
of relation and the relation itself (Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 
150).  
Antecedents are the markers of the emergence at  the micro level of relations 
that, far from destroying larger unities in the field, such as historical sequences 
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and economic processes, actually  compose them (Deleuze, 36).  Larger unities are 
engendered by antecedents; that is, they are the product (and the producer) of the 
tiny, random manifestations of force that enter into relations with each other at 
different points and moments in the field.  In genealogy, history thus takes the 
form of a force relation—a micro-physics of force—rather than a relation of 
language or meaning (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 139).  
To this force that pervades the field, genealogy gives the name of power. 
According to genealogy, previous conceptions of power, such as those used by 
traditional history  and Marxist  criticism, take no account of power’s real 
complexity, its real specificity, its real diversity (Power/Knowledge, 188). 
Genealogy undertakes to formulate a fully  complex theory of power, and the first 
action it  takes in this regard is to negate the old idea that  power can be held. 
Whereas in traditional history power is seen to be possessed by different people or 
institutions at different times; and whereas in Marxist criticism power is owned by 
fathers, husbands, employers, teachers, prison guards and other representatives of 
the State, which is itself representative of the interests of a class; in genealogy 
power is not a substance and therefore is not something that is acquired, seized or 
shared; it is not a property, possession, or privilege; it is not something that one 
clings on to or allows to slip  away; it is not built up  out of individual or collective 
wills; it is not derivable from interests (The History of Sexuality.  Volume I: An 
Introduction, 94); rather, it is a non-subjective field of force.  
This is not to say that power is independent or could be made sense of 
outside of historical sequences or economic processes; there is no power that is 
exercised without a series of aims and objectives.  But, for genealogy, this does 
not mean that power results from the choice or decision of a body or group of 
bodies: the aims of power are decipherable, and yet nobody  invented or 
formulated them (94).  The stated aims and objectives of those who claim to wield 
power usually remain distant from the reality  of the workings and configurations 
of power itself.  Individual tactics are drafted for particular needs, but these take 
shape in piecemeal fashion without anyone’s consciously  knowing what they  add 
up to (Hacking, ‘The Archaeology of Foucault’, 35).
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[In genealogy] power relations are both intentional and 
non-subjective…Every disciplinary  act is planned and 
calculated; power is intentional at the tactical level where 
guard confronts prisoner; doctor, patient; lecturer, 
audience.  But the set  of power relations, the strategic 
connections, the deep functionalism of power has no 
subject and is the product of no one’s plan.  (Walzer, 63)
Power in genealogy is not brandished by a body or specific set of bodies against 
others but is a complex form of organisation in which we are all involved (Taylor, 
76).  Aside from the particular conscious purpose which people pursue in their 
given context, there is the configuration of the field itself, and this cannot be 
attributed to anybody as their plan or conscious purpose (85-6).  In genealogy, 
there are bodies and organisations that rule other bodies; there are suppressions 
and repressions that come from authority; there are forms of power that serve 
some classes above all others, but these ruling classes do not know how they do it, 
nor could they do it without the other terms in the power relation—the 
functionaries, the governed, the repressed, the exiled—each willingly or 
unwillingly contributing (Hacking, ‘The Archaeology of Foucault’, 28). 
Thus envisaged, power can neither be located at nor emanating from a 
single point in the field.  Power has no single source or centre.  Quite the 
opposite: it is exercised from innumerable points, in an interplay  of non-
egalitarian and mobile correspondences.  There is no focal point of power, but 
rather an endless network of power relations (Walzer, 55).  What this means is that 
there is no escaping from power; beyond power there is only more power.  Power 
is always already present, constituting the very thing that a body or bodies might 
use to counter it.  Power invests the dominated, passes through them and with the 
help  of them, relying on them just as they, in their struggle against power, rely on 
the hold it exerts on them (Deleuze, 27-8). Which is to say: where there is power, 
there is also resistance, and this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power (Foucault, The History of Sexuality.  Volume I: An Introduction, 
94-96).  Resistance to power does not have to come from outside power to be real, 
nor is it inexorably frustrated through being immanent in power.  On the contrary, 
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it exists all the more by being in the same place as power; like power, resistance is 
multiple and can be integrated in global strategies (Power/Knowledge, 142). 
It would be a mistake, then, to equate this picture of omnipresent  relations 
of power in a system to the idea that power inevitably amounts to absolute rule or 
command.  If this were the case, history  would assume the form of a homogenous 
narrative of perpetual despotism, and genealogical analysis would be unnecessary. 
In fact power implies an imperfect correspondence of force; the manner in which 
force fails to correspond with itself (the manner in which it confronts itself in an 
non-egalitarian relation), and the positive significance that  can attach to such 
discrepancies is what genealogy is interested in locating (Gordon, 247).
The omnipresence of power: not because it has the 
privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible 
unity, but because it  is produced from one moment to the 
next, at  every point, or rather in every  relation from one 
point to another.  Power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it  comes from 
everywhere.  (Foucault, The History of Sexuality.  Volume 
I: An Introduction, 93)
Working on the principle that power comes from everywhere but does not 
affect everything uniformly, genealogy cannot confine itself to analysing the 
governing body in a system.  The schematism genealogy purposely avoids is that 
which consists of locating power solely in the governing body, and thereby 
turning the governing body into the major, privileged and almost  unique 
instrument of the power of one class over another.  For genealogy, power goes 
much further than the governing body; it  passes through more and finer channels; 
it is much more ambiguous.  In genealogy, each individual discourse, body or 
environment has at  its disposal a certain power, and for that reason can also act as 
the vehicle for transmitting a wider power (Power/Knowledge, 72).  Of course, 
genealogy does not regard the power of the governing body as unimportant; it 
does not aim to minimise its effectiveness.  Instead what it means to say is that 
relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily 
extend beyond the limits of the governing body, firstly, because the governing 
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body, regardless of how widely its apparatuses reach, is far from being able to 
occupy  the whole field of actual power relations, and, secondly, because the 
governing body  can only  operate on the basis of other, already  existing power 
relations (122).  In other words, an excessive insistence on an exclusive role 
played by the governing body leads to the risk of overlooking all the mechanisms 
and effects of power that do not pass directly  through the governing body, yet 
often sustain the governing body more effectively than its own institutions (73). 
The sovereignty of the governing body, the form of the law, or the overall unity of 
domination: for genealogy these are only the terminal forms power takes.  Power 
is, in the first instance, the multiplicity  of force relations immanent in the field in 
which they operate and which constitute their own organisation (The History of 
Sexuality.  Volume I: An Introduction, 92).
In contrast to Marxist power, then, genealogical power does not  simply 
mean a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of 
certain bodies in the system.  According to genealogy, it is possible to know with 
reasonable certainty who exploits others, who receives the profits, how these 
funds are reinvested, and which bodies, environments and discourse are involved, 
but, even with this knowledge, it is impossible to claim that power is solely in the 
hands of those who govern (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 213).  Power 
is not a property but a practice.  Power is exercised rather than possessed.  Power 
is not simply what the dominant class has and the oppressed lack; it is not the 
acquired or preserved privilege of the dominant class, but the overall effect of 
relations of discursive and material practices; the dominated are as much a part of 
the network of power relations as the dominating.  Genealogy  does not deny the 
existence of class and class struggle; certainly everybody does not occupy the 
same position; certain positions preponderate and permit an effect of supremacy 
to be produced.  What genealogy does is illustrate class in a different way: power 
is not homogenous, nor is it  substantially identified with an individual who 
exercises it  by right of birth; rather it is defined only  by the particular points 
through which it passes (Deleuze, 25; Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 156).  
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[A]mong all the conditions for avoiding a repetition of the 
Soviet experience and preventing revolutionary process 
from running into the ground, one of the first things that 
has to be understood is that power is not  localised in the 
State apparatus and that nothing in society will be changed 
if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below 
and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more 
minute and everyday level, are not also changed.  (59-60)
In genealogy, then, between every body in a system—between a man and a 
woman, between members of a family, between a teacher and a pupil, between 
each body  who knows and each body who does not—there exist relations of 
power which are not simply a projection of the power of the governing body over 
the individual; they are rather the concrete, changing field in which the governing 
body is grounded; they are the conditions which makes it possible for the 
governing body to function.  That is to say, for the governing body  to work in the 
way it does, there must be much smaller and quite specific relations of domination
—micro-relations—which have their own configuration and relative autonomy 
(Power/Knowledge, 188).  
A functional microanalysis takes whatever is still 
pyramidal in the Marxist image and replaces it with a strict 
immanence where centres of power and disciplinary 
techniques form multiple segments, linked to one another 
with the individuals of a mass traverse or inhabit, body 
and soul (family, school, barracks, factory, if need be 
prison).  The thing called power is characterised by 
immanence of field without transcendent unification, 
continuity of line without global centralisation, and 
contiguity  of parts without distinct totalisation: it  is a 
social space.  (Deleuze, 27)
Genealogy does not believe that  relations of power are only engendered from the 
top downward, nor does it  believe that power is evenly distributed, that there 
exists a sort of democratic or anarchic distribution of power through bodies. 
Instead, genealogy believes that larger strategies of power, such as the governing 
body, encrust themselves and depend for their conditions of exercise at the micro 
level (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 200).  Genealogy rejects the old ‘descending’ 
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analysis of power, which starts from the centre of power and aims at the discovery 
of the extent to which it permeates into the base, the degree to which it reproduces 
itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society.  Rather, it 
conducts an ‘ascending’ analysis, starting from the level of antecedents where 
force relations are enacted by players who do not know what they  are doing—tiny 
local events which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own 
techniques and tactics—and then moving up  to see how these force relations have 
been, and continue to be, invested, colonised, utilised, involved, transformed, 
displaced and extended by ever more general force relations and by forms of 
global domination (99).  
In such an ascending analysis, power is not always suffered, it is sometimes 
enjoyed.  That is to say, power is not taken only  in a pejorative sense.  It is also a 
positive concept, one that functions in the very division of phenomena into 
positive and negative, good and evil (Flynn, 35-6).  Indeed, genealogy  ceases to 
pose the question of power in moral terms, and begins to pose it instead in terms 
of existence; it no longer asks whether power is right or wrong, legitimate or 
illegitimate, but rather asks what do relations of power consist of, how is power 
practised (Davidson, ‘Structures and Strategies of Discourse’, 2).  
Since it incites, induces, seduces; since it passes through every  force 
relation; since it is practised rather than possessed, genealogical power is not 
essentially  repressive (Deleuze, 71).  In defining the effects of power as 
repression, traditional history and Marxist criticism adopt a purely  juridical 
conception of such power; that is to say, they identify power with a law that says 
‘no’; they  understand power above all as carrying the force of a prohibition; they 
see power working only  through the mode of censorship, exclusion and blockage 
(Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 59).  Genealogy believes this to be a narrow 
conception of power.  In genealogy’s view, power would be a fragile thing if its 
only function were to repress; such a power would be poor in resources, 
monotonous in the tactics it uses, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed 
always to repeat itself.  It would be a power that only had the force of the negative 
on its side, the power to say ‘no’.  Having no capacity  to produce, capable only of 
posting limits, it would be nothing more than anti-energy  (59).  It would be 
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incapable of doing anything except render what it  dominates incapable of doing 
anything either, except for what power allows it to do.  It would be a power 
focused on little else than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos; all 
modes of domination, submission and subjugation would be ultimately  reduced to 
an effect of obedience (The History of Sexuality.  Volume I: An Introduction, 85). 
It would be unable to account for why certain bodies in the system are brought to 
obey it.  And it would be unable to offer any picture of progress than one that sees 
bodies overcoming repression (silencing the ‘no’ or indeed turning it to a ‘yes’) 
(Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, Progress’, 137). 
By contrast, what makes genealogical power hold good, what makes it 
strong—the key  to its acceptance by all bodies through which it  passes—is the 
fact that it does not only  weigh down as a prohibitive force, but also traverses and 
produces things.  More than a negative energy whose function is repression, 
genealogical power is a productive network (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 59, 
119).  Not only does power repress bodies; not only does it destroy  environments; 
not only does it prevent discourse, power (re)constitutes these things, and 
conversely they (re)constitute power.  Power subjects bodies; power builds 
environments; power yields discourse; and at the same time bodies, environments 
and discourse carry power.  
The productive power of power shows up in the genealogical field as 
effects.  To incite, provoke and produce constitute ‘active effects,’ while to be 
incited or provoked, to be induced or produce constitute ‘reactive affects’.  The 
latter are not simply repercussions of the former, but can be active resistance.  At 
the same time, each effect has the power to affect and to be affected, such that 
each effect implies power relations.  Every  field distributes power according to 
these relations and their variations (Deleuze, 71).  Thus, genealogy is interested in 
the effects of power that show up in its field; it is interested in power at its 
extremities, in its ultimate destinations in regional and local bodies, discourses, 
institutions and environments; it is interested in locating the point where power 
invests itself, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments 
and eventually even violent means of material intervention (Foucault, Power/
Knowledge, 96).  It studies power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is 
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completely implicated in its real and effective practices; the point where power is 
in direct and immediate relationship with what can only provisionally  be called its 
object (for it  is also its subject); there, in the field of bodies, environments and 
discourses where power installs itself (and is installed) and produces its real 
effects (97).
That power is productive, and that  the effects of its productivity  are 
discernible, is genealogy’s pivotal insight.  As we shall now see, it is what enables 
genealogy to account for relations between body, environment and discourse, and 
thereby to dissolve the division, erected by archaeology, between discursive and 
non-discursive systems.
  
It is genealogy’s view that from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards
—that is, from the Classical episteme to the present—there has been a sustained 
boom in the productivity of power (119).  Not only are the great governing 
apparatuses developed (the army, the police and fiscal administration), but there is 
also established a new ‘economy’ of power: procedures and technologies which 
allow the effects of power to circulate throughout the entire social body.  These 
new techniques are—and remain—much more efficient and much less wasteful 
than those previously  employed.  Pre-Classical (pre-modern) feudal societies 
functioned essentially  through signs and levies.  Signs, rituals and ceremonies of 
loyalty were enacted for feudal lords; levies were paid in the form of taxes, 
pillage, hunting and war.  In the Classical episteme, by contrast, a form of power 
comes into being that begins to exercise itself through social production and 
social service; that is, power becomes a matter of producing service from 
individuals in their concrete lives (125).  This is a power bent on generating force 
in and around bodies, making them grow a certain way, and ordering them rather 
than one dedicated to impeding bodies, making them submit or destroying them. 
It operates less through physical force and representation by law than through 
hegemony of norms, political technologies, and the shaping of the body and mind 
(Best, 49).  It  is what genealogy calls disciplinary power or simply discipline: a 
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mechanism of power possessed of highly specific procedural techniques and 
novel instruments (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 104); a mechanism of power that 
traverses every body, environment and discourse, linking them, prolonging them, 
and making them converge and function in a new way (Deleuze, 26).  
As we have seen, as opposed to the old mode of violent coercion or 
destruction, discipline (re)constitutes.  Its target  for (re)constitution is threefold. 
Firstly, it produces new gestures, actions, habits, and skills, and ultimately new 
kinds of bodies.  Secondly, it distributes the spaces and organises the timing 
within which bodies function; that is, it affects the enclosure, partitioning and 
functional spread of environment in order to direct the physical and mental 
activity of bodies.  Thirdly, it yields new forms of discourse, new ways of 
speaking and thinking, which are themselves carriers of discipline.  Here we shall 
deal with each of these individually—power’s (re)constitution of body, power’s 
(re)constitution of environment and power’s (re)constitution of discourse—but 
only in order to show that, in fact, they cannot be isolated; they  do not operate 
individually; they are interdependent; in terms of discipline, they  are one; together 
they are the subject and object of discipline; they are discipline’s practice.  
To begin, the body.  Genealogy illustrates how discipline (re)constitutes the 
body by  describing how it punishes it.  In this context, genealogy juxtaposes pre-
Classical and modern approaches to punishment, and identifies four principle 
transitions: firstly, punishment is no longer a public display, a spectacular 
demonstration of the sovereign’s might, but rather a discrete application of 
constraints needed to preserve public order; secondly, what is punished is no 
longer the crime but the criminal, the concern of the law being not so much what 
criminals have done as what (environment, heredity, upbringing) has led them to 
do it; thirdly, those who determine the precise nature and duration of punishment 
are no longer the judges who impose penalties in conformity with the law, but the 
experts (psychiatrists, social workers, parole boards) who decide how to 
implement indeterminate judicial sentences; and finally, the avowed purpose of 
punishment is no longer retribution (either to deter others or for the sake of pure 
justice) but the reform and rehabilitation of the criminal (Gutting, Foucault, 80). 
Genealogy thus presents two exemplary  modes of punishment, the first a brutal 
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public event  focussed on the heinousness of the crime itself and aimed at 
retribution and deterrence; the second representing the new, ‘gentler’ way  of 
punishment, the product it would seem, of a more civilised, more ‘humane’ 
approach to it.  But, according to genealogy, this modern, humane punishment is 
not what it seems.  The shift from ‘atrocious’ torture to humane rehabilitation or 
‘correction’ may look like increased humanitarianism and progressive recognition 
of the autonomy of the individual; in reality, however, it is a more finely tuned 
mechanism of control over the body, a more effective spinning of the web of 
power over everyday life.  The real point of the new penal system is not to punish 
less but to punish better; to punish with more universality  and necessity, to insert 
the power to punish more deeply into the body (Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, 
Progress’, 136; Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 82).
The true objective of the [penal] reform movement [in the 
Classical episteme], even in its most general formulations, 
was not so much to establish a new right to punish based 
on more equitable principles, as to set up  a new economy 
of the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, so 
that it should be neither too concentrated at certain 
privileged points, nor too divided between opposing 
authorities; so that  it should be distributed in homogenous 
circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous 
way, down to the finest grain of the social body.  (80) 
 
In this picture, discipline is diffused throughout the genealogical field, colonising 
the bodies contained in it, utilising the bodies’ energy  while inducing obedience 
and conformity (Best, 54).  Discipline’s aim is to make of the bodies in the field a 
collection of disciplined bodies, that is, bodies that  not only  do what discipline 
wants but do it in precisely  the way discipline wants (Gutting, Foucault, 82).  In 
such a disciplinary system, the body enters a machinery of power that explores it, 
breaks it  down and rearranges it; in the process, the body learns to operate as 
discipline wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that discipline 
determines.  In this way, discipline produces subjected and practised entities, 
pliable tools of economic productivity; in this way, discipline produces docile 
bodies (Flynn, 37; Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 138).
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Docile bodies are a useful force because they are both productive bodies and 
subjected bodies.  What is more, docile bodies can be obtained without recourse 
to violence.  Certainly, they can be brought about through subjection to direct 
contact, through a bearing down of physical force; but the process does not 
necessarily involve violent or bloody methods.  The production of docile bodies 
can be a mechanism that is subtle; it  can be calculated, organised, technically 
thought out; it  can dismiss the use of weapons or terror and yet remain of a 
physical order (26).  
Discipline produces docile bodies using several methods that are often 
hidden from view by their very obviousness.  In the first instance, it proceeds 
from the distribution—or the break-up and the rearrangement—of bodies in space. 
To achieve this end, it sometimes requires enclosures, such as schools, workshops, 
offices, factories, barracks, hospitals, or prisons, but the principle of enclosure is 
not indispensable; discipline also works in spaces outside such enclosures, and 
often in a more flexible and detailed way as a result.  That is to say, discipline can 
partition space, create sites of supervision and analysis, erect  walls to break 
communications, but it can also establish the art  of rank, for example, which 
individualises bodies by  a location that does not give them a fixed position, but 
distributes them and circulates them in a network of hierarchical relations 
(141-46).
As well as a mechanism for analysing and distributing bodies in space, 
discipline must be understood as a machinery  for controlling and capitalising 
bodies in time (157).  The timetable, for example, permits discipline to establish 
rhythms, impose particular occupations and regulate cycles of repetition.  Various 
other techniques, from weapon training to penmanship, break down bodily acts 
into their elements: the position of the torso, limbs, articulations is defined; to 
each movement are assigned a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of 
succession is prescribed.  A docile body is the prerequisite of an efficient (time-
saving) gesture; the body must seek to intensify the use of the slightest moment. 
Through discipline, time penetrates the docile body and with it all the meticulous 
controls of discipline itself (149-154).  
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Fig. 3.  Richard W. Bailey.  Nineteenth-Century English. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999) 11. 
Here: a relation, an interdependence.  On one hand, discipline attaches itself 
to the body; it breaks the body down using the rhythms of work, rest, and 
holidays; it inscribes itself in the joints, the nervous system, temperament, the 
digestive apparatus; it  appears in respiration, in movement, in diets (Foucault, 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 147-53).  On the other hand, the body 
attaches itself to discipline; it  relies on it; it obliges it and makes it an obligation; 
it makes it suitable for transmission; it gives discipline its discipline.  In other 
words, bodies are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising discipline; they  are not only its inert or consenting target; they  are 
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always also the elements of its articulation; they are the vehicles of discipline, not 
only its points of application (Power/Knowledge, 98). 
The body, but also everything that the body touches and everything that 
touches it—environment—is the domain of discipline.  The exercise of discipline 
presupposes an environment devoid of public space, an environment in which 
power is hidden but bodies are under constant scrutiny, an environment that 
coerces by means of observation, an environment characterised by hierarchical 
surveillance (Taylor, 74).  To this end, discipline produces an architecture that 
fulfils the functional needs of ordinary people at the same time as it  renders bodies 
visible; that is, it  produces an architecture that acts on those it shelters by  opening 
them to surveillance and thereby to control (Gutting, Foucault, 83). 
Side by side with the major technology of the telescope, 
the lens and the light beam, which were an integral part of 
the new physics and cosmology  [of the Classical 
episteme], there were the minor techniques of multiple and 
intersecting observations, of eyes that must see without 
being seen; using techniques of subjection and methods of 
exploitation, an obscure art of light  and the visible was 
secretly preparing a new knowledge of man (Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, 171).
This modern architecture of discipline finds an almost ideal model in the military 
camp.  The model of the camp, or at least its underlying principle, has for a long 
time been integral to urban development, to the construction of working-class 
housing estates, hospitals, asylums, schools, offices and especially prisons (171). 
This is an architecture that is built not simply  to be seen (as with the ostentation of 
palaces), or to observe the external space (as with the geometry of fortresses), but 
to permit internal control: to render visible those who are inside.  The old schema 
of confinement and enclosure—thick walls, a heavy gate that prevents entering 
and leaving—is thus replaced by a detailed configuration of openings, of filled 
and empty spaces, passages and transparencies (Foucault, Disicpline and Punish, 
172).  No more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locks; all that is needed is 
that separations are clear and openings well arranged (202).  Here, from the 
central watchtower or its equivalent, a single gaze can see everything constantly. 
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A single central vantage point permits the surveillance of all bodies, which 
themselves are incapable of seeing the watcher.  The principle of control is not the 
fact but the possibility of observation.  That is to say, the watcher will actually 
look at a given body  only occasionally, but the body has no way of knowing when 
these occasions may  arise and so must always assume that it is being observed. 
The body is seen, but it  does not see; it is the object of information, never a 
subject in communication (200).  What is induced as a result is a state of 
conscious and permanent  visibility  of bodies that assures the automatic 
functioning of discipline (Gutting, Foucault, 83-84).  In effect, discipline reverses 
the principle of the dungeon; or more specifically, it preserves the enclosing 
function of the dungeon and eliminates its capacity to deprive of light and to hide. 
Full lighting and the eye of the watcher capture better than darkness.  Visibility is 
the trap (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200).
Fig. 4.  Michel Foucault.  Discipline and Punish.  (New 
York: Vintage, 1979) Plate 4. 
  
Discipline-as-environment aims to transform the bodies it contains; it seeks 
to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of 
discipline right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them.  And, 
though it finds its purest  form in the military camp or the prison, it is in fact 
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polyvalent in its applications: it  can serve not only to reform barracks and prisons, 
but also to treat patients, to instruct schoolchildren, to confine the insane, to 
supervise workers, to put beggars and idlers to work.  In short, whenever there is a 
multiplicity of bodies on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be 
imposed, a disciplinary architecture can be used (205).  
And is used.  According to genealogy, the disciplinary techniques 
introduced in prisons and barracks have become the model for other modern sites 
of control, such as schools, hospitals, factories and offices (Gutting, Foucault, 
81).  Discipline has broadened its scope, spread out from body  to body, 
environment to environment; it  has moved from enclosures to increasingly and 
indefinitely more generalised spaces; it  has metastasised to pervade all of society. 
As it  sprawls, discipline does not replace all other modalities of power; rather, it 
infiltrates them, sometimes undermines them, but  in any case serves as an 
intermediary between them, linking them together, extending them and above all 
making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant 
elements (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 216).  And, of course, as is the case 
with power in all its forms, the converse is also true: the mechanism of discipline 
found in a specific enclosed space, such as a prison, represents a continuation and 
intensification of what takes place in more ordinary places.  Outside the prison, 
we all live to a time schedule, get up  to an alarm, work to a rigid routine, live in 
the eye of authority, are periodically  subject  to examination and inspection; this 
generalised system of discipline is what makes our modern model of prison 
thinkable; the prison would not be possible without the norms of discipline 
functioning exterior to it (Walzer, 58).
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Fig 5.  Richard W. Bailey.  Nineteenth-Century English. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999) 60.
Thus, a spreading out of discipline.  And, at  the same time, a seeping in.  A 
percolation.  A leaking through walls.  A sinking into skin and muscle.  A flowing 
through capillaries to the furthest extremities of body.  As much as discipline 
stretches out, it materially  penetrates the body in depth, and it does so without 
depending on the mediation of the body’s own awareness or representations; 
discipline takes hold in the body whether or not it has been interiorised in 
consciousnesses (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 186).  And yet consciousness, 
too, is a defining point of passage for discipline; the mind is principle among 
discipline’s termini; in discourse discipline enters into what is perhaps its clearest
—most real, most material—relation with itself.  
Discipline is, perhaps more than anything else, power of mind over mind. 
When it penetrates the body, it  does so ultimately  to reach something other than 
the body itself; it is to reach our conceptions of ourselves, that is, our ideas of 
‘Man’, ‘Normal Man’, ‘Sane Man’, ‘Essence of Man’, ‘Truth of Man’, 
‘Humanity’.  In other words, discipline’s final interest is in our images of self—
our story of ourselves—which it aims to mould in certain ways.  The spread of 
discipline throughout the social fabric is accompanied by  a corresponding shaping 
of our ideas of ourselves into categories of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘mad’, ‘law-abiding’ and ‘delinquent’, and so on.  Genealogy calls this 
process normalisation, and means by it the imposition of a model of well-ordered 
human activity on all aspects of social life: when we behave in certain ways, even 
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in what we believe to be a climate of relative personal freedom, we are wittingly 
or unwittingly responding to, obeying, conforming to, enduring, resisting 
categories of behaviour established by discipline (Hoy, ‘Introduction’, 13).   
Through discipline, consciousness is instilled with normalising judgement. 
We judge others (and ourselves) not  by the intrinsic rightness and wrongness of 
their (our) words and actions but by where these words and actions place them 
(us) on a ranked scale that compares them (us) to everyone else.  Actions 
conscious and unconscious are referred to a whole—Man, Humanity, Normality—
that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of 
rule to be followed.  We differentiate and are differentiated from one another in 
terms of a minimal threshold: an average to be respected or an optimum towards 
which we must strain.  Our abilities, our levels, our ‘nature’ are measured in 
quantitative terms and hierarchised in terms of value, and, through this value-
giving mechanism, conformity is instilled; the limit that will define difference in 
relation to all other differences is drawn in our minds, the external frontier of the 
abnormal is marked in our consciousnesses (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 
182-83). 
Normalising judgement therefore constitutes a peculiarly pervasive means 
of control: we are brought to believe that for virtually any  level of achievement, 
there is an even higher level possible; we learn to make ‘abnormal’ modes of 
behaviour socially  (humanly) unacceptable, even if they are far from the blatant 
transgressions that  called for violent retribution in older modalities of power.  In 
the disciplinary regime, the threat of being judged abnormal—or its opposite, the 
desire to be judged above or outside the normal—constrains our every thought 
(Gutting, Foucault, 84); meanwhile, from the outside, we subject the slightest 
departures from correct behaviour to examination and punishment (Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, 178).  
When a judgement cannot be framed in terms of good and 
evil, it is stated in terms of normal and abnormal.  And 
when it is necessary to justify this last distinction, it is 
done in terms of what is good or bad for the individual. 
These are expressions that signal the fundamental duality 
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of Western consciousness.  (Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice, 230)
In this sphere of consciousness controlling consciousness, the body serves 
as an instrument or intermediary: when we intervene upon the body  to imprison it, 
rehabilitate it  or to make it work, it is in order to deprive it of an idea: the Liberty 
that we regard as the right  and the property of Man (Discipline and Punish, 11). 
When we deem it necessary to manipulate the body, we do so at a distance, in the 
proper way, according to strict rules, and with a ‘higher’ aim in mind: 
‘humanisation’, ‘normalisation’, the rediscovery of Man in the ‘inhuman’.  
Fig. 6.  Richard W. Bailey.  Nineteenth-Century English. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999) 73.
In other words, our work is carried out for the ‘good’ of that body.  We are not 
interested in inflicting pain (even those bodies we condemn to death are 
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anaesthetised in the last moment, denied the ability to feel the experience of 
death); instead we are interested in acting on the heart, thoughts, the will, the 
inclinations; we, in our guises as warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, 
psychologists, teachers, parents, spouses, are concerned to change bodyless 
reality: consciousness, mind, soul (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 16).
According to genealogy, then, discipline works as a normalising gaze 
(inward and outward) that  establishes over our minds a visibility through which 
we differentiate and judge ourselves and others, with the aim of (re)constituting 
ourselves and others.  Our discourses are thus shown to be produced in the service 
of discipline; our discourses are the vehicle of its expansion, its ever-increasing 
penetration of bodies, minds, institutions, societies.  Our discursive practices do 
not purely and simply produce discourse; they  are embodied in discipline: in the 
technical processes, in the institutions, in the patterns for general behaviour, in 
forms of transmission and diffusion, in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose 
and maintain power (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 200).  Thus 
conceived, our discursive practices go beyond mere linguistic expression; they are 
in fact producers of the conditions in which discipline produces modes of 
consciousness that  thereby  work to produce physical changes in bodies, 
environment and discourse itself.  
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Fig. 7.  Michel Foucault.  Discipline and Punish.  (New 
York: Vintage, 1979) Plate 2.
  
Genealogy is concerned, therefore, not just with the discourses through which we 
know the world, but with the power that constantly  (re)constitutes the discourses 
through which we constantly  (re)constitute the world and its discourses.  In 
genealogy, we are not just discursive constructs; we are also products of 
technologies of power through which—by which, against which—our minds (our 
identity, desires, fears) are shaped and (re)constituted.  In turn, it  is through these 
(re)constituted minds that we look upon ourselves and the world; it is through 
these (re)constiuted minds that we shape how we and our environments actually 
look and interact.
In genealogy, we are not pre-given entities which are seized on by the 
exercise of power.  We are not a collection of elementary atoms which power 
comes to strike, subdue, split or crush.  In fact, we—our stories, identities and 
characteristics—are the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, 
multiplicities, movements, desires (Power/Knowledge, 74).  It  is always already 
one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain 
discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. 
We are not the opponent of power; we are one of its prime effects.  We are an 
effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which we are 
that effect, we are the vehicle of power’s articulation.  We whom power has (re)
constituted are at the same time its carrier (98).  
Thus, in the genealogical scheme, power makes us; it makes us aware of 
what we should not be, and thereby makes us what we think we are (and where, 
and how).  That is to say, power (re)constitutes our knowledge of ourselves and 
our world.  Knowledge implies power, for power is what makes things visible and 
articulable—it is what makes them thinkable—in the first place.  Objective, non-
relativised knowledge is an abstraction, a myth; beliefs are valid only relative to 
power.  Genealogy’s ‘knowledge’ of power, for instance, is itself a form of power. 
Genealogy’s relativist  claims themselves have validity  only relative to the power 
235
that produces them.  But this does not mean that power does not produce genuine 
knowledge.  On the contrary, power only produces genuine knowledge because it 
produces the only  kind of knowledge we can know: that  which is produced by 
power.  The mere fact that a particular cognitive state is an effect  of power does 
not exclude it from the realm of knowledge (Gutting, Foucault, 53); rather it is the 
only realm of knowledge we know.  It is an illusion to imagine that knowledge 
can exist  where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can 
develop outside power’s injunctions, demands and interests.  In fact, knowledge 
and power are integrated with one another; there is no possibility of knowledge 
outside the field of power, nor will there ever be a time when knowledge will 
cease to depend on power.  It is not possible for power to be exercised without 
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power (Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge, 27, 52).
By merging power and knowledge in this way, genealogy annuls the 
archaeological division between the discursive and non-discursive domains 
(between body, action, environment, on the one hand, and mind, texts, 
representations, intellectual constructs, on the other).  When power and 
knowledge are unified, our knowledge of something and nothing, time and space, 
particle and field, matter and force, mind and body, the articulable and the visible, 
the discursive and the non-discursive domains join to become equal effects of 
power: our knowledge of something and our knowledge of nothing, our 
knowledge of discourse and our knowledge of bodily  action, and so on, are 
products of the same relations of power.  It is power-knowledge that joins matter 
and force; it is power-knowledge that joins particle and field; it is power-
knowledge that joins discourse and environment.
This joining of discursive and non-discursive domains has far-reaching 
consequences.  It is, at base, a challenge to the most enduring dualism in science 
and philosophy: that of mind/body, consciousness/world.  If the power that 
animates the non-discursive realm (body, environment, world) is the same power 
that animates our minds (our knowledge of body, environment and world), what 
does this mean for truth?  How can we be sure that our theories are true if truth is 
itself conditioned by  a power that is as much non-discursive (non-conscious) as it 
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is discursive (conscious)?  Can any of our knowledge really be true?  If not, what 
does this mean for our categories of ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’?  And—the question we 
have been building to all this time—what does it mean for the kind of fiction we 
call ‘historical’ (and therefore to some degree ‘factual’)?
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III
Are You Pulling My Tail?
According to Foucauldian theory, then, power produces knowledge, and not 
simply  by encouraging types of knowledge that serve to dominate or by applying 
methods of knowledge that are useful to those in government; at every level in the 
social realm, at every point of contact between bodies and between discourses, 
power and knowledge directly imply one another; there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any  knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations 
(Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27).  Foucauldian theory is not content to say 
that power has a need for a particular discovery, or a particular form or approach 
to knowledge-seeking; rather it insists that knowledge and power are integrated 
with one another; the exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new 
objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information; the exercise of 
power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly 
induces effects of power (Power/Knowledge, 51).  To imagine that there will be a 
time when knowledge will cease to depend on power—to imagine an era of 
‘pure’ or ‘free’ knowledge, to imagine an era of Truth—is fall under the spell of a 
utopian dream.  It  is impossible for power to be exercised without knowledge; 
knowledge always engenders power (52).  Everything we know is a product of 
power, and is therefore the truth (as only we can know it).
We are subjected to the production of truth through power 
and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth…[W]e are forced to produce the truth 
of power that our society demands, of which it has need, 
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in order to function: we must speak the truth; we are 
constrained or condemned to confess or to discover the 
truth.  Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, 
its registration of truth: it  institutionalises, professionalises 
and rewards its pursuit.  In the last analysis, we must 
produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must 
produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place. 
In another sense, we are also subjected to truth in the sense 
in which it is truth that makes the laws, that produces the 
true discourse which, at least partially, decides, transmits, 
and itself extends upon the effects of power.  In the end, 
we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our 
undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living and 
dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the 
bearers of the specific effects of power.  (93-94)
According to this theoretical scheme, everything we think we know about the 
world is an effect of power.  We say something is true not because we have seen to 
its heart or isolated its essence, not because we have extracted some deep a priori 
fact from the world, but because the conditions of power that make possible our 
statement of truth correspond to the effects of power that that statement generates: 
the possibility of a true proposition and the judgement that it  is true conform to 
the same normalising conditions, to the same rules of power-knowledge.  We 
cannot step outside these rules in order to resist them because the rules already 
imply our resistance.  Even to discuss power is to have already entered relations 
of power.
‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered 
procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, 
circulation and operation of statements.  ‘Truth’ is linked 
in a circular relation with systems of power which produce 
and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it.  A ‘regime’ of truth.  (133)
Objections to Foucauldian theory  have tended to focus on this circular 
relation, this apparently inescapable loop.  Here is a vision of power that is itself 
necessarily implicated in its own vision of power; here is a conception of an all-
encompassing, all-inclusive power that reappears as the foundation of its own 
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discourse (Trombadori, 19-20); here is a flowing of power through the whole 
porous network of the social, the mental and the corporeal, a flowing which runs 
directly  into itself (Baudrillard, 9); here is a discourse that is a mirror of the power 
it describes (10); here is an argument about knowledge that claims to be no freer 
from power and thus no truer than any other; here is a thesis that cannot escape its 
own antithesis.  
Looking at this paradox, objectors conclude that Foucauldian theory cannot, 
in fact, be what it  purports to be.  Despite its insistence on an ineludible coil of 
power, the Foucauldian account is not a neutral description that cooly accepts its 
place in the power regime; rather, it is a view of power that  is intended to subvert 
and disrupt the spread of power: it aims to a version of truth about power. 
Objectors say that Foucauldian theory is itself a counterexample to its own 
suggestion that  the entire social body has become disciplined, that  none of us can 
speak anything but the ‘truth’ sanctioned by  the regime.  When Foucauldian 
theory  holds that resistance to discipline can come only from within the 
disciplinary  system, logically it must actually  be referring to marginalised places 
in the system that have not been fully subjected to discipline, places where some 
form of counter-truth can be expressed.  If discipline were really total, if carceral 
techniques and normalising tendencies were indeed infinitesimally ingrained, then 
there would be no grounds for Foucauldian theory; there would be no way that 
anybody, including Foucauldian theorists, could understand they were being 
disciplined in this way (Hoy, ‘Introduction’, 14); there would be no truth that is 
truly opposing or contesting.   
Moreover—the complaints continue—even if we grant that  Foucauldian 
theory  can, against its own rules, consider itself ‘non-disciplined’ and therefore 
the bearer of oppositional truth, it refuses to use this privileged, non-normalised 
position to offer alternatives to the current operations of power; it provides no 
new moral or political standards on which to base a challenge to the spread of 
discipline.  Resistance in Foucauldian theory is presented as simply inevitable, 
that is, as inevitable as the discipline it describes (and implicitly  resists).  In this 
sense, Foucauldian theory  urges resistance—it calls on us to see through the 
progressive and benevolent veneer of our society and thereby to resist the forces 
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of discipline that create the very illusions of progression and benevolence—but it 
offers no account of what would constitute good reasons for resisting nor any 
explanations of how it could be resisted; its own resistance is an unexplained 
given.  
According to its critics, then, Foucauldian theory objects to discipline while 
denying that there can be anything like liberation from it, a space of non-
disciplined truth we can flee to; Foucauldian theory portrays the dangers of 
discipline while insisting that these dangers are always and everywhere met by 
resistance, a meeting of forces that  defines the dangers in the first place.  But is 
this the only way that we can think about power?  Can principles for the criticism 
of power be developed from a standpoint independent of power?  By denying the 
possibility of a standpoint outside power, does Foucauldian theory not doom 
criticism (of power and everything else) to nihilism or indeed fatalism? (Hoy, 
‘Introduction’, 10).  In such a scheme, what consistency do the words ‘struggle’ or 
‘resistance’ really have?  Within such an apparently  predetermined dynamic, what 
can actually  change the terms of a relation of power? (Trombadori, 19).  And—the 
bigger question—why would resistance be preferable to submission?  Why would 
we—why ought we—struggle against discipline if the outcome of our struggle 
can only be to make discipline what it is?  
Critics argue that only by employing normative notions (that is, the kind of 
notions it  is trying to expose) could Foucauldian theory begin to answer these 
questions; only with the introduction of standards of behaviour and essential 
qualities of Man could Foucauldian theory  begin to tell us what is truly wrong 
with the modern power-knowledge regime and why  we ought to oppose it  (Fraser, 
238).  Its refusal of all such norms, standards and essences means that all it  can 
say is that power breeds resistance, and that resistance depends on power.  It 
cannot provide an adequate description of resistance without  the power it resists. 
It cannot specify  the meaning of the terms struggle and opposition in a positive 
way, that is, without the implicit  threat that struggle is capable of reproducing 
domination and repression—an orthodoxy of truth—in a new guise.  
In this way, Foucauldian theory  is accused of a lack of interest in the 
problem of how a properly  dissenting political movement might be developed.  It 
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is charged with ignoring those practical, organised resistance movements which 
actually occur in particular sites of opposition and which are often successful in 
impeding, if not actually  stopping, the progress of tyrannical power (Said, 151). 
Because the emphasis of Foucualdian theory is on the productivity  of power, it 
appears to sit within rather than against power; its concern with domination is 
critical, say the objectors, but  not finally as contestatory  or as oppositional as on 
the surface it seems to be.  Foucauldian theory  aims to reveal power’s injustice 
and cruelty, but by  its own theorisation lets it go on more or less unchecked (152). 
It fails to hypothesise a possible response other than the simple refusal of truth, 
and therefore of any justified (political) action.  If it has a moral, it seems to be 
this: do not bother with politics at all; proceed instead with criticism that is always 
condemned to speak the truth of discipline.  
Paradoxical.  Passive.  Quietist.  Conservative.  Deterministic.  Nihilistic. 
What are we to make of these charges?  Are they fair appraisals?  Do they do 
justice to the claims made by Foucauldian theory  about the power-knowledge 
regime and our capacity to act  within it?  What role does political action actually 
play  in Foucauldian theory?  What freedom for action does it attribute to 
individuals?  And, more fundamentally, who are these individuals, these selves, 
who seem to want freedom from discipline?  If, as we shall see, Foucauldian 
theory  rejects the notion of a stable self as source of power-knowledge, what kind 
of self—if any—does it imagine to be implicated in power relations?  Who is 
speaking and acting?  Who is resisting?
While it would be difficult to deny that  the overriding emphasis of 
Foucauldian theory is on the ways in which individuals are classified, excluded, 
objectified, individualised, disciplined and normalised, it would also be a 
misrepresentation to say that there are not distinctly  Foucauldian strategies for 
resistance and activism (Best, 55).  As we shall see, these strategies are based not 
on an ability to stand outside power but on a specific vision of selfhood in which 
aesthetic values act as bearers of personal and political freedom within the regime 
of power.  The question of how Foucauldian theory comes to depend on 
aesthetics, and on fiction in particular, to advance its mode of personal freedom 
and resistance is where we shall now turn our attention.
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  
To begin, we should try  to get a proper grasp on what kinds of politics, action and 
resistance are actually thinkable in Foucauldian theory.  We should do so not to 
defend Foucauldian theory from the above criticisms—our purpose is not to prove 
that Foucauldian theory is true or truer than any other theory—but to show how 
these criticisms are products of the same epistemological conditions as 
Foucauldian theory and are therefore always already  built into Foucualdian 
theory’s formulations.  
Foucauldian theory anticipates the accusation that  it precludes the 
possibility of organised or generalised political action by arguing that Marxism—
the theoretical terrain from which the majority  of such accusations are launched—
is itself doomed to failure.  For Foucauldian theory, the weakness of Marxism 
stems from its assumption of a knowledge of a true and desirable future state.  The 
Marxist concept of political action leading to liberation or emancipation (first  for 
the masses and subsequently  for everyone) implies the establishment of a new 
world order.  Once the workers have exerted their maximum power, and once their 
necessary  dictatorship  has withered away, then there will be a society free of 
exploitation.  Foucauldian theory argues that this image ignores a simple fact: that 
to imagine a future society  is really to extend our participation in the present one. 
Apparently novel institutions are in fact based on elements taken from (the 
pastness of) present systems.  We cannot escape the conceptual conditions 
underlying our discourses; we cannot envisage a place, a time or a state that is 
totally new (Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 231).  
In line with this, Foucauldian theory  contends that freedom in the absence 
of power does not exist; freedom without power is a mere (Marxist) abstraction. 
Just as it is impossible to conceptualise truth without falsity, it is likewise absurd 
to conceptualise a completely  liberated, undisciplined society: such a society 
would have freedom without a genuine contrast; such a society  would have only 
one view, one colour; ‘freedom’ would be the name given to absolute rule.  For 
this reason, Foucauldian theory does not posit  liberty as the opposite of power, the 
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result of overcoming power.  Instead, liberty is implied within the power relation 
(Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, Progress’, 139).  Freedom does not appear only  when 
relations between forces are suspended.  In fact, relations between forces are 
never suspended.  There is no moment of freedom that does not refer back to a 
kind of power; there is no act of freedom that is not itself an exertion of power.
According to the Foucauldian view, Marxist programmes of revolutionary 
change rest on models that are no less idealist—no less impossible—by virtue of 
their being thinkable.  In Marxism, the notion of ‘the people’ or ‘the workers’ 
apparently  derives from direct observation of poverty and exploitation in factories 
and other workplaces, but it functions in Marxist thought as a transcendental 
signified, a covert reference to a non-existent thing.  The term ‘the workers’ 
cannot really point to the common needs and desires of a precise number of 
human beings without denying the differences among and between them; it is a 
generalisation; it is a form of rhetorical dictatorship.  Marxism gives a global 
explanation to what are in fact local phenomena; in Marxism, the global class 
struggle and its exigencies are used to explain the way people relate and come into 
conflict with each other in much smaller contexts, such as family, workplace and 
professional association (Taylor, 85).  
This is what Foucauldian theory means when its says that the Marxist global 
model leads directly to further oppression (Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 181). 
Marxist revolutions, structured as they are around a central opposition between 
two generalised groups, each possessing pre-given and immediately recognisable 
values, achieve nothing but the restoration of the representative forms of 
centralism and hierarchical structure that they  once claimed to be struggling 
against (Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 212).  Marxist 
revolutions, that is, do not change the power network; they  simply take over the 
existing state apparatus, and then keep it running behind a new screen.  
For this reason, Foucauldian theory questions whether the dialectic can 
actually serve as a rule of action in political struggle.  It argues that, in the pre-
modern world, when power was effectively centralised in a royal court and a few 
related institutions, a dialectical revolution might have been successful, but that in 
the modern age, characterised as it is by diffused micro-centres of power, it is 
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meaningless (Gutting, Foucault, 88).  Knowing this should not lead to reactionary 
despair, however.  Instead, this knowledge should be experienced as a kind of 
liberation: from the assumption that liberation requires global transformation. 
According to Foucauldian theory, the reason for the failure of Marxism, and the 
reason we have not been able to find adequate forms of resistance to replace it, is 
a result of the fact that we continue to conceive of power the Marxist way, as a 
centralised macro-force (Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 213). 
Foucauldian theory is an attempt to think about power in a different way, in terms 
of a logic free of such generalising constraints.  Rather than matching Marxism 
with a global systematic theory which holds everything in place, it  sets out to 
analyse the specificity of mechanisms of power as they occur from point to point, 
and thereby  come up with a truly  accessible way to resist  it (Power/Knowledge, 
143-44).  For Foucauldian theory, resistance is always local because power is 
always exercised locally. 
Are there no great radical ruptures, massive binary 
divisions, then?  Occasionally, yes.  But more often one is 
dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, 
producing cleavages in a society that shift about, 
fracturing unities and effecting regroupings…Just as the 
network of power relations ends by forming a dense web 
that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without 
being exactly localised in them, so too the swarm of points 
of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual 
unities.  And it is doubtless the strategic codification of 
these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, 
somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on 
the institutional integration of power relationships.  (The 
History of Sexuality.  Volume I: An Introduction, 96)
In other words, power builds from the bottom up.  We cannot hope to explain 
power in terms of a top-down war between dominators and dominated.  There 
may indeed be identifiable classes or groups, some of which appear ‘on top’ and 
some of which appear ‘on the bottom’ at a given time, but such divisions can only 
be explained by focusing on the combinations, alignments, mutual effects, 
oppositions and side-effects that local relations of power produce (Taylor, 85). 
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Rarely is a binary between rulers and ruled at  the root of power relations; rarely 
does an all-encompassing opposition serve as a general matrix.  Accordingly, we 
cannot escape from relations of power all at once, globally, massively, by a radical 
rupture or by a flight without return; there is no locus of revolt or source of 
rebellion, no pure law of the revolutionary (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 142). 
On the contrary, power is exercised at innumerable points, in the interplay of 
local, non-egalitarian and mobile relations, such as economic dependencies, 
knowledge relationships and sexual unions.  Power is played out as a plurality of 
autonomous struggles waged at localised points in society: in families, in 
factories, in offices, in prisons, in asylums, in hospitals, in schools.  It is the 
effects of these micro-relations that are felt through the whole social body; it  is the 
relay of effects at the local level that are often mistaken for global movements. 
What this means is that, in the Foucauldian scheme, there can be many 
different kinds of resistance: as many kinds as there are possible power relations. 
Moreover, resistance is actually stronger by virtue of being varied and local. 
Resistance is all the more real and effective because it  is formed right at the point 
where relations of power emerge (142).  Resistance to power does not have to 
come from outside power and therefore has direct access to power; resistance has 
real life by virtue of being in the same place as power.  And, because resistance 
and discipline are locked together in a permanent relation, it is always possible 
that power relations itself will be inverted, however temporarily  (Discipline and 
Punish, 27).  These real, local instances of inversion—these micro-revolutions—
constitute subversive recodifications of the power relation itself.  They can change 
material conditions locally, their effects can be felt at other points of contest, but 
even so, it is conceivable that they  leave untouched larger power relations, such as 
those which form the basis for the state apparatus (Power/Knowledge, 123).  A 
micro-revolution does not necessarily  imply a new control of the state or a new 
functioning of institutions, but, on the other hand, a micro-revolution cannot 
become ‘historical’—it  cannot become generally  recognised and analysed—
except by  the effects that it induces on the larger network in which it is caught up 
(Discipline and Punish, 27).  Larger political movements are, in fact, relays of 
micro-revolutions.
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In this vision of things, every exercise of power is accompanied by or gives 
rise to resistance, every subjugation is resisted as it is experienced.  And what this 
does, in effect, is open a space for action in any context (Flynn, 36).  No 
overarching plan is required to resist; no predetermined theory needs to be 
followed in order to subvert the dynamics of power in which we are implicated at 
every  moment; all that is needed is an understanding of the stakes: what are we 
resisting exactly? what would an inversion of this particular power relation mean 
for us?  In a sense, then, resistance is localised, but in another sense it  is also 
generalised: all of us in our individual contexts are engaged in relations of power 
and resistance; all of us have the leeway, not to evade power completely, but to 
alter (or to leave unaltered) the dynamics of the power relation in which we are 
involved in each moment.  In this way, the division between resistance and non-
resistance, resistors and non-resistors, rebels and non-rebels is exposed as unreal. 
There are no ‘good subjects’ of resistance (Gordon, 257).  We all fight each other 
all the time.  There is always within each of us something that fights something 
else (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 208).  We are all accidental resistors. 
[I]f you ask me, ‘Does this new technology of power 
[discipline] take its historical origin from an identifiable 
individual or group of individuals who decide to 
implement it so as to further their interests or facilitate 
their utilisation of the social body?’ then I would say  ‘No’. 
These tactics were invented and organised from the 
starting points of local conditions and particular needs. 
They  took shape in piecemeal fashion, prior to any  class 
strategy designed to weld them into vast, coherent 
ensembles.  (159)  
Here, there is no escape from power; there is no possibility of a standpoint from 
which we can view or evaluate power’s sum.  We experience power only  in 
diverse and multiple ways at the micro-level when we find ourselves subjected to 
particular exercises of power, or indeed when we ourselves exercise power over 
other bodies and environments (Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, Progress’, 142). 
Neither our comprehension of power nor our attempts to change its dynamics 
depends on grasping its totality.  To understand power, and thereby  to subvert it, 
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we must study  our everyday encounters with power, our particular confrontations 
with and resistances to impositions of power, our own wielding of power against 
others.  Charting these micro-instances of power will reveal more general patterns 
of struggle beyond our immediate context.  Change, however, does not occur by 
transforming the whole at once.  Change occurs only by resisting injustices—or 
imposing justices—at the particular points where they manifest themselves (143). 
Since power is decentred and plural, so must our forms of political struggle be 
multiple and local.  We must break with unifying and totalising strategies, and 
instead cultivate personalised forms of resistance (Best, 57).  When resistance is 
directed against power as it is, then all of us who find intolerable the power as it is 
exercised in our immediate environment, can begin the struggle on our own 
terrain and employ actions that we recognise as our own.  In engaging in a 
struggle that concerns our own individual interests, whose objectives we clearly 
understand and whose methods only we can determine, we enter into a 
revolutionary process (Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 216).
At this point, then, we can identify three distinguishing characteristics of 
political resistance as envisioned by Foucualdian theory.  Firstly, Foucualdian 
resistance is continuous.  Inherent in the Marxist model is the assumption that 
political projects are capable of being finished.  In Marxism, there is a final 
outcome.  When things go wrong, when the revolution fails, it is the prior 
conceptualisation and organisation—the planning—that is blamed.  In 
Foucauldian theory, by contrast, resistance is a constant of life, not just of special 
moments of revolutionary upheaval (Gutting, Foucault, 30).  Power is always 
retreating, reorganising its forces, investing itself elsewhere; we are therefore 
engaged in a perpetual struggle against newly emerging manifestations of power 
(Taylor, 86).
Secondly, power is seen to build from local contexts to larger structures 
without our guiding will.  It performs relays—it proliferates—without any 
conscious plan on our parts.  Larger patterns of resistance emerge from our local 
strategies, but they do not adhere to any preordained programme.
Thirdly—and, as we shall see, most fundamentally—resistance is 
individualised.  It is personal.  Resistance comes in the form of detailed responses 
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formulated by those individuals concretely involved in the problems (Gutting, 
Foucault, 23).  Universal systems of morality  are not valid for judging the right or 
wrong of resistance; there can be no authority  of resistance other than the 
judgement of those of us who are directly experience a situation (31).  We must at 
all times refuse to assume the standpoint  of one speaking in the name of others, no 
matter how oppressed or subjugated we believe them to be (Gordon, 256).  That is 
to say, it is necessary to do away with spokespersons.
I carefully  guard against  making the law.  Rather, I 
concern myself with determining problems, unleashing 
them, revealing them within the framework of such 
complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and 
legislators: all those who speak for others and above 
others.  It is at that moment that the complexity  of the 
problem will be able to appear in its connection with 
people’s lives; and consequently, the legitimacy of a 
common enterprise will be able to appear through concrete 
questions, difficult cases, revolutionary movements, 
reflections and evidence.  (Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 
159)
In this context, the contribution of those of us who are not  directly involved in a 
particular struggle can only extend to creating the conditions in which those of us 
who are directly involved can speak; the contribution of outsiders must always 
give way to the reflection and decisions of the resistors ourselves (Gordon, 258). 
Those of us who act and struggle must no longer be represented by others who 
stand as our conscience.  By our local action we represent ourselves.
Good.
But here is the problem: Foucauldian theory also shows itself to be highly 
sceptical about the existence of a stable representing self: an ‘I’ that can represent 
the world (and its power relations) in an authentic or truthful way to him or 
herself.  For Foucauldian theory, the weakness of Marxism stems from its 
assumption of a knowledge of a natural, essential human state (Hacking, ‘Self-
Improvement’, 239).  The Marxist concept of political action leading to liberation 
implies an inherent human essence waiting to be freed from the shackles of a 
repressive power.  After the revolution, in a society  of freely associating 
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individuals, we will all be living according to our nature.  Without the forces of 
exploitation bearing down upon us and conditioning our needs and desires, we 
will have direct access to the self and what it really  wants and needs.  In the 
Marxist future, we will have self-knowledge.  Foucauldian theory rejects this 
notion of an essential nature within us—a unified self—that must overcome 
power if it  wants to come to full and true expression (Taylor, 77); it  breaks with 
the Marxist conception of selfhood as a constant to be revealed. 
Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the 
same: leave that to our bureaucrats and our police to see 
that our papers are in order.  (Foucault, The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, 17)
Indeed, in the Foucauldian scheme, it is our very  acceptance of the notion that we 
have a self that makes us an object of control.  Once we believe we have a self, it 
becomes our obligation to find it, and finding it requires a vocabulary with which 
to describe it, and part of finding such a vocabulary is to enlist the help of experts 
(teachers, politicians, doctors, psychologists and so on), and part of putting 
ourselves in the hands of experts is the requirement that we go on trying to 
describe ourselves, what it  feels like to have our own particular self, and this 
plunges us deep  into the disciplinary system.  For Foucauldian theory, the idea of 
self is nothing more than a stratagem of power.  It helps the cause of discipline by 
presenting us as enigmas who need external help to resolve ourselves (Taylor, 78). 
The disciplinary programme of self-knowledge, embraced as a vehicle for 
discovering one’s uniqueness, merely re-enacts power-knowledge relations.  The 
quest for freedom is channelled into a series of illusory liberations from 
repression (Bernauer, 158).  We may think we are liberating ourselves when we 
declare our ‘true’ selves in the face of power, but in fact we are still being 
dominated by certain disciplinary images of what  it  is to be a free and fulfilled 
being (rich, thin, tanned, calm, rational, mobile and so on).  Far from escaping 
power, we are assuming the shape it has moulded for us (Taylor, 79). 
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of 
elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert 
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material on which power comes to fasten or against which 
it happens to strike, and in doing so subdues or crushes 
individuals.  In fact, it is already one of the prime effects 
of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain 
discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and 
constituted as individuals.  The individual, that is, is not 
the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime 
effects.  (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 98)
  
Power does not attach itself to a nodal self; rather, power feeds into the modes of 
behaviour that we call the self (The History of Sexuality.  Volume I: An 
Introduction, 11).  There is no human nature.  There is no objective self that has 
been or could be described by our theories.  There is, instead, a construction, one 
continually  being redesigned in an ongoing discourse generated by  the 
imperatives of discipline.  The self is no more than a jumble of theories about its 
own nature, theories through which power is defined and extended.  
In this vision, the knowledge that is supposed to liberate us—the knowledge 
of our selves—appears as the primary instrument of our domination (Gutting, 
Foucault, 76).  Discoveries about our own nature are actually just new social 
norms for behaviour (94).  Our acceptance of the demands for liberation is no 
more an expression of our ‘true’ nature as, say, the demands for a traditional 
morality  (98).  Through the workings of discipline, increasingly nuanced 
classifications of the types and limits of normal behaviour take shape, which leads 
to a generalised, public definition of the normal mind, the normal body, the 
natural state of the self.  It  is according to (or against) this standard that  our selves 
are formed (Hutton, 126).  Discipline is the public expression of our essential 
activity as human beings: the construction of modes of discourse and of action 
through which we shape our conception of self.  The self is the words and the 
deeds that we define ourselves by.  The self is not a hidden reality to be 
discovered (through self-analysis or other means) but the aggregate of the forms 
we have chosen to provide public definitions of who we are; it is an expression, 
an externalisation of the norms we have spent our lives internalising (127). 
The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, 
or precisely to the extent to which it is that  effect, it is the 
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element of its articulation.  The individual which power 
has constituted is at  the same time its vehicle.  (Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge, 98)
External authority  shapes the structures of minds, which is subsequently 
externalised in our repeated avowals of normalised selfhood.  In this way, we 
participate in the policing of ourselves and others; we act  as forces of discipline; 
we create forms which imprison our own freedom and creativity (Hutton, 137); 
we become victims of our own ‘self-knowledge’ (Bernauer, 159).  We are the 
objects and the instruments of the exercise of discipline.  Discipline leads us to 
focus our attention on our selves.  It places the self in front of the self: the self is 
the watcher and the watched, the potential liberator and the potentially liberated 
(if only  ‘we’ could understand our ‘selves’ better).  The self (the knowledge that 
may be gained of the self) is an effect of the productive power of power (194). 
The self is an illusion that power relies on to guarantee its own penetration and 
dispersion.
But if this is the case, if the self is really  an illusion of power, who are these 
individuals, these selves, that Foucauldian theory  calls on to speak and act for 
themselves?  If there is no self that is not an effect of power, who does 
Foucauldian theory  expect to speak or act?  If there is no self to do the resisting, 
who (if not merely  power itself) is resisting?  At first glance, this appears to be an 
untenable contradiction: Foucauldian theory seems to allow some sense of self 
when it speaks of local resistance but then disallows all appeals to a priori self 
when it speaks of power as the producer of selves; it presents a picture of willed 
personal action that is, at the same time, deeply  sceptical of the existence of a self 
from which such action can be willed.  For the sake of coherence, should 
Foucauldian theory not take a clearer stand?  Should it not come down on one side 
or the other, either as a believer in the self or as a negator of it?  Perhaps.  But the 
fact is that Foucauldian theory’s apparently paradoxical view of the self is entirely 
coherent with present conditions of knowledge about the self.  Foucault’s 
disappearing and reappearing self is made thinkable by a epistemological field 
whose very configuration presupposes such a self/no-self paradox.  Which is to 
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say: today it is impossible to think about the self without encountering, and 
probably at some point sustaining, this paradox.  
  
At core, the question of the existence or non-existence of the self is a question 
about our experience of time and space; it is a question about consciousness. 
Today, when we wonder about the self, we are actually  wondering whether it is 
possible to define consciousness, whether it is possible to articulate what it is like 
to be us (Nagel, 436).  Implicit in any such inquiry  is a conceptual division 
between the inner and the outer, the subjective and the objective.  On the one 
hand, there are our own experiences, which seem to be real and undeniable.  Our 
experiences make up the world we live in; we cannot have any experiences but 
our own; they are all we have.  On the other hand, there appears to be a physical 
world that gives rise to these experiences.  We may  have doubts about what the 
world is made of, what its essential nature is, but we accept that  it exists apart 
from us (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 256-59).  The cause of this experience 
of separation is our intuition that, because our consciousness and the world seem 
so different, they  must be different: out there, there are physical things that we can 
measure and agree upon, while in here there are experiences that  escape objective 
evaluation.  This division of the inner and the outer, consciousness and the world, 
is fundamental to our present thinking about the self, even though most 
contemporary  philosophers and scientists reject such a separation as illusory  (Loc. 
780-81).  As we shall see, it is difficult to reject the inner/outer dualism without 
falling back on it as a useful fiction.
To accept the inner/outer dualism is to believe that there are two different 
realms or worlds: one of consciousness, which is non-physical and non-extended, 
and another of the physical world, which is made of extended substance.  The 
question such a belief raises is: how do the two realms relate?  How can 
immaterial consciousness be related to material objects in space?  For dualism to 
make sense the interaction has to work in both directions: physical events in the 
world must somehow give rise to non-physical experiences of that world.  In the 
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other direction, our mental life, our thoughts and our feelings, must be able to 
influence the physical world (Loc. 415-18).  But how and where and when does 
this interaction take place?  
Our brain consists of over a billion neurons, with many billions of 
interconnections among them (Loc. 440-43).  When we are dualists, we believe 
that out of these connections a separate consciousness is born, one which then 
loops back to influence the brain itself.  We find it relatively easy  to argue for a 
relationship  between separate consciousness and the brain because changes in the 
brain cause changes in consciousness, and vice versa.  We find it much more 
difficult, however, to describe the precise nature of this relationship  (when it takes 
place, where it takes place, how it takes place and why it takes place).   Even with 
all our current understanding of brain function, we cannot understand how 
subjective experience arises from an objective world of living brain cells.  We 
accept that, in order to affect brain cells, consciousness must be using some kind 
of energy  or matter, but we cannot conceive of consciousness itself as having 
physical as well as mental properties.  As a result, we simply have to believe in 
separate worlds of subjective experiences and objective substance; we have to 
believe that these two realms, though related in some way, are fundamentally  and 
permanently divided (Metzinger, ‘I Am the Content of a Transparent Self Model’, 
149).  
Thus, as dualists, we believe consciousness to be something extra to matter, 
a presence that hovers over brain processes, an ingredient that we have in addition 
to our physical abilities.  We believe that even if we knew everything there is to 
know about our body and its functions, our understanding would not be complete, 
there would be something left out, and that something would be consciousness 
itself.  In our dualist opinion, to explain the nature of physical functions is not to 
answer the question of why the performance of these functions is accompanied by 
experience; to explain the nature of the body  is to ignore the possibility that we 
could have evolved into beings that process information without any inner 
experience or feeling at all (Chalmers, ‘The Puzzle of Conscious Experience’, 63). 
Given that consciousness is, in the dualist scheme, an added ingredient to 
biological activity, and that it is possible within this scheme to imagine that we 
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could have evolved without it, the question we dualists must ask is why we have it 
(what advantages does it give us?) and at  what point did it appear (when did non-
conscious matter become conscious?) (Blackmore, ‘Introduction’, 7).  Our debates 
about why we have consciousness usually focus on its evolutionary  benefits. 
Gaining consciousness, we argue, has helped us to avoid seasonal predators, to 
acquire mates, to gain charge of animals for farming and so on (Gazzaniga, Loc. 
521).  In terms of when consciousness appeared, we have a number of options to 
choose from, but most are based on the idea that the universe developed from a 
totally  insensate mass, and then at some point consciousness lit  up; that  is, when 
biological organisms evolved to a certain state, when their brains attained a 
particular level of complexity, consciousness suddenly  switched on.  Of course, 
none of this actually  explains how consciousness and matter might interact.  We 
establish dualism as a means of answering the question of consciousness—what is 
it like to be us?—but in fact  all we are doing is formulating the question a 
particular way: here is consciousness, there is matter, how do we connect the two?  
Given that neither science nor philosophy has yet managed to come up  with 
a set of fundamental laws to govern such a connection (Chalmers, ‘I’m 
Conscious’, 42), it is possible to deny  that there is a dualism at all, and to argue 
instead that the world we move in and our experience of that world are one, that 
consciousness is intrinsic to matter and entirely inseparable from it.  When we 
adopt this view, we stop being dualists and become monists.  Monism is helpful 
because it has no use for the question of why consciousness evolved.  According 
to monism, any  creature that has come to have intelligence, perception, memory 
and emotions will necessarily be conscious as well.  Indeed, in monism, there is 
no sense in talking about consciousness at all, for there is nothing extra that exists 
apart from physical functions: brain processes and bodily functions are 
consciousness.  There is no longer a deep mystery of consciousness to solve. 
Rather, our task as monists is to explain why there seems to be such a mystery; 
why we seem to be having ineffable, non-material, conscious experiences 
(Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 337-47).
In approaching this task, however, our options are limited and as 
problematic as those that face the dualists.  For one, we could choose to make 
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consciousness fundamental (Chalmers, ‘I’m Conscious’, 42).  We could doubt that 
real things actually  exist out there and decide that only  ideas or perceptions of 
things exist for us.  This does away with dualism, but at the same time it makes it 
very hard to understand why and how there appears to be a physical world, why 
this physical world seems to have consistent, enduring qualities that we can agree 
upon, or indeed how science and philosophy are possible at all (Blackmore, 
Consciousness, Loc. 348-51).  Another option is to take matter as fundamental. 
We could contend that there is only matter, and that the physical universe is 
causally closed.  In other words, we could argue that  interactions between matter 
and energy exhaust all the forces of the universe, so there is no room for a non-
material force such as consciousness to intervene.  In such a view, mental states 
would be identical with physical states; there would be consciousness apart from 
or outside of matter (Loc. 352-56).  Consciousness would simply  be a 
fundamental function of the brain (Koch, 133).  Experiences would simply be 
what brains do (Blackmore, ‘Introduction’, 4).   At some point, however, we 
would have to face the problem of accounting for these experiences 
(Consciousness, Loc. 276-81).  It is not enough to talk about perception, memory 
or intelligence as purely physical processes and then claim to have explained 
consciousness.  If we are really  talking about consciousness, then we must deal in 
some manner with subjectivity; if we claim that consciousness is identical with 
physical processes, we must explain why non-physical consciousness appears so 
strongly to exist  (Loc. 324-28).  How can thoughts and feelings and mental 
images be matter when they seem to be so different from matter?  It seems that by 
claiming consciousness is physical, we are taking away the very phenomenon—
subjective experience—that we are trying to explain; we are making it  difficult to 
talk about consciousness in a way  that does justice to the way  it  feels (Loc. 
359-63).   
A final option would be to reject dualism by claiming that the world is all 
made of one kind of stuff, a stuff that cannot be classified as either mental or 
physical (Loc. 375-76).  This would involve imagining a kind of simple and 
undifferentiated consciousness found throughout the world, a basic field of 
consciousness that sometimes comes together into unified, coherent objects that 
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we think of as selves (Chalmers, ‘I’m Conscious’, 44).  In this context, we could 
attribute a degree of consciousness proportional to the size and complexity  of the 
brain under consideration (Greenfield, 97), though there would be nothing 
stopping us from asserting that all material things—creatures with brains but also 
water, stones, electrons and so on—have awareness, however primitive 
(Chalmers, ‘I’m Conscious’, 43).  This would raise difficult questions, of course. 
Is a stone aware?  If so, is each of its molecules also separately aware?  What 
would it  mean for something as simple as an electron to have consciousness? 
What would it be like to be an electron? (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 
383-85).  Presumably, only an electron can know.
At this point, what is interesting to note is how quickly our monist 
consideration of the question what is it like to be us? has led us to the question 
what is it like to be something else?  Clearly, we need to be careful.  Wondering 
what it is like to be someone or something else—an electron, a mountain, a tree, 
an animal, another person—implies that we have definite knowledge of what it  is 
like to be us; it implies that we have a conclusive definition of our own 
consciousness against which we can contrast  other possible forms of 
consciousness; it implies that the problems begin only  when we start asking about 
what it is like to be an entity other than ourselves (Loc. 675-78).  But is this really 
the case?  Is accessing our own conscious experience really  a simple task?  What 
does it actually  mean to look into our own experience and answer the question 
what is it like to be us?  How can we look?  Who is looking?  What are we 
looking for?  Is it possible to describe more than a tiny  fraction of our lived 
experience?  Does the process of trying to capture our experiences not also 
destroy them? (Loc. 670-71).   When we catch ourselves in the middle of a train 
of thought, are we conscious then?  Were we conscious at all before?  Or are these 
just different levels or manifestations of the same overall consciousness? 
This question of which experiences our consciousness has access to calls 
attention to a fundamental presumption in our current thinking: that  there are 
contents of consciousness, that we have access to these contents at  all times, and 
that these contents shape our actions.  If it is true, however, that our consciousness 
contains things, then it seems unable to contain very much: most of what goes on 
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in our brains seems to be outside of consciousness; indeed much of it is 
inaccessible to it.  For example, we have no conscious access to the pH in our 
enteric nervous system (our stomachs) or to the state of our immune systems, 
despite the fact that both systems contain millions of neurons (Koch, 132). 
Likewise, we see our hands performing tasks, but we are not conscious of all the 
rapid brain activity  that precedes that perception.  We work at our computers but 
are unconscious of how we type the words or where the words are coming from. 
We are not  even aware of how our brains construct our sentences; we are only 
aware (and then vaguely) of the ideas we are trying to express and the words that 
emerge (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 461-65).  In all of these cases every one 
of our brain’s cells, with their billions of connections, are active; some respond or 
‘fire’ faster and some slower, depending on what we are doing, yet most of this 
activity never makes it into our consciousness (Loc. 466-69).  
This suggests that there must be an underlying difference in the brain 
between conscious and unconscious processes.  But what could this mean?  Most 
often it  is taken to mean that some brain cells, brain areas or types of brain 
activity create or generate conscious experiences while the rest do not.  But this 
throws us right  back into the dualist problem, for if we accept the difference 
between conscious and unconscious brain functions then we not  only  have to 
explain what it means for a physical brain to ‘create’ or ‘generate’ an extra 
ingredient called consciousness, we also have to describe the relationship between 
the brain activity that generates consciousness and that which does not 
(‘Introduction’, 5).  Moreover, we have to account for unconscious perception 
(intuitive, emotional or subliminal awareness); we have to study  the ways in 
which we are affected by countless unnoticed events going on around us, and at 
some point we have to distinguish between information that  we process 
consciously  and that which we process without knowing it (Consciousness, Loc. 
910-15).  And where would we drawn the line?
For the fact is that what we normally call conscious experience is not 
always as conscious as we presume it to be.  Our consciousness of, say, our visual 
surroundings is far more sparse than we intuitively believe (Ambinder, 48).  When 
we look around we do not, and cannot, take in everything at once, even though we 
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are unaware of any gaps.  Somehow the brain fills in the missing pieces, and as a 
result, we imagine that somewhere inside our head or mind there is a complete 
picture: everything we are perceiving now is entering us and forming contents in 
our consciousness (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 923-26).   We imagine that 
experiences flow through our conscious mind as a stream of contents.  The stream 
may break, change direction or be disrupted, but it remains a series of conscious 
events, always available to us.  All we have to do is focus on an element in the 
stream—a particular piece of content—and then we know what we are conscious 
of in a particular moment.  In other words, we ask ourselves the question, What 
we conscious of now?, and we get an answer because some of our thoughts and 
perceptions are in the conscious stream while the rest are not.  For this reason, we 
leap to the conclusion that we are always conscious, that at every waking moment 
in our lives we must be conscious of something or other.  
But what is happening when we are not asking ourselves the question, What 
are we conscious of now?  The fact is we cannot know if we are conscious when 
we are not asking ourselves if we are conscious or not.  Whenever we ask the 
question we get a definite answer, but we cannot know about those times when we 
are not asking the question (Loc. 1885-95).  For instance, when we are driving a 
car, singing along to the music on the radio and thinking about what happened 
yesterday or about what might happen tomorrow, are we conscious of the road, of 
our feet as they press on the peddles, of our hand as it shifts the gear-stick?  When 
we are not asking the consciousness any  questions, it seems there are no contents 
of consciousness; it seems when we are not paying attention to something, we are 
not consciously  perceiving it (Mack, 180).  Instead, the brain carries on, doing 
multiple things in parallel, and none of them seems either to be in consciousness 
or out of it (Blackmore, ‘There Is No Stream of Consciousness,’ 26).
Experiments show that even though we have the impression of looking at a 
rich visual world, enormous changes can be made in that world without us really 
noticing them  (O’Regan, 165).  This casts doubt on the idea that our senses build 
up detailed inner representations of the world that can then be used to compare 
one moment of our experience to the next.  Indeed, it might even be the case that 
consciousness is not  about representation at all; it might be that the information 
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we need is actually stored outside of consciousness (in the brain or in the world), 
and that the actual experiences that we have really derive from the activity that we 
are involved in (166).  In this view, our internal knowledge about what we are 
looking at is nil, or rather, it  is limited to a simple semantic description.  When we 
have our eyes open this description is enriched by visual material, and we have 
the feeling that it is real.  If there is a part of the visual scene about which we want 
to have more information—say, for example, the route of a particular line on the 
palm of our hand—all we need to do is look at our hand, direct our attention to 
specific area of it, and that information will become conscious.  In this picture, 
consciousness is not made up  of contents; consciousness does not constitute a full 
and constant stream that  runs through us.  Rather, we have to inquire into the 
world to have consciousness of it; we have to wonder about the route of the line 
on the palm of our hand before that information becomes relevant to us; 
otherwise, it  is simply not there.  We are not conscious of anything other than 
what we are interrogating ourselves about.  There is no consciousness other than 
that which corresponds to our inquiry into some aspect of our environment.  What 
remains after we remove our attention from a scene is merely  a semantic 
description of that scene, which is essentially non-visual (168).
Thus, though we might be seen by others to be gazing at  our hand, we may 
not actually  be conscious of our hand; our consciousness may be focused on other 
things.  More than that, we do not even know it is a hand until we become 
conscious of it, or ‘name’ it.  In the moment of naming it, our hand gains 
existence.  When we move our attention away from the hand, it ceases to exist 
except as a memory, which, as information, is fundamentally different to our 
vision of it.  By  extension, we could say that there is no world until we focus on 
its parts and name them, and that in focusing and naming in this way, we create 
the world, and in creating it, we divide it and separate it from us.  We could say 
that, until the moment of conscious naming, we are neither consciousness or 
unconscious of the world but are the world itself, we are the world being the 
world.  
We will return to this conception of non-separation in a moment.  Before 
that, it is important that we challenge a series of further notions upon which the 
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conscious/unconscious dualism rests.  The first of these is that we need 
consciousness for performing actions.  As we have seen, a natural way of thinking 
about consciousness is to imagine that information streams in through the senses 
and is processed as contents, which leads to our consciously perceiving a world 
which we can then act upon.  In other words, it  is natural for us to assume that we 
consciously  perceive something before we act upon it.  It turns out, however, that 
the brain is not organised in this way, and we could probably not survive if it were 
(Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 600-9).  Experiments show that the brain can 
bring about action without the need for the extra force of consciousness.  We see, 
hear, breathe, control movements and perform countless other actions without any 
help  from consciousness.  We can jump out of the way of an obstacle long before 
our consciousness has recognised the obstacle; indeed, in terms of survival, it is 
not necessary that it does recognise it, ever.  There is not even any proof that 
aesthetic appreciation, creativity or falling in love are done by  consciousness; it is 
equally conceivable that they simply constitute the workings of our brain (Loc. 
382-87).  
This leads us back to a problem we have already discussed: time.  We do not 
always experience things, or report their occurrence, in the order in which they 
actually happen in the world.  What is more, it takes time—about fifty 
milliseconds—to transmit information from the retina to the brain's visual areas. 
What this means is that conscious events are at least half a second old.  An object 
we observe may well have changed its position, shape, colour or place between an 
initial glance and a second registration of it  (Libet, Mind Time, 58-59).  It might 
be tempting to think about this delay in consciousness as something like this: a 
stimulus, such as a pinch on the arm, causes signals to pass through the body into 
the brain, where the information is processed in the relevant areas until it finally 
arrives in consciousness as the feeling of the pinch.  In this view, we see two 
different kinds of phenomenon at work, each with their own timing.  Firstly, there 
are objective events with physical times that can be measured with instruments, 
such as the time of the pinch or the time at which a certain brain cell fires. 
Secondly, there are subjective experiences with their own times, such as the time 
at which the experience of the pinch happens, or when the pinch comes into 
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consciousness.  But this way of thinking about the delay in consciousness leads us 
into trouble.  It forces us to isolate a place in the brain where physical events 
correspond to mental ones, or a time at which unconscious processes turn into 
conscious ones.  Thinking this way, we are accepting that conscious experiences 
are something other than brain events, which brings us right back to the dualist 
problem (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 675-85).  A different  way to think 
about the delay in consciousness is to question the assumption that  conscious 
experiences are events that happen at particular times, that is, to challenge the 
notion that conscious experiences can be timed at all.  If we drop the assumption 
that there is one real time at which things happen in the brain and another real 
time at which they enter consciousness, we can imagine, for example, different 
streams of neural activity  that  can potentially elicit  various responses, none of 
which is ever either in or out of consciousness (Dennett, Consciousness 
Explained, 134).  We can envisage, between the poles of brain activity and action, 
multiple parallel streams of processing, and no moment at which incoming 
information turns into outgoing decisions, that is, no measurable instant when 
consciousness happens (109).
The further we go with our monist challenge, the nearer we come to the 
awkward notion that consciousness is powerless, that it  does not have a function, 
that it is useful for nothing (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 382-87).  That is to 
say, the more we push our monist project, the closer we come to denying the 
existence of conscious will.  We begin to wonder whether consciousness has 
anything at all to do with our actions, or even the decisions for our actions.  When 
we raise our arm to look at our hand, who or what made the decision to do so, and 
who or what initiated the action?  We know that the brain is involved.  When 
making such a volitional act, neural activity flows through the brain.  But 
experiments show that this flow begins over one-third of a second before we have 
the conscious desire to act.  In other words, a lot of neural processing takes place 
before we consciously  decide to raise our arm (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 
1340-42).  We have no idea when and where consciousness might intervene in the 
process (Loc. 1287-89). 
262
Free will in the metaphysical sense really  implies that 
there is action without any  physical precedents. Now as 
scientists, or even as any thinking person, we know that 
cannot be the case. There always have to be physical 
precedents.  (Koch, 131)
From this, it is possible to conclude that to believe consciousness causes our 
actions is to invest in a delusion.  This delusion comes about in three stages: 
firstly, unbeknownst to us, our brain receives information, on the basis of which it 
begins to plan for an action; secondly, although we are ignorant of the underlying 
mechanisms, we become aware of thinking about the action and call this an 
intention; and finally, the action occurs and we jump to the conclusion that our 
conscious thoughts caused it (Wegner, ‘Don’t Think About a White Bear’, 251). 
This is what we might call the ‘trick’ of consciousness: the ability  to interpret 
conscious thought as the cause of action, even though the action happens before 
the thought (‘The Mind’s Best  Trick’, 65).  Realising that this is a trick brings us 
face-to-face with the possibility that our tendency  to feel like a conscious agent 
comes at a cost of being technically wrong all the time (The Illusion of Conscious 
Will, 342).  
If we accept that free will is a trick of the mind, what should we make of our 
actions?  To what extent are we responsible for them?  (Blackmore, 
Consciousness, Loc. 1481-82).  At one extreme, we could conclude that we might 
as well give in to the unconscious forces—the power—beyond our control.  But 
what would this ‘giving in’ look like?  How would it be lived?  Lying on the floor 
all day, for instance, would not really  giving be in; in fact, it would be an action, 
one very difficult  to execute and with far-reaching consequences for your body, 
your environment and those around you.  At the other extreme, we might argue 
that although consciousness cannot initiate an action, it  can act to prevent it.  In 
other words, although we do not have free will, we do have ‘free won’t’ (Libet, 
‘Unconscious Cerebral Initiative’, 536-37).  This has important implications for 
our ideas of action and power.  It suggests that, although we cannot consciously 
control our desires and impulses—although forces shape our desires and impulses 
before we become conscious of them—we can, in fact, consciously prevent  them 
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from being acted out.  That is, we have the power to consciously resist what we 
cannot consciously  generate or initiate.  But does this not get us caught in an 
another impossible spiral?  Presumably, resistance to action is also an action, and 
therefore must itself be initiated before we are conscious of it.   There is nothing 
to say  that a battle between impulses and resistance to those impulses is not, at 
base, a battle between two unconscious forces.  And anyway: who really owns this 
conscious veto?  To what degree can we say  that conscious resistance is ours 
while unconscious impulse is out of our control?
It is becoming clear that how we think about conscious free will depends on 
how we think about the self.  It is common sense to think that we have a self.  As 
the focus of our consciousness is fixed by our questions, as we make judgements, 
as we speak about what we are doing or what we have experienced, we have the 
real and powerful feeling that there is someone speaking, judging, experiencing 
(Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 410).  We do not feel like a body or a brain. 
Rather, we feel like someone who owns a body and a brain.  We feel as though we
—our selves—are somewhere inside our head looking out, asking these questions, 
making these judgements (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 1065-67).  When we 
raise our arm to look at our hand, it seems to us that there must be someone 
having this ‘hand experience’; it seems that there cannot be this hand experience 
without us, the experiencer.  At the centre of any scene we are aware of at a given 
time, there seems to be us, and this inner identity seems to have unity and to be 
continuous from one moment to the next (Loc. 2399-2404).  We are the subject of 
our experiences; we are the inner agent who carries out actions and makes 
decisions (or at least  resists our impulses); we are our unique personality; we are 
the source of our selves.  The self is us; it is the reason why anything matters in 
our lives (Loc. 2404-9).
But this feeling of having or being a self is deeply  problematic (Dennett, 
Consciousness Explained, 365).  Is it actually possible to see or feel or hear the 
experiencer as opposed to the experienced world? (Blackmore, Consciousness, 
Loc. 2424).  Is it  possible to observe or measure the self?  From a scientific point 
of view, there is actually no need for an owner of experiences; there is no need for 
an inner self to observe what we are doing.  Our brain does not need ‘us’ to work. 
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In fact, our brain is causally closed: one neuron affects another, groups of neurons 
interact, one brain state leads to the next; there is no need for any further 
intervention by a self (Loc. 1068-74).  In other words, we have experiences, but 
there is no requirement for us to have them; events happen, and also their 
consequences, but, scientifically at least, they  do not necessitate a central unified 
agent (Parfit, 19-26).  
When we believe in a self, we put implicit  faith in the idea that there is a 
central ‘theatre’ (in the material brain or the non-material mind or both) where all 
the things currently ‘in consciousness’ come together.  In this theatre, our 
conscious audience—our self—watches the incoming display and intervenes 
based on what it  sees (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 165).  But this theatre 
cannot be said to exist.  Our science has found no place in the brain where 
consciousness gathers; there is no site or single region equipped to process, 
simultaneously, all the sound, movement, shape and colour we experience.  In 
fact, the picture that our science presents is quite different: when information 
comes in from the senses, it is distributed in multiple places for different purposes 
(Damasio, Descartes’ Error, Loc. 1847-51).  In this picture, the brain is a radically 
parallel processing system.  All kinds of mental activity  are accomplished in the 
brain by  parallel, multitrack processes, which keep the activity  under continuous 
revision.  Like the many  drafts of a text, the activity is constantly revised and 
altered.  At any  point in time there are multiple drafts or narrative fragments at 
various stages of ‘editing’ in various places in the brain.  Rather than a complete 
picture projected into a central theatre, there are multiple ‘drafts’ being edited in 
different places at once (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 407).  None of these 
drafts are actually  in or out  of consciousness.  The sense that there is a narrative 
stream or sequence comes about when the parallel stream is probed in some way, 
for example, by asking a question (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 1574-93). 
But up to that point—up to the point when we interrogate or inquire—it is 
impossible to say whether the stream is conscious or not (Loc. 842).  
So, when we look at our hand, we consciously  see it as a result of probing 
the stream of multiple drafts at  one of many possible points.  There is judgement 
in this act, and the event may be laid down in memory, but there is not a stable, 
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unified experience called ‘seeing the hand’.  On the contrary, impressions arise, 
get revised, affect behaviour and leave traces in memory, which then get overlaid 
by other traces and so on.  All this produces various overlapping narratives, none 
of which tell us the ‘truth’ about our experience of the hand (Dennett, 
Consciousness Explained, 407).  In other words, if we ask, what was I actually 
experiencing when I looked at my hand?, there is no right answer because there is 
no theatre, and no coherent show (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 1593-1600).  
This suggests that there is no proposition about our own conscious 
experience that is immune to error, unlikely as that error might be.  We cannot 
have infallibility about our own consciousness, even if we can come close enough 
to explain why  it  seems so powerfully as if we do (Dennett, ‘How Could I Be 
Wrong?’, 13).  In everyday life we can usually discriminate between our own 
internally generated thoughts and our current vision of the world.  We can be 
tricked, however (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 7267-76).  Our capacity to 
discriminate between the images of vision and those of memory or imagination 
are affected by, for example, whether we expect something to be ‘real’ or 
‘imagined’.  Distinguishing memories of events that happened from events we 
have imagined can be difficult in certain circumstances.  Failure to make such 
distinctions results in false memories, that is, convincing memories of events that 
never actually  happened (Loc. 7280-85).  We all hold false memories of various 
kinds, and even valid memories may consist of accurate elements mixed with 
plausible concoctions and embellished with invented details (Loc. 7290-92).  In 
fact, we cannot really draw a sharp  dividing line between ‘real’ and ‘false’ 
memories, particularly when they concern experiences for which there can be no 
public corroboration (Loc. 7299-7301).  
All of this undermines our conviction that we know exactly what we are 
conscious of at any time; it urges us to be agnostic about the reality  of conscious 
experiences; it makes it difficult for us to either challenge or accept as entirely 
true our own assertions about what  we see or what  we believe we saw; as we 
listen to our descriptions of our experiences, the best we can do is maintain a 
constructive and sympathetic neutrality, in the hopes of compiling a definitive 
description of the world according to us (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 83). 
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We may protest  to ourselves; we may argue that we are really having these 
experiences, to which we can only  reassure ourselves that we believe we are being 
sincere (Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 9547-51).  Deep down, however, we 
know the most we can hope for is a believable fiction (Loc. 9563-65).
If all we can be certain of is that what we are conscious of is a plausible 
fiction, it becomes difficult to maintain a belief in an enduring self who has access 
to truth.  It must be that the feeling we have of a continuous, unified self that 
overlooks ourselves and has direct relationship with the world is also a mental 
fiction.  It must be that, ultimately, we have never had or been a self (Metzinger, 
Being No One, 1).  Accepting this requires us to throw out any idea we might  have 
that we are single entities who live the life of this particular body.  Instead, we 
must accept that the word ‘self’ refers to nothing that is real or persisting; we must 
accept that the self is only a series of experiences linked loosely  together in 
various ways, a fleeting impression that arises along with each experience and 
then fades away again; we must accept that the self is a word, an idea, a construct 
(Blackmore, Consciousness, Loc. 1102-7).  In such a view, every  time ‘we’ seem 
to exist, it is just a temporary  fiction and not the same ‘we’ who seemed to exist  a 
moment before.  ‘We’ are constituted by the discourses in which we are involved 
in a given moment (Harré, 104).  Our self is born as the story of our life is told; 
we are the music while the music lasts (Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 
313).  
The aspects of self, which we designate as self, are 
projections, in terms always more or less psychological, of 
our ways of handling texts: in the comparisons we make, 
the traits we extract as pertinent, the continuities we 
assign, or the exclusions we practice. (Foucault, 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 127) 
So—the question we must now ask—what might this fictional self be for? 
To what end might the fiction exist?  It  might be the case that the self is just a tool 
we have developed for social convenience; it  might just  be a construct that  allows 
us to describe the things that we do, a practical way of thinking about things and 
of talking about things to others (O’Regan, 169).  In other words, we might need a 
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self that thinks it knows in order to think that we know; without the self, we might 
not be able to know (Ramachandran, 190).  Equally, we could argue that the self 
did not emerge in order to know anything; rather, we could say, it is a biological 
product which, like spiders’ webs, appeared gradually  during evolution in order to 
help  us to survive.  We make our own selves—we spin our webs out of words and 
deeds—but we do not know why we are doing it, nor do we have to know (Loc. 
3064-71).  We just spin, and the result is the belief in our own existence as a self 
and the conviction that that this self is actually worth preserving, which is a useful 
belief to have if our aim is to copy genes (Metzinger, ‘I Am the Content of a 
Transparent  Self Model’, 151-52).  In other words, evolution has not only given 
us bodies that are determined to stay alive even if we find living painful, but has 
caused those bodies to produce an illusion of self, which we will go on defending 
because it helps pass on the genes of our ancestors.
But perhaps it  is even wrong to say that ‘we’ build our narratives.  Does not 
the idea of selves building narratives of ourselves let the self in through the back 
door (and free will along with it)?
Our tales are spun, but for the most  part we don’t spin 
them; they spin us. Our human consciousness, and our 
narrative selfhood, is their product, not their source 
(Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 418). 
Here, we return to the idea (advanced, as we saw, by Foucualdian archaeology) of 
discourse as a force operating independently of those who appear to speak for 
themselves.  
We can easily  imagine a culture where discourse would 
circulate without any need for an author.  Discourses, 
whatever their status, form or value, and regardless of our 
manner of handling them, would unfold in a pervasive 
anonymity.  No longer the tiresome repetitions:  ‘Who is 
the real author?’  ‘Have we proof of his authenticity and 
originality?’  ‘What has he revealed of his most profound 
self in his language?’
New questions will be heard:  ‘What are the modes of 
existence of this discourse?’  ‘Where does it come from; 
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how is it circulated; who controls it?’  ‘What placements 
are determined for possible subjects?’  ‘Who can fulfil 
these diverse functions of the subject?’
Behind all these questions we would hear little more than 
the murmur of indifference: ‘What matter who’s 
speaking?’ 
(Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 138) 
Here, our self ceases to be the cause of discourse and instead becomes an 
abstraction of it.  Here, we are not speaking but are being spoken; here, speaking 
is an action of the world, it is the world describing itself to itself.
I am a strange loop.  I am a mirage that perceives itself. 
(Hofstadter, 363)
But there is a problem: even if we accept—even if we are entirely  convinced
—that the inner/outer dualism is false, and that the self is a fiction, our sense of a 
separate, experiencing, speaking self persists.  Infuriatingly, the illusion does not 
collapse, the fiction does not disappear.  Firm in our new belief in the no-self and 
in the unity of consciousness and the world, we still feel like we are speaking for 
ourselves, and the world continues to appear to exist independently  of us; we stay 
inside and the world stays outside.  This persistence of a sense of separation, even 
after we have exposed it  as false, forces us into a strange position: perhaps we 
have to train ourselves to experience non-separation; perhaps we have to think 
counter-intuitively—or perhaps not think at all—in order to understand what it 
means to be a non-separate no one.  But what would this training consist of? 
What would it mean to experience something other than the fictional selves we 
experience, and how would we teach ourselves to gain access to it?  What would 
it mean to step outside of the story that  is being told by or through ‘us’?  Who or 
what would we be, if not our stories? 
If we are true monists—true believers in unity—we believe that nothing can 
be separate, independent or free; we believe that nothing can break from the 
forces of the world and simply do as it pleases.  Moreover, we believe that  nothing 
does at all; rather, it is being done.  Our task, then, is to free ourselves 
(presumably, in some non-doing way) from the illusion that we are doers, that we 
269
can do.  While it  might be possible, intellectually, to achieve this freedom, it is 
another matter to accept all the consequences of it (Blackmore, Consciousness, 
Loc. 2759-60).  For example, to believe that we are not doing is to take a neutral 
stance on life and death, for to live or to die is out of our hands, it is not our doing.
Suppose we take ourselves to be individual snowflakes 
with a particular crystalline form. Certainly there is a 
difference between the two, they have different structures. 
And here one snowflake is falling into the ocean; what 
does it fear? ‘I am about to be annihilated, I shall 
disappear, I shall be gone, nothing.’  But perhaps what 
happens instead—and this is a metaphor for death or 
enlightenment—is an infinite expansion, as you remember 
that you are not just that  one drop of frozen water, but that 
you are water.  So this metaphor of substance is another 
level that is simultaneously  present with the form; the 
separation does not disappear: it is just that it is only  the 
form; the substance is unity.  (LaBerge, 146)
But how might it be possible to live according to this conviction?  What can we 
do, practically, with the knowledge that there is no separate existence for what is 
sitting in the chair right  now?  How can we function socially  when we know that 
we are separate, nameable, thinkable only  by virtue of our fictional discourses 
about ‘us’?  How can we run our everyday lives when we know that, beyond our 
forms, we are the same as everything?  Is it possible to resist situations that appear 
unbearable to us when we know that we cannot step outside of that situation, 
when we know that we are also part of it, and more than that, equal to it? 
Silence is one option.  If the aim of our speech is truth but every  word we 
utter is an act of separation—the creation of a separating fiction—then speaking 
becomes a difficult task.  ‘Arm’ is a fiction.  ‘Hand’ is a fiction.  ‘Line’ is a fiction. 
Every  word names the world and thereby separates it, and in the process teaches 
us to believe in what does not exist except as a fiction.  Another option is to speak 
without personal or possessive pronouns.  At first, this appears like a valid 
compromise.  Instead of saying ‘We are are looking at our hand,’ perhaps we 
would say, ‘It is looking at its hand’.  Or perhaps we can continue to use ‘we’ and 
‘our’ because we want to join with others and communicate with them.  That is, 
270
perhaps we can surrender to the limitations of language out of practical need, or a 
desire to be accepted and understood.  
Perhaps ‘truth’ should not be our aim at all; perhaps unity should not be 
something we strive to think about or understand, but rather something we agree 
to accept.  If we cannot get  rid of the conscious mind in order to live as totally 
non-separated no ones, then perhaps the best we can do is to question the fictions 
that consciousness offers us, to take our stories with a pinch of salt.  Which is to 
say: perhaps we can behave as if dualism is a fact, as if we are a self who acts, as 
if we have free will, as if there is a world outside ourselves; and perhaps we can, 
in turn, treat  others as if they, too, are separate selves with free will and a world 
outside themselves.  This way  we might be able to live honestly, without really 
believing in something we know cannot be true.  Living in this mode, ‘freedom’ 
would not mean the freedom to be free; rather, ‘freedom’ would be to delight in 
the fiction of freedom; our freedom would be to move through the illusion of the 
real, and to notice how, in reality, we are being moved.  In all the things that 
matter to us we could make decisions based on our consideration of what counts 
the most, and in the process we could celebrate the fact that, finally, none of it can 
be for us or by us, and none of it can be true.  
If we believe the fiction, it is not a fiction, and we are subjects with the 
power to affect change and to determine final truths; if we recognise the fiction as 
fiction, we cease being subjects and become subject to ever changing fluxes, 
whose shapes and volumes and contours we have the capacity to relish, whose 
meaning and consequence we can evaluate and discuss, without needing to find 
out the ultimate truth, for we would know that  ‘we do not know’ is really the only 
possible position, and that there are no such thing as mistakes (for knowing a 
mistake implies knowing the truth).
I would have to say that [knowing I have no free will] gives me 
a sense of peace. There are a whole lot of things that I do not 
have to worry about controlling because I know that I am really 
just a little window on a lovely  machinery that is doing lots of 
things…I was recently faced with a major life decision, and part 
of the process of deciding in advance was the knowledge that 
after I had made the decision there might be a period of regret 
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but then I could start looking forward to things falling into 
place, that  I would decide that I had done the right thing, and 
that people around me would help me continue to believe that I 
had done the right thing.  (Wegner, 255)
  
We can now see that Foucauldian theory forms part of an epistemological field in 
which a deep scepticism about the self coexists with a practical agreement to act 
and to think as if this self existed.  Foucauldian genealogy constitutes an attempt 
to overcome the dualism of discursive and non-discursive realms (matter and 
consciousness) established by archaeology.  The result  is a theory which uses a 
force called ‘power’ to dissolve dualism, but which, in the end, falls back on 
dualism in order allow for the possibility—however limited—of willed personal 
resistance.  In other words, genealogy  is a theory that exposes the fiction of 
dualism but finds that, in the final account, it cannot do without it.  If it is to 
attribute even a minimum of free will to resisting parties in local struggles, 
genealogy has to behave as if the fiction of dualism had some practical worth at 
the micro-level. 
This as if perspective is most evident when Foucauldian theory  takes it upon 
itself to act as an enabler of locally resisting selves.  That  is to say, Foucauldian 
theory’s ambivalent position in relation to the self is brought into sharp relief 
when it harnesses its own cultural influence in order to call attention to 
overlooked historical texts, thereby creating the conditions in which marginalised 
figures from the past appear to speak for themselves.  In I, Pierre, for example, a 
group of Foucauldian theorists, including Foucault himself, presents a dossier of 
documents relating to an 1835 case of parricide in a small village in Normandy. 
The dossier consists of three medical reports, a collection of court exhibits 
including statements by witnesses, and most importantly—the reason for the 
group’s interest in the case—a memoir by the murderer himself, a young peasant 
called Pierre Rivière.  In a series of notes appended to the dossier, the group 
makes it clear that what motivated them to edit and publish the dossier was, above 
all, Rivière’s memoir (Foucault, ‘Tales of Murder’, 199).  This memoir, they  say, 
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is the voice of the normally silent party in a common power relation: the poor 
criminal versus the community, judicial and state apparatuses (the judge, the 
prosecutor, the Minister of Justice, the country practitioner, the villagers, the 
mayor, the parish priest, and so on).  But not only that.  For the group, the memoir 
is also the articulate voice of a man who claimed that he could only barely read 
and write; here, they  say, is the self-proclaiming, myth-building, life-affirming 
voice of a murderer.  
[More than anything] what led us to spend more than a 
year on these documents was simply the beauty of 
Rivière’s memoir.  The utter astonishment it produced in 
us was the starting point.  (Foucault, ‘Forward’, x)
After nearly 150 years Pierre Rivière’s memoir strikes us 
as a text of singular strangeness.  Its beauty alone is 
sufficient justification for it today.  (‘Tales of Murder’, 
199)
The implication is that, though the fate of Rivière’s body is sealed (be it through 
imprisonment or death), his discourse grants him immortality: his fiction of self 
ultimately  wins out against the discourses of discipline.  And how does it  do so? 
By being beautiful.  
As the Foucauldians make clear in their notes, it was the beauty of Rivière’s 
words that worked to upset the relations of power in which Rivière found himself: 
first this beauty was taken by the legal authorities as proof that Rivière was not 
mad (and hence grounds for condemning him to death); subsequently  this same 
beauty became, in the hands of the doctors, proof that Rivière was mad (and hence 
ground for shutting him up for life) (xiii).  The categories into which Rivière was 
slotted—simpleton or schemer, sane or insane—was to determine what was to be 
done with him, and it was the aesthetic quality  of his words that ultimately 
governed this determination.  The question that the judges and the doctors asked 
themselves was not, ‘What is Rivière’s crime?’ but rather, ‘What is Rivière? 
What kind of person speaks so?’  In other words, it was less the facts about 
Rivière’s actions than the possibility of thinking about him in a certain way that 
fixed his fate (Hacking, ‘The Archaeology of Foucault’, 33).  And, more than 
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anything else, what rendered this task problematic was the beauty  of his words: on 
one hand, Rivière must be mad because his speech cannot be said to form part of 
the everyday discourse of men; on the other hand, he must be sane because he 
demonstrates the capacity to lift his diction above the level of common speech. 
Making this decision—eradicating this doubt—was crucial: depending on which 
way the judgement fell, Rivière’s memoir would be ignored as the nonsensical 
ravings of a maniac and would disappear into non-history, or it  would be taken 
seriously as a rational justification and would therefore be a valid document, an 
acceptable part of history; it would in some sense be true.
It is clear, then, that  the Foucauldians’ interest in Rivière is, at base, an 
interest in the processes by  which selves are constructed in history, and that this 
interest is, in turn, an interest  in ‘truth’, specifically, the kind of truth the self 
(which, as we have seen, is always fictional and always historical) might be said 
to ‘hold’ or ‘contain’.  The Foucauldians suggest that attributing ‘truth’ to the 
world or other selves is the same process—the same power relation—by which 
we attribute ‘truth’ to our own self; that is to say, in the very moment we attribute 
truth externally, we attribute truth internally: we are a mirror of the truth we 
project out onto the world.  In the Rivière case, the Foucualdians show that, at the 
very moment in which ‘madman’ took shape as a possible self for Rivière, there 
was also constructed a self capable of recognising and understanding madness: the 
madness experts (Remarks on Marx, 65).  Like critics determining whether a 
certain painting or sculpture is indeed art, the experts in the Rivière case marked 
the limits of sanity that should bound the self, and in the process, attributed selves 
to themselves.  Rivière, meanwhile, by  producing a memoir that through its 
beauty confounds simple classification, made it difficult  for the experts to 
recognise him and therefore to recognise themselves.  If we cannot judge Rivière 
one way or the other, then what kind of judges are we?  Have we ourselves gone 
mad if we cannot recognise the madness in this murderer’s words?  As a result, the 
experts entered into battles with each other—authority struggles—over what 
Rivière was and what ought to be done with him.  Before it was finally decided 
that he was indeed insane—before they turned his fictional self into ‘fact’ and 
thereby produced the proof of the ‘truth’ of madness—Rivière was, in a real 
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sense, unthinkable.  He did not have ‘truth’; he did not belong to ‘proper’ 
knowledge; he was just what he actually was: a beautiful fiction.  
By re-presenting the Rivière memoir as historical fiction, the Foucauldians 
seek to re-enact and once again destabilise this power relation between self and 
authority, between fiction and fact.  By allowing Rivière to speak for himself 
(‘Forward’, xiii), they seek to give renewed authority to his discourse of self; they 
wish to reclaim Rivière’s words from the madness experts and re-propose them as 
a reasonable kind of knowledge.  Conversely, they  wish to undermine the truth 
claims made by  the authorities in their interpretations of Rivière’s memoir.  They 
aim to show that, although Rivière’s self is nothing but a fiction, it is still a kind of 
knowledge: it  does not tell us whether Rivière was mad or not, nor does it express 
the essence of evil; rather, it  offers some useful insight into the position of the 
resisting power in a specific power relation, and the capacity of the resisting 
power to harness aesthetics in order to problematise that relation. 
But—a question the Foucauldians are shy about addressing—is Rivière 
really speaking for himself?  While the Foucauldians claim not to interpret 
Rivière’s memoir or to subject it to commentary—
We could hardly speak about [Rivière’s memoir] without 
involving it  in one of the discourses (medical, legal, 
psychological, criminological) which we wished to use as 
our starting point in talking about it.  If we had done so, 
we would have brought it within the power relation whose 
reductive effect we wished to show, and we ourselves 
should have fallen into the trap it set.  (xiii)
—they  do not refrain from appending to the dossier their own notes, in which lie a 
multitude of meanings and interpretations.  These notes may be ‘on Rivière’s 
side’ in the sense that they purport  to resist the discourses of official authority, but 
the cost is that they preclude Rivière from doing what they  want him to do: speak 
for himself.  In the dossier, Rivière’s urgent ‘I’ becomes a studied Foucauldian 
‘we’.  Indeed, even if the Foucauldians had not included their notes; even if 
Rivière’s text had been allowed to stand alone as a single voice speaking against 
the doctors and the judges, the very act of publishing the dossier in Rivière’s name 
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a century and a half after the events constitutes a statement in itself.  The 
presentation of the text as ‘also historical’ (not only a personal account but also 
one with wider ramifications) is itself a discourse; it is power demanding space 
for a new voice within the discourses of power; it is power working against  itself; 
it is power resisting. 
When all is said and done, battles simply  stamp the mark 
of history on nameless slaughters, while narrative makes 
the stuff of history from mere street brawls.  The frontier 
between the two is perpetually  crossed.  (‘Tales of 
Murder’, 205)
The Foucauldians suggest that what allows Rivière’s humble narrative to cross 
this frontier into history—what singles it out for our attention now—is its beauty. 
But this beauty  is a judgement that the Foucauldians—the new beauty experts—
have made on its behalf.  Their external judgement is as much the author of 
Rivière’s text as Rivière himself: today, would we know about Rivière if the 
Foucauldians had not decided he was beautiful? 
Furthermore, if, as we have seen, the self is an historical fiction, then in the 
name of what is Rivière supposed to be speaking?  What truth are his words 
capable of revealing?  This question highlights the now familiar paradox inherent 
in Foucauldian theory and practice: the desire for the self to speak for itself (the 
desire for the self to express its truth), combined with the knowledge that the 
self’s claim to speak for itself (to speak any truth of self) is a fiction.  
Foucauldian theory’s response to this contradiction is to offer aesthetic 
cultivation of the fictional self as a form of liberty open to the self, and therefore 
as a means of resistance within the power system.  This idea sees the self 
recognise itself as fiction (or at least as something unfixed and malleable), and 
subsequently  mould itself into new forms that are both more transgressive and 
more intense than before.  This transgression is neither a denial of existing truths 
and the limits corresponding to them, nor is it an affirmation of some new realm 
of truths.  Rather, it is an aesthetic contestation that carries those truths to their 
fictional limits.  It is an affirmation of self—an intensification that places the self 
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beyond the deadening certainties of conventional life—but one made with the 
knowledge that there is actually  no single unchanging self (Gutting, ‘Michel 
Foucault: A User’s Manual’, 22).  In this framework, self-knowledge stops being a 
search for truth and becomes a search for alternative aesthetic forms of existence 
(24).  Here, it is not  necessary  to know ‘what’ we are but to become something we 
were not before (Foucault, ‘Truth, Power, Self’, 9).
According to Foucauldian theory, such a search for new forms of self would 
require us to analyse the practices (such as voicing opinions, writing memoirs, 
taking confession, undergoing psychoanalysis, partaking in meditation or 
performing physical training) by which we are led to focus our attention on 
ourselves, by  which we decipher, recognise and acknowledge ourselves as selves. 
In other words, we would analyse those practices of telling the truth—those 
games of truth—by which we propose to think about our own selves as sane or 
insane, healthy or sick, victim or criminal, and so on.  This would be done in order 
to recognise the fiction of both the studying and the studied self (The History of 
Sexuality.  Volume II: The Use of Pleasure, 6-7).  Then, in those moments when 
the self fabricates a coherent, unified identity—say ‘criminal’ or ‘victim’—we 
would set out to experiment with that identity, push it to its limits, risk its 
destruction, and thereby call into question the categories of ‘criminal’ and 
‘victim’, and then, by  extension, the category  of the self itself.  To call the self 
into question in this way  would mean to live with the possibility that the self can 
at any time be turned into something radically other, a newer, more powerful form 
of fiction (Remarks on Marx, 46-48).  
In this scheme, then, we partake in resistance to power when we take our 
selves as our subject, that is, when we take power for our selves and thereby 
power takes us for itself (Deleuze, 92).  This conception of the self-forming self 
challenges the idea that what we now imagine our selves to be is the only  form of 
existence possible.  It urges us to seek out experiences in which the self is not a 
given, in which it is possible to lose identities and form new identities (equally 
fictional but perhaps more intensely aware of this fictionality).
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[I]n the course of history, men [have] never ceased 
constructing themselves, that is, to shift continuously the 
level of their subjectivity, to constitute themselves in an 
infinite and multiple series of different subjectivities that 
would never reach an end and would never place us in the 
presence of something that would be ‘man’.  Man is an 
animal of experience, he is involved ad infinitum within a 
process that, by defining a field of objects, at the same 
time changes him, deforms him, transforms him and 
transfigures him as a subject.  (Foucault, Remarks on 
Marx, 123-24)
We are animals of experience; we are nature with consciousness; we are the world 
looking at  itself and always changing what it sees.  To enter a process of self-
transformation is to enter a process with no end.  No form we give ourselves can 
be perfect.  Even in the deepest recesses of our psyches there are no experiences 
which, if evoked, will reveal a true, final identity.  Every expression of self is 
historical fiction: an image of what we believed our self to be a moment ago.  In 
this sense, we cannot be a finished work but must always be a work to be 
accomplished, a work that needs further work (Veyne, ‘The Final Foucault and 
His Ethics’, 231).  
This perpetual working on the self is, in the Foucauldian view, a form of 
self-care (Hutton, 140).  It  is the process by which the self recognises the fiction 
of itself, which is a form of kindness, for it allows us to give meaning and beauty 
to the persisting illusion.  For, as we have seen, the feeling of self does not 
disappear when its fictionality  is exposed; the self is not annihilated; emptiness 
does not fill its space.  Rather, the masquerade of self finishes.    
[A]n experience is neither true nor false: it is always a 
fiction, something constructed, which exists only after it 
has been made, not before; it isn’t something that is ‘true’, 
but it has been a reality…[T]he difficult relation with truth 
is entirely at stake in the way in which truth is found used 
inside an experience, not fastened to it, and which, within 
certain limits, destroys it. (Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 
36)
278
The aim is to drop our attachment to a ‘true’ self and instead to create ourselves as 
works of art (Bernauer, 161).  This requires us to formulate an aesthetics or style 
of existence.  The capacity to resist in the power regime differs for everyone, and 
the stylisation of the self invites us to engage in a struggle according to our own 
understanding of the world.  Far from promoting self-absorption, it deprives us of 
the illusion that we can separate ourselves from the world and its forces (162): we 
are in the fight already, so how are we going to appear for battle?  The point is not 
to pursue an aesthetic ideal but to resist those forces that work to prevent us from 
transforming ourselves, those forces that want us to stay the same (productive, 
obedient, docile).  
Thus envisaged, self-creation is not the eradication of power but a 
problematisation of power  (Foucault, The History of Sexuality.  Volume II: The 
Use of Pleasure, 10).
Problematisations formulate the fundamental issues and 
choices through which individuals confront their 
existence.  The fact that my existence is problematised in a 
specific way is no doubt determined by the social power 
relations in which I am embedded.  But, given this 
problematisation, I am able to respond to the issues it 
raises in my own way, or, more precisely, in a way by 
which I will define what I, as a self, am in my  historical 
context.  (Gutting, Foucault, 103)
We define our selves according to each struggle we encounter; we are equally 
defined by those struggles.  This form of self-definition does not mean replacing 
one truth with another (the ‘truth’ of domination with the ‘truth’ of resistance); 
rather, it  is the process by  which we assume the responsibility for how we are 
defined.  It is the inward deployment of power in an effort  to alter the rules of 
conduct in such a way  that they match our personal needs in that  moment.  It is 
the crafting of the historical fiction of self in a manner that transgresses externally 
imposed traditions and conventions.  And, as a result, it is the destabilisation of 
the relation of power.  
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[It is] not a matter of emancipating truth from every 
system of power (which would be a chimera for truth is 
already power) but  of detaching the power of truth from 
the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, 
within which it operates at the present time.  (Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge, 133)
To problematise, therefore, is to use power to make our self an oeuvre, one 
carrying aesthetic values and stylistic criteria associated with transgression (The 
History of Sexuality.  Volume II: The Use of Pleasure, 10-11).  To problemsatise is 
to act upon ourselves, and in the process, constitute ourselves as selves acting on 
other selves (Hacking, ‘Self-Improvement’, 235).  To problematise is to discipline 
ourselves in a way  that we would wish others to discipline us.  Viewed in this 
way, as a form of transgressive morality, discipline can be understood in terms 
other than domination; it can be understood as a means to achieve, if not self-
knowledge as truth, then self-knowledge as fiction (and thereby our capacity  to 
modify  and refine it).  Here, then, fiction represents a kind of knowledge; 
knowledge of the fiction of the self leads us to ask what knowledge we might 
need to improve this fiction, to master it.  And because a fiction can never be truly 
mastered, the process of mastering is ongoing; each product of self-discipline can 
in turn be further stylised; there is no final outcome, no moment of completion. 
The task is not to ‘discover’ our secret  inner being, but rather to identify and 
accentuate individual differences, to exhibit personal styles as different as possible 
from those around us, to continually produce radically different selves (Best 67).  
So, although liberation from the regime of truth is impossible—although we 
cannot think the unthinkable—we have the liberty to channel power into the 
ongoing practice of mastering the fictional self, which in turn can change the rules 
of truth.  This vision of personal inner work might appear to preclude solidarity or 
shared experience; it might seem to go against all ideas of community, school or 
tribe; but in fact it is meant to implicate all of us: not just artists, philosophers or 
mystics who supposedly  live on the fringes of society, but  all selves.  It  certainly 
undermines universal necessities and global models of freedom, and it  does imply 
that we do not need others in order to master our fictional selves (Foucault, 
‘Truth, Power, Self’, 18), but it also suggests that the creation and celebration of 
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personal difference enables communion with others, facilitates the joining or 
crossing of individual fictions, and as a consequence brings about a kind of truth.  
[Such an] experience is, of course, something one has 
alone; but it cannot have its full impact unless the 
individual manages to escape from pure subjectivity in 
such a way that others can—I will not say  re-experience it 
exactly—but at least cross paths with it  or retrace it. 
(Remarks on Marx, 40)
Thus, whatever appeal this picture of aesthetic liberty  might have, it remains 
locked to an as if conception of self.  Active within it are the old dualisms: in the 
first instance, a division between the inner and the outer (the inner now becoming 
a site where an aesthetic rebellion against normalising external forms can take 
place), and in addition, an interaction between two separate types of self (the 
constituting self and constituted self, the fiction-maker and the historical fiction). 
Foucauldian theory seems willing to declare disbelief in the self as anything other 
than a historical fiction, and yet it simultaneously demonstrates a reluctance to 
consider the possibility of a self entirely  devoid of liberty and free will, or a 
system of discourse that does not require some notion of truth, however deflated.
The subject should not be entirely abandoned.  It should 
be reconsidered, not to restore the theme of an originating 
subject, but  to seize its functions, its intervention in 
discourse and its systems of dependencies.  We should 
suspend the typical questions: how does a free subject 
penetrate the density of things and endow them with 
meaning; how does it accomplish its design by animating 
the rules of discourse from within?  Rather, we should ask: 
under what conditions and through what forms can an 
entity like the subject appear in the order of discourse; 
what position does it occupy; what functions does it 
exhibit; and what rules does it follow in each type of 
discourse? (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 
137-38)
So the self remains, but as a fiction.  And therefore as a kind of fact: the fact of 
being an historical fiction.  At this point, the Foucauldian idea of self reaches its 
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limit: the self is not allowed to hold any truth except the truth of its own 
historicity, its own fictionality.  Foucauldian theory  questions the notion that a self 
can hold truth, that truth can be part of the ‘contents’ of self, but it does not 
disavow all faith in the possibility of agreement among selves about their own 
historical fictional nature; it does not preclude the truth of the historical fiction.  In 
a single movement, it dissolves the epistemological difference between aesthetic, 
philosophical and scientific discourses by  showing that they  are, in fact, equally 
historical and equally fictional, but, in the final account, it attributes to historical 
fiction a special capacity for truth which the self can exploit in its quest  for liberty 
and resistance within the regime of truth.  
Ultimately, then, in the Foucauldian scheme, truth does not mean a true 
proposition to be discovered or accepted but the set of rules that make it possible 
to utter and to recognise those propositions held as true (Veyne, ‘The Final 
Foucault and His Ethics’, 227).  We cannot escape these rules of truth, but we do 
have the capacity to bend them, to transgress them, to intensify our experience as 
it plays out in and around them.  So although there are no lives to which we 
should aspire—no true life—there are truths we can tell about the fiction of 
ourselves.  
I am well aware that I have never written anything but 
fictions.  I do not mean to say, however, that truth is 
therefore absent.  It seems to me that  the possibility  exists 
for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to 
induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true 
discourse engenders or ‘manufactures’ something that 
does not as yet exist, that it  ‘fictions’ it.  One ‘fictions’ 
history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, 
one ‘fictions’ a politics not yet in existence on the basis of 
a historical truth.  (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 193)
For Foucauldian theory, if something is thinkable as an historical fiction, it is a 
truth: it claims the right to refute error and inconsistencies, and to oppose itself to 
falsity.  The conditions under which we attribute truth to an idea or an event are 
precisely those under which we make an historical fiction of it.  We cannot 
distinguish between the two—truth and historical fiction—even though we behave 
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as if we can.  The concept of truth is itself an historical fiction.  ‘Truth’ coincides 
with our feeling that the world demands to be represented one way or another.  We 
know, however, that our representation of the world cannot really be true, and that 
not even that is true, for everything we represent can, in all truth, be called 
historical fiction, which does not mean the world we represent does not exist; 
rather, it means that the world is simply not what it appears to be.
283
Conclusion
There is a story that  tells of a Cambridge professor called G. E. Moore who, fed 
up of sceptical attacks on common sense as he understood it, held out his hand 
and claimed that any  argument that  he did not know he had a hand must be rated 
less convincing than his immediate certainty that he did (Blackburn, 28).  After 
what we have seen, what might we say about this scene?  How might we interpret 
this historical fiction in light of what we have learned about time, space and truth? 
To begin, we might say that the very fact  that someone feels the need to 
hold out his hand and declare the reality  of it is the product  of an epistemological 
field in which the reality both of his hand and his self as an owner of that hand is 
far from certain.  This character Moore thinks he knows he has a hand because, at 
this historical juncture at least, we have agreed that at the extremity of our arm 
there is a hand; we have agreed that at some point (we cannot say  precisely 
where) the arm becomes a wrist, and then at some further point, the wrist becomes 
a hand.  Moore calls this naming ‘truth’ because he agrees not to think about what 
a hand actually is: what it contains, where its limits lie, what differentiates it  from 
what lies around it (atoms that we do not call ‘hand’).  That is, he has agreed not 
to consider why, at some point in history, we found it necessary to separate the 
hand from the wrist and the wrist from the arm, and thereby to fabricate the fiction 
of the hand, and to make ourselves experts in this fiction; hand experts, such as 
Moore shows himself to be.  (Is it not possible, after all, to imagine another kind 
of fiction, one in which the hand and the arm cannot be thought of as separate but 
necessarily form a single unit?)  
What is more, Moore thinks he knows he has a hand because it feels to him 
that he owns it: there it is, a part of his body, obeying the orders of his brain, 
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therefore it must belong to him.  But here, again, he is agreeing not to ask the 
question of who is doing the owning.  Does his brain own his hand?  Does his 
mind own it?  Does it belong to his psyche, his self?  Does he still own it  when he 
is not conscious of it (that  is, when he is not holding it out in order to make 
common sense arguments about it but is using it to garden, say, or to type on his 
computer)?  And who is to say that the hand is not using the brain?  Or that the 
world is not using the hand?  How can we draw lines between these things—brain 
and hand, world and hand—in any  way that is fundamentally true?  Is truth 
simply  a practical agreement not to ask too many questions? Is truth just what it is 
useful to believe?  
In the course of my  works, I utilise methods that are part 
of the classic repertory: demonstration, proof by  means of 
historical documentation, quoting other texts, referral to 
authoritative comments, the relationship between ideas 
and facts, the proposal of explanatory  patterns etc.  There 
is nothing original in that.  From this point of view, 
whatever I assert in my writing can be verified or refuted 
as in any  other history book.  Despite that, people who 
read me, even those who appreciate what I do, often say to 
me laughing: ‘But in the end you realise that the things 
you say  are nothing but  fictions!’  I always reply: ‘Who 
e v e r t h o u g h t h e w a s w r i t i n g a n y t h i n g b u t 
fiction?’  (Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 33)
The catagories of ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’ do not spring naturally from some 
knowing essence in the world—an essence such as ‘hand’—but are discourses 
within a system of power relations dominated by those in charge of classification: 
those who become experts in ‘truth’ or in ‘fiction’ by  defining what fits into these 
categories and how those entities thus categorised should look and behave.  But, 
of course, to create a category is also to create resistance to that category—already 
built  into a category is the anxiety that it is impossible to know what  that category 
actually is—and the result  is a system of learning that is deeply  uncertain about its 
own capacity to ‘teach’ the knowledge that categorisation purports to establish. 
To talk about the boundaries, the overlaps, the dialogues between categories such 
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as ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’—or indeed between ‘science’, ‘literature’, ‘history’, ‘fact’, 
‘evidence’, ‘theory’, ‘art’, ‘critical’, ‘creative’—is to make a knowledge out of 
what our institutions fear does not constitute a knowledge at all.  ‘We do not really 
teach,’ say the professors of fiction, but the grades are still assigned and the 
degrees are still rewarded, and the fiction of knowledge continues.
To illustrate:
Fig. 8.  Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.  Collected Works: 
Volume 45.  London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991.  Plate 2.
This photograph is, so it must be that Lizzie Burns was.  And if she was, she must 
be available to us in some way; there must be some truth about her that we can 
grasp and hold onto and teach thereafter?  But consider again our opening 
proposition: she was.  Looking at this photograph, it  certainly seems so.  But is it 
true?  Was she?  Truly?  The fact—or rather the historical fiction—is that  Lizzie 
Burns only thought she was Lizzie Burns; there was no true Lizzie Burns 
underlying her own thoughts about herself (thoughts which themselves formed 
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part of a complex system of discourses within a regime of power).  Every  thought 
Lizzie Burns had—every story  she told—was about identification to an historical, 
fictional self.  Without her historical fiction, there was no self.  Every thought she 
had referred back to ‘her’: that is how ‘she’ (her self) survived.
But perhaps we cannot actually speak for Lizzie Burns.  If we want to go 
about questioning selves, should it not be our own that we question?  All right. 
Let me take a look at my  own self, then.  I can see that I feel like I know that I am. 
I can see that when I think, I have the impression that my thoughts are my own; 
they  appear to be my authentic expression; mine and mine alone.  But how 
authentic, how personal, can a statement like ‘I am’ or ‘I feel’ or ‘I think’ actually 
be?  I appear to be thinking for myself, but to what extent is it even possible to do 
so?  My thoughts and my  words are always already  products of some other 
statement; they do not come pure; they are not the originators of new meaning; 
they  come already caused; they come always already spoken.  And so my self, 
which relies on these thoughts and words to define itself, comes already thought. 
Fundamentally, my self is not doing the thinking but is being thought.  And I can 
only presume that it is the same for all selves.  The possibilities of thought—what 
is thinkable as a self—are the same for me as they are for you, even if we are 
thinking differently at a particular moment; even if we think differently for our 
entire lives.  At a fundamental level, there are no new thoughts, no true thoughts, 
only perpetually  changing conditions in which certain thoughts are rendered 
thinkable and others not.  As a self, I do not have a special access to truth (about 
myself or anything else), though in practice I behave as though I do.  When I 
come to realise the historical fiction and the historical fiction persists, then my 
liberty consists in delighting in what appears to be but really  is not.  And in this I 
am no different from you.
We are, then?
Well, are we?
Only when we think we are some aloof species that is in charge of 
something can we say that we are doing or being anything.  If, on the other hand, 
we begin to think of ourselves as part of the world as opposed to separate selves 
inspecting it, then we see that  we have no choice but to go where everything else 
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goes; the cause and effect of everything and ‘nothing’.  The universe—energy—is 
all of it.  We have no options.  We can protest all we want, but if the world moves 
(planet, sea, earth, hand), we move.  
There is no separation that is not discursive.  Our limited senses determine 
what we perceive, and our language separates it all out.  Any apparently  separate 
thing cannot ultimately be true, since consciousness has created it  with names. 
We name what cannot be named and try  to make it  real through a name.  We 
believe that our names—our divisions—are true, that there is a world that  is 
separate from itself.  This is the historical fiction.  
The secret of theory is that truth [like time and empty 
space] does not exist.  You cannot confront it in any way. 
The only thing you can do is play  with some kind of 
provocative logic.  Truth constitutes a space that can no 
longer be occupied.  The whole strategy is indeed not to 
occupy  it.  It  means creating a void so that  others will fall 
into it.  (Baudrillard, 130)
Historical fiction is what happens when we try to be someone when in fact 
there is no one to be.  All the truth that  we think we know is born in this process 
of trying.  Really, there is no truth for what is sitting in the chair right now.  We 
are the experience of the universe, and even that cannot be true.  If, in a flash, the 
origin of the universe and the ultimate meaning of life were revealed to us, still it 
would mean nothing because ultimately  everything in the universe is ‘nothing’ 
imagined as something, and the energy that we are exists prior to everything ‘we’ 
think we are.  If we saw everything anyone has ever longed to see; if we 
experienced all the dimensions within one thought, still it would only have 
meaning as a thought, that is, an historical fiction.    
And, of course, ‘historical fiction’ is itself a story: possibly the last story. 
Once we have admitted that nothing can be true except as historical fiction, the 
next step  is to question the truth of historical fiction itself.  Can we truly say that 
things exist as historical fiction?  There is only the story appearing now, but is 
there even that?  It would take a lifetime to describe this moment, this ‘now’, 
which does not even exist except as our story, and our story does not even exist. 
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Fiction is the story of having arrived somewhere, on our way from an imagined 
past to an imagined future.  In fact, ultimately, there is not even this story, so we 
do not have to pretend.  To think that we know something—anything—is to 
believe a story of the past. 
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